9 ideas
15833 | Tell cleverness from answers, but wisdom from questions [Mahfouz] |
Full Idea: You can tell whether a man is clever by his answers. You can tell whether a man is wise by his questions. | |
From: Naguib Mahfouz (works [1998]) | |
A reaction: [Popped up on Twitter. I am adjusting to the 21st century] The observation is simplistic, of course, but very nice indeed. |
19323 | 'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy] |
Full Idea: The difference between (a) snow is white, and (b) 'snow is white' true is that the first makes a claim that only depends on the colour of snow, while the second depends both on the colour of snow and the meaning of the sentence 'snow is white'. | |
From: John Etchemendy (Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence [1988], p.61), quoted by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.7 | |
A reaction: This is a helpful first step for those who have reached screaming point by being continually offered this apparently vacuous equivalence. This sentence works well if that stuff is a particular colour. |
19137 | We can get a substantive account of Tarski's truth by adding primitive 'true' to the object language [Etchemendy] |
Full Idea: Getting from a Tarskian definition of truth to a substantive account of the semantic properties of the object language may involve as little as the reintroduction of a primitive notion of truth. | |
From: John Etchemendy (Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence [1988], p.60), quoted by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 1 | |
A reaction: This is, I think, the first stage in modern developments of axiomatic truth theories. The first problem would be to make sure you haven't reintroduced the Liar Paradox. You need axioms to give behaviour to the 'true' predicate. |
14181 | Validity is where either the situation or the interpretation blocks true premises and false conclusion [Etchemendy, by Read] |
Full Idea: The Representational account of validity says an argument is valid if there is no situation where the premises are true and the conclusion false. The Interpretation account says the premises are true and conclusion false under no interpretations. | |
From: report of John Etchemendy (The Concept of Logical Consequence [1999]) by Stephen Read - Formal and Material Consequence 'Inval' | |
A reaction: My immediate instinct is to want logic to be about situations, rather than interpretations. Situations are more about thought, where interpretations are more about language. I think our account of logic should have some applicability to animals. |
14180 | Etchemendy says fix the situation and vary the interpretation, or fix interpretations with varying situations [Etchemendy, by Read] |
Full Idea: In Etchemendy's Interpretational Semantics (perhaps better called 'Substitutional') we keep the situation fixed and vary the interpretation; in Representational Semantics ('Modal'?) we keep interpretations fixed but consider varying situations. | |
From: report of John Etchemendy (The Concept of Logical Consequence [1999]) by Stephen Read - Formal and Material Consequence 'Inval' | |
A reaction: [compressed] These are semantic strategies for interpreting logic, so they are two ways you might go about assessing an argument. |
16657 | Substance, Quantity and Quality are real; other categories depend on those three [Henry of Ghent] |
Full Idea: Among creatures there are only three 'res' belong to the three first categories: Substance, Quantity and Quality. All other are aspects [rationes] and intellectual concepts with respect to them, with reality only as grounded on the res of those three. | |
From: Henry of Ghent (Quodlibeta [1284], VII:1-2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.3 | |
A reaction: Pasnau connects with the 'arrangement of being', giving an 'ontologically innocent' structure to reality. That seems to be what we all want, if only we could work out the ontologically guilty bit. |
16658 | The only reality in the category of Relation is things from another category [Henry of Ghent] |
Full Idea: There is beyond a doubt nothing real in the category of Relation, except what is a thing from another category. | |
From: Henry of Ghent (Quodlibeta [1284], VII:1-2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.3 | |
A reaction: This seems to have been the fairly orthodox scholastic view of relations. |
16645 | Accidents are diminished beings, because they are dispositions of substance (unqualified being) [Henry of Ghent] |
Full Idea: Accidents are beings only in a qualified and diminished sense, because they are not called beings, nor are they beings, except because they are dispositions of an unqualified being, a substance. | |
From: Henry of Ghent (Quodlibeta [1284], XV.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 10.4 | |
A reaction: This is aimed to 'half' detach the accidents (as the Eucharist requires). Later scholastics detached them completely. Late scholastics seem to have drifted back to Henry's view. The equivocal use of 'being' here was challenged later. |
22012 | Kant says things-in-themselves cause sensations, but then makes causation transcendental! [Henry of Ghent, by Pinkard] |
Full Idea: Kant claimed that things-in-themselves caused our sensations; but causality was a transcendental condition of experience, not a property of things-in-themselves, so the great Kant had contradicted himself. | |
From: report of Henry of Ghent (Quodlibeta [1284], Supplement) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 04 | |
A reaction: This early objection by the conservative Jacobi (who disliked Enlightenment rational religion) is the key to the dispute over whether Kant is an idealist. Kant denied being an idealist, but how can he be, if this idea is correct? |