Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Bert Leuridan and Anon (Bhag)

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Serene wisdom is freedom from ties, and indifference to fortune [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Who everywhere is free from all ties, who neither rejoices nor sorrows if fortune is good or is ill, his is a serene wisdom.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 2.57)
     A reaction: This is very similar to the 'apatheia' of the Stoics, though they are always more committed to rationality. This is quite a good strategy when times are hard, but as a general rule it offers a bogus state of 'wisdom' which is really half way to death.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Seek salvation in the wisdom of reason [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Seek salvation in the wisdom of reason.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 2.49)
     A reaction: Quotations like this can usually be counterbalanced in eastern philosophy by wild irrationality, but they certainly felt to tug of reason. Only the Dhaoists seem really opposed to reason (e.g. Idea 7289).
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
I am all the beauty and goodness of things, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: I am the beauty of all things beautiful; ...I am the goodness of those who are good, says Krishna.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 10.36)
     A reaction: Another attempt to annexe everything which is admirable to the nature of God. This sounds strikingly Platonic (c.f. Idea 7992, which seems Aristotelian). One scholar dates the text to 150 BCE. I think there is influence, one way or the other.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: A generalisation is explanatory if and only if it is invariant.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §4)
     A reaction: [He cites Jim Woodward 2003] I dislike the idea that generalisations and regularities explain anything at all, but this rule sounds like a bare minimum for being taken seriously in the space of explanations.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: The main alternative to the dispositional theory of biological functions (which confer a survival-enhancing propensity) is the etiological theory (effects are functions if they play a role in the causal history of that very component).
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3)
     A reaction: [Bigelow/Pargetter 1987 for the first, Mitchell 2003 for the second] The second one sounds a bit circular, but on the whole a I prefer causal explanations to dispositional explanations.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: Nothing can count as a mechanism unless it produces some macro-level regular behaviour. To produce macro-level regular behaviour, it has to rely on micro-level regularities.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §5)
     A reaction: This is the core of Leuridan's argument that regularities are more basic than mechanisms. It doesn't follow, though, that the more basic a thing is the more explanatory work it can do. I say mechanisms explain more than low-level regularities do.
Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on the existence of regularities.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3)
     A reaction: This seems to be the Humean rearguard action in favour of the regularity account of laws. Wrong, but a nice paper. This point shows why only powers (despite their vagueness!) are the only candidate for the bottom level of explanation.
Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: To model a mechanism one must incorporate pragmatic laws. ...As valuable as the concept of mechanism and mechanistic explanation are, they cannot replace regularities nor undermine their relevance for scientific explanation.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1)
     A reaction: [See Idea 12786 for 'pragmatic laws'] I just don't see how the observation of a regularity is any sort of explanation. I just take a regularity to be something interesting which needs to be explained.
We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: Summary: mechanisms depend on regularities, there may be regularities without mechanisms, models of mechanisms must incorporate pragmatic laws, and pragmatic laws do not depend epistemologically on mechanistic models.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1)
     A reaction: See Idea 14382 for 'pragmatic' laws. I'm quite keen on mechanisms, so this is an arrow close to the heart, but at this point I say that my ultimate allegiance is to powers, not to mechanisms.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: I see nothing metaphysically wrong in an infinite ontological regress of mechanisms and regularities.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §5)
     A reaction: This is a pretty unusual view, and I can't accept it. My revulsion at this regress is precisely the reason why I believe in powers, as the bottom level of explanation.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
In all living beings I am the light of consciousness, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: In all living beings I am the light of consciousness, says Krishna.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 10.22)
     A reaction: Everything grand seems to be claimed for God at this stage of culture, but I am not sure how coherent this view is, unless this is pantheism. In what sense could we possibly be Krishna, when none of us (except Arjuna) is aware of it?
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
All actions come from: body, lower self, perception, means of action, or Fate [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Whatever a man does, good or bad, in thought, word or deed, has these five sources of action: the body, the lower 'I am', the means of perception, the means of action, and Fate.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 18.14/15)
     A reaction: The 'means of action' will presumably take care of anything we haven't thought of! Nothing quite matches the idea of 'the will' here. A twitch from the first, eating from the second, a startled jump from the third, struck by lightning from the fifth.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Hate and lust have their roots in man's lower nature [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Hate and lust for things of nature have their roots in man's lower nature.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 3.34)
     A reaction: It seems outmoded now (since Freud) to label parts of human nature as 'higher' and 'lower'. I would defend the distinction, but it is not self-evident. The basis of morality is good citizenship, and parts of our nature are detrimental to that.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
There is no greater good for a warrior than to fight in a just war [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: There is no greater good for a warrior than to fight in righteous war.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 2.31)
     A reaction: What worries me now is not the urging to fight, as long as a good cause can be found, but the idea that someone should see his social role as 'warrior'. The modern 'soldier' is ready to fight, but a traditional 'warrior' is obliged to fight.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
     Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us.
     From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus
     A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: The dispositional theory of biological functions is not unquestioned. The main alternative is the etiological theory: a component's effect is a function of that component if it has played an essential role in the causal history of its existence.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3)
     A reaction: [He cites S.D. Mitchell 2003] Presumably this account is meant to fit into a theory of evolution in biology. The obvious problem is where something comes into existence for one reason, and then acquires a new function (such as piano-playing).
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The visible forms of nature are earth, water, fire, air, ether; mind, reason, and the sense of 'I' [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: The visible forms of nature are eight: earth, water, fire, air, ether; the mind, reason, and the sense of 'I'.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 7.4)
     A reaction: Presumably there is an implication that there are also invisible forms. The Bhuddists launched an attack on 'I' as one of the categories. The first five appear to be Aristotle's, which must be of scholarly (and chronological) interest.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: A generalization is a 'pragmatic law' if it allows of prediction, explanation and manipulation, even if it fails to satisfy the traditional criteria. To this end, it should describe a stable regularity, but not necessarily a universal and necessary one.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1)
     A reaction: I am tempted to say of this that all laws are pragmatic, given that it is rather hard to know whether reality is stable. The universal laws consist of saying that IF reality stays stable in certain ways, certain outcomes will ensue necessarily.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: Strict regularities are rarely if ever discovered in the life sciences.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §2)
     A reaction: This is elementary once it is pointed out, but too much philosophy have science has aimed at the model provided by the equations of fundamental physics. Science is a broad church, to employ an entertaining metaphor.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: By 'law of nature' or 'natural law' I mean a generalization describing a regularity, not some metaphysical entity that produces or is responsible for that regularity.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1 n1)
     A reaction: I take the second version to be a relic of a religious world view, and having no place in a naturalistic metaphysic. The regularity view is then the only player in the field, and the question is, can we do more? Can't we explain regularities?
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
Everything, including the gods, comes from me, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: All the gods come from me, says Krishna. ...I am the one source of all
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 10.2/8)
     A reaction: This seems very close to monotheism, and sounds very similar to the position that Zeus seems to occupy in later Greek religion, where he is shading off into a supreme and spiritual entity.
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 3. Hinduism
Brahman is supreme, Atman his spirit in man, and Karma is the force of creation [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Brahman is supreme, the Eternal. Atman is his Spirit in man. Karma is the force of creation, wherefrom all things have their life.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 8.3)
     A reaction: I can't help wondering how they know all this stuff, but then I'm just a typical product of my culture. We seem to have a trinity here. Who's in charge? Is Atman just a servant? Is Karma totally under the control of Brahman?
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
Only by love can men see me, know me, and come to me, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Only by love can men see me, and know me, and come unto me, says Krishna
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 11.54)
     A reaction: There seems to be a paradox here, as it is unclear how you can love Krishna, if you have not already seen him in some way. This is another paradox of fideism - that faith cannot possibly be the first step in a religion, as faith needs a target.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / e. Hell
The three gates of hell are lust, anger and greed [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Three are the gates of this hell, the death of the soul: the gate of lust, the gate of wrath, and the gate of greed. Let a man shun the three.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 16.21)
     A reaction: Anyone who wishes to procreate, champion justice, and make a living, has to pursue all three. Wisdom consists of pursuing the three appropriately, not in shunning them. How did this bizarre puritanism ever come to grip the human race?