41 ideas
22334 | Analysis must include definitions, search for simples, concept analysis, and Kant's analysis [Glock] |
Full Idea: Under 'analysis' a minimum would include the Socratic quest for definitions, Descartes' search for simple natures, the empiricists' psychological resolution of complex ideas, and Kant's 'transcendental' analysis of our cognitive capacities. | |
From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 6.1) | |
A reaction: This has always struck me, and I find the narrow focus on modern logic a very distorted idea of the larger project. The aim, I think, is to understand by taking things apart, in the spirit of figuring out how a watch works. |
3123 | Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal] |
Full Idea: Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints. | |
From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 5) |
3125 | Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal] |
Full Idea: A person's desires and beliefs tend to cause what they tend to rationalise. This coordination of causality and rationalisation lies at the heart of psychology. | |
From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 5.3) |
4913 | Brain lesions can erase whole categories of perception, suggesting they are hard-wired [Carter,R] |
Full Idea: The discovery that a single brain lesion can erase all knowledge of man-made artefacts, or all knowledge of animals, suggests that these categories somehow hard-wired into the brain - that we all have a set of 'memory pigeonholes'. | |
From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.190) | |
A reaction: Presumably something can become 'hard-wired' through experience, rather than from birth. The whole idea of 'hard-wired' seems misleading about the brain. What matters is that the brain physically constructs categories. |
3105 | Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal] |
Full Idea: It is metaphysically necessary that Hesperus is Phosphorus, but not logically necessary, since logical deduction could not reveal its truth, and it is not epistemologically necessary, as the ancient Greeks didn't know the identity. (Natural necessity?) | |
From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 1.6) |
3106 | If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal] |
Full Idea: Since conceivability is the chief method of assessing the claims of metaphysical necessity, I think such claims are incautious. | |
From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 1.6) |
22332 | German and British idealism is not about individual ideas, but the intelligibility of reality [Glock] |
Full Idea: Neither German nor British Idealism reduced reality to episodes in the minds of individuals. Instsead, they insisted that reality is intelligible only because it is a manifestation of a divine spirit or rational principle. | |
From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 5.2) | |
A reaction: They standardly reject Berkeley. Such Idealism seems either to be the design argument for God's existence, or neo-Stoicism (in its claim that nature is rational). Why not just say that nature seems to be intelligible, and stop there? |
4910 | Sense organs don't discriminate; they reduce various inputs to the same electrical pulses [Carter,R] |
Full Idea: Despite their variety, each sense organ translates its stimulus into electrical pulses; rather than discriminating one type of input from another, the sense organs actually make them more alike. | |
From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.174) | |
A reaction: An illuminating observation, which modern 'naïve realists' should bear in mind. Secondary qualities are entirely unrelated to the nature of the input, and are merely 'what the brain decides to make of it'. Discrimination is in our neurons. |
4911 | The recognition sequence is: classify, name, locate, associate, feel [Carter,R, by PG] |
Full Idea: The sequence of events in the brain for perceptual recognition is first identifying a rough class for the object, then a name, then a location, then some associations, and finally an emotion. | |
From: report of Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.181) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This seems to be one of those places where neuro-science trumps philosophy. You can't argue with empirical research, so philosophical theories had better adapt themselves to this sequence. The big modern discovery is the place of emotion in recognition. |
4919 | There seems to be no dividing line between a memory and a thought [Carter,R] |
Full Idea: It has become clear from research that there is no clear dividing line between a memory and a thought. | |
From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.308) | |
A reaction: This always struck me as an obvious criticism of Descartes, when he claimed that memory was not an essential part of the 'thinking thing'. How can you think or understand without memory of the different phases of your thoughts? No memory, no mind! |
3113 | The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal] |
Full Idea: The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth. | |
From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 2.2) |
4908 | No one knows if animals are conscious [Carter,R] |
Full Idea: No one knows if animals are conscious. | |
From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.155) | |
A reaction: This is a report from the front line of brain research, and should be born in mind when over-confident people make pronouncements about this topic. It strikes me as important to grasp that animals MIGHT not be conscious. |
4902 | Pain doesn't have one brain location, but is linked to attention and emotion [Carter,R] |
Full Idea: Scans show there is no such thing as a pain centre; pain springs mainly from the activation of areas associated with attention and emotion. | |
From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p. 12) | |
A reaction: Most brain research points to the complex multi-layered nature of experiences that were traditionally considered simple. We can be distracted from a pain, and an enormous number of factors can affect our degree of dislike of a given pain. |
4904 | Proper brains appear at seven weeks, and neonates have as many neurons as adults do [Carter,R] |
Full Idea: The main sections of the brain, including the cerebral cortex, are visible within seven weeks of conception, and by the time the child is born the brain contains as many neurons - about 100 billion - as it will have as an adult. | |
From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p. 17) | |
A reaction: Of interest in the abortion debate, and also in thinking about personal identity. However, it seems clear that the number of connections, rather than neurons, is what really matters. A small infant may well lack personal identity. |
4915 | In primates, brain size correlates closely with size of social group [Carter,R] |
Full Idea: Brain size in primates is closely associated with the size of the social group in which the animal lives. | |
From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.257) | |
A reaction: Intriguing. Humans can have huge social groups because of language, which suggests a chicken-or-egg question. Language, intelligence and size of social group must have expanded together in humans. |
4917 | Consciousness involves awareness, perception, self-awareness, attention and reflection [Carter,R] |
Full Idea: Awareness, perception, self-awareness, attention and reflection are all separate components of consciousness, and the quality of our experience varies according to which and how many of them are present. | |
From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.300) | |
A reaction: Philosophers like to emphasise 'qualia' and 'intentionality'. This remark slices the cake differently. 'Attention' is interesting, dividing consciousness into two areas, with some experience fading away into the darkness. Hume denied self-awareness. |
4916 | There is enormous evidence that consciousness arises in the frontal lobes of the brain [Carter,R] |
Full Idea: A huge volume of evidence suggests that consciousness emerges from the activity of the cerebral cortex, and in particular from the frontal lobes. | |
From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.298) | |
A reaction: Dualists must face up to this, and even many physicalists have a rather vague notion about the location of awareness, but we are clearly homing in very precise physical substances which have consciousness as a feature. |
4905 | Normal babies seem to have overlapping sense experiences [Carter,R] |
Full Idea: Connections in a baby's brain probably give the infant the experience of 'seeing' sounds and 'hearing' colours - which occasionally continues into adulthood, where it is known as 'synaesthesia'. | |
From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p. 19) | |
A reaction: A fact to remember when discussing secondary qualities, and the relativism involved in the way we perceive the world. If you have done your philosophy right, you shouldn't be surprised by this discovery. |
4918 | In blindsight V1 (normal vision) is inactive, but V5 (movement) lights up [Carter,R] |
Full Idea: Scans show that a sub-section of the visual cortex called V5 - the area that registers movement - lights up during blindsight, even though V1 - the primary sensory area that is essential for normal sight - is not active. | |
From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.307) | |
A reaction: The whole point of blindsight is to make us realise that vision involves not one module, but a whole team of them. The inference is that V1 involves consciousness, but other areas of the visual cortex don't. |
4912 | Out-of-body experiences may be due to temporary loss of proprioception [Carter,R] |
Full Idea: Out-of-body experiences may be due to temporary loss of proprioception. | |
From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.187) | |
A reaction: This is only a speculation, but it is an effect which can be caused by brain injury, and dualists should face the possibility that this evidence (prized by many dualists) can have a physical explanation. |
4903 | Scans of brains doing similar tasks produce very similar patterns of activation [Carter,R] |
Full Idea: The pattern of brain activation during, say, a word retrieval task is usually similar enough among the dozen or so participants who typically take part in such studies for their scans to be overlaid and still show a clear pattern. | |
From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p. 17) | |
A reaction: This doesn't surprise me, though it could be interpreted as supporting type-type identity, or as supporting functionalism. Armstrong and Lewis endorse a sort of reductive functionalism which would fit this observation. |
4920 | Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex [Carter,R] |
Full Idea: The nuts and bolts of thinking - holding ideas in mind and manipulating them - takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex. | |
From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.312) | |
A reaction: Keep this firmly in view! Imagine that the skull is transparent, and brain activity moves in waves of colour. Dualism would, in those circumstances, never have even occurred to anyone. |
4906 | Babies show highly emotional brain events, but may well be unaware of them [Carter,R] |
Full Idea: Babies show emotion dramatically, but the areas of the brain that in adults are linked to the conscious experience of emotions are not active in newborn babies. Such emotions may therefore be unconscious. | |
From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p. 19) | |
A reaction: Traditionally, 'unconscious emotion' is a contradiction, but I think we should accept this new evidence and rethink the nature of mind. Not only might emotion be non-conscious, but we should even consider that rational thinking could be too. |
4909 | The only way we can control our emotions is by manipulating the outside world that influences them [Carter,R] |
Full Idea: We try to manipulate our emotions all the time, but all we are doing is arranging the outside world so it triggers certain emotions - we cannot control our reactions directly. | |
From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.155) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to throw a very illuminating light on a huge amount of human behaviour, such as going to the cinema or listening to music. The romantic movement encouraged direct internal manipulation. Compare sex fantasies with viewing pornography. |
3112 | Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal] |
Full Idea: Commonsense psychology is a powerful explanatory theory, and largely correct, but it seems to be profoundly dualist, and treats minds as immaterial spirits which can transmigrate and exist disembodied. | |
From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Fans of folk psychology tend to focus on central normal experience, but folk psychology also seems to range from quirky to barking mad. A 'premonition' is a widely accepted mental event. |
4914 | A frog will starve to death surrounded by dead flies [Carter,R] |
Full Idea: A frog will starve to death surrounded by dead flies. | |
From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.195) | |
A reaction: A nice warning against assuming that rationality is operating when a frog feels hungry and 'decides' to have lunch. We should take comfort from the fact that humans are NOT this stupid, and philosophers should try to accurately describe our gift. |
3108 | If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal] |
Full Idea: My view is that the concepts of both the Earth person and the Twin Earth person refer to BOTH forms of diamonds or water (H2O and XYZ). | |
From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 1.7) | |
A reaction: Fair enough, though that seems to imply that my current concepts may actually refer to all sorts of items of which I am currently unaware. But that may be so. |
3110 | Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal] |
Full Idea: Humans are largely made of H2O, so there could be no twin on Twin Earth, and (as Kuhn noted) nothing with a significantly different structure from H2O could be macroscopically very like water (but topaz and citrine will do). | |
From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 2.1) | |
A reaction: A small point, but one that appeals to essentialists like me (see under Natural Theory/Laws of Nature). We can't learn much metaphysics from impossible examples. |
3124 | Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal] |
Full Idea: The question of what a pre-scientific term extends over is extremely difficult for a Putnam-style externalist to answer. …There seems no good reason to assume that they extend over natural kinds ('whale', 'cat', 'water'). | |
From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 5.1) | |
A reaction: The assumption seems to be that they used to extend over descriptions, and now they extend over essences, or expert references. This can't be right. They have never changed, but now contain fewer errors. |
3117 | Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal] |
Full Idea: We need to think of concepts as organic entities that can persist through changes of extension. | |
From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 3.3) | |
A reaction: This would be 'organic' in the sense of modifying and growing. This is exactly right, and the interesting problem becomes the extreme cases, where an individual stretches a concept a long way. |
3104 | Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal] |
Full Idea: Is a relationship with diamonds necessary for having a concept of diamonds? | |
From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 1.4) | |
A reaction: Probably not, given that I have a concept of kryptonite, and that I can invent my own concepts. Suppose I was brought up to believe that diamonds are a myth? |
3103 | Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal] |
Full Idea: It has been argued (e.g. by Tyler Burge) that certain relations to other language users are determinants of content. | |
From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 1.4) | |
A reaction: Burge's idea (with Wittgenstein behind him) strikes me as plausible (more plausible than water and elms determining the content). Our concepts actually shift during conversations. |
3111 | Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal] |
Full Idea: Empty terms and concepts provide the largest problem for the externalist thesis of the world dependence of concepts. | |
From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 2.2) | |
A reaction: A speculative concept could then become a reality (e.g. an invention). The solution seems to be to say that there is an internal and an external component to most concepts. |
3109 | If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal] |
Full Idea: If we accept Putnam's externalist conclusion about the meaning of a word, it is a short step to a similar conclusion about the contents of the twins' beliefs, desires and so on. | |
From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This is the key step which has launched a whole new externalist view of the nature of the mind. It is one thing to say that I don't quite know what my words mean, another that I don't know my own beliefs. |
3116 | Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal] |
Full Idea: Putnam and Burge claim that there could be two words that a misinformed subject uses to express different concepts, but that express just one concept of the experts. | |
From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 3.2) | |
A reaction: This pushes the concept outside the mind of the user, which leaves an ontological problem of what concepts are made of, how you individuate them, and where they are located. |
3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
Full Idea: To say that contents of my belief are narrow is to say that they are intrinsic to me, hence that any perfect twin of mine would have beliefs with the same contents. | |
From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 5) | |
A reaction: I personally find this more congenial than externalism. If my twin and I studied chemistry, we would reach identical conclusions about water, as long as we remained perfect twins. |
3118 | If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal] |
Full Idea: If we identify a psychological property with its causal role then we lose the obvious explanation of why the event has the causal role that it has. | |
From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 4.1) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints very nicely one of the biggest errors in modern philosophy. There are good naturalistic reasons to reduce everything to causal role, but there is a deeper layer. Essences! |
3119 | Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal] |
Full Idea: We can't define mass in terms of its causal powers because massive objects do different things in different physical systems. …What an object (or concept) with a given property does depends on what it interacts with. | |
From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 4.1) | |
A reaction: This leaves an epistemological problem, that we believe in mass, but can only get at it within a particular gravitational or inertial system. Don't give up on ontology at this point. |
22336 | We might say that the family resemblance is just a consequence of meaning-as-use [Glock] |
Full Idea: Against Wittgenstein's family resemblance view one might evoke his own idea that the meaning of a word is its use, and that diversity of use entails diversity of meaning. | |
From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 8.2) | |
A reaction: Wittgenstein might just accept the point. Diversity of concepts reflects diversity of usage. But how do you distinguish 'football is a game' from 'oy, what's your game?'. How does usage distinguish metaphorical from literal (if it does)? |
22335 | The variety of uses of 'game' may be that it has several meanings, and isn't a single concept [Glock] |
Full Idea: The proper conclusion to draw from the fact that we explain 'game' in a variety of different ways is that it is not a univocal term, but has different, albeit related, meanings. | |
From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 8.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Rundle 1990] Potter says Wittgenstein insisted that 'game' is a single concept. 'Game' certainly slides off into metaphor, as in 'are you playing games with me?'. The multivocal view would still meet family resemblance on a narrower range. |
4907 | The 'locus coeruleus' is one of several candidates for the brain's 'pleasure centre' [Carter,R] |
Full Idea: Noradrenaline is an excitatory chemical that induces physical and mental arousal and heightens mood. Production is centred in an area of the brain called the locus coeruleus, which is one of several candidates for the brain's 'pleasure' centre. | |
From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p. 30) | |
A reaction: It seems to me very morally desirable that people understand facts of this kind, so that they can be more objective about pleasure. Pleasure is one cog in the machine that makes a person, not the essence of human life. |