38 ideas
9240 | Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: The necessity with which love binds the will puts an end to indecisiveness concerning what to care about. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.13) | |
A reaction: I put this here as a reminder that there may be more to necessity than the dry concept of metaphysicians and logicians. 'Why did you rescue that man first?' 'Because I love him'. Kit Fine recognises many sorts of necessity. |
6685 | 'Subjectivism' is an extension of relativism from the social group to the individual [Graham] |
Full Idea: What is called 'subjectivism' is really just an extension of relativism from the level of the social group to the level of the individual. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Personally I prefer to stick with 'relativism', at any level. 'Relative' is a two-place predicate, so we should always specify what is relative to what, unless it is obvious from context. Morality might be relative to God, for example. |
9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: The essential difference between persons and other creatures is in the structure of the will, with their peculiar characteristic of being able to form 'second-order desires'. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], Intro) | |
A reaction: There are problems with this - notably that all strategies of this kind just shift the problem up to the next order, without solving it - but this still strikes me as a very promising line of thinking when trying to understand ourselves. See Idea 9266. |
9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: It is having second-order volitions, and not having second-order desires generally, that I regard as essential to being a person. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §II) | |
A reaction: Watson criticises Frankfurt for just pushing the problem up to the the next level, but Frankfurt is not offering to explain the will. He merely notes that this structure produces the sort of behaviour which is characteristic of persons, and he is right. |
9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: The statement that a person enjoys freedom of the will means that he is free to want what he wants to want. More precisely, he is free to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he wants. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §III) | |
A reaction: A good proposal. It covers kleptomaniacs and drug addicts quite well. Thieves have second-order desires (to steal) of which kleptomaniacs are incapable. There is actually no such thing as free will, but this sort of thing will do. |
3519 | Man uses his body, so must be separate from it [Anon (Plat), by Maslin] |
Full Idea: A man uses his whole body to do things, and therefore, just as a person is distinct from a tool he uses, so it follows that a man must be distinct from his body. | |
From: report of Anon (Plat) (Alcibiades [c.340 BCE]) by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 2.3 | |
A reaction: This 'follows'? Every part of my body and my mind makes 'use' of every other part. My body uses my mind to achieve reproduction. He presumably means 'person' rather than 'man'. |
9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: A person's will is the effective desire which moves (or will or would move) a person all the way to action. The will is not coextensive with what an agent intends to do, since he may do something else instead. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §I) | |
A reaction: Essentially Hobbes's view, but with an arbitrary distinction added. If the desire is only definitely a 'will' if it really does lead to action, then it only becomes the will after the action starts. The error is thinking that will is all-or-nothing. |
20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: Frankfurt says that basic issues concerning freedom of action presuppose and give weight to a concept of 'acting on a desire with which the agent identifies'. | |
From: report of Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 1 | |
A reaction: [the cite Frankfurt 1988 and 1999] I'm not sure how that works when performing a grim duty, but it sounds quite plausible. |
9228 | Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: Ranking desires in order of preference is no help, because a person who wants one thing more than another may not regard the former as any more important to him than the latter. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.5) | |
A reaction: A salutary warning. Someone may pursue something with incredible intensity, but only to stave off a boring and empty existence. The only way I can think of to assess what really matters to people is - to ask them! |
9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: I use the term 'wanton' to refer to agents who have first-order desires but who are not persons because, whether or not they have desires of the second-order, they have no second-order volitions. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §II) | |
A reaction: He seems to be describing someone who behaves like an animal, performing actions without ever stopping to think about them. Presumably some persons occasionally become wantons, if, for example, they have an anger problem. |
9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: It is not true that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if his will was free when he did it. He may be morally responsible for having done it even though his will was not free at all. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §IV) | |
A reaction: Frankfurt seems to be one of the first to assert this break with the traditional view. Good for him. I take moral responsibility to hinge on an action being caused by a person, but not with a mystical view of what a person is. |
6699 | The chain of consequences may not be the same as the chain of responsibility [Graham] |
Full Idea: From a utilitarian point of view, the error of Archduke Ferdinand's driver (he turned up a cul-de-sac) was the worst in history, ...but the chain of consequences may not be the same as the chain of responsibility. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: Can you cause something, and yet not be responsible for it? The driver was presumably fully conscious, rational and deliberate. He must share the responsibility for catastrophe, just as he shares in the causing of all the consequences. |
9238 | Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: The ultimate warrant for moral principles cannot be found in reason. The sort of opprobrium that attaches to moral transgressions is quite unlike the sort of opprobrium that attaches to the requirements of reason. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.5 n6) | |
A reaction: More like a piece of evidence than a proper argument. We may not feel indignant if someone fails a maths exam, but we might if they mess up the arithmetic of our bank account, even though they meant well. |
9232 | It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.10) | |
A reaction: This book is a lovely attempt at getting to the heart of where values come from. 'Football isn't a matter of life and death; it's more important than that' - Bill Shankly (manager of Liverpool). Frankfurt is right. |
9234 | If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: It is not possible for a person who does not already care at least about something to discover reasons for caring about anything. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.11) | |
A reaction: This is the key idea of this lovely book. Without a glimmer of love somewhere, it is not possible to bootstrap a meaningful life. The glimmer of caring about one thing is transferable. See the Ancient Mariner and the watersnake. |
9229 | What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: What is worth having or worth doing for its own sake alone may nonetheless be worth very little. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.5) | |
A reaction: That is one of my cherished notions sunk without trace! Aristotle's idea that ends are what matter, not means, always struck me as crucial. But Frankfurt is right. Collecting trivia is done for its own sake. Great tasks are performed as a means. |
9233 | Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: Identifying the criteria to be employed in evaluating various ways of living is also tantamount to providing an answer to the question of how to live. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.10) | |
A reaction: Presumably critical reflection is still possible about those criteria, even though he implies that they just arise out of you (in a rather Nietzschean way). The fear is that critical reflection on basic criteria kills in infant in its cradle. |
9235 | Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: It is often understood that we begin loving things because we are struck by their value. ..However, what I have in mind is rather that what we love necessarily acquires value for us because we love it. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.3) | |
A reaction: The uneasy thought here is that this makes value much less rational. If you love because you value, you could probably give reasons for the value. If love comes first it must be instinctive. He says he loved his children before they were born. |
9236 | Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: It is not among the defining features of love that it must be hot rather than cool, ..and nor is it essential that a person like what he loves. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.4) | |
A reaction: An interesting pair of observations. The greatness of love would probably be measured by length, or by sacrifice. Extreme heat makes us a little suspicious. It would be hard to love something that was actually disliked. |
9237 | The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: Relationships that are primarily romantic or sexual do not provide very authentic or illuminating paradigms of love. ...The love of parents for their small children comes closest to offering recognizably pure instances of love. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.4) | |
A reaction: Excellent. Though perhaps a relationships which began romantically might settle into something like the more 'pure' love that he has in mind. Such a relationship must, I trust, be possible between adults. |
9239 | I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: Beside the fact that my children are important to me for their own sakes, there is the additional fact that loving my children is important to me for its own sake. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.7) | |
A reaction: This is at the heart of Frankfurt's thesis, that love is the bedrock of our values in life, and we therefore all need to love in order to generate any values in our life, quite apart from what our love is directed at. Nice thought. |
6698 | Negative consequences are very hard (and possibly impossible) to assess [Graham] |
Full Idea: Negative consequences make the extension of the consequences of our actions indefinite, and this means that it is difficult to assess them; it may make it impossible, since there is now no clear sense to the idea of THE consequences of an action at all. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: The general slogan of 'Do your best' covers most objections to the calculation of consequences. It is no excuse for stealing a wallet that 'at least I wasn't committing genocide'. How easy were the alternative actions to do? |
6700 | We can't criticise people because of unforeseeable consequences [Graham] |
Full Idea: It is unreasonable to say that people have acted badly because of consequences which were not merely unforeseen but unforeseeable. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: Interesting, and it sounds right. A key question in moral philosophy is how much effort people should make to assess the consequences of their actions. We must surely absolve them of the truly 'unforeseeable' consequence. |
9227 | We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: People who are scrupulously moral may nonetheless be destined by deficiencies of character or of constitution to lead lives that no reasonable person would freely choose. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.2) | |
A reaction: This fairly firmly refutes any Greek dream that all there is to happiness is leading a virtuous life. Frankfurt is with Aristotle more than with the Stoics. It would be tempting to sacrifice virtue to get a sunny character and good health. |
9230 | People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: Besides wanting to fulfil his desire, the person who cares about what he desires wants something else as well: he wants the desire to be sustained. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.6) | |
A reaction: Plato, in 'Gorgias', makes this fact sound like a nightmare, resembling drug addiction, but in Frankfurt's formulation it looks like a good thing. If you want to make your family happy because you love them, you would dread finding your love had died. |
9241 | Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: Far from demonstrating a flaw in character or being a sign of weakness, coming to love oneself is the deepest and most essential - and by no means the most readily attainable - achievement of a serious and successful life. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.14) | |
A reaction: Obviously it will be necessary to dilineate the healthy form of self-love, which Frankfurt attempts to do. Ruthless vanity and self-seeking certainly look like the worst possible weaknesses of character. With that proviso, he is right. |
6704 | Egoism submits to desires, but cannot help form them [Graham] |
Full Idea: Egoism is inadequate as a guide to good living. Though it tells us what to do, given pre-existent desires, it cannot help us critically form those desires. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: A crucial point in morality. It also applies to utilitarianism (should I change my capacity for pleasure?), and virtue theory (how should I genetically engineer 'human nature'?). I think these problems push us towards Platonism. See Idea 4840. |
6701 | Rescue operations need spontaneous benevolence, not careful thought [Graham] |
Full Idea: If more lives are to be saved in natural disasters, what is needed is spontaneity on the part of the rescuers, a willingness not to stop and think but to act spontaneously. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: This seems right, but must obviously be applied with caution, as when people are drowned attempting hopeless rescues. The most valuable person in an earthquake may be the thinker, not the digger. |
6693 | 'What if everybody did that?' rather misses the point as an objection to cheating [Graham] |
Full Idea: I can object to your walking on the grass by asking 'What if everybody did that?', but the advantages of cheating depend upon the fact that most people don't cheat, so justifying my own cheating must involve special pleading. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: It is, of course, reasonable to ask 'What if everybody cheated?', but it is also reasonable to reply that 'the whole point of cheating is that it exploits the honesty of others'. This shows that Kant cannot simply demolish the 'free rider'. |
6691 | It is more plausible to say people can choose between values, than that they can create them [Graham] |
Full Idea: To say that individuals are free to choose their own values is more naturally interpreted as meaning that they are free to choose between pre-existent values. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Existentialism seems absurdly individualistic in its morality. Nietzsche was the best existentialist, who saw that most people have to be sheep. Strong personalities can promote or demote the old values on the great scale of what is good. |
6688 | Life is only absurd if you expected an explanation and none turns up [Graham] |
Full Idea: If 'life is absurd' just means 'there is no logical explanation for human existence', we have no reason for anguish, unless we think there should be such an explanation. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at Kierkegaard and Camus. 'Absurd' certainly seems to be a relative notion, and we have nothing to compare life with. However, life does strike us as a bit odd sometimes, don't you think? |
9300 | Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: Boredom is a serious matter. It is not a condition that we seek to avoid just because we do not find it enjoyable. ..It threatens the very continuation of conscious mental life. ..Avoiding bored is a primitive urge for psychic survival. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.8) | |
A reaction: Presumably nihilism will flood into the emptiness created by boredom. Frankfurt will see it as a lack of love for anything in your life, and hence an absence of value. Frankfurt is very good. |
6705 | Existentialism may transcend our nature, unlike eudaimonism [Graham] |
Full Idea: It is the freedom to transcend our nature which eudaimonism seems to ignore and existentialism brings to the fore. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: It is wildly exciting to 'transcend our nature', and very dreary to polish up the nature which is given to us. In this I am a bit conservative. We should not go against the grain, but we shouldn't assume current living is the correct line of the grain. |
6690 | A standard problem for existentialism is the 'sincere Nazi' [Graham] |
Full Idea: A standard problem for existentialism is the 'sincere Nazi'; there were undoubtedly some true believers, who saw in Nazism a creed that they wanted to believe, and who freely chose to endorse it. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: The failing of Nazis was that they were not good citizens. They might have been good members of a faction, but they were (in my opinion) poor citizens of Germany, and (obviously) appalling citizens of Europe. The objection to existentialism is good. |
6689 | The key to existentialism: the way you make choices is more important than what you choose [Graham] |
Full Idea: The chief implication of existentialism is this: what you choose to do, how you choose to spend your life, is not as important as the way you choose it. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: While existentialists place emphasis on some notion of 'pure' choice, this is very close to the virtue theory idea that in a dilemma there may be several different choices which could all be rightly made by virtuous people. Integrity is a central virtue. |
9231 | Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt] |
Full Idea: What counts as far as freedom goes is not causal independence, but autonomy. It is a matter of whether we are active rather than passive in our motives and choices, whether those are what we really want, and not alien to us. | |
From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.8) | |
A reaction: This is why setting your own targets is excellent, but having targets set for you by authorities is pernicious. These kind of principles need to be clear before any plausible theory of liberalism can be developed. |
6706 | The great religions are much more concerned with the religious life than with ethics [Graham] |
Full Idea: The fact is that the great religions of the world are not principally concerned with ethics at all, but with the religious life for its own sake. ..The Sermon on the Mount, for example, is mainly concerned with how to pray and worship. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: This seems to me a highly significant point, given that most people nowadays seem to endorse religion precisely because they wish to endorse morality, and think religion is its essential underpinning. See Idea 336 for the core problem ('Euthyphro'). |
6709 | Western religion saves us from death; Eastern religion saves us from immortality [Graham] |
Full Idea: For Western minds, religion entails the belief and hope that we will be saved from death and live forever, but the belief of Eastern religions is that we do live forever, and it is from this dreadful fate that we must look to spirituality to save us. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: Nice. I have certainly come to prefer the Eastern view, simply on the grounds that human beings have a limited capacity. I quite fancy three hundred years of healthy life, but after that I am sure that any potential I have will be used up. |