46 ideas
12585 | Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: Ordinary speakers are notoriously unsuccessful if asked to offer an explicit definition of the concept 'chair'. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992], 6.1) |
22886 | The modern idea of 'limit' allows infinite quantities to have a finite sum [Bardon] |
Full Idea: The concept of a 'limit' allows for an infinite number of finite quantities to add up to a finite sum. | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 1 'Aristotle's') | |
A reaction: This is only if the terms 'converge' on some end point. Limits are convenient fictions. |
22914 | An equally good question would be why there was nothing instead of something [Bardon] |
Full Idea: If there were nothing, then wouldn't it be just as good a question to ask why there is nothing rather than something? There are many ways for there to be something, but only one way for there to be nothing. | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 8 'Confronting') | |
A reaction: [He credits Nozick with the question] I'm not sure whether there being nothing counts as a 'way' of being. If something exists it seems to need a cause, but no cause seems required for the absence of things. Nice, though. |
12581 | Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: Once a thinker has acquired a perceptually individuated concept, his possession of that concept can causally influence what contents his experiences possess. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992], 3.3) | |
A reaction: Like having 35 different words for 'snow', I suppose. I'm never convinced by such claims. Having the concepts may well influence what you look at or listen to, but I don't see the deliverances of the senses being changed by the concepts. |
12579 | Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: Perceptual experience has a second layer of nonconceptual representational content, distinct from immediate 'scenarios' and from conceptual contents. These additional contents I call 'protopropositions', containing an individual and a property/relation. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992], 3.3) | |
A reaction: When philosophers start writing this sort of thing, I want to turn to neuroscience and psychology. I suppose the philosopher's justification for this sort of speculation is epistemological, but I see no good coming of it. |
12586 | Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: I dispute the view that consciousness of a belief consists in some kind of belief that one has the belief. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992], 6.2) | |
A reaction: Thus if one is trying to grasp the notion of higher-order thought, it doesn't have to be just more of same but one level up. Any sensible view of the brain would suggest that one sort of activity would lead into an entirely different sort. |
12608 | Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: 'Concept' is a notion tied, in the classical Fregean manner, to cognitive significance. Concepts are distinct if we can judge rationally of one, without the other. Concepts are constitutively and definitionally tied to rationality in this way. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.2) | |
A reaction: It seems to a bit optimistic to say, more or less, that thinking is impossible if it isn't rational. Rational beings have been selected for. As Quine nicely observed, duffers at induction have all been weeded out - but they may have existed, briefly. |
18568 | Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery] |
Full Idea: Peacocke's 'Simple Account' says philosophers should determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for possessing a concept, and psychologists should explain how the human mind meets these conditions. | |
From: report of Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992]) by Edouard Machery - Doing Without Concepts 2 | |
A reaction: One can't restrict philosophy so easily. Psychologists could do that job themselves, and dump philosophy. Philosophy is interested in the role of concepts in meaning, experience and judgement. If psychologists can contribute to philosophy, fine. |
18571 | Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery] |
Full Idea: Peacocke's method for discovering the possession conditions of concepts is committed to a specific account of counterfactual judgements - the Simulation Model (judgements we'd make if the antecedent were actual). | |
From: report of Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992]) by Edouard Machery - Doing Without Concepts 2.3.4 | |
A reaction: Machery concludes that the Simulation Model is incorrect. This appears to be Edgington's theory of conditionals, though Machery doesn't mention her. |
18572 | Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke] |
Full Idea: Peacocke's Simple Account fails to connect the psychology and philosophy of concepts, it subordinates psychology to specific field of philosophy, it is committed to analytic/synthetic, and (most important) its method is very sketchy. | |
From: comment on Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992]) by Edouard Machery - Doing Without Concepts 2.3.5 | |
A reaction: Machery says Peacocke proposes a research programme, and he is not surprised that no one has every followed. Machery is a well-known champion of 'experimental philosophy', makes philosophy respond to the psychology. |
17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: The possession conditions for the concept 'red' of the colour red are tied to those very conditions which individuate the colour red. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Explaining the A Priori [2000], p.267), quoted by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 2.5 | |
A reaction: Jenkins reports that he therefore argues that we can learn something about the word 'red' from thinking about the concept 'red', which is his new theory of the a priori. I find 'possession conditions' and 'individuation' to be very woolly concepts. |
11127 | If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: We might say that the concept just is the mental representation, ...but there are concepts that human beings may never acquire. ...But if concepts are individuated by their possession conditions this will not be a problem. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Rationale and Maxims in Study of Concepts [2005], p.169), quoted by E Margolis/S Laurence - Concepts 1.3 | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that I understand the notion of a concept we (or any other creature) may never acquire. They no more seem to exist than buildings that were never even designed. |
12577 | Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: Possession of any concept requires the capacity to make judgements whose content contain it. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Idea 12575 suggested that concept possession was an ability just to think about the concept. Why add that one must actually be able to make a judgement? Presumably to get truth in there somewhere. I may only speculate and fantasise, rather than judge. |
12578 | A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: There can be no more to a concept than is determined by a correct account of what it is to possess that concept. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992], 3.2) | |
A reaction: He calls this the Principle of Dependence. An odd idea, if you compare 'there is no more to a book than its possession conditions'. If the principle is right, I struggle with the proposal that a philosopher might demonstrate such a principle. |
12587 | Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: On the account I have been developing, what makes it the case that someone is employing one concept rather than another is not constituted by his impression of whether he is, but by complex facts about explanations of his judgements. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992], 7.2) | |
A reaction: I presume this brings truth into the picture, and hence establishes a link between the concept and the external world, rather than merely with other concepts. There seems to be a shadowy behaviourism lurking in the background. |
12605 | A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: My basic Fregean idea is that a sense is individuated by the fundamental condition for something to be its reference. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: For something to actually be its reference (as opposed to imagined reference), truth must be involved. This needs the post-1891 Frege view of such things, and not just the view of concepts as functions which he started with. |
12607 | Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: The Fregean view is that the essence of a concept is given by the fundamental condition for something to be its reference. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Peacocke is a supporter of the Fregean view. How does this work for concepts of odd creatures in a fantasy novel? Or for mistaken or confused concepts? For Burge's 'arthritis in my thigh'? I don't reject the Fregean view. |
12609 | Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: For each concept, there will be some reasons or norms distinctive of that concept. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This is Peacocke's bold Fregean thesis (and it sounds rather Kantian to me). I dislike the word 'norms' (long story), but reasons are interesting. The trouble is the distinction between being a reason for something (its cause) and being a reason for me. |
12584 | An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: At some point a good account of conceptual mastery must tie the mastery to abilities and relations that do not require conceptualization by the thinker. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992], 5.3) | |
A reaction: This obviously implies a physicalist commitment. Peacocke seeks, as so many do these days in philosophy of maths, to combine this commitment with some sort of Fregean "platonism without tears" (p.101). I don't buy it. |
12604 | Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: For some particular concept, we can argue that some of its distinctive features are adequately explained only by a possession-condition that involves reference and truth essentially. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: He reached this view via the earlier assertion that it is the role in judgement which key to understanding concepts. I like any view of such things which says that truth plays a role. |
9335 | Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco] |
Full Idea: Peacocke argues that it may be a condition of possessing a certain concept that one be fundamentally committed to certain propositions which contain it. A concept is constituted by playing a specific role in the cognitive economy of its possessor. | |
From: report of Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992]) by John Greco - Justification is not Internal §9 | |
A reaction: Peacocke is talking about thought and propositions rather than language. Good for him. I always have problems with this sort of view: how can something play a role if it doesn't already have intrinsic properties to make the role possible? |
9336 | A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich] |
Full Idea: Peacocke has a distinctive view of reference: The reference of a concept is that which will make true the primitively compelling beliefs that provide its possession conditions. | |
From: report of Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992]) by Paul Horwich - Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority §9 | |
A reaction: The first thought is that there might occasionally be more than one referent which would do the job. It seems to be a very internal view of reference, where I take reference to be much more contextual and social. |
12610 | Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: The phenomenon of understanding sentences one has never encountered before is decisive against theories of meaning which do not proceed compositionally. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 4.3) | |
A reaction: I agree entirely. It seems obvious, as soon as you begin to slowly construct a long and unusual sentence, and follow the mental processes of the listener. |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us. | |
From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus | |
A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts? |
22902 | Why does an effect require a prior event if the prior event isn't a cause? [Bardon] |
Full Idea: To say that a reaction requires the earlier presence of an action just raises anew the question of why it is 'required' if it isn't bring about the reaction. | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 4 'Pervasive') | |
A reaction: This is another example of my demand that empiricists don't just describe and report conjunctions and patterns, but make some effort to explain them. |
22905 | Becoming disordered is much easier for a system than becoming ordered [Bardon] |
Full Idea: Systems move to a higher state of entropy …because there are very many more ways for a system to be disordered than for it to be ordered. …We can also say that they tend to move from a non-equilibrium state to an equilibrium state. | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 5 'Thermodynamic') | |
A reaction: Is it actually about order, or is it just that energy radiates, and thus disperses? |
22913 | The universe expands, so space-time is enlarging [Bardon] |
Full Idea: More and more space-time is literally being created from nothing all the time as the universe expands. | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 8 'Realism') | |
A reaction: [He cites Paul Davies for this] Is the universe acquiring more space, or is the given space being stretched? Acquiring more time makes no sense, so what is more space-time? |
22889 | We should treat time as adverbial, so we don't experience time, we experience things temporally [Bardon, by Bardon] |
Full Idea: Kant says that instead of focusing on the nouns 'time' and 'space', it would be more on target to focus on the adverbial applications of the concepts - that we don't experience things in time and space so much as experience them temporally and spatially. | |
From: report of Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 2 'Kantian' | |
A reaction: Put like that, Kant's approach has some plausibility, given that we don't actually experience space and time as entities. To jump from that to idealism seems daft. Does every adverb imply idealism about what it specifies? |
22900 | How can we question the passage of time, if the question takes time to ask? [Bardon] |
Full Idea: Even questioning the passage of time may be self-defeating: can any question be meaningfully asked or understood without presuming the passage of time from the inception of the question to its conclusion? | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 4 'Pervasive') | |
A reaction: [He cites P.J. Zwart for this] We can at least, in B-series style, specify the starting and finishing times of the question, without talk of its passage. Nice point, though. |
22898 | What is time's passage relative to, and how fast does it pass? [Bardon] |
Full Idea: If time is passing, then relative to what? How could time pass with respect to itself? Further, if time passes, at what rate does it pass? | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 4 'Pervasive') | |
A reaction: I remember some writer grasping the nettle, and saying that time passes at one second per second. Compare travelling at one metre per metre. |
22897 | The A-series says a past event is becoming more past, but how can it do that? [Bardon] |
Full Idea: In the dynamic theory of time the Battle of Waterloo is become more past. If we insist on the A-series properties, this seems inevitable. But how can a past event be changing now? | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 4 'Reasons') | |
A reaction: [He cites Ulrich Meyer for this] We don't worry about an object changing its position when it is swept down a river. The location of the Battle of Waterloo relative to 'now' is not a property of the battle. That is a 'Cambridge' property. |
22896 | The B-series is realist about time, but idealist about its passage [Bardon] |
Full Idea: The B-series theorist is a realist about time but an idealist about the passage of time. This is the Static Theory of time. | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 4 'Reasons') | |
A reaction: Note the both A and B are realists about time, and thus deny both the relationist and the idealist view. |
22901 | The B-series needs a revised view of causes, laws and explanations [Bardon] |
Full Idea: If we accept the static (B-series) view, we have to reevaluate how we think about causation, natural laws, and scientific explanation. | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 4 'Pervasive') | |
A reaction: Any scientific account which refers to events seems to imply a dynamic view of time. Lots of scientists and philosophers endorse the static view of time, but then fail to pursue its implications. |
22903 | The B-series adds directionality when it accepts 'earlier' and 'later' [Bardon] |
Full Idea: The static (B-series) theory, by embracing the relational temporal properties 'earlier' and 'later', adds a directional ordering to the block of events. | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 5 'Time's') | |
A reaction: I'm not clear whether this addition to the B-series picture is optional or obligatory. It is important that it seems to be a bolt-on feature, not immediately implied by the timeless series. What would Einstein say? |
22910 | To define time's arrow by causation, we need a timeless definition of causation [Bardon] |
Full Idea: The problem for the causal analysis of temporal asymmetry is to come up with a definition of causation that does not itself rely on the concept of temporal asymmetry. | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 5 'Causal') | |
A reaction: This is the point at which my soul cries out 'time is a primitive concept!' Leibniz want to use dependency to define time's arrow, but how do you specify dependency if you don't know which one came first? |
22909 | We judge memories to be of the past because the events cause the memories [Bardon] |
Full Idea: On the causal view of time's arrow, memories pertain to the 'past' just because they are caused by the events of which they are memories. | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 5 'Causal') | |
A reaction: How am I able to distinguish imagining the future from remembering the past? How do I tell which mental events have external causes, and which are generated by me? |
22904 | The psychological arrow of time is the direction from our memories to our anticipations [Bardon] |
Full Idea: The psychological arrow of time refers to the familiar fact that that we remember (and never anticipate) the past, and anticipate (but never remember) the future. | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 5 'Psychological') | |
A reaction: Bardon rejects this on the grounds that the psychology is obviously the result of the actual order of events. Otherwise time's arrow would just result from the luck of how we individually experience things. |
22906 | The direction of entropy is probabilistic, not necessary, so cannot be identical to time's arrow [Bardon] |
Full Idea: The coincidence of thermodynamic direction and the direction of time is striking, but they can't be one and the same because the thermodynamic law is merely probabilistic. Orderliness could increase, but it is highly improbable | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 5 'Thermodynamic') | |
A reaction: This seems to be persuasive grounds for rejecting thermodynamics as the explanation of time's arrow. |
22907 | It is arbitrary to reverse time in a more orderly universe, but not in a sub-system of it [Bardon] |
Full Idea: It would seem arbitrary to say that the direction of time is reversed if the whole universe becomes more orderly, but it isn't reversed for any particular sub-system that becomes more orderly. | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 5 'Thermodynamic') | |
A reaction: The thought is that if time's arrow depends on entropy, then the arrow must reverse if entropy were to reverse (however unlikely). |
22883 | It seems hard to understand change without understanding time first [Bardon] |
Full Idea: It is very tough to see how we could understand what change is without understanding what time is. | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], Intro) | |
A reaction: This thought is aimed at those who are hoping to define time in terms of change. My working assumption is that time must be a primitive concept in any metaphysics. |
22890 | We experience static states (while walking round a house) and observe change (ship leaving dock) [Bardon] |
Full Idea: We make a fundamental distinction between perceptions of static states and dynamic processes, …such as walking around a house, and watching a ship leave dock. | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 2 'Kantian') | |
A reaction: This seems to be a fundamental aspect of our mind, rather than of the raw experience (slightly supporting Kant). In both cases we experience a changing sequence, but we have two different interpretations of them. |
22884 | The motion of a thing should be a fact in the present moment [Bardon] |
Full Idea: Whether or not something is in motion should be a fact about that thing now, not a fact about the thing in its past or in its future. | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 1 'Arrow') | |
A reaction: This is one of the present moment, in which nothing can occur if its magnitude is infinitely small. I have no solution to this problem. |
22892 | Experiences of motion may be overlapping, thus stretching out the experience [Bardon] |
Full Idea: Experience itself may be constituted by overlapping, very brief, but temporally extended, acts of awareness, each of which encompassesa temporally extended streeeeetch of perceived events. | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 2 'Realism') | |
A reaction: [cites Barry Dainton 2000] I think this sounds better than Russell's suggestion, though along the same lines. I take all brain events to be a sort of memory, briefly retaining their experience. Very fast events blur because of overload. |
22911 | At least eternal time gives time travellers a possible destination [Bardon] |
Full Idea: If all past, present and future events timelessly coexist, then at least there is a potential destination for the time traveller. …The Presentist treats past and future events as nonexistent, so there is no place for the time traveller to go. | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 6 'Fictional') | |
A reaction: Not a good reason to believe in the eternal block of time, of course. The growing block has a past which can be visited, but no future. |
22912 | Time travel is not a paradox if we include it in the eternal continuum of events [Bardon] |
Full Idea: As long as we understand any time travel events to be timelessly included in the history of the world, and thus as part of the fixed continuum of events, time travel need not give rise to paradox. | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 6 'Time travel') | |
A reaction: This would presumably block going back and killing your own grandparent. |
22882 | We use calendars for the order of events, and clocks for their passing [Bardon] |
Full Idea: Roughly speaking, we use calendars to track the order of events in time, and clocks to track changes and the passing of events. | |
From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], Intro) | |
A reaction: So calendars cover the B-Series and clocks the A-Series, showing that this distinction is deeply embedded, and wasn't invented by McTaggart. |