59 ideas
18877 | Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Moral realism isn't realism about things, and it seems strange to suggest that moral realism is existence entailing in the way that realism about unobservable is. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism') | |
A reaction: Cameron is questioning whether a realist has to believe in truthmakers. It seems to me that his doubts are because he insists that truthmaking is committed to the existence of 'things'. I assume any moral realism must supervene on nature. |
18868 | Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron] |
Full Idea: What possible reason could one have for thinking of some propositions that they need to be grounded in what there is that doesn't apply to all propositions? | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: Well, if truthmaking said that all truths are grounded, then some could be grounded in what there is, and others in how it is, or maybe even how it isn't (if you get a decent account of negative truths). |
18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
Full Idea: I think truthmaker theory is contingently true. [n24] If there could have been nothing, what makes that true? But if truthmaker maximalism is a necessary truth, there's necessarily something. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 4 n24) | |
A reaction: Truthmaking is beginning to feel like Gödel's Theorems. You can 'make' lots and lots of truths ('prove' in Gödel), but there will be truths that elude the making. Truthmaker theory itself will be one example. So is Maximalism another one? |
18867 | Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Orthodox truthmaker theory (Armstrong's) entails Maximalism (that every true proposition has at least one truthmaker), and Necessitarianism (that the existence of a truthmaker necessitates the truth of its proposition). | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: I think I accept both of these. If you say only some truths have truthmakers, the other truths are then baffling. And how could a truthmaker fail in its job? But that doesn't necessitate the existence of the proposition. |
18873 | God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The truthmaker thought is that explanation only bottoms out at existence facts; for God to give a complete plan of the world He needs only make an inventory of what is to exist. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: He is defending Necessitarianism about truthmaking. I'm struggling with this. An inventory of the contents of my house doesn't begin to fix all the truths that arise from them. Why is Cameron so resistent to 'how' things are being part of the truthmaking? |
15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron] |
Full Idea: We could abandon the view that truthmakers necessitate the truth of that which makes them true, and say that an object makes a truth when its intrinsic nature suffices for that truth. The object would have a different intrinsic nature if the truth failed. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Truthmakers') | |
A reaction: [He cites Josh Parsons 1999, 2005 for this] This approach seems closely related to Kit Fine's proposal that necessities arise from the natures of things. It sounds to me as if an object with that intrinsic nature would necessitate that truth. |
18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
Full Idea: I reject saying there must be an additional truthmaker for 'Determinately, p': rather, I say that the truthmaker for p must simply be a determinate existent rather than a mere existent. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 6) | |
A reaction: As he puts it (quite persuasively), God doesn't need to add an extra truthmaker for a determinate truth. Cameron rejects Necessitarianism. He uses 'determinate' fairly uncritically. What makes the truth of the truthmaker's determinacy? |
18879 | What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The explanation of the truth of the proposition [p] doesn't stop at it being the case that p, so it's false to claim that whenever a proposition is true it's true in virtue of the world being as the proposition says it is. The features often lie deeper. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Grounding') | |
A reaction: [He is opposing Jennifer Hornsby 2005] Cameron offers 'the average family has 2.4 children' as a counterexample' (since no one actually has 2.4 children). That seems compelling. Second example: 'the rose is beautiful'. |
18880 | Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Rivals to the truthmaker claim that facts about what there is are the truthmakers, there are theories that add facts about how the things are, or add dispositional facts, or modal facts, or haecceitistic facts, or maybe moral facts. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Grounding') | |
A reaction: [compressed] He seems to think his version has a monopoly on truthmaking, but I don't see why these other theories shouldn't count as truthmaking. The truthmaker for 'live grenades are dangerous' is not just the existence of grenades. |
18874 | Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron] |
Full Idea: It's definitely not sufficient to be a realist that one be a truthmaker theorist, since one can simply be anti-realist about the truthmakers. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism') | |
A reaction: It is not quite clear how unreal truth makers could actually MAKE propositions true, rather than just being correlated with them. |
18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The orthodox truthmaker theorist thinks the facts concerning the existence of the truthmakers do not admit of further explanation. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 6) | |
A reaction: It is fairly obvious, I suppose, that not every truth can have a truthmaker, just as the verification principle could not be verified, and you can't perceive your perception in order to check it. Could God withdraw the power of truthmaking? |
15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The most popular view is that an object is a truthmaker if the object couldn't exist and the truth be false. But contingent predications are also held to need truthmakers. Socrates is not necessarily snub-nosed, so a trope or state of affairs is needed. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Truthmakers') | |
A reaction: Cameron calls this 'some heavy ontological commitments'. If snub-nosedness is necessitated by the trope of 'being snub-nosed', what is the truthmaker for Socrates having that trope? |
18869 | Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron] |
Full Idea: If negative truths don't have truthmakers then make no mistake: they are ungrounded. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: What would be the grounding for truths which expressed the necessary preconditions for all existence? Could 'nothing whatever exists' ever be a truth? |
18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The property 'being such as to have been a child' is suspicious because it points beyond its instances in the sense that a thing's presently having that property tells us nothing about the present intrinsic nature of the thing. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 2) | |
A reaction: This is his objection to what he calls the 'Lucretian' strategy, which tries to make history into a property of present reality. That is implausible, I think, because there is no test for the property, apart from knowledge of the past. Reality is tensed? |
18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Temporal distributional properties are fundamental - it is exactly the same property that is grounding the truth about how the bearer now is that is grounding truths about how the bearer was. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 4) | |
A reaction: Some kind of slight of hand is going on here, though he does a nice job of confronting all possible objections. This is the sort of metaphysics you come up with when you stake everything on the dubious notion of a 'property'. |
18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Whilst not logically inconsistent, it would be bad if it could now be true that ten years ago there was a sea battle, but that five years ago it wasn't true that five years before that there was a sea battle. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 4) | |
A reaction: Nicely makes the point that you can't let the past rely on truthmakers in the present, if those truthmakers are about to go out of existence. So you need a sustained truthmaker, without giving up presentism. Enter 'temporally distributed properties'? |
18871 | I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron] |
Full Idea: I tend to think that the fundamental reason we can have the correspondence theory of truth is that truthmaker theory is correct. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: [This responds to Fumerton 2006, who gives the opposite view] Cameron gives himself the classic problem of spelling out the correspondence relation (perhaps as 'congruence'). I like truthmaking, but I'm unsure about correspondence. |
18870 | Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron] |
Full Idea: One view says truthmaker theory stands or falls with the correspondence theory of truth, because the truthmaker for p is just the portion of reality that p corresponds to: truthmaker and correspondence can be conversely defined. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: The normal view, which I prefer, is that correspondence is a particular theory of truthmaking, invoking a precise 'correspondence' relation. Hence abolishing correspondence would not abolish truthmaking, if you had a rival account. |
15879 | The Square of Opposition has two contradictory pairs, one contrary pair, and one sub-contrary pair [Harré] |
Full Idea: Square of Opposition: 'all A are B' and 'no A are B' are contraries; 'some A are B' and 'some A are not B' are sub-contraries; the pairs 'all A are B'/'some A are B' and 'no A are B'/'some A are B' are contradictories. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 3) | |
A reaction: [the reader may construct his own diagram from this description!] The contraries are at the extremes of contradiction, but the sub-contraries are actual compatible. You could add possible worlds to this picture. |
15102 | S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron] |
Full Idea: S4 says there must be some necessary truths, because the actual necessary truths must be necessary. (It says if there are some actual necessary truths then that is so - but the S4 axiom is an actual necessary truth, if true). | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (On the Source of Necessity [2010], 2) |
15891 | Traditional quantifiers combine ordinary language generality and ontology assumptions [Harré] |
Full Idea: The generalising function and the ontological function of discourse are elided in the traditional quantifier. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 5) | |
A reaction: This simple point strikes me as helping enormously to disentangle the mess created by over-emphasis on formal logic in ontology, and especially in the Quinean concept of 'ontological commitment'. |
15878 | Some quantifiers, such as 'any', rule out any notion of order within their range [Harré] |
Full Idea: The quantifier 'any' unambiguously rules out any presupposition of order in the members of the range of individuals quantified. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 3) | |
A reaction: He contrasts this with 'all', 'each' and 'every', which are ambiguous in this respect. |
18881 | For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The analytic commitment of realism is that truths are grounded in the world. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Grounding') | |
A reaction: Certain fifth-level truths might be a long way from the actual world, and deeply interfused with human concepts and theories. Negative truths must be fitted into this picture. |
18875 | Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Realism about a discourse is 1) to think that the sentences are, when construed literally, literally true or false, and 2) to think that some of the sentences of the discourse are non-vacuously true. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism') | |
A reaction: [Cameron adds 'non-vacuously' to an idea of Sayre-McCord 199 p.5] This is realism based on what is 'true', without specifying 'commitments', so I like it. Cameron says it makes mathematical postulationists into realists. He likes 'mind-independent'. |
18878 | Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron] |
Full Idea: All that is necessary for realism, I claim, is that truth is grounded in mind-independent features of fundamental reality. Truthmaker theory comes into play because it is a theory about what those features are (…so it isn't a commitment to realism). | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism') | |
A reaction: [He cites Michael Devitt for this approach] What is the word 'fundamental' doing here? Because the mind-dependent parts of reality are considered non-fundamental? The no-true-Scotsman-hates-whisky move? His truthmaking is committed to 'things'. |
18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Spatial distribution properties say how things are across a region of space, such as being polka-dotted. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 3) | |
A reaction: I think the routine fallacy of inferring properties from predicates is buried here. We truthfully describe it as 'polka-dotted', but that doesn't mean we must reify polka-dottedness, and see it as a feature of the world. What is a 'jumbled' space? |
15401 | Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The essentialist approach would be to say that an intrinsic property is one such that it is no part of what it is to instantiate that property that the bearer stands in some relation to its surroundings. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Analysis') | |
A reaction: This is offered as an alternative to the David Lewis account in terms of duplicates across possible worlds. You will have gathered by now, if you have spent days poring over my stuff, that I favour the essentialist approach. |
15393 | An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Intrinsic properties are those that an object has solely in virtue of how it is, independently of its surroundings. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Better not mention quantum mechanics and fields if you want to talk of objects being independent of their surroundings. Am I 'independent' of gravity, or is gravity 'independent' of me? |
15874 | Scientific properties are not observed qualities, but the dispositions which create them [Harré] |
Full Idea: The properties of material things with which the sciences deal are not the qualities we observe them to have, but the dispositions of those things to engender the states and qualities we observe. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 2) | |
A reaction: I take this to be the correct use of the word 'qualities', so that properties are not qualities (in the way Heil would like). |
15396 | Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Criteria for identity across times have proven hard to give. Whatever criteria we lay down, it seems that there are possible situations in which two later objects bear the relevant relation to one earlier object, though only one of them can be identical. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Personal') | |
A reaction: We only have to think of twins, amoebae that fission, and the Ship of Theseus. We seem to end up inventing a dubious criterion in order to break the tie. |
18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
Full Idea: What change is on the account being offered is to instantiate a non-uniform distributional property. Being red at one time and orange at a later time is to be analysed as instantiating the distributional property 'being red-then-orange'. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 4) | |
A reaction: One of those moments when you begin to doubt whether 'being analysed' successfully actually adds much to our wisdom. His property sounds suspiciously 'gruesome' - i.e. subject to the vagaries of how we chose to describe the thing. |
15884 | Laws of nature remain the same through any conditions, if the underlying mechanisms are unchanged [Harré] |
Full Idea: A statement is a law of nature if it is true in all those worlds which differ only as to their initial conditions, that is in which the underlying mechanisms of nature are the same. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 4) | |
A reaction: Harré takes it that laws of nature have to be necessary, by definition. I like this way of expressing natural necessity, in terms of 'mechanisms' rather than of 'laws'. Where do the mechanisms get their necessity? |
15103 | Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron] |
Full Idea: I conclude that Blackburn has not shown that any grounding of the necessary in the contingent (the Contingency Horn of his dilemma) is doomed to failure. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (On the Source of Necessity [2010], 2) | |
A reaction: [You must read the article for details of Cameron's argument!] He goes on to also reject the Necessity Horn (that there is a regress if necessities must rely on necessities). |
18872 | We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron] |
Full Idea: I think we should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: An interesting passing remark. Presumably there would be unknowable truths about such worlds, which wouldn't bother a full-blooded realist. Indiscernible to whom? Me? Humanity? A divine mind? |
15880 | In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered [Harré] |
Full Idea: In the physical sciences the particular observations and experimental results are usually orderable, while in the biological sciences it is the classes of organism which are ordered, not the particular organisms. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 3) | |
A reaction: Harré is interesting on the role of ordering in science. Functions can be defined by an order. Maths feeds on orderings. Physics, he notes, focuses on things which vary together. |
15869 | Reports of experiments eliminate the experimenter, and present results as the behaviour of nature [Harré] |
Full Idea: In accounts of experiments, by Faraday and others, the role of the guiding hand of the actual experimenter is written out in successive accounts. The effect is to display the phenomenon as a natural occurrence, existing independently of the experiments. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 1) | |
A reaction: He records three stages in Faraday's reports. The move from active to passive voice is obviously part of it. The claim of universality is thus implicit rather than explicit. |
15881 | We can save laws from counter-instances by treating the latter as analytic definitions [Harré] |
Full Idea: When we come upon a counter-instance to a generalisation we can save the putative law, by treating it as potentially analytic and claiming it as a definition. ...Thus magnetism doesn't hold for phosphorus, so we say phosphorus is not a magnetic substance. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 3) | |
A reaction: He notes this as being particularly true when the laws concern the dispositions of substances, rather than patterns of events. |
15882 | Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them [Harré] |
Full Idea: Since there are three different dimensions of generality into which every law of nature is generalised, there can be no one system of logic which will govern inference to or from every law of every kind. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 3) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at the covering-law approach, which actually aims to output observations as logical inferences from laws. Wrong. |
15888 | The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré] |
Full Idea: The grue problem illustrates the enormous importance that the concept of a natural-kind plays in real science. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 5) | |
A reaction: The point is that we took emeralds to be a natural kind, but 'grue' proposes that they aren't, since stability is the hallmark of a natural kind. |
15887 | 'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré] |
Full Idea: In introducing the predicate 'grue' we also introduce an additional causal hypothesis into our chemistry and physics; namely, that when observed grue emeralds change from blue to green. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 5) | |
A reaction: [The 'when observered' is a Harré addition] I hate 'grue'. Only people who think our predicates have very little to do with reality are impressed by it. Grue is a behaviour, not a colour. |
15889 | It is because ravens are birds that their species and their colour might be connected [Harré] |
Full Idea: It is because ravens are birds that it makes sense to contemplate the possibility of a lawful relation between their species and their colour. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 5) | |
A reaction: Compare the 'laws' concerning leaf colour in autumn, and the 'laws' concerning packaging colour in supermarkets. Harré's underlying point is that raven colour concerns mechanism. |
15890 | Non-black non-ravens just aren't part of the presuppositions of 'all ravens are black' [Harré] |
Full Idea: Non-black non-ravens have no role to play in assessing the plausibility of 'All ravens are black' because their existence is not among the existential presuppositions of that statement. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 5) | |
A reaction: [He cites Strawson for the 'presupposition' approach] |
15885 | The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism [Harré] |
Full Idea: The 'must' of Newton's First Law is different. There is no deeper level relative to the processes described to give a mechanism which generates uniform motion. There is no such mechanism. ..It specifies what it is for something to be a material thing. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 4) | |
A reaction: Harré says the law can only exist as part of a network of other ideas. |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles. | |
From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro' | |
A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture? |
15868 | Idealisation idealises all of a thing's properties, but abstraction leaves some of them out [Harré] |
Full Idea: An 'idealisation' preserves all the properties of the source but it possesses these properties in some ideal or perfect form. ...An 'abstraction', on the other hand, lacks certain features of its source. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 1) | |
A reaction: Yet another example in contemporary philosophy of a clear understanding of the sort of abstraction which Geach and others have poured scorn on. |
15886 | Science rests on the principle that nature is a hierarchy of natural kinds [Harré] |
Full Idea: The animating principle behind the material and discursive practices of science is the thesis that nature exemplifies multiple hierarchies of natural kinds. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 5) | |
A reaction: I agree. I take it to be a brute fact that there seem to be lots of stable natural kinds, which are worth investigating as long as they stay stable. If they are unstable, there needs to be something stable to measure that by - or we give up. |
15864 | Classification is just as important as laws in natural science [Harré] |
Full Idea: Classification systems, or taxonomies, are as important a part of the natural sciences as are the laws of nature. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 1) | |
A reaction: This illustrates how our view of science is radically shifted if we give biology equal prominence with physics. |
15865 | Newton's First Law cannot be demonstrated experimentally, as that needs absence of external forces [Harré] |
Full Idea: We can never devise an experimental situation in which there are no external forces to act on a body. It follows that Newton's First Law could never be demonstrated by means of experiment or observation. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 1) | |
A reaction: It can't be wholly demonstrated, but certain observations conform to it, such as the movement of low friction bodies, or the movements of planetary bodies. |
15862 | Laws can come from data, from theory, from imagination and concepts, or from procedures [Harré] |
Full Idea: Boyle's Law generalises a mass of messy data culled from an apparatus; Snell's Law is an experimentally derived law deducible from theory; Newton's First Law derives from concepts and thought experiments; Mendel's Law used an experimental procedure. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 1) | |
A reaction: Nice examples, especially since Boyle's and Newton's laws are divided by a huge gulf, and arrived at about the same time. On p.35 Harré says these come down to two: abstraction from experiment, and derivation from deep assumptions. |
15870 | Are laws of nature about events, or types and universals, or dispositions, or all three? [Harré] |
Full Idea: What is Newton's First Law about? Is it about events? Is it about types or universals? Is it about dispositions? Or is it, in some peculiar way, about all three? | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 2) | |
A reaction: If laws merely chart regularities, then I suppose they are about events (which exhibit the regular patterns). If laws explain, which would be nice, then they are only about universals if you are a platonist. Hence laws are about dispositions. |
15871 | Are laws about what has or might happen, or do they also cover all the possibilities? [Harré] |
Full Idea: Is Newton's First Law about what has actually happened or is it about what might, or could possibly happen? Is it about the actual events and states of the world, or possible events and states? | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 2) | |
A reaction: I presume the first sentence distinguishes between what 'might (well)' happen, and what 'could (just) possibly happen'. I take it for granted that laws predict the actual future. The question is are they true of situations which will never occur? |
15876 | Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties? [Harré] |
Full Idea: The idea of the Dretske-Armstrong-Tooley view is very simple: the laws of nature relate properties to properties. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 2) | |
A reaction: Presumably the relations are necessary ones. I don't see why we need to mention these wretched 'universals' in order to expound this theory. It sounds much more plausible if you just say a property is defined by the way it relates to other properties. |
15872 | Must laws of nature be universal, or could they be local? [Harré] |
Full Idea: Is a law of nature about everything in the universe or just about a restricted group of things? | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 2) | |
A reaction: I presume the answer is that while a law may only refer to a small group of things, the law would still have to apply if that group moved or spread or enlarged, so it would have to be universals. A laws confined to one time or place? Maybe. |
15867 | Laws describe abstract idealisations, not the actual mess of nature [Harré] |
Full Idea: The laws of nature are not simple descriptions of what can be seen to happen. They are descriptions of abstractions and idealisations from a somewhat messy reality. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 1) | |
A reaction: This view seems to have increasingly gripped modern philosophers, so that the old view of God decreeing a few simple equations to run the world has faded away. |
15860 | We take it that only necessary happenings could be laws [Harré] |
Full Idea: We do not take laws to be recordings of what happens perchance or for the most part, but specifications of what happens necessarily | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 1) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a plausible necessary condition for a law, but it may not be a sufficient one. Are trivial necessities laws? On this view if there are no necessities then there are no laws. |
15892 | Laws of nature state necessary connections of things, events and properties, based on models of mechanisms [Harré] |
Full Idea: A law of nature tells us what kinds of things, events and properties (all else being equal) go along with what. The 'must' of natural necessity has its place here because it is bound up with a model or analogy representing generative mechanisms. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 5) | |
A reaction: This is Harré's final page summary of laws. I agree with it. I would say that the laws are therefore descriptive, of the patterns of behaviour that arise when generative mechanisms meet. Maybe laws concern 'transformations'. |
15875 | In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them [Harré] |
Full Idea: In drawing 'countefactual' conclusions we can be thought imaginatively to vary the conditions under which the substance, set-up etc. is manipulated or stimulated, while maintaining constant our conception of the nature of the being in question. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 2) | |
A reaction: Presumably you could vary the substance and keep the situation fixed, but then the counterfactual seems to be 'about' something different. Either that or the 'situation' is a actually a set of substances to be tested. |
15104 | The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron] |
Full Idea: What seems so wrong about the 'moving spotlight' theory is that here one time is privileged, but all the times are on a par ontologically. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (On the Source of Necessity [2010], 4) | |
A reaction: The whole thing is baffling, but this looks like a good point. All our intuitions make presentism (there's only the present) look like a better theory than the moving spotlight (that the present is just 'special'). |
18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |
Full Idea: If there are temporally extended entities - and there are - then there must be extended regions of time for those entities to extend in. Hence presentism is false. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 4) | |
A reaction: [Cameron is playing devil's advocate] Something has to be weird here, and I take it to be the fact that the past no longer exists, and yet it is fixed and supports truths. Get over it. My childhood has gone. Totally. Irrevocably. |