Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Proclus and Thomas M. Crisp

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10 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
The weaker version of Truthmaker: 'truth supervenes on being' [Crisp,TM]
     Full Idea: The weaker version of Truthmaker is that 'truth supervenes on being'.
     From: Thomas M. Crisp (Presentism [2003], 3.4)
     A reaction: [He cites Lewis 2001 and Bigelow 1988] This still leaves the difficulty of truths about non-existent things, and truths about possibilities (esp. those that are possible, but are never actualised). What being do mathematical truths supervene on?
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
The Truthmaker thesis spells trouble for presentists [Crisp,TM]
     Full Idea: The Truthmaker thesis (that 'for every truth there is a truthmaker, that is, something whose very existence entails the truth' - Fox 1987) spells trouble for the presentist about time.
     From: Thomas M. Crisp (Presentism [2003], 3.4)
     A reaction: The point is that presentists can no longer express truths about the past (never mind the future), because the truthmakers for them don't exist. This seems to neglect the power of tense - the truth of the claim that 'p was true'.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Truthmaker has problems with generalisation, non-existence claims, and property instantiations [Crisp,TM]
     Full Idea: Truthmaker is controversial: what of truths like 'all ravens are black', or 'there are no unicorns'. And 'John is tall' is not made true by John or the property of being tall, but by the fusion of the two, but what could this non-mereological fusion be?
     From: Thomas M. Crisp (Presentism [2003], 3.4)
     A reaction: A first move is to include modal facts (or possible worlds) among the truthmakers. The unicorns are tricky, and seem to need all of actuality as their truthmaker. I don't see the tallness difficulty. Predication is odd, but so what?
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Worm Perdurantism has a fusion of all the parts; Stage Perdurantism has one part at a time [Crisp,TM]
     Full Idea: Worm-theoretic Perdurantism says spatio-temporal continuants are mereological fusions of instantaneous temporal parts or stages located at different times; Stage-theoretic Perdurantism says they are instantaneous temporal stages of continuants.
     From: Thomas M. Crisp (Presentism [2003], 2.1)
     A reaction: [Armstrong, Lewis and Quine defend the first; Sider the second] The Stage view seems to be the common sense view. Sider suggests that the earlier stages are counterparts, not the thing as it currently is.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Geometrical proofs do not show causes, as when we prove a triangle contains two right angles [Proclus]
     Full Idea: Geometry does not ask 'why?' ..When from the exterior angle equalling two opposite interior angles it is shown that the interior angles make two right angles, this is not a causal demonstration. With no exterior angle they still equal two right angles.
     From: Proclus (Commentary on Euclid's 'Elements' [c.452], p.161-2), quoted by Paolo Mancosu - Explanation in Mathematics §5
     A reaction: A very nice example. It is hard to imagine how one might demonstrate the cause of the angles making two right angles. If you walk, turn left x°, then turn left y°, then turn left z°, and x+y+z=180°, you end up going in the original direction.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
     Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
     From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
     A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
The origin of geometry started in sensation, then moved to calculation, and then to reason [Proclus]
     Full Idea: It is unsurprising that geometry was discovered in the necessity of Nile land measurement, since everything in the world of generation goes from imperfection to perfection. They would naturally pass from sense-perception to calculation, and so to reason.
     From: Proclus (Commentary on Euclid's 'Elements' [c.452]), quoted by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 9.12 n55
     A reaction: The last sentence is the core of my view on abstraction, that it proceeds by moving through levels of abstraction, approaching more and more general truths.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
'Eternalism' is the thesis that reality includes past, present and future entities [Crisp,TM]
     Full Idea: I use the term Eternalism for the thesis that reality includes past, present and future entities. (It is sometimes used for the view that all propositions have their truth-value eternally - it is always true or never true).
     From: Thomas M. Crisp (Presentism [2003], Intro n.1)
     A reaction: 'Eternalism' strikes me as an excellent word for the former meaning, so I shall promote that, and quietly forget the second one. The idea that the future exists has always stuck in my craw, and the belief that Napoleon still exists strikes me as a weird.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentists can talk of 'times', with no more commitment than modalists have to possible worlds [Crisp,TM]
     Full Idea: We can talk of 'moments of time' as abstract objects. This will be attractive to the presentist. As possible worlds give an economical theory of modal talk, so 'times' gives us a theory for temporal talk.
     From: Thomas M. Crisp (Presentism [2003], 3.4)
     A reaction: Thus we can utilise 'times', while having no more commitment to them than to possible worlds. Nice. He cites Prior and Fine 1977 and Chisholm 1979.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
The only three theories are Presentism, Dynamic (A-series) Eternalism and Static (B-series) Eternalism [Crisp,TM]
     Full Idea: Three theories exhaust the options on time: presentism, dynamic eternalism (eternalism with the tensed dynamic A-series view of time, and the totality of events changing over time), and static eternalism (eternalism with the B-series).
     From: Thomas M. Crisp (Presentism [2003], 2.4)
     A reaction: I think the idea that reality is Static Eternalism is just a misunderstanding, arising from our imaginative ability to take a lofty objective overview of a very fluid reality. The other two are the serious candidates. Present, or Growing-block.