150 ideas
22115 | Wise people should contemplate and discuss the truth, and fight against falsehood [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The role of the wise person is to meditate on the truth, especially the truth regarding the first principle, and to discuss it with others, but also to fight against the falsity that is its contrary. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Contra Gentiles [1268], I.1.6), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 14 | |
A reaction: So nice to hear someone (from no matter how long ago) saying that wisdom is concerned with truth. If you lose your grip on truth (which many thinkers seem to have done) you must also abandon wisdom. Then fools rule. |
22101 | Philosophy aims to know the truth about the way things are [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The study of philosophy has as its purpose to know not what people have thought, but rather the truth about the way things are. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Sententia on 'De Caelo' [1268], I.22.228), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 05 | |
A reaction: I agree with this deeply unfashionable opinion. Of course, modern investigations must be more sensitive to biases built into language, culture and conceptual schemes. But I am one of those sad old folks who still think truths can be stated. |
1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.10) |
1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Mind is compelled by necessary truths that can't be regarded as false, but not by contingent ones that might be false. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 12) |
21267 | Supposing many principles is superfluous if a few will do it [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: It is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob2) | |
A reaction: Notice that this is 'superfluous' rather than 'wrong'. But ten people can lift a piano which could have been lifted by eight. Note that this is 150 years before Ockham. |
22102 | Arguing with opponents uncovers truths, and restrains falsehoods [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: There is no better way of uncovering the truth and keeping falsity in check than by arguing with people who disagree with you. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (On the spiritual perfection of life [1268], 26), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 05 | |
A reaction: Not the sort of attitude you associate with medieval scholastics, who are presumed to be dogmatists. How many modern philosophers actually have the courage to follow this advice? |
11197 | The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: What sorts things into their proper genus and species are the definitions that express what they are. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92) | |
A reaction: This is straight from Aristotle, though Aristotle's view is a little more complex, I think. If the definitions 'express what they are', then definitions seem to specify the essence. |
13070 | If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: Socrates has no definition if definitions by their nature must be in purely general terms, and if no purely general terms can succeed in uniquely singling out this signated matter. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], 23) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 1.1.2 | |
A reaction: There seem to be two models. That general terms actually individuate the matter of Socrates, or that they cross-reference to (so to speak) define Socrates 'by elimination', as the only individual that fits. But the latter is a poor definition. |
23176 | Truth is universal, but knowledge of it is not [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q94 4) | |
A reaction: Amazing how many modern thinkers fail to grasp this simple distinction. However, the truth is not quite the same for all if diverse persons are expressing a single truth with different concepts and languages. The word 'facts' is helpful here. |
20621 | Types of lying: Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal? [Aquinas, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
Full Idea: Lying can involve (1) speaking false words, (2) the intention to speak false words, (3) the intention of bringing about deception, and (4) the ultimate goal of one's deception. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q110) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 10 'Lying' | |
A reaction: It's a start, but much more is needed to clarify lying. Irony is an obvious problem with (1). |
1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Good itself as taken in by mind is one truth among others, and truth itself as goal of mind's activity is one good among others. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) |
21248 | If the existence of truth is denied, the 'Truth does not exist' must be true! [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and if truth does not exist, then the proposition 'Truth does not exist' is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Art 1, Obj 3) | |
A reaction: A classic example of turning the tables, also applicable to anyone who firmly denies knowledge, or that words are meaningful, or says that meaning needs verification. However, one measily truth is not much consolation. |
22104 | Truth is the conformity of being to intellect [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The word 'true' expresses the conformity of a being to intellect. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Disputed questions about truth [1267], I.1c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 09 | |
A reaction: I believe in a 'robust' theory of truth, but accept that the concept of 'correspondence' has major problems. So I embrace with delight the word 'conformity'. I offer the world The Conformity Theory of Truth! 'Conform' is suitably vague. |
23173 | If a syllogism admits one absurdity, others must follow [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: In syllogistic arguments, granted one absurdity, others must follow too. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q19 6) | |
A reaction: This asserts the necessity of logical consequence, which he derives from Aristotle. |
11195 | If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: If being is what makes propositions true, then anything we can express in an affirmative proposition, however unreal, is said to be; so lacks and absences are, since we say that absences are opposed to presences, and blindness exists in an eye. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92) | |
A reaction: See Idea 11194 for the alternative Aristotelian approach to being, according to categories. Do absences and lacks have real essences, or causal properties? The absence of the sentry may cause the loss of the city. |
22103 | Being is basic to thought, and all other concepts are additions to being [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Being is inherently intellect's most intelligible object, in which it finds the basis of all conceptions. ...All of intellect's other conceptions must be arrived at by adding to being, insofar as they express what is not expressed by 'being' itself. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Disputed questions about truth [1267], I.1c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 09 | |
A reaction: I like the word 'intelligible' here. We might know reality, or be aware of appearances, but what is intelligible lies nicely in between. What would Berkeley make of that? I presume 'intelligible' means 'makes good sense'. |
15812 | Being implies distinctness, which implies division, unity, and multitude [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: What first comes to mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of one; fourthly the notion of multitude. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I Q11 ar2 ad4), quoted by Roderick Chisholm - Person and Object 1.5 | |
A reaction: This is one of the best things I have read on 'being'. It is the Aristotelian recognition that we can only study being by studying identity, and that this leads on to wider metaphysics. Other approaches to being are dead ends. |
21268 | Non-human things are explicable naturally, and voluntary things by the will, so God is not needed [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: All natural things can be reduced to one principle, which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle, which is human reason, or will. Therefore God does not exist. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob2) | |
A reaction: Not, of course, the opinion of Aquinas. So the possibility of naturalism (assuming the human will can be further reduced to nature) was a clear option in the thirteenth century. In reply Aquinas cites his Fifth Way. |
16655 | Different genera are delimited by modes of predication, which rest on modes of being [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Being is delimited into different genera in accord with different modes of predicating, which depend on different modes of being. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (On Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' [1266], V.9.890), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.3 | |
A reaction: I like this. When people say that predication is the way we divide things up, and go all linguistic-relativist about things, they forget how closely language not only describes reality, but arises out of, or is even caused by, reality. 'Grue' is silly. |
16641 | Whiteness does not exist, but by it something can exist-as-white [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Whiteness is said to exist not because it subsists in itself, but because by it something has existence-as-white. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quodlibeta [1267], IX.2.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 10.2 | |
A reaction: It seems unavoidable to refer to the whiteness as 'it'. It might be called the 'adverbial' theory of properties, as ways of doing something. |
11201 | Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Incidental properties have an incomplete essence, and need to refer in their definitions to their subject, lying outside their own genus. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.93) | |
A reaction: These are 'incidental' properties, but it is a nice question whether properties have essences. Presumably they must have if they are universals, or platonic Forms. The notion of being 'strong' can be defined without specific examples. |
11205 | If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: If (in the Platonic view) manyness was contained in humanness it could never be one as it is in Socrates, and if oneness was part of its definition then Socrates would be Plato and the nature couldn't be realised more than once. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.100) | |
A reaction: I suppose the reply is that since we are trying to explain one-over-many, then this unusual combination of both manyness and oneness is precisely what distinguishes forms from other ideas. |
13090 | The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: In the view of Aquinas, while substantial form is the ultimate ground of identity and difference of angels, it is matter that provides a principle of diversity in the case of corporeal substances. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 5.2.3 | |
A reaction: This is at least as good a proposal as their apatial location. There is more chance of reidentifying matter than of precisely reidentifying a spatial location. Two indistinguishable spheres remain the classic problem case (of Max Black, Idea 10195) |
17555 | 'One' can mean undivided and not a multitude, or it can add measurement, giving number [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: There are two sorts of one. There is the one which is convertible with being, which adds nothing to being except being undivided; and this deprives of multitude. Then there is the principle of number, which to the notion of being adds measurement. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones de Potentia Dei [1269], q3 a16 ad 3-um) | |
A reaction: [From a lecture handout] I'm not sure I understand this. We might say, I suppose, that insofar as water is water, it is all one, but you can't count it. Perhaps being 'unified' and being a 'unity' are different? |
16765 | Humans only have a single substantial form, which contains the others and acts for them [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: A human being has no substantial form other than the intellective soul alone, and it contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, and all lower forms, and it alone brings about whatever it is that less perfect forms bring about in other things. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia Q76 4c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.1 | |
A reaction: He says brutes and plants also have a single soul. Pasnau says this is Aquinas's most distinctive doctrine, because other thinkers postulate a whole hierarchy of substantial forms. |
16766 | One thing needs a single thing to unite it; if there were two forms, something must unite them [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: One thing simpliciter is produced out of many actually existing things only if there is something uniting and tying them to each other. If Socrates were animal and rational by different forms, then to be united they would need something to make them one. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones de anima [1269], 11c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.2 | |
A reaction: This is the reply to the idea that a single thing is just an interesting of many sortal essences. It presumes, of course, that a thing like a horse has something called 'unity'. |
11202 | It is by having essence that things exist [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: It is by having essence that things exist. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.94) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 11199, which gives a fuller picture. This idea seems to suggest essence as the cause of existence, which sounds wrong. Perhaps essence is a necessary condition of existence, but it is necessary that nothing indeterminate can exist? |
11203 | Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Specific essence differs from generic essence by being demarcated: individuals are demarcated within species by dimensionally defined material, but species within genus by a defining differentiation taken from the form. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.95) | |
A reaction: It clearly won't be enough to define an individual just to define its material and its shape. The material might also be essential to the genus, as when defining fire. Probably not very helpful. |
11200 | The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Form alone cannot be a composite substance's essence. For a thing's essence is expressed by its definition, and unless the definition of a physical substance included both form and material, the definition wouldn't differ from mathematical objects. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.93) | |
A reaction: This is the sort of thoroughly sensible remark that you only get from the greatest philosophers. Minor philosophers fall in love with things like forms, and then try to use them to explain everything. |
11196 | Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Since being as belonging to a category expresses the 'isness' of things, and belongs to all ten Aristotelian categories, essence must be something all the natures that sort different beings into genera and species have in common. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92) | |
A reaction: I like this because it is the essence which does the sorting, not the sorting which defines the essence (which seems to me to be a deep and widespread confusion). |
11208 | A simple substance is its own essence [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: A simple substance is its own essence. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.103) | |
A reaction: Aquinas takes complex substances to have their essences in various ways, but this thought is the basis of all essence. Presumably the Greek word 'ousia' names the key ingredient. |
22170 | Senses grasp external properties, but the understanding grasps the essential natures of things [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Our imagination and senses grasp only the outer properties of things, not their natures. ...Understanding, however, grasps the very substance and nature of things, so that what is represented in understanding is a likeness of thing's very essence. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quodlibeta [1267], 8.2.2) | |
A reaction: This is exactly the picture I endorse for modern science. Explanation is the path to understanding, and that must venture beyond immediate experience. |
5937 | The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction [Ross] |
Full Idea: A state of opinion is good because of its degree of groundedness, and because the degree of conviction corresponds to the degree of groundedness. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §VI) | |
A reaction: This is an early statement (from an ethical intuitionist) of what are now called the 'epistemic virtues'. It seems impossible to prove that these characteristics make an opinion good, but it also seems hard to deny either of them. |
23175 | The conclusions of speculative reason about necessities are certain [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Since the speculative reason is concerned chiefly with necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without fail. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q94 4) | |
A reaction: This seems over-confident, and to confuse the facts with our knowledge of the facts. Simple arithmetic may seem certain, but long and intricate proofs are always a little uncertain. |
5936 | Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain [Ross] |
Full Idea: Knowledge is superior in value to opinion because it has certainty or complete absence of doubt. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §VI) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a classic blunder, dating back to Descartes, which I think of as 'setting the bar too high'. It leads without fail to scepticism, because certainty is simply impossible for human beings. I am a committed fallibilist about knowledge. |
21337 | A knowing being possesses a further reality, the 'presence' of the thing known [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Knowing beings are differentiated from non-knowing beings by this: non-knowing beings have only their own reality, but knowing beings are capable of possessing also the reality of something else, ...a presence of the thing known produced by this thing. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,q.Q14,art 1) | |
A reaction: [Quoted by Ryan Meade in a talk at Pigotts] A famous and much discussed remark. Aquinas was a direct realist about perception, so this presence seems to be the thing itself, rather than a 'representation'. |
21249 | Some things are self-evident to us; others are only self-evident in themselves [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other hand, self-evident in itself, and to us. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Art 1, Obj 3) | |
A reaction: A clear distinction, which is hard to deny, though there are lots of borderline cases. Self-evident to genius, and self-evident to future genius. Self-evident to almost everyone. Goldbach's Conjecture may be self-evident but unknowable. |
22169 | Initial universal truths are present within us as potential, to be drawn out by reason [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: For present in us by nature are certain initial truths everyone knows, in which lie potentially known conclusions our reasons can draw out and make actually known. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quodlibeta [1267], 8.2.2) | |
A reaction: Note that these are truths rather than concepts, but that they have to be 'drawn out' by reason. This is Descartes' view of the matter, where the 'natural light' of reason is needed to articulate what is innate, such as geometry. |
21250 | A proposition is self-evident if the predicate is included in the essence of the subject [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject. E.g. Man is an animal, because animal is included in the essence of man. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Art 1, Obj 3) | |
A reaction: Aquinas focuses on the essence of the subject, where Kant embraces the whole concept of the subject. Is it self-evident that we are genetically related to apes? Yes, to a geneticiist. Is that part of human essence? No. So Kant wins. |
22168 | Minds take in a likeness of things, which activates an awaiting potential [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: What the mind takes in is not some material element of the agent, but a likeness of the agent actualising some potential the patient already has. This, for example, is the way our seeing takes in the colour of a coloured body. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quodlibeta [1267], 8.2.1) | |
A reaction: This is exactly right. Descartes agreed. It works for colour, but not (obviously) for cheese graters. |
5927 | I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross] |
Full Idea: The sensum-theory seems to me less probable than a causal theory of perception, which regards sensuous experience as not being apprehension at all, but a set of mental events produced by external bodies on our bodies and minds. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV) | |
A reaction: The point is that there is no third item between the object and the mind, which has to be 'apprehended'. Sense-data give a good account of delusions (where we apprehend the 'data', but not the real object). I think I agree with Ross. |
20224 | Sensation prepares the way for intellectual knowledge, which needs the virtues of reason [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension, for these prepare the way to intellectual knowledge. And therefore in these powers there are none of the virtues by which we know truth; these are in the intellect or reason. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q56 a5 obj3), quoted by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - Virtues of the Mind III 2.2 | |
A reaction: A gem of a quotation for Zagzebski's thesis, that knowledge is defined in terms of the intellectual virtues. The only virtues of perception are in focusing and paying attention to features. Good eyesight is a biological 'virtue', I suppose. |
1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: All our knowledge comes through our senses, but that doesn't mean that everything we know is sensed. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 18) |
22109 | The fullest knowledge places a conclusion within an accurate theory [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
Full Idea: Having 'scientia' is the fullest possible human cognition, by which one situates the fact expressed by a conclusion in an explanatory theory that accurately maps metaphysical or physical reality. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Sententia on 'Posterior Analytics' [1269], 1.2.9, 1.5.7) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11 | |
A reaction: That is a perfect statement of my concept of knowledge. Explanatory theories must specify the essential natures of the entities involved. We don't aim for 'knowledge', we aim for the 'fullest possible cognition'. This account extend's Aristotle's. |
5940 | Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable [Ross] |
Full Idea: It may be that two orders or classes of good things are not commensurable, though they are comparable, with those in the other. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §VI) | |
A reaction: This refers to moral issues, but seems helpful when faced with Kuhn's claim that Newton and Einstein are 'incommensurable'. We could hardly prefer one theory to another if we couldn't compare them. |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles. | |
From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro' | |
A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture? |
11198 | Definition of essence makes things understandable [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: It is definition of essence that makes things understandable. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92) | |
A reaction: The aim of philosophy is understanding, which is achieved by successful explanation. I totally agree with this Aristotelian view, so neatly summarised by Aquinas. |
22107 | Sensations are transmitted to 'internal senses' in the brain, chiefly to 'phantasia' and 'imagination' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
Full Idea: Sensory species received in external senses are transmitted to 'internal senses', organs located in the brain. The most important of these for cognition are 'phantasia' and 'imagination' (part of phantasia), which produce and preserve 'phantasms'. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11 | |
A reaction: This seems to make Aquinas a representative realist. I add this to my portfolio of philosophical faculties - those required by philosophy, rather than by psychology or neuroscience. |
9098 | Mental activity combines what we sense with imagination of what is not present [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Mental activity combines two activities which in the senses are distinct: exterior perception in which we are simply affected by what we sense, and interior imagination in which we create images of things that are not, and never have been present. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.2) | |
A reaction: Geach cites this thought to show that he is anti-abstractionist, since mind creates images, and these can arise from things which have not been experienced. Any defence of abstractionism must allow an active power to imagination. |
9092 | Abstracting A from B generates truth, as long as the connection is not denied [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Abstacting A from B can mean denying A's connection with B, or simply thinking A without thinking B. Abstracting what in reality is connected generates falsehood if done the first way, but not if done the second. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1) | |
A reaction: Despite Geach's denials, this seems to make Aquinas a classic abstractionist. He goes on to distinguish two sorts of abstraction, but he certainly thinks of abstraction from sense experience as a revelation about the nature of reality. |
9093 | We understand the general nature of things by ignoring individual peculiarities [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: If we think what defines a stone, man or horse, without thinking of any individual peculiarities it may have, this is precisely what we do when we abstract the general nature of what we understand from any particular way in which we imagine it. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1) | |
A reaction: This may not be simple abstraction from sense experience, since there would obviously be a threatened circularity in the process. Do you need to know the essential definition first, in order to discard the individual peculiarities? |
9097 | The mind abstracts generalities from images, but also uses images for understanding [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Our mind both abstracts the species from images when it attends to the general nature of things, and understand the species in the images when it has recourse to the images in order to understand the things whose species it has abstracted. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1) | |
A reaction: Geach claims that the second half of this idea means that Aquinas is not an abstractionist, but he seems to be explictly abstractionist about the way in which we create higher level concepts from lower ones. |
9095 | Very general ideas (being, oneness, potentiality) can be abstracted from thought matter in general [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: There are even things we can abstract from thought matter in general, things like being and oneness and potentiality and realization. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1) | |
A reaction: The Aristotelian 'potentiality' means possibility, which means that modality is understood by abstraction. Aquinas seems to have four levels: particular perceived, general perceived, particular thought, and general thought. This is the highest level. |
9099 | Particular instances come first, and (pace Plato) generalisations are abstracted from them [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The generality attaching to a nature - its relatedness to many particular instances - results from abstraction, so in this sense a generalized nature presupposes its instances, and does not, as Plato thought, precede them. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.2) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a quite explicit endorsement of abstractionism by Aquinas, despite all Geach's assertions to the contrary. |
10508 | Species are abstracted from appearances by ignoring individual conditions [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The agent intellect abstracts intelligible species from phantasms insofar as through the power of the agent intellect we can take into our consideration the natures of the species without the individual conditions. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 Ad4) | |
A reaction: There might be a threatened circularity here, in trying to decide which features to ignore and which to retain. If we saw a hundred horses with a white nose blaze, we still wouldn't be sure that this was essential to a horse. Innate notions of species?? |
22111 | Aquinas attributes freedom to decisions and judgements, and not to the will alone [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
Full Idea: Aquinas conceives of freedom as free decision or judgement, which cannot be attributed to the will alone. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 12 | |
A reaction: This idea might improve the free will debate considerably, because it is not clear what sort of thing a 'will' is, and it is not clear how an entity can be 'free' in isolation, by its intrinsic nature. Isn't all freedom contextual? |
1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Something apprehended to be good and appropriate in any and every circumstance that could be thought of would compel us to will it. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) |
1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Because will moves itself by deliberation - a kind of investigation which doesn't prove some one way correct but examines the alternatives - will doesn't compel itself to will. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) |
1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The will is not compelled to move, for it doesn't have to want the pleasant things set before it. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 21) |
1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 24) |
1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Nothing can be willed except good, but many and various things are good, and you can't conclude from this that wills are compelled to choose this or that one. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 05) |
1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Reasoning powers can entertain opposite objects. Now will is a reasoning power, so will can entertain opposites and is not compelled to embrace one of them. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.x2) |
1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: We are forced to admit that, in any will that is not always willing, the very first movement to will must come from outside, stimulating the will to start willing. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) | |
A reaction: cf Nietzsche |
22105 | The human intellectual soul is an incorporeal, subsistent principle [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: It is necessary to say that that which is the principle of intellective activity, what we call the soul of a human being, is an incorporeal, subsistent principle. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia.Q75 2c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 10 | |
A reaction: Note 'subsistent' rather than 'existent' (capable of independence?). This identifies the immortal soul with the conscious mind. 'Principle' is an odd word, presumably with roots in Aristotle. It seems to be an Aristotelian 'form' [morphe]. |
20700 | Without God's influence every operation would stop, so God causes everything [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: If God's divine influence stopped, every operation would stop. Every operation, therefore, of everything is traced back to him as cause. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Contra Gentiles [1268], III.67), quoted by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 3 'Freedom' | |
A reaction: If the systematic interraction of mind and body counts as an 'operation', then this seems to imply Occasionalism. |
5924 | Identical objects must have identical value [Ross] |
Full Idea: If a thing possesses any kind of intrinsic value in a certain degree, anything exactly like it must in all circumstances possess it in the same degree. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV) | |
A reaction: This is the earlier notion of supervenience in philosophy, before it was applied to the mind. So a perfect duplication of the Mona Lisa will be worth as much as the original? A perfect clone of your partner is as good as the original? |
22108 | First grasp what it is, then its essential features; judgement is their compounding and division [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The intellect first apprehends the quiddity of a thing. ...Then it acquires the properties, accidents and dispositions associated with the thing's essence. It must proceed from one compounding or dividing of aspects to another, which is reasoning. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia.Q85 5c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11 | |
A reaction: [compressed] Tracking the process of acquiring knowledge of a thing (rather than necessary and sufficient conditions for full knowledge) is closer to Quine's naturalised epistemology than to the standard analytic approach to the concept of knowledge. |
10503 | We abstract forms from appearances, and acquire knowledge of immaterial things [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: To cognize that which is in individual matter, not as it is in such matter, is to abstract the form from the individual matter that the phantasms represents. Thus we come to a degree of cognition of immaterial things. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 1 Reply) | |
A reaction: This offers abstraction as a kind of inference to best explanation which takes us beyond immediate empirical experience to what is behind it. Aquinas thinks the concepts and explanation are spiritual, but they may be generalities and essences. |
10509 | Understanding consists entirely of grasping abstracted species [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Of the thing understood all that is within the actually understanding intellect is the abstracted intelligible species. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 Art2) | |
A reaction: Abstraction is never supposed to be a luxury bolt-on, but is always seen (in this tradition, and presumably in the modern one), as essential to the intellect, and its way of coming to understand the world. Aristotelian definition is behind this idea. |
10506 | Mathematics can be abstracted from sensible matter, and from individual intelligible matter [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Intellect can abstract mathematical species from sensible matter, both individual and common. Yet it cannot abstract such species from common intelligible matter, but only from individual intelligible matter. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 Ad2) | |
A reaction: The idea is that common intelligible matter lacks underlying substance, which is where quantity is to be found. |
9094 | Mathematical objects abstract both from perceived matter, and from particular substance [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Objects of mathematics abstract from perceived matter both in particular and in general, though from thought matter (substance as underlying quality) only in particular and not in general. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1) | |
A reaction: This appears to be a thoroughly abstractionist view of the way in which humans create mathematics. Aquinas explicitly denies the Platonic view that the numbers already have abstract existence, awaiting our discovery. |
10505 | We can just think of an apple's colour, because the apple is not part of the colour's nature [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The apple is not part of the nature of the colour, and so nothing prevents one from understanding the colour while understanding nothing of the apple. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 1 Ad 1) | |
A reaction: This helps to clarify why the procedure of 'ignoring' features is possible. It suggests that some features might be too entangled with the substance (too essential?) to be thus ignored. I can't think of an example, though. Why not?! |
10504 | Abstracting either treats something as separate, or thinks of it separately [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Abstracting takes place in two ways: by composition and division, understanding something to be not in another or to be separated from it; and by a simple and unconditioned consideration, understanding one thing while not considering the other at all. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 1 Ad 1) | |
A reaction: The second way is by 'ignoring', which he says cannot contain error. The first seems to be considering some mode of a thing to be actually separate from the thing, which could clearly be erroneous. Ignoring makes to commitment to a unity. |
10507 | Numbers and shapes are abstracted by ignoring their sensible qualities [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Quantities such as numbers and dimensions, and also shapes (which are the limits of quantities) can be considered without their sensible qualities, which is for them to be abstracted from sensible matter. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 Ad2) | |
A reaction: His account relies on underlying substance, which is where quantity is to be found (presumably because a substance is the epitome of a unit). |
9096 | The mind must produce by its own power an image of the individual species [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The agent mind must itself turn to images, and produce by its own power in the receptive mind a representation as to species of whatever the images represent as individual. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1) | |
A reaction: Unlike much of this section, this sentence supports Geach's claim that Aquinas agrees with him - that the mind creates its concepts, rather than 'abstracting' them from experience. |
11206 | The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Attribution is something mind brings to completion by constructing propositional connections and disconnections, basing itself on real-world unity possessed by the things being attributed to one another. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.102) | |
A reaction: This compromise story seems to me to be exactly right. I take it that we respond to the real joints of nature, but using thought and language which is riddled with convention. |
1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The will can avoid actually willing something by avoiding thinking of it, since mental activity is subject to will. In this respect we aren't compelled to will even total happiness, which is the only perfect good. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 07) |
23180 | The will is the rational appetite [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The will is the rational appetite. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q58 4) | |
A reaction: Defining the will in terms of reason sounds more like an Enlightenment optimist than a medieval theologian. I suspect that for him it is tautological the reason is involved, if only the reason can make decisions. Hobbes prefers to ruling appetite. |
1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The will is compelled by its ultimate goal (to achieve happiness), but not by the means to achieve it. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.07) |
1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Will's object is what is good, and so it cannot will anything but what is good. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.06) |
5933 | Aesthetic enjoyment combines pleasure with insight [Ross] |
Full Idea: Aesthetic enjoyment seems to be a blend of pleasure with insight into the nature of the object that inspires it. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §V) | |
A reaction: This is persuasive. Concentration seems required for aesthetic pleasure. It probably enhances sensual pleasure, but it doesn't seem essential. Some literature only gives the illusion of insight, and there is no real insight in listening to music. |
5928 | Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events [Ross] |
Full Idea: In order to avoid the difficulties that beset both a purely objective and a purely subjective view of beauty, I find myself driven to one which identifies beauty with the power of producing a certain sort of experience in minds. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV) | |
A reaction: This makes beauty a relational quality, rather than an intrinsic one. Ross's theory won't avoid the many usual problems about relativism. Do we define colour similarly, as a power in objects to produce certain sensations? |
5911 | Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics [Ross] |
Full Idea: The moral order expressed in the propositions of duties is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the universe (or any possible universe) as is the spatial or numerical structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II) | |
A reaction: A few of the axioms of geometry (e.g. the parallel line postulate) have been changed, with interesting results. Moral duties seem to change dramatically in a crisis, such as a war, or a ship sinking. Can I have a duty if I am too dim to perceive it? |
5926 | The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it [Ross] |
Full Idea: I cannot agree that a description of a patch of colour would be complete without the statement that it is beautiful (if that is so); for its beauty might be for some purposes the most important fact about it. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV) | |
A reaction: 'Important' to whom. To me the most important fact about my pen might be that it is mine, but that doesn't seem to be a feature of an intrinsic description of the pen. If beauty is a relational quality, Ross's point is undermined. |
1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: If we are not free to will in any way, but are compelled, everything that makes up ethics vanishes: pondering action, exhorting, commanding, punishing, praising, condemning. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) | |
A reaction: If doesn't require some magical 'free will' to avoid compulsions. All that is needed is freedom to enact your own willing, rather than someone else's. |
22112 | For humans good is accordance with reason, and bad is contrary to reason [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: A human being's good is existing in accordance with reason, while what is bad for a human being is whatever is contrary to reason. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia IIae.Q18.5c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 13 | |
A reaction: For anyone who thought Kant invented the idea that morality derives from reason. This idea of Aquinas is a fairly precise echo of the stoic view (which influenced Kant). Is there a circularity? Is it irrational because bad, or bad because irrational? |
7259 | Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Ross, by Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Ross held that moral principles are self-evident to us, meaning that no more is needed to reveal their truth to us as general guides to behaviour than what is the case before us, not that we can discover a moral truth just by thinking about it. | |
From: report of W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930]) by Jonathan Dancy - Intuitionism | |
A reaction: This seems to be a crucial distinction between two types of intuitionism, one that is purely a priori, and one that chimes in with the 'particularist' reading of virtue theory. The former is implausible and much attacked; the latter is more interesting. |
5913 | The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics [Ross] |
Full Idea: We have no more direct way of access to the facts about rightness and goodness and their objects, than by thinking about them; the moral convictions of thoughtful and well-educated people are the data of ethics just as perceptions are the data of science. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II) | |
A reaction: Sounds suspiciously like 'the intuitions of people like me', and hence gets a bad name in late twentieth century super-democratic society (esp. in America), but personally I think you can only value education if you think educated people are superior. |
5920 | Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross] |
Full Idea: For most theories of value may be divided into those which treat it as a quality and those which treat it as a relation between that which has value and something else, usually a state of mind. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV) | |
A reaction: We might say that a leaf only has value to a tree (which has no mind). Presumably if value is a relation to a mind, it can be further reduced to being an object of desire, but this will give class A drugs a greater value than a beautiful deed. |
5923 | The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross] |
Full Idea: I conclude that the arguments in favour of thinking of value as an objective are no more successful than those in favour of treating it as a relation, ..and the natural view that value is a quality therefore holds its ground. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV) | |
A reaction: See Ross's text for the arguments. It seems unlikely that argument could fully demonstrate his claim. Even physical qualities (such as weight or velocity) can have a relational component, and many things can only have value in a cultural context. |
5918 | The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross] |
Full Idea: By calling a thing intrinsically good we mean that it would be good even if nothing else existed. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV) | |
A reaction: This dramatic image (the Mona Lisa alone in vacancy) raises grave doubts about whether there is very much that could qualify for 'intrinsic value'. I even doubt the value of the MS of the Goldberg Variations, if nothing else exists. |
5930 | All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross] |
Full Idea: Everyone would prefer the second of two universes, if each had equal vice and virtue, and each had equal pleasure and pain, but in the first the virtuous were miserable and the vicious happy, while in the second universe it was the opposite. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §V) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a very good example of an intuition which it is hard to resist. Would some vile Mafia boss really want heaven to be full of murderers, while good-hearted and kind people all went to hell? |
22494 | We must know the end, know that it is the end, and know how to attain it [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the thing which is the end but also knowing it under the aspect of the end and the relation of the means to that end. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-I.Q132), quoted by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness 4 | |
A reaction: We don't talk much now about 'perfect' knowledge of something, but I suppose this is the necessary and sufficient conditions. If you complete the checklist, your knowledge should be perfect (if the list is right). |
5922 | An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances [Ross] |
Full Idea: If a thing is only instrumentally good or bad, then even when its nature remains the same it might have a different instrumental value if the causal laws of the universe, or of other things in the universe, were different. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV) | |
A reaction: A bad tin-opener might be instrumentally good if it was the only one you owned, so we don't need to change the causal laws of the universe. |
5921 | We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross] |
Full Idea: While it can be intelligently asked whether the pleasant or beautiful has value, it cannot be intelligently asked whether the good has value, since the good is just to be valuable. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV) | |
A reaction: It is simply tautological that goodness has value, and that valuable things are good. But an assassin might 'value' a 'good' way of killing someone, or an instrument of torture. We might say "He values x, but x is bad". Still, he must think x is good. |
5932 | The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross] |
Full Idea: Four things seem to be intrinsically good - virtue, pleasure, the allocation of pleasure to the virtuous, and knowledge. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §V) | |
A reaction: I greatly admire a philosopher who has the courage to assert such a thing, in the face of centuries of scepticism about anyone's ability to even get started in this area. We need the bold assertions first; we can work back to doubts later, if necessary. |
5910 | The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross] |
Full Idea: There are three main things which are intrinsically good - virtue, knowledge, and with certain limitations, pleasure. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II) | |
A reaction: This combines the views of most of the main schools of ancient Greece. For Socrates, knowledge delivers the others; for Aristippus, pleasure eclipses the others; for Zeno of Citium, virtue is all that matters. Ross is a pluralist, like Aristotle. |
5898 | 'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross] |
Full Idea: 'Right' does not mean the same as 'morally good'; we cannot substitute 'he is a right man' for 'he is a morally good man'; this is not just an English idiom, as it is clear that a 'right act' is the act which ought to be done. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §I) | |
A reaction: This is nowadays accepted as a basic distinction in ethical discussions. Shooting a prisoner might be the right thing to do, but it is unlikely to be good. We may talk of 'good deeds', but never of 'right' people. |
5899 | If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross] |
Full Idea: If it is our duty to produce one or other of two or more different states of affairs, without its being our duty to produce one rather than the another, then in such a case each of these acts will be right, and none will be our duty. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §I) | |
A reaction: An elegant piece of analytical philosophy, which shows fairly conclusively that 'right' is distinct from 'duty', as well as being distinct from 'good'. We can generalise about right actions, without identifying anyone who has the duty to perform them. |
5904 | In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross] |
Full Idea: In the past 'what is right' was hardly disentangled from 'what the tribe ordains'; ..'it is the custom' has been accompanied by 'the custom is right', or 'the custom is ordained by someone who has the right to command'. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §I) | |
A reaction: Ross is rejecting this older view, in favour an absolute (and intuitively known) concept of what is right. All right-thinking people should wish Ross luck in his project, no matter how pessimistic the onlooker may be. |
5919 | Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross] |
Full Idea: Goodness in general runs out beyond the strict scope of ethics, if ethics be the philosophical study of good conduct; for some things that are good are neither conduct nor dispositions to conduct. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV) | |
A reaction: This seems to be right, just as the Greek term 'areté' extended beyond moral virtue to excellence in athletics or pottery. Maybe philosophers are too interested in ethics, and have thus missed the philosophical core of the problem. |
5941 | Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross] |
Full Idea: Actions are morally good in virtue of their motives; this is quite distinct from rightness, which belongs to act in virtue of the nature of what is done. So a good action may not do what is right, and a right action need not be morally good. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §VII) | |
A reaction: This sounds neat, but it is hard to find clearcut examples to confirm it. Having your cat put down may be right but not good, but presumably your motive was good. |
5938 | Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross] |
Full Idea: The acquisition of pleasure for oneself rarely, if ever, presents itself as a duty, while the attainment of moral goodness habitually presents itself as a duty; this surely points to an infinity superiority of virtue over pleasure. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §VI) | |
A reaction: You have to be a fully paid-up intuitionist (like Ross) before you can assert such gloriously confident judgements about duty. Personal pleasure could become a duty if you had mistakenly denied it to yourself for a long time. |
5931 | All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross] |
Full Idea: Can anyone doubt that it would be a better state of the universe if, with equality in respect of virtue and of pleasure, and of the allocation of pleasure to the virtuous, the persons in the universe had a far greater understanding of its laws and nature? | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §V) | |
A reaction: Another nice test of our intuitions, with which it is hard to disagree. This technique of argument is found in Plato's Republic (360e onwards). See also Aristotle Idea 543. There are some intuitions which you expect to be universal. |
5939 | Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross] |
Full Idea: The doctrine that morality is entirely social, that all duty consists in promoting the good of others, seems to me profound mistake; intellectual integrity, the love of truth for its own sake, is among the most salient elements in a good moral character. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §VI) | |
A reaction: The objection to this might be than an ideal love of truth is a social virtue, because it produces reliable and useful citizens. Would it be immoral for Robinson Crusoe to live by fictions, instead of facing the depressing truth? |
1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Good applies to all goals, just as truth applies to all forms mind takes in. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) | |
A reaction: In danger of being tautological, if good is understood as no more than the goal of actions. It seems perfectly possibly to pursue a wicked end, and perhaps feel guilty about it. |
5905 | We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross] |
Full Idea: On reflection it seems clear that pleasure is not the only thing in life that we think good in itself, that for instance we think the possession of a good character, or an intelligent understanding of the world, as good or better. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II) | |
A reaction: Aristotle and Plato would obviously agree with this. I agree, as I cannot comprehend the claim that pleasure is self-evidently the good, simply because it feels nice. Why shouldn't evil feel nice? |
5929 | No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross] |
Full Idea: If anyone thinks pleasure alone is the good, it seems to me enough to ask whether, of two states of the universe holding equal amounts of pleasure, we should really think no better of one in with virtuous dispositions and actions than of its opposite. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §V) | |
A reaction: An important technique of argument, analagous to scientific experiment. Hold the variable which is considered to be uniquely vital constant, and see if anyone cares if some other variable changes. It is a good argument. |
5906 | Promise-keeping is bound by the past, and is not concerned with consequences [Ross] |
Full Idea: When a man fulfils a promise because he thinks he ought to do so, it seems clear that he has no thought of its total consequences; he thinks in fact much more of the past than of the future. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II) | |
A reaction: Not entirely true. It is right and good and useful (etc.) to break a minor promise, in order to achieve major good consequences, like saving someone's life. Promises made when drunk should be reconsidered when sober. |
18622 | Promises create a new duty to a particular person; they aren't just a strategy to achieve well-being [Ross] |
Full Idea: To make a promise is not merely to adapt an ingenious device for promoting the general well-being; it is to put oneself in a new relation to one person in particular, creating a specifically new duty to him, not reducible to promoting general well-being. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], p.38), quoted by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 2.3.a | |
A reaction: Of course, a politician might make a promise to society as a whole, but even there Ross seems to be right. 'I'll do it' is not the same as 'I promise you all I'll do it', which is more personal. |
23181 | All acts of virtue relate to justice, which is directed towards the common good [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The good of any virtue …is referable to the common good, to which justice directs, so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice insofar as it directs man to the common good. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q58 5) | |
A reaction: Michael Sandel has recently lamented to fading of the concept of 'the common good' from our moral and political life. In which case this thought of Aquinas takes on great importance. I certainly like it. It seems to apply to courage, for example. |
5908 | Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross] |
Full Idea: There is nothing arbitrary about the prima facie duties; each rests on a definite circumstance which cannot seriously be held to be without moral significance. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II) | |
A reaction: He goes on to list the duties. Some of these duties will inevitably arise if we acknowledge both the rightness of keeping contracts, and the desirability of increasing general happiness. |
8009 | Aquinas wanted, not to escape desire, but to transform it for moral ends [Aquinas, by MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas (unlike St Augustine's Platonism) is not concerned with escaping from the snares of the world and of desire, but with transforming desire for moral ends. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.9 | |
A reaction: This is very close to Aristotle himself, for whom education of the feelings (into good habits, and then true virtues) was central. Education of feelings should be central to all education (though young psychopaths may show resistance). |
23182 | Legal justice is supreme, because it directs the other virtues to the common good [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: There must be one supreme virtue essentially distinct from every other virtue, which directs all the virtues to the common good, and this virtue is legal justice. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q58 6) | |
A reaction: This concept of legal justice is underpinned, for Aquinas, by the concept of natural law, which has divine backing. Positive law could hardly fulfil such a major role, given that it could be corrupt. |
22399 | Temperance prevents our passions from acting against reason [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The passions may incite us to something against reason, and so we need a curb, which we name 'temperance'. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia 2ae Q61 a.3), quoted by Philippa Foot - Virtues and Vices II | |
A reaction: I am increasingly unclear what 'reason' means in contexts like these. It seems to mean no more than the awareness of greater goods than the indulgence of passion. Without that awareness, high intelligence couldn't produce temperance. |
23177 | Justice directs our relations with others, because it denotes a kind of equality [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: It is proper to justice, as compared with the other virtues, to direct man in his relations with others, because it denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are wont to say that things are 'adjusted' when they are made equal. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q57 1) | |
A reaction: Even if you say justice is giving people what they deserve, rather than mere equality, they must still be equal in receiving like for like. Legal justice implies equality before the law (except for monarchs?). |
5917 | People lose their rights if they do not respect the rights of others [Ross] |
Full Idea: The main element in any one's right to life or liberty or property is extinguished by his failure to respect the corresponding right in others. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II App II) | |
A reaction: This obvious truth brings out the way in which rights are based on a contract (with the whole of a society) rather than being based on 'natural rights'. If ownership were totally communal, you couldn't introduce a 'right' to private property. |
5900 | We should do our duty, but not from a sense of duty [Ross] |
Full Idea: Our duty is to do certain things, but not to do them from the sense of duty. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §I) | |
A reaction: A very nice remark, which pinpoints an aspect of Kant which makes most people feel uneasy. "I only came to visit you in hospital because it is my duty". |
5942 | We like people who act from love, but admire more the people who act from duty [Ross] |
Full Idea: We may like better the man who acts more instinctively, from love, but we are bound to think the man who acts from sense of duty the better man. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §VII) | |
A reaction: So why don't we like better men? Presumably a person who only acts from love might equally have acted from some other much worse feeling. Aristotle is right: we both like and admire those who act from love of virtue, not from mere self-control. |
5909 | Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself [Ross, by PG] |
Full Idea: The prima facie duties are of fidelity, gratitude, justice, beneficence (the act, rather than the motive), self-improvement, and non-maleficence. | |
From: report of W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: I admire anyone who has the courage to make a statement like this. A thousand analytical philosophers sharpen their knives for the attack, all armed with Cartesian or empirical scepticism. But to deny these duties is to drop out of society. |
5914 | An act may be described in innumerable ways [Ross] |
Full Idea: Any act may be correctly described in an indefinite, and in principle infinite, number of ways. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II) | |
A reaction: This problem is right at the heart of Kant's theory - that of how precisely to state the 'maxim' which is going to be universalised. We could, of course, tell Ross to use his intuitions to decide which of the maxims is the best description. |
5912 | We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity [Ross] |
Full Idea: Ceteris paribus, we should pay our debts rather than give our money in charity, when we cannot do both. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II) | |
A reaction: This seems a neat objection to utilitarianism, though we could reply that the failure to repay a debt will lead to far more trouble, for you and for your creditor, than your failure to be charitable. |
5916 | Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things [Ross] |
Full Idea: A 'right' does not stand for a purely moral notion; it began, I suppose, by standing for a legal notion, and its usage has broadened out so as to include certain things that cannot be claimed at law, but it is not yet correlative to duty. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II App I) | |
A reaction: Presumably 'natural rights' are those which ought to be legal rights - or they are so obvious that there is no point in discussing legal rights until the natural rights are granted. Don't we make laws because we perceive rights? |
23179 | People differ in their social degrees, and a particular type of right applies to each [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: There are many differences of degrees among men, for instance, some are soldiers, some are priests, some are princes. Therefore some special kind of right should be alloted to them. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q57 4) | |
A reaction: An objection (3), but Aquinas endorses it in his reply. In 58.10 he says striking a prince is worse that striking a commoner. The shift to the idea that everyone is supposed to be equal before the law has been slow, and we are not quite there yet. |
22114 | Tyrannical laws are irrational, and so not really laws [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: A tyrannical law, since it is not in accord with reason, is not unconditionally a law, but is rather a perversion of law. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia IIae.Q92.1, ad 4), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 13 | |
A reaction: Only a belief in natural law can give a basis for such a claim. Positivists will say a tyrannical law is unconditionally a law like any other, but a bad one. |
23174 | Natural law is a rational creature's participation in eternal law [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: It is evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q91 2) | |
A reaction: It is not enough merely that God decrees eternal laws. It is also necessary for us to use reason in order to participate. I'm not sure what reasoning process is involved. |
22113 | Right and wrong actions pertain to natural law, as perceived by practical reason [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: All things to be done or to be avoided pertain to the precepts of natural law, which practical reasoning apprehends naturally as being human goods. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia IIae.Q94.2c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 13 | |
A reaction: No mention of God, but you feel the divine presence in the background. He also cites 'eternal law'. No coincidence that the atheist Hobbes rejected natural law. Personally I would offer an atheistic defence of natural law, based on human nature. |
7291 | For Aquinas a war must be in a just cause, have proper authority, and aim at good [Aquinas, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: Aquinas argued that on three conditions war can be justified: first, that there is a just cause; second, that it is begun on proper authority; and third, that it is waged with right intention, for 'the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil'. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II) by A.C. Grayling - Among the Dead Cities Ch.6 | |
A reaction: But see also Idea 7292. Nowadays we are rightly suspicious of all three conditions. Evil people seem to think their cause is just; authority has often been seized by violence, or is being abused; and people seem confused about what is good or evil. |
5508 | Aquinas says a fertilized egg is not human, and has no immortal soul [Aquinas, by Martin/Barresi] |
Full Idea: In Aquinas's view the fertilized egg is not, either at the moment of conception or for quite a while afterwards, endowed with an immortal soul. In fact, technically speaking, it is not even human. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by R Martin / J Barresi - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' p.20 | |
A reaction: It is pointed at that therefore Aquinas does not give good support for modern Catholic views on abortion. There is certainly no reason why a human zygote should be ensouled from the start, as God may do this whenever He wishes. |
5915 | Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any [Ross] |
Full Idea: On the whole, since we mean by a right something that can be justly claimed, we should probably say that animals have not rights, not because the claim to humane treatment would not be just if it were made, but because they cannot make it. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II App I) | |
A reaction: This would also apply to a human being who was, for some reason, unable to claim their rights. If Amnesty can claim rights for prisoners, presumably we can claim rights for dumb animals. Ross is on weak ground. |
16687 | Bodies are three-dimensional substances [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Bodies are those substances in which one finds three dimensions. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia Q18.2c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 16.2 | |
A reaction: Pasnau points out that this extensional view of physical bodies was a commonplace long before Descartes. Presumably there are also non-dimensional substances (such as angels?). |
11207 | A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: When things are so related that one causes the other to exist, the cause can exist without what it causes but not vice versa. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.103) | |
A reaction: This is open to question, if causes are supposed to be sufficient for effects. Presumably Aquinas would support the view that if the cause had not been, the effect would not have happened. But the current idea indicates the priority relation. |
1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Even a sufficient cause doesn't always compel its effect, since it can sometimes be interfered with so that its effect doesn't happen | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 15) |
15202 | Eternity coexists with passing time, as the centre of a circle coexists with its circumference [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The centre of a circle is directly opposite any designated point on the circumference. In this way, whatever is in any part of time coexists with what is eternal as being present to it even though past or future with respect to another part of time. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Contra Gentiles [1268], I.66), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 2 c | |
A reaction: A nice example of a really cool analogy which almost gets you to accept something which is actually completely incomprehensible. |
23178 | Divine law commands some things because they are good, while others are good because commanded [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The divine law commands certain things because they are good and forbids others because they are evil, while others are good because they are prescribed, and others evil because they are forbidden. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q57 2) | |
A reaction: This is a fifty-fifty response to the Euthyphro dilemma, but it seems to leave the theological puzzle of the source of the goodness which is prescribed because it is in fact good. |
21251 | We can't know God's essence, so his existence can't be self-evident for us [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition 'God exists' is not self-evident to us, but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Art 1, Obj 3) | |
A reaction: Depends on his definition of self-evidence (Idea 21250), which needs knowledge of the essence of the subject. Anselm required 'understanding' of the concept. One might understand the existence criteria without knowing the whole essence. Anselm wins. |
5614 | If you assume that there must be a necessary being, you can't say which being has this quality [Kant on Aquinas] |
Full Idea: To those who assume the existence of a necessary being, and would only know which among all things had to be regarded as such a thing, one could not answer: This thing here is the necessary being | |
From: comment on Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Immanuel Kant - Critique of Pure Reason A612/B640 | |
A reaction: See Aquinas in Idea 1431. Kant makes a nice point. You might turn out to be the necessary being? How could you tell? You only know that there must be one lurking somewhere. I could be a slug. Aquinas makes a huge leap to God. |
21269 | Way 1: the infinite chain of potential-to-actual movement has to have a first mover [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: A thing can only be reduced from potentiality to actuality by something actual. A thing can never be in actuality and potentiality in the same respect. So what is moved must be moved by another. But this cannot go on to infinity, with no first mover. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This relies on the Aristotelian ideas of potentiality and actuality. We might talk about things moving, but lacking the 'power' to move. This is almost identical to Plato in 'The Laws' (which I guess Aquinas knew nothing of). |
21271 | Way 3: contingent beings eventually vanish, so continuity needs a necessary being [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: That which can not-be at some time is not. So if everything can not-be, then once there was nothing in existence. If so, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist. So there must be some being having of itself its own necessity. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Why can't things take it in turns to not-be, so that something is always on duty? Maybe it is a feature of things that they bring other things into existence (e.g. virtual particles)? |
21270 | Way 2: no effect without a cause, and this cannot go back to infinity, so there is First Cause [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: If there is no first cause among efficient causes, there is no ultimate or intermediate cause. That in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity is plainly false. So it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, which everyone calls God. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply) | |
A reaction: [compressed] It doesn't seem to follow at all that the First Cause is God. There could be a single thing like the Phoenix, with unique self-causing properties. Or a quantum fluctuation. |
21272 | Way 4: the source of all qualities is their maximum, so something (God) causes all perfections [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: More and less are predicated of different things according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum. The maximum of a genus is the cause of all in that genus. So there must be something causing the perfections of all beings. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The argument makes a startling jump from each quality (like heat or nobility) having a maximum, to their being a single entity (a 'being' at that) which is the sole source of all human perfections. |
21273 | Way 5: mindless things act towards an obvious end, so there is an intelligent director [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end, which is usually in the same way, to obtain the best result. Hence they achieve their end designedly. Hence some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is Greek teleology with a vengeance. Plants probably illustrate best what he has in mind. There is obvious teleology in human affairs, and there is a sort of teleology in living things, but we take the end to be reinforced by success. |
20211 | Life aims at the Beatific Vision - of perfect happiness, and revealed truth [Aquinas, by Zagzebski] |
Full Idea: Aquinas describes the ultimate end of human life as the Beatific Vision, a state that is simultaneously the enjoyment of perfect happiness and a perfect revelation of truth. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - Virtues of the Mind II 4.2 | |
A reaction: I like that a lot, even though my idea of the revelation of truth is very distant from that of Aquinas. Ignorant happiness is not much of an aspiration. |
22106 | Aquinas saw angels as separated forms, rather than as made of 'spiritual matter' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
Full Idea: Unlike some of his contemporaries, Aquinas does not think that there is a 'spiritual matter' that angels or disembodied souls have as one of their components, but rather that they are separated forms that configure no matter at all. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 10 | |
A reaction: 'Separated forms' sounds like the modern concept of abstract entities, meaning that souls and angels exist in the way that platonists believe numbers exist. How else might Aquinas have understood them? |
16711 | Heretics should be eradicated like wolves [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Heretics are wolves …and therefore ought to be eradicated. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Sentences [1264], IV.13.2.3sc), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |
23306 | Humans have a non-physical faculty of reason, so they can be immortal [Aquinas, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Aquinas infers from Aristotle that intellectual understanding is the only operation of the soul that is performed without a physical organ, so that only human souls, and not animal ones, can be immortal. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I, q75, a3, resp) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Reason' | |
A reaction: This shows why so many thinkers are desperate to hang on to dualism, of some sort. Interesting that he only claims partial dualism. |
1863 | If the soul achieves well-being in another life, it doesn't follow that I do [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Even if soul achieves well-being in another life, that doesn't mean I do or any other human being does. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Super Epistolam Pauli Apostoli [1272]) |
4412 | Those in bliss have their happiness increased by seeing the damned punished [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: In order that the bliss of the saints may be more delightful for them, and they may render more copious thanks to God for it, it is given to them to see perfectly the punishment of the damned. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], III Supp Q94,1), quoted by Friedrich Nietzsche - On the Genealogy of Morals I.§15 | |
A reaction: This has probably been repudiated by the Church of England. Justice should be seen to be done. Presumably you mustn't gloat, or you join them. |
21266 | God does not exist, because He is infinite and good, and so no evil should be discoverable [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: If one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the name God means that He is infinite goodness. If therefore God existed there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob1) | |
A reaction: This is not, of course, the opinion of Aquinas. I love the way he states the opposition's arguments so lucidly. The modern problem usually talks of God's omnipotence, rather than infinity. His formulation allows that there might be undiscoverable evil. |
21274 | It is part of God's supreme goodness that He brings good even out of evil [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: As Augustine says, God would not allow any evil to exist in his works, unless he were to bring good even out of evil. It is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He allows evil to exist and out of it produces good. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob1rep) | |
A reaction: Are God's powers so limited that He could not have achieved an equal amount of good without having to indulge in some evil first? |