Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Tuomas E. Tahko and Jack Joslin

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6 ideas

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
16978 If conceivability is a priori coherence, that implies possibility [Tahko]
     Full Idea: Maybe conceivability could be understood as a priori coherence, which implies possibility.
     From: Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 3.2)
     A reaction: I'm not quite sure why 'a priori' has to be there. Assessing conceivability just is assessing coherence. That couches it as a rational activity, rather than as a purely imaginary one. Trying to conceive a square circle isn't just daydreaming.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
20653 Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
     Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
     From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
     A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
16975 Essences are used to explain natural kinds, modality, and causal powers [Tahko]
     Full Idea: Essences are supposed to do a lot of explanatory work: natural kinds can be identified in terms of their essences, metaphysical modality can be reduced to essence, the causal power of objects can be explained with the help of essence.
     From: Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 1)
     A reaction: Natural kinds and modality are OK with me, but I'm dubious about the third one. If an essence explains something's causal powers, I have no idea what an essence might be. Essence are largely characterised in terms of causal powers.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
16976 Scientific essentialists tend to characterise essence in terms of modality (not vice versa) [Tahko]
     Full Idea: The conception of essence taken for granted in much of the 'scientific essentialist' literature is that essence can be explained in terms of modality (rather than the other way round).
     From: Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 2.1)
     A reaction: [He cites Ellis and Bird] That is, presumably, that they are inclined to say that the essence of gold is a set of necessary properties. Maybe conceptual necessities dictate the properties of gold, and they in turn dictate metaphysical necessities?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
16977 If essence is modal and laws are necessary, essentialist knowledge is found by scientists [Tahko]
     Full Idea: If essence is conceived in terms of modality and the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, it seems that the laws of nature constitute essentialist knowledge, so the discovery of essences is mostly due to scientists.
     From: Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 2.1)
     A reaction: This seems muddled to me. The idea that the laws themselves are essences is way off target. No one thinks all knowledge of necessities is essentialist. Mumford, for example, doesn't even believe in laws.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
7417 God can't have silly perfections, but how do we decide which ones are 'silly'? [Joslin]
     Full Idea: It is clear that God cannot have all conceivable perfections, because otherwise he would have absurd perfections (like being the perfect prawn sandwich), so a line must be drawn, and how are we to decide which perfections are appropriate and essential?
     From: Jack Joslin (talk [2006]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This is an excellent question for curbing the absurdities of those who want to load God with every good thing that can possibly be conceived. Is the God who is also a perfect prawn sandwich more perfect than the one who isn't?