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8476
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Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein]
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Full Idea:
In axiomatizing, we are merely sorting out among the truths of a science those which will play a special role, namely, serve as axioms from which we derive the others. The sentences are already true in a non-conventional or ordinary sense.
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From:
Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.5)
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A reaction:
If you were starting from scratch, as Euclidean geometers may have felt they were doing, you might want to decide which are the simplest truths. Axiomatizing an established system is a more advanced activity.
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8452
|
Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein]
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Full Idea:
In traditional logic from Aristotle to Kant, universal sentences have existential import, but Brentano and Boole construed them as universal conditionals (such as 'for anything, if it is a man, then it is mortal').
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From:
Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.2)
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A reaction:
I am sympathetic to the idea that even the 'existential' quantifier should be treated as conditional, or fictional. Modern Christians may well routinely quantify over angels, without actually being committed to them.
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8473
|
The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein]
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Full Idea:
The question to be posed is whether is-a-member-of should be considered a logical constant, that is, does logic include set theory. Frege, Russell and Whitehead held that it did.
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From:
Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.5)
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A reaction:
This is obviously the key element in the logicist programme. The objection seems to be that while first-order logic is consistent and complete, set theory is not at all like that, and so is part of a different world.
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8458
|
Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein]
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Full Idea:
Modest ontologies are Nominalism (Goodman), admitting only concrete individuals; and Extensionalism (Quine/Davidson) which admits individuals and sets; but Intensionalists (Frege/Carnap/Church/Marcus/Kripke) may have propositions, properties, concepts.
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From:
Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.3)
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A reaction:
I don't like sets, because of Idea 7035. Even the ontology of individuals could collapse dramatically (see the ideas of Merricks, e.g. 6124). The intensional items may be real enough, but needn't have a place at the ontological high table.
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2748
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A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
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Full Idea:
Nozick says Gettier cases aren't knowledge because the proposition would be believed even if false. Proper justification must be more sensitive to the truth ("track the truth").
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From:
report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981], 3.1) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 3.1
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A reaction:
This is a bad idea. I see a genuine tree in my garden and believe it is there, so I know it. That I might have believed it if I was in virtually reality, or observing a mirror, won't alter that.
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22662
|
In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick]
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Full Idea:
On the instrumental conception of rationality, it consists in the effective and efficient achievement of goals, ends, and desires. About the goals themselves it has little to say.
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From:
Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.64)
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A reaction:
[He quotes Russell 1954 p.viii as expressing this view] A long way from Greek logos, which obviously concerns the rational selection of right ends (for which, presumably, reasons can be given). In practice our ends may never be rational, of course.
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22667
|
Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick]
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Full Idea:
Rationality involves some degree of self-consciousness. Not only reasons are evaluated, but also the processes by which information arrives, is stored, and recalled.
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|
From:
Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.74)
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A reaction:
I defend the idea that animals have a degree of rationality, because they can make sensible judgements, but I cannot deny this idea. Rationality comes in degrees, and second-level thought is a huge leap forward in degree.
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8471
|
Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein]
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Full Idea:
'Socrates is human' is true if 1) subject referent is identical with a predicate referent (Nominalism), 2) subject reference member of the predicate set, or the subject has that property (Platonism), 3) predicate set a member of the subject set (Montague)
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|
From:
Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.3)
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A reaction:
Orenstein offers these as alternatives to Quine's 'inscrutability of reference' thesis, which makes the sense unanalysable.
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20585
|
If an experience machine gives you any experience you want, should you hook up for life? [Nozick]
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Full Idea:
Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired ...such as writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. ...Should you plug into this machine for life?
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|
From:
Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], 3 'Experience')
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|
A reaction:
A classic though experiment which crystalises a major problem with hedonistic utilitarianism. My addition is a machine which maximises the pleasure of my family and friends, to save me the bother of doing it.
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18643
|
A minimal state should protect, but a state forcing us to do more is unjustified [Nozick]
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|
Full Idea:
A minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; any more extensive state will violate persons' rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified.
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|
From:
Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], Pref)
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|
A reaction:
This has some plausibility for a huge modern state, where we don't know one another, but it would be a ridiculous attitude in a traditional village.
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|
18642
|
Individual rights are so strong that the state and its officials must be very limited in power [Nozick]
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|
Full Idea:
Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do.
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|
From:
Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], Pref)
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|
A reaction:
This claim appears to be an axiom, but I'm not sure that the notion of 'rights' make any sense unless someone is granting the rights, where the someone is either a strong individual, or the community (perhaps represented by the state).
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|
18644
|
States can't enforce mutual aid on citizens, or interfere for their own good [Nozick]
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|
Full Idea:
A state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purposes of getting some citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit activities to people for their own good or protection.
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|
From:
Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], Pref)
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|
A reaction:
You certainly can't apply these principles to children, so becoming an 'adult' seems to be a very profound step in Nozick's account. At what age must we stop interfering with people for their own good. If the state is prohibited, are neighbours also?
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22661
|
My Anarchy, State and Utopia neglected our formal social ties and concerns [Nozick on Nozick]
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Full Idea:
The political philosophy represented in Anarchy, State and Utopia ignored the importance of joint and official symbolic statement and expression of our social ties and concern, and hence (I have written) is inadequate.
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|
From:
comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], p.32) by Robert Nozick - The Nature of Rationality p.32
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|
A reaction:
In other words, it was far too individualistic, and neglected community, even though it has become the sacred text for libertarian individualism. Do any Nozick fans care about this recantation?
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|
18641
|
If people hold things legitimately, just distribution is simply the result of free exchanges [Nozick, by Kymlicka]
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|
Full Idea:
If we assume that everyone is entitled to the goods they currently possess (their 'holdings'), then a just distribution is simply whatever distribution results from people's free exchanges.
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|
From:
report of Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 4.1.b
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|
A reaction:
If people's current 'legitimate' holdings are hugely unequal, it seems very unlikely that the ensuing exchanges will be 'free' in the way that Nozick envisages.
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20539
|
Property is legitimate by initial acquisition, voluntary transfer, or rectification of injustice [Nozick, by Swift]
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|
Full Idea:
Nozick identified three ways in which people can acquire a legitimate property holding: initial acquisition, voluntary transfer, and rectification (of unjust transfers).
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|
From:
report of Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Adam Swift - Political Philosophy (3rd ed) 1 'Nozick'
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|
A reaction:
I think it is a delusion to look for justice in the ownership of property. You can't claim justice for buying property if the money to do it was acquired unjustly. And what rights over those who live on the land come with the 'ownership'?
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|
18646
|
How did the private property get started? If violence was involved, we can redistribute it [Kymlicka on Nozick]
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|
Full Idea:
How did these natural resources, which were not initially owned by anyone, come to be part of someone's private property? ...The fact that the initial acquisition often involved force means there is no moral objection to redistributing existing wealth.
|
|
From:
comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 4.2.b
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|
A reaction:
[He cites G.A. Cphen 1988 for the second point] Put like this, Nozick's theory just looks like the sort of propaganda which is typically put out by the winners. Is there an implicit threat of violent resistance in his advocacy of individual rights?
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21737
|
Unowned things may be permanently acquired, if it doesn't worsen the position of other people [Nozick]
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|
Full Idea:
One may acquire a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing, as long as the position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing is not thereby worsened.
|
|
From:
Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], p.178), quoted by G.A. Cohen - Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? 2
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|
A reaction:
Cohen attacks this vigorously. His main point is that Nozick has a very narrow view of what the acquisition should be compared with. There are many alternatives. Does being made unable to improve something 'worsen' a person's condition?
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|
21738
|
Maybe land was originally collectively owned, rather than unowned? [Cohen,GA on Nozick]
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|
Full Idea:
Why should we not regard land as originally collectively owned rather than, as Nozick takes for granted, owned by no one?
|
|
From:
comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], p.178) by G.A. Cohen - Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? 2
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|
A reaction:
Did native Americans and Australians collectively own the land? Lots of peoples, I suspect, don't privately own anything, because the very concept has never occured to them (and they have no legal system).
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