Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hastings Rashdall, Carl Hoefer and John Richardson

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
20350 Metaphysics generalises the data, to get at the ontology [Richardson]
     Full Idea: The evidence lies at the periphery of the [metaphysical] system and runs in from there, through decreasingly specific accounts of the data, to the central ontology.
     From: John Richardson (Nietzsche's System [2002], Intro)
     A reaction: Philosophy is the study of high level generalisations, IMHO. Studying them means studying the reasons for asserting them. Richardson puts it very nicely.
20349 Metaphysics aims at the essence of things, and a system to show how this explains other truths [Richardson]
     Full Idea: The core of metaphysics is an account of the 'essence' or 'being' of things. ...And metaphysics needs system, to show how these primary truths reach out into all the other truths, to help us see that, and how, they are true.
     From: John Richardson (Nietzsche's System [2002], Intro)
     A reaction: I like the phrase 'the essential nature' of things, because it doesn't invoke rather dodgy entities called 'essences', but everyone understands the idea of focusing on what is essential, and on things having a distinct 'nature'.
20351 Metaphysics needs systems, because analysis just obsesses over details [Richardson]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics makes system a virtue, contrary to the tendency of analysis, which breaks a problem into ever finer parts and then absorbs itself in these.
     From: John Richardson (Nietzsche's System [2002], Intro)
     A reaction: I disagree, because it seems to rule out analytic metaphysics. I prefer Bertrand Russell's view. Admittedly analysis oftens gets stuck in the bog, especially if it hopes for salvation in logic, only to discover its certainties endlessly receding.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 2. Ethical Self
1457 Morality requires a minimum commitment to the self [Rashdall]
     Full Idea: A bare minimum of metaphysical belief about the self is found to be absolutely presupposed in the very idea of morality.
     From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], II.III.I.4)
     A reaction: This may not be true of virtue theory, where we could have a whole creature which lacked any sense of personhood, but yet had clear virtues and vices in its social functioning. Even if choices are central to morality, that might not need a self.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
6674 All moral judgements ultimately concern the value of ends [Rashdall]
     Full Idea: All moral judgements are ultimately judgements as to the value of ends.
     From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], VII.I)
     A reaction: I am increasingly struck by this, especially when observing that it is the great gap in Kant's theory. For some odd reason, he gives being rational the highest possible value. Why? Nietzsche is good on this. 'Eudaimonia' seems a good start, to me.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 6. Ideal Utilitarianism
6673 Ideal Utilitarianism is teleological but non-hedonistic; the aim is an ideal end, which includes pleasure [Rashdall]
     Full Idea: My view, called Ideal Utilitarianism, combines the utilitarian principle that Ethics must be teleological with a non-hedonistic view of ethical ends; actions are right or wrong as they produce an ideal end, which includes, but is not limited to, pleasure.
     From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], VII.I)
     A reaction: I certainly think that if you are going to be a consequentialist, then it is ridiculous to limit the end to pleasure, as it is an 'open question' as to whether we judge pleasures or pains to be good or bad. I am fond of beauty, goodness and truth, myself.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
20356 Humans dominate because, unlike other animals, they have a synthesis of conflicting drives [Richardson]
     Full Idea: In contrast to the other animals, man has cultivated an abundance of contrary drives and impulses within himself: thanks to this synthesis, he is master of the earth.
     From: John Richardson (Nietzsche's System [2002], §966)
     A reaction: If this is true, it presents the fundamental challenge of politicial philosophy - to visual a successful social system for a creature which does not have a clear and focused nature. For Nietzsche, this 'synthesis' continually evolves.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
20366 A mind that could see cause and effect as a continuum would deny cause and effect [Richardson]
     Full Idea: An intellect that could see cause and effect as a continuum and a flux, and not, as we do, in terms of an arbitrary division and dismemberment, would repudiate the concept of cause and effect.
     From: John Richardson (Nietzsche's System [2002], §112)
     A reaction: Maybe we do see it as a continuum? The racket swings and the ball is propelled, but the contact is a unity, not two separate events.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
19035 General Relativity allows substantivalism about space-time - that it has independent properties [Hoefer]
     Full Idea: General Relativity describes space-time in a way that allows it to exist with determinate properties not reducible to the properties and relations of its material contents. Hence nearly all physicists and philosophers writing on GR are substantivalists.
     From: Carl Hoefer (The Metaphysics of Space-Time Substantivalism [1996], p.5), quoted by Barbara Vetter - Potentiality 7.3
     A reaction: I'm encouraged by this, as I instinctly favour substantivalism. Imagine removing all the objects from space-time, one by one. What happens as you approach the end of the task? Once they are removed, can they be replaced?
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
1458 Conduct is only reasonable or unreasonable if the world is governed by reason [Rashdall]
     Full Idea: Absolutely reasonable or unreasonable conduct could not exist in a world which was not itself the product of reason or governed by its dictates.
     From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], II.III.I.4)
1459 Absolute moral ideals can't exist in human minds or material things, so their acceptance implies a greater Mind [Rashdall, by PG]
     Full Idea: An absolute moral ideal cannot exist in material things, or in the minds of individual people, so belief in it requires belief in a Mind which contains the ideal and is its source.
     From: report of Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], II.III.I.4) by PG - Db (ideas)