Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Robin Waterfield and Samuel Alexander

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5 ideas

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
A mathematical object exists if there is no contradiction in its definition [Waterfield]
     Full Idea: A mathematical object exists provided there is no contradiction implied in its definition.
     From: Robin Waterfield (Introduction to 'Hippias Minor' [1987], p.44), quoted by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 1.4
     A reaction: A rather bizarre criterion for existence. Not one, for example, that you would consider applying to the existence of physical objects! But then Poincaré is the father of 'conventionalism', rather than being a platonist.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
To be is to have causal powers [Alexander,S]
     Full Idea: To be is to have causal powers.
     From: Samuel Alexander (works [1927], §4), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Nonreductivist troubles with ment.causation
     A reaction: This is sometimes called Alexander's Principle. It is first found in Plato, and is popular with physicalists, but there are problem cases... A thing needs to exist in order to have causal powers. To exist is more than to be perceived.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
     Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
     From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
     A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished [Alexander,S]
     Full Idea: Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do, no purpose to serve, a species of noblesse which depends on the work of its inferiors, but is kept for show and might as well, and undoubtedly would in time be abolished.
     From: Samuel Alexander (Space, Time and Deity (2 vols) [1927], 2:8), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Nonreductivist troubles with ment.causation IV
     A reaction: Wonderful! Kim quotes this, and labels the implicit slogan (to be real is to have causal powers) 'Alexander's Dictum'. All the examples given of epiphenomena are only causally inert within a defined system, but they act causally outside the system.
Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S]
     Full Idea: Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do and no purpose to serve.
     From: Samuel Alexander (works [1927]), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.129
     A reaction: An objection, but not, I think, a strong one. The fact, for example, that sweat is shiny is the result of good evolutionary reasons, but I cannot think of any purpose which it serves. All events which are purposeful are likely to have side-effects.