15 ideas
| 10414 | Abstract objects are constituted by encoded collections of properties [Zalta, by Swoyer] |
| Full Idea: In Zalta's view abstract objects are correlated with collections of properties. ..They encode, as well as exemplify, properties; indeed, an abstract object (such as a Euclidean triangle) is constituted by the properties it encodes. | |
| From: report of Edward N. Zalta (Abstract Objects:intro to Axiomatic Metaphysics [1983]) by Chris Swoyer - Properties 6.3 | |
| A reaction: If we are going to explain abstract objects with properties, then properties had better not be abstract objects. Zalta has a promising idea if we start from a nominalist and naturalistic view of properties (built from physical powers). 'Encode'? |
| 10558 | Abstract objects are actually constituted by the properties by which we conceive them [Zalta] |
| Full Idea: Where for ordinary objects one can discover the properties they exemplify, abstract objects are actually constituted or determined by the properties by which we conceive them. I use the technical term 'x encodes F' for this idea. | |
| From: Edward N. Zalta (Deriving Kripkean Claims with Abstract Objects [2006], 2 n2) | |
| A reaction: One might say that whereas concrete objects can be dubbed (in the Kripke manner), abstract objects can only be referred to by descriptions. See 10557 for more technicalities about Zalta's idea. |
| 10415 | Properties make round squares and round triangles distinct, unlike exemplification [Zalta, by Swoyer] |
| Full Idea: On Zalta's view, properties with the same encoding extensions are identical, but may be distinct with the same exemplification extension. So the properties of being a round square and a round triangle are distinct, but with the same exemplification. | |
| From: report of Edward N. Zalta (Abstract Objects:intro to Axiomatic Metaphysics [1983]) by Chris Swoyer - Properties | |
| A reaction: (For Zalta's view, see Idea 10414) I'm not sure about 'encoding' (cf. Hodes's use of the word), but the idea that an abstract object is just a bunch of possible properties (assuming properties have prior availability) seems promising. |
| 2986 | Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons] |
| Full Idea: Belief might be accorded the status of core or chief propositional attitude. | |
| From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], p.126) |
| 2978 | Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons] |
| Full Idea: In contrast with Brentano and Husserl, consciousness or attention are no longer seen as essential to intentionality. | |
| From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as being correct, although there seem to be plenty of current philosophers who do not accept it (e.g. Searle). I think philosophy of mind may be stuck in the dark ages if thinkers don't accept this proposal. |
| 1457 | Morality requires a minimum commitment to the self [Rashdall] |
| Full Idea: A bare minimum of metaphysical belief about the self is found to be absolutely presupposed in the very idea of morality. | |
| From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], II.III.I.4) | |
| A reaction: This may not be true of virtue theory, where we could have a whole creature which lacked any sense of personhood, but yet had clear virtues and vices in its social functioning. Even if choices are central to morality, that might not need a self. |
| 2984 | Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons] |
| Full Idea: It is possible to give an account of concept-formation without a language of thought or representation, based on perception, which in the brain seems to involve information without representation. | |
| From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], p.66) | |
| A reaction: This claim strikes me as being a little too confident. One might say that a concept IS a representation. However, the perception of several horses might 'blur' together to form a generalised horse. |
| 2979 | Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons] |
| Full Idea: How else, other than via some form of representational system, could a human organism contain information as a content over which it could operate or 'attitudinise'? | |
| From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Depends what you mean by 'representational'. In its vaguest sense, this is just a tautology - content must be held in the mind in some form or other, but that tells us nothing. |
| 2987 | Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons] |
| Full Idea: It is not easy to employ our folk psychology in the understanding of persons in a very different culture. | |
| From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], p.241) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a highly significant problem for the friends of folk psychology. It also breaks down in extreme situations, or with mental illness. It seems closer to culture than to brain structure. |
| 2977 | All thinking has content [Lyons] |
| Full Idea: I cannot say I am simply thinking but not thinking about anything. | |
| From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Hard to disagree. However, I can plausibly reply to 'What are you thinking?' with 'Nothing', if my consciousness is freewheeling. Utterly disconnected content isn't really what we call 'thinking'. |
| 10557 | Abstract objects are captured by second-order modal logic, plus 'encoding' formulas [Zalta] |
| Full Idea: My object theory is formulated in a 'syntactically second-order' modal predicate calculus modified only so as to admit a second kind of atomic formula ('xF'), which asserts that object x 'encodes' property F. | |
| From: Edward N. Zalta (Deriving Kripkean Claims with Abstract Objects [2006], p.2) | |
| A reaction: This is summarising Zalta's 1983 theory of abstract objects. See Idea 10558 for Zalta's idea in plain English. |
| 6674 | All moral judgements ultimately concern the value of ends [Rashdall] |
| Full Idea: All moral judgements are ultimately judgements as to the value of ends. | |
| From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], VII.I) | |
| A reaction: I am increasingly struck by this, especially when observing that it is the great gap in Kant's theory. For some odd reason, he gives being rational the highest possible value. Why? Nietzsche is good on this. 'Eudaimonia' seems a good start, to me. |
| 6673 | Ideal Utilitarianism is teleological but non-hedonistic; the aim is an ideal end, which includes pleasure [Rashdall] |
| Full Idea: My view, called Ideal Utilitarianism, combines the utilitarian principle that Ethics must be teleological with a non-hedonistic view of ethical ends; actions are right or wrong as they produce an ideal end, which includes, but is not limited to, pleasure. | |
| From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], VII.I) | |
| A reaction: I certainly think that if you are going to be a consequentialist, then it is ridiculous to limit the end to pleasure, as it is an 'open question' as to whether we judge pleasures or pains to be good or bad. I am fond of beauty, goodness and truth, myself. |
| 1458 | Conduct is only reasonable or unreasonable if the world is governed by reason [Rashdall] |
| Full Idea: Absolutely reasonable or unreasonable conduct could not exist in a world which was not itself the product of reason or governed by its dictates. | |
| From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], II.III.I.4) |
| 1459 | Absolute moral ideals can't exist in human minds or material things, so their acceptance implies a greater Mind [Rashdall, by PG] |
| Full Idea: An absolute moral ideal cannot exist in material things, or in the minds of individual people, so belief in it requires belief in a Mind which contains the ideal and is its source. | |
| From: report of Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], II.III.I.4) by PG - Db (ideas) |