8 ideas
| 15927 | Definition just needs negation, known variables, conjunction, disjunction, substitution and quantification [Weyl, by Lavine] |
| Full Idea: For mathematics, Weyl arrived (by 1917) at a satisfactory list of definition principles: negation, identification of variables, conjunction, disjunction, substitution of constants, and existential quantification over the domain. | |
| From: report of Hermann Weyl (works [1917]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite V.3 | |
| A reaction: Lavine summarises this as 'first-order logic with parameters'. |
| 14367 | An explanation is a causal graph [Woodward,J, by Strevens] |
| Full Idea: On Woodward's manipulationist view, an explanation would take the form of a causal graph. | |
| From: report of James Woodward (Making Things Happen [2003]) by Michael Strevens - No Understanding without Explanation 1 | |
| A reaction: The idea is that causation is all to do with how nature responds when you try to manipulate it. I'm certainly in favour of tying explanation closely to causation. |
| 1457 | Morality requires a minimum commitment to the self [Rashdall] |
| Full Idea: A bare minimum of metaphysical belief about the self is found to be absolutely presupposed in the very idea of morality. | |
| From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], II.III.I.4) | |
| A reaction: This may not be true of virtue theory, where we could have a whole creature which lacked any sense of personhood, but yet had clear virtues and vices in its social functioning. Even if choices are central to morality, that might not need a self. |
| 6674 | All moral judgements ultimately concern the value of ends [Rashdall] |
| Full Idea: All moral judgements are ultimately judgements as to the value of ends. | |
| From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], VII.I) | |
| A reaction: I am increasingly struck by this, especially when observing that it is the great gap in Kant's theory. For some odd reason, he gives being rational the highest possible value. Why? Nietzsche is good on this. 'Eudaimonia' seems a good start, to me. |
| 6673 | Ideal Utilitarianism is teleological but non-hedonistic; the aim is an ideal end, which includes pleasure [Rashdall] |
| Full Idea: My view, called Ideal Utilitarianism, combines the utilitarian principle that Ethics must be teleological with a non-hedonistic view of ethical ends; actions are right or wrong as they produce an ideal end, which includes, but is not limited to, pleasure. | |
| From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], VII.I) | |
| A reaction: I certainly think that if you are going to be a consequentialist, then it is ridiculous to limit the end to pleasure, as it is an 'open question' as to whether we judge pleasures or pains to be good or bad. I am fond of beauty, goodness and truth, myself. |
| 10246 | The limit of science is isomorphism of theories, with essences a matter of indifference [Weyl] |
| Full Idea: A science can determine its domain of investigation up to an isomorphic mapping. It remains quite indifferent as to the 'essence' of its objects. The idea of isomorphism demarcates the self-evident boundary of cognition. | |
| From: Hermann Weyl (Phil of Mathematics and Natural Science [1949], 25-7), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
| A reaction: Shapiro quotes this in support of his structuralism, but it is a striking expression of the idea that if there are such things as essences, they are beyond science. I take Weyl to be wrong. Best explanation reaches out beyond models to essences. |
| 1458 | Conduct is only reasonable or unreasonable if the world is governed by reason [Rashdall] |
| Full Idea: Absolutely reasonable or unreasonable conduct could not exist in a world which was not itself the product of reason or governed by its dictates. | |
| From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], II.III.I.4) |
| 1459 | Absolute moral ideals can't exist in human minds or material things, so their acceptance implies a greater Mind [Rashdall, by PG] |
| Full Idea: An absolute moral ideal cannot exist in material things, or in the minds of individual people, so belief in it requires belief in a Mind which contains the ideal and is its source. | |
| From: report of Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], II.III.I.4) by PG - Db (ideas) |