Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Robert Axelrod and James Baillie

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic

3299	In logic identity involves reflexivity (x=x), symmetry (if x=y, then y=x) and transitivity (if x=y and y=z, then x=z) [Baillie]
	Full Idea: In logic identity is an equivalence relation, which involves reflexivity (x=x), symmetry (if x=y, then y=x), and transitivity (if x=y and y=z, then x=z).
	From: James Baillie (Problems in Personal Identity [1993], Intr p.4)

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction

20653	Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
	Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
	From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
	A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?

23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies

22725	When players don't meet again, defection is the best strategy [Axelrod]
	Full Idea: When players will never meet again, the strategy of defection is the only stable strategy.
	From: Robert Axelrod (The Evolution of Co-Operation [1984], 5)
	A reaction: This gives good grounds for any community's mistrust of transient strangers, such as tourists. And yet any sensible tourist will want communities to trust tourists, and will therefore behave in a reliable way.

22724	Good strategies avoid conflict, respond to hostility, forgive, and are clear [Axelrod]
	Full Idea: Successful game strategies avoid unnecessary conflict, are provoked by an uncalled for defection, forgive after a provocation, and behave clearly so the other player can adapt.
	From: Robert Axelrod (The Evolution of Co-Operation [1984], 1)
	A reaction: [compressed] Exactly what you would expect from a nice but successful school teacher. The strategies for success in these games is the same as the rules for educating a person into cooperative behaviour. TIT FOR TAT does all these.