21 ideas
9758 | To make sense of personal identity, focus on agency rather than experience [Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: A focus on agency makes more sense of personal identity than a focus on experience. | |
From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §2) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as eminently sensible advice for the beginning of any discussion of personal identity. Her personal bęte noir is Parfit, who focuses on what we are conscious of. |
9757 | A person viewed as an agent makes no sense without its own future [Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: In forming a particular plan of life, you need to identify with your future in order to be what you are even now. When the person is viewed as an agent, no clear content can be given to the idea of a merely present self. | |
From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §2) | |
A reaction: I certainly like the notion that we should treat persons primarily as agents, since I take personhood to be more like a process than an existent entity. If a large brick is about to hit you, you actually have no future, though you think you have. |
9759 | Theory of action focuses on explanation and prediction; practical action on justification and choice [Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: When we look at our actions from the theoretical standpoint our concern is with their explanation and prediction. When we view them from the practical standpoint our concern is with their justification and choice. | |
From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §4) | |
A reaction: A nice distinction, which invites us to further subdivide action theory into two branches, with entirely different concerns. |
18678 | Maybe final value rests on the extrinsic property of being valued by a rational agent [Korsgaard, by Orsi] |
Full Idea: Korsgaard argues for the ultimate dependence of final value on the extrinsic property of being valued by a rational agent. | |
From: report of Christine M. Korsgaard (Creating the Kingdom of Ends [1992]) by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 2.3 n4 | |
A reaction: This hyper-Kantian view doesn't strike me as very plausible. Not philosophical theory which entirely cuts animals out of the story has much appeal for me. |
18225 | If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: If you can only know what is intrinsically valuable through intuition (as Moore claims), you can still argue about what is unconditionally valuable. There must be something unconditionally valuable because there must be a source of value. | |
From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Three') | |
A reaction: If you only grasped the values through intuition, does that give you enough information to infer the dependence relations between values? |
18228 | An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: If what is final is whatever is an end but never a means, ...why should something be more valuable just because it is useless? | |
From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Finality') | |
A reaction: Korsgaard is offering this as a bad reading of what Aristotle intends. |
9760 | Self-concern may be a source of pain, or a lack of self-respect, or a failure of responsibility [Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: For utilitarians, self-concern causes needless pain; for Kantians, it evinces a lack of respect for one's own humanity; for the religious moralist, it is a failure of responsibility for what has been placed in one's special care. | |
From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §5) | |
A reaction: Worryingly, given my heathenish views, I find the third one the most congenial. If we don't take responsibility for our own selves (e.g. for having a great talent), then no one (even parents) will take responsibility for anything. |
18224 | Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: 'Subjectivism' identifies good ends with or by reference to some psychological state. ...'Objectivism' says that something is good as an end if a property, intrinsic goodness, is attributed to it. | |
From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Three') | |
A reaction: Not sure about 'objectivism' here, as attributing a 'property'. A tomato is not intrinsically good. Hopeless for building walls. |
9761 | Personal concern for one's own self widens out into concern for the impersonal [Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: The personal concern which begins with one's life in a particular body finds its place in ever-widening spheres of agency and enterprise, developing finally into a personal concern for the impersonal. | |
From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §5) | |
A reaction: I am very struck by this nice thought, which comes from a very committed Kantian. It seems to me to capture the modern orthodoxy in ethical thinking - that concern for one's self, rather than altruism, is central, but altruism should follow from it. |
18233 | Contemplation is final because it is an activity which is not a process [Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: It is because contemplation is an activity that is not also a process that Aristotle identifies it as the most final good. | |
From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Activity') | |
A reaction: Quite a helpful way of labelling what Aristotle has in mind. So should we not aspire to be involved in processes, except reluctantly? I take the mind itself to be a process, so that may be difficult! |
18226 | For Aristotle, contemplation consists purely of understanding [Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: Contemplation, as Aristotle understand it, is not research or inquiry, but an activity that ensues on these: an activity that consists in understanding. | |
From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Aristotle') | |
A reaction: Fairly obvious, when you read the last part of 'Ethics', but helpful in grasping Aristotle, because understanding is the objective of 'Posterior Analytics' and 'Metaphysics', so he tells you how to achieve the ideal moral state. |
23429 | The environment needs localised politics, with its care for the land [Dobson] |
Full Idea: More localised politics helps to generate the disposition of care for the land which is a core feature of environmental politics. | |
From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 4) | |
A reaction: I currently live in a time when localised politics is hugely devalued, because centralisation and privatisation are cheaper. It seems obvious that many human needs require a commitment to a particular locality. |
23424 | An ideology judges things now, and offers an ideal, with a strategy for reaching it [Dobson] |
Full Idea: An ideology generally has three components: a judgement (usually critical) of how things are, a picture of the ideology's ideal society, and a strategy for progressing towards the ideal. | |
From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: Conservatives tend to think we are already living in the ideal, and they reject most ideologies for being 'idealistic' (which presumably means delusional). I'm a fan of ideals, but combined with cool judgement. |
23426 | Ecologism is often non-liberal, by claiming to know other people's best interests [Dobson] |
Full Idea: Liberals say that their preferences are their interests, and resist the idea that anyone could know their interests better than they can. …To this degree, ecologism might be regarded as 'non-liberal'. | |
From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: There are lots of other cases where liberal citizens may not realise their best interests, such as in the control of traffic, or of drugs. |
23427 | Socialism can be productive and centralised, or less productive and decentralised [Dobson] |
Full Idea: Marx and his heirs promote a productivist socialism, but utopian socialists such as William Morris offer a less productivist and more decentralised form of socialism. | |
From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: Modern history teaches us to be very cautious about the centralised version. Presumably you could be decentralised but still value production highly, even if it is a bit less efficient. |
23428 | Difference feminists say women differ fundamentally from men [Dobson] |
Full Idea: Difference feminists argue that men and women are fundamentally different. | |
From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: You can be significantly different without being 'fundamentally' different. Personally I don't see a huge difference, even though history may have greatly exaggerated and dramatised what differences there are. |
23422 | For the environment, affluence and technology matter as much as population size [Dobson] |
Full Idea: Although bare population figures are important for environmental impact, the level of affluence and the technology are also crucial factors. | |
From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: It is worth noting that the technology can also have a good impact, though affluence is nearly always bad. |
23423 | We currently value the present fourteen times more highly than the future [Dobson] |
Full Idea: At current rates we seem to value present concerns as fourteen times more valuable than future concerns. | |
From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: A sobering figure, which sounds about right. This directly influences how much we spend on future concerns. One thought is that future generations may be much more affluent than us! |
23430 | A million years is a proper unit of political time [Dobson] |
Full Idea: We must acknowledge that a million years is a proper unit of political time. | |
From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 5) | |
A reaction: [He cites Colin Tudge] Such thinking is almost impossible, but owners of large aristocratic estates seem to have thought in centuries, because they were confident of continuity. The more we identify with all of humanity, the more this is possible. |
23425 | Ecologism says growth must be reduced, and efficiency is not enough [Dobson] |
Full Idea: A central belief of the ideology of ecologism is that aggregate growth must be reduced, and that this is very unlikely to be achieved by efficiency gains alone. | |
From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: He argues that efficiency gains invariably lead to increased production. Trickle down economics needs huge growth to deliver a good life for the poorest sector. Ecologism has to be fairly egalitarian about wealth. |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us. | |
From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus | |
A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts? |