Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Vittorio Hsle and Correia,F/Schnieder,B

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics

17266	Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder]
	Full Idea: In the heyday of modal logic, philosophers typically tried to account for any metaphysical notions in modal terms.
	From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.4)
	A reaction: Lewisian realism about possible worlds actually gets rid of purely 'modal' terms, but I suppose they include possible worlds in their remark. Annoying for modal logicians to be told they had a 'heyday' - a nice example of the rhetoric of philosophy.

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems

22820	Early Romantics sought a plurality of systems, in a quest for freedom [Hösle]
	Full Idea: It was an early Romantic idea that there is necessarily a plurality of systems in which individuality is expressed; for a complete system would destroy freedom.
	From: Vittorio Hösle (A Short History of German Philosophy [2013], 7)
	A reaction: I'm not clear why you are free because you are locked into system that differs from that of other people. True freedom seems to be either no system, or continually remaking one's own system. Why is such freedom valuable? Freedom v truth?

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason

17263	Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder]
	Full Idea: What is most puzzling about the rationalist tradition is the steadfast certainty with which the Principle of Sufficient Reason was often accepted, since it in effect denies that there are fundamental facts.
	From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.2)
	A reaction: A very simple and interesting observation. The principle implies either a circle of reasons, or an infinite regress of reasons. Nothing can be labelled as 'primitive' or 'foundational' or 'given'. The principle is irrational!

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding

17270	Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder]
	Full Idea: We may take existential dependence to be a relation induced by certain cases of grounding, but one may also think that facts about existential dependence are prior to corresponding ground claims, and in fact ground those claims.
	From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.3)
	A reaction: I would vote for grounding, since dependence seems more abstract, and seems to demand explanation, whereas grounding seems more like a feature of reality, and to resist further intrinsic explanation (on the whole).

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation

17268	Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder]
	Full Idea: To us it seems advisable to separate the objective notion of grounding, which belongs to the field of metaphysics, from the epistemically loaded notion of explanation.
	From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.2)
	A reaction: Paul Audi is the defender of the opposite view. I'm with Audi. The 'epistemically loaded' pragmatic aspect is just contextual - that we have different interests in different aspects of the grounding on different occasions.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts

17267	The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder]
	Full Idea: There is a disagreement on the issue of factual identity, concerning the 'granularity' of facts, the question of how fine-grained they are.
	From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 3.3)
	A reaction: If they are very fine-grained, then no two descriptions of a supposed fact will capture the same details. If we go broadbrush, facts become fuzzy and less helpful. 'Fact' was never going to be a clear term.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction

20653	Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
	Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
	From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
	A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?

25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history

22819	In the 18th century history came to be seen as progressive, rather than cyclical [Hösle]
	Full Idea: The turning point in the history of the philosophy of history occurs in the eighteenth century, when the ancient cyclical model of Vico is superseded by the idea of progress.
	From: Vittorio Hösle (A Short History of German Philosophy [2013], 6)
	A reaction: He says that Hegel merely inherited this progressive view, rather than creating it. I'm not sure how widely held the cyclical view was. I don't recognise it in Shakespeare. Science and technology must have suggested progress.