11 ideas
22002 | Wolff's version of Leibniz dominated mid-18th C German thought [Pinkard] |
Full Idea: The dominant philosophy of mid-eighteenth century Germany was Wolffianism, a codified and almost legalistically organised form of Leibnizian thought. | |
From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: Kant grew up in this intellectual climate. |
22021 | Romantics explored beautiful subjectivity, and the re-enchantment of nature [Pinkard] |
Full Idea: Early Romanticism can be seen as the exploration of subjective interiority and as the re-enchantment of nature (as organic). Hegel said they had the idea of a 'beautiful soul', which (he said) either paralysed action, or made them smug. | |
From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], 06) | |
A reaction: [compressed, inc Note 1] A major dilemma of life is the extent of our social engagement, because it makes life worthwhile, but pollutes the mind with continual conflicts. |
22010 | The combination of Kant and the French Revolution was an excited focus for German philosophy [Pinkard] |
Full Idea: After the French Revolution, philosophy suddenly became the key rallying point for an entire generation of German intellectuals, who had been reading Kant as the harbinger of a new order. | |
From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], Pt II Intro) | |
A reaction: Kant was a harbinger because he offered an autonomous status to each individual, rather than being subservient to a social order. |
22036 | In Hegel's time naturalism was called 'Spinozism' [Pinkard] |
Full Idea: In Hegel's time the shorthand for the Naturalistic worldview was 'Spinozism'. | |
From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], 10) | |
A reaction: Spinozism hit Germany like a bomb in 1786, when it was reported that the poet Hölderlin was a fan of Spinoza. |
13831 | Logic is based on transitions between sentences [Prawitz] |
Full Idea: I agree entirely with Dummett that the right way to answer the question 'what is logic?' is to consider transitions between sentences. | |
From: Dag Prawitz (Gentzen's Analysis of First-Order Proofs [1974], §04) | |
A reaction: I always protest at this point that reliance on sentences is speciesism against animals, who are thereby debarred from reasoning. See the wonderful Idea 1875 of Chrysippus. Hacking's basic suggestion seems right. Transition between thoughts. |
13827 | Logical consequence isn't a black box (Tarski's approach); we should explain how arguments work [Prawitz] |
Full Idea: Defining logical consequence in the way Tarski does is a rather meagre result, treating an argument as a black box, observing input and output, while disregarding inner structure. We should define logical consequence on the basis of valid arguments. | |
From: Dag Prawitz (On the General Idea of Proof Theory [1974], §2) |
13825 | Natural deduction introduction rules may represent 'definitions' of logical connectives [Prawitz] |
Full Idea: With Gentzen's natural deduction, we may say that the introductions represent, as it were, the 'definitions' of the logical constants. The introductions are not literally understood as 'definitions'. | |
From: Dag Prawitz (Gentzen's Analysis of First-Order Proofs [1974], 2.2.2) | |
A reaction: [Hacking, in 'What is Logic? §9' says Gentzen had the idea that his rules actually define the constants; not sure if Prawitz and Hacking are disagreeing] |
13823 | In natural deduction, inferences are atomic steps involving just one logical constant [Prawitz] |
Full Idea: In Gentzen's natural deduction, the inferences are broken down into atomic steps in such a way that each step involves only one logical constant. The steps are the introduction or elimination of the logical constants. | |
From: Dag Prawitz (Gentzen's Analysis of First-Order Proofs [1974], 1.1) |
13826 | Model theory looks at valid sentences and consequence, but not how we know these things [Prawitz] |
Full Idea: In model theory, which has dominated the last decades, one concentrates on logically valid sentences, and what follows logically from what, but one disregards questions concerning how we know these things. | |
From: Dag Prawitz (On the General Idea of Proof Theory [1974], §1) |
22048 | Idealism is the link between reason and freedom [Pinkard] |
Full Idea: Idealism was conceived as a link between reason and freedom. | |
From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], 14 Conc) | |
A reaction: I'm beginning to see the Romantic era as the Age of Freedom, which followed the Age of Reason. This idea fits that picture nicely. Pinkard says that paradoxes resulted from the attemptl |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles. | |
From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro' | |
A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture? |