14221
|
Serious essentialism says everything has essences, they're not things, and they ground necessities [Shalkowski]
|
|
Full Idea:
Serious essentialism is the position that a) everything has an essence, b) essences are not themselves things, and c) essences are the ground for metaphysical necessity and possibility.
|
|
From:
Scott Shalkowski (Essence and Being [2008], 'Intro')
|
|
A reaction:
If a house is being built, it might acquire an identity first, and only get an essence later. Essences can be physical, but if you extract them you destroy thing thing of which they were the essence. Does all of this apply to abstract 'things'.
|
14222
|
Essences are what it is to be that (kind of) thing - in fact, they are the thing's identity [Shalkowski]
|
|
Full Idea:
The route into essentialism is, first, a recognition that the essence of a thing is "what it is to be" that (kind of) thing; the essence of a thing is just its identity.
|
|
From:
Scott Shalkowski (Essence and Being [2008], 'Essent')
|
|
A reaction:
The first half sounds right, and very Aristotelian. The second half is dramatically different, controversial, and far less plausible. Slipping in 'kind of' is also highly dubious. This remark shows, I think, some confusion about essences.
|
9220
|
Lewis must specify that all possibilities are in his worlds, making the whole thing circular [Shalkowski, by Sider]
|
|
Full Idea:
If purple cows are simply absent from Lewis's multiverse, then certain correct propositions turn out to be impossible. Lewis must require a world for every possibility. But then it is circular, as the multiverse needs modal notions to characterize it.
|
|
From:
report of Scott Shalkowski (Ontological Ground of Alethic Modality [1994], 3.9) by Theodore Sider - Reductive Theories of Modality 3.9
|
|
A reaction:
[Inversely, a world containing a round square would make that possible] This sounds very nice, though Sider rejects it (p.197). I've never seen how you could define possibility using the concept of 'possible' worlds.
|
20653
|
Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
|
|
Full Idea:
There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
|
|
From:
report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
|
|
A reaction:
I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?
|
14224
|
Equilateral and equiangular aren't the same, as we have to prove their connection [Shalkowski]
|
|
Full Idea:
That 'all and only equilateral triangles are equiangular' required proof, and not for mere curiosity, is grounds for thinking that being an equilateral triangle is not the same property as being an equiangular triangle.
|
|
From:
Scott Shalkowski (Essence and Being [2008], 'Serious')
|
|
A reaction:
If you start with equiangularity, does equilateralness then require proof? This famous example is of two concepts which seem to be coextensional, but seem to have a different intension. Does a dependence relation drive a wedge between them?
|