Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, T.H. Huxley and Dean W. Zimmerman

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8 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals

10197	An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place [Zimmerman,DW]
	Full Idea: An immanent universal will routinely be 'at some distance from itself', in the sense that it is wholly present in more than one place.
	From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306)
	A reaction: This is the Aristotelian view, which sounds distinctly implausible in this formulation. Though I suppose redness is wholly present in a tomato, in the way that fourness is wholly present in the Horsemen of the Apocalypse. How many rednesses are there?

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects

10198	If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW]
	Full Idea: If nothing existed except two electrons, which are indiscernible, it remains possible that differences will emerge later. Even if this universe has eternal symmetry, such differences are still logically, metaphysically, physically and causally possible.
	From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306)
	A reaction: The question then is whether the two electrons have hidden properties that make differences possible. Zimmerman assumes that 'laws' of an indeterministic kind will do the job. I doubt that. Can differences be discerned after the event?

10199	Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW]
	Full Idea: Possible differences which may later become discernible could be treated as differences in a counterpart, which is similar to, but not identical with, the original object.
	From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.307)
	A reaction: [compressed] This is a reply to Idea 10198, which implies that two things could never be indiscernible over time, because of their different possibilities. One must then decide issues about rigid designation and counterparts.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction

20653	Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
	Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
	From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
	A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism

3157	T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism [Huxley, by Rey]
	Full Idea: T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism.
	From: report of T.H. Huxley (Method and Results [1893]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 3.1.1
	A reaction: This is, of course, impossible, because there can't be a clear statement of epiphenomenalism.

3154	Brain causes mind, but it doesn't seem that mind causes actions [Huxley]
	Full Idea: All states of consciousness are caused by molecular changes of brain substance. It seems to me there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the matter of the organism.
	From: T.H. Huxley (Method and Results [1893], p.244), quoted by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 3.1.1
	A reaction: This sounds odd. Most people would say there is nothing more obvious than mental events causing actions. It certainly seems undeniable that actions are cause by the contents of thoughts, so a molecular account of intentional states is needed.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block

14610	Neither 'moving spotlight' nor 'growing block' views explain why we care what is present or past [Zimmerman,DW]
	Full Idea: Neither the 'moving spotlight' nor the 'growing block' view of A-theory time can explain why we care so much about whether things (such as a headache) are present or past.
	From: Dean W. Zimmerman (The Privileged Present: A-Theory [2008], 3)
	A reaction: He goes on the defend Presentism as the best version of the A-series view. You can't deny that the past is more of a 'truthmaker' than the future, so it seems to have a firmer ontological status. Deeply weird.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series

14608	A-theorists, unlike B-theorists, believe some sort of objective distinction between past, present and future [Zimmerman,DW]
	Full Idea: To be an A-theorist is to believe in some sort of objective distinction between what is present and past and future. ..To be a B-theorist is to deny the objectivity of our talk about past, present and future.
	From: Dean W. Zimmerman (The Privileged Present: A-Theory [2008], 2)
	A reaction: The A/B distinction originates with McTaggart. All my intuitions side with the A-theory, certainly to the extent that the present seems to be objectively privileged in some way (despite special relativity).