38 ideas
| 501 | Reason is a more powerful persuader than gold [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: In power of persuasion, reasoning is far stronger than gold. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B051), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.04.12 |
| 514 | Beauty is merely animal without intelligence [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Physical beauty is merely animal unless intelligence be present. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B105) |
| 525 | Behave well when alone, and feel shame in you own eyes [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Do not say or do what is base, even when you are alone. Learn to feel shame in your own eyes much more than before others. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B244), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.31.7 | |
| A reaction: I like this. How you think and behave when unobserved is the true test of who you are. Feeling shame at a very private failing is an interesting phenomenon. |
| 502 | Good breeding in men means having a good character [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Good breeding in cattle depends on physical health, but in men on a well-formed character. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B057), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.29.18 | |
| A reaction: In our ultra-democratic age (supposedly) it is heresy to talk about good breeding, or some people being superior to others. But surely people should aim to improve their characters? |
| 507 | Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B073), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.5.23 | |
| A reaction: Is it possible to love something without seeing it as beautiful? A badly crippled dog, for example. If not, that seems to reveal something about beauty. |
| 521 | We should only choose pleasures which are concerned with the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: One should choose not every pleasure, but only that concerned with the beautiful. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B207), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.22 | |
| A reaction: The pleasures we should prefer are those which involve the whole person, rather than the mere stimulation of one sense. Sez me. |
| 505 | Good and true are the same for everyone, but pleasures differ [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: For all men, good and true are the same; but pleasant differs for different men. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B069) | |
| A reaction: Truth is not 'for' anyone, but there's good-in-itself, and good-for-me. Are there some pleasures we should all enjoy (such as watching our children flourish)? |
| 508 | Only accept beneficial pleasures [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Accept no pleasure unless it is beneficial. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B074) | |
| A reaction: Maybe all pleasures bestow some benefit - even if they are linked to harm. I struggle to see what is wrong with a harmless and non-beneficial pleasure, and I doubt if anyone could explain it to me. |
| 520 | The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B194), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.03.46 | |
| A reaction: Only, of course, for those able to perceive the nobility. In what does the 'nobility' consist, other than in the morally acceptable pleasure? Hard to explain 'noble'. Just 'wow!'? |
| 522 | Moderation brings more pleasures, and so increases pleasure [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Moderation multiplies pleasures, and increases pleasure. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B211), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.27 | |
| A reaction: So moderation is a sneaky trick to avoid moderation? I presume the most intense pleasures are mostly unfamiliar, and so add novelty to the mix. Apart from eating chocolate, of course. |
| 506 | Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not an adult [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not a man. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B070) | |
| A reaction: Not factually correct, since the world is full of adults who have immoderate desires (notably for money). However, there are plenty of grown ups who don't seem very adult. |
| 523 | It is as brave to master pleasure as to overcome the enemy [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: The brave man is not only he who overcomes the enemy, but he who is stronger than pleasures. Some men are masters of cities, but are enslaved by women. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B214), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.07.25 | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure if 'bravery' is the relevant virtue here.Sounds like self-control or temperance. I suspect that mastering a city is quite pleasurable, if that's your thing. |
| 503 | Virtue doesn't just avoid evil, but also doesn't desire it [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Virtue consists, not in avoiding wrong-doing, but in having no wish thereto. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B062), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.17.37 |
| 518 | A bad life is just a drawn-out death [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: To live badly is not just to live badly, but to spend a long time dying. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B160), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 497 | Be virtuous from duty, not from fear [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Refrain from crimes not through fear but through duty [deon]. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B041), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.95 | |
| A reaction: [not sure about the translation here] |
| 499 | Repentance of shameful deeds is salvation [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Repentance for shameful deeds is salvation in life. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B043) |
| 524 | Virtue comes more from practice than from nature [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: More men become good through practice than by nature. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B242), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.66 |
| 519 | One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B190), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.91 |
| 500 | The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the person wronged [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the man wronged. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B045) |
| 526 | Small appetite makes poverty equal to wealth [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Small appetite makes poverty equivalent to wealth. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B284), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.33.24 |
| 1539 | The endless desire for money is a crueller slavery than poverty [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Unless a point of satiety is reached, the desire for money is far more cruel than the utmost poverty, because the greater the desire, the greater the need | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B219), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.10.43 |
| 511 | It is better to have one intelligent friend than many unintelligent [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: The friendship of one intelligent man is better than that of all the unintelligent. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B098) |
| 498 | It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B042), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.44.68 | |
| A reaction: Something wrong with the translation here, if there is no Greek word for 'duty'. |
| 1541 | It is better to be poor in a democracy than be rich without freedom [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Poverty in a democracy is as preferable to what is called prosperity under autocracy as freedom is to slavery. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B251), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.40.42 |
| 6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
| Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us. | |
| From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus | |
| A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts? |
| 20712 | God is 'eternal' either by being non-temporal, or by enduring forever [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: Saying 'God is eternal' means either that God is non-temporal or timeless, or that God has no beginning and no end. The first ('classical') view is found in Anselm, Augustine, Boethius, Aquinas, Calvin and Descartes. | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 8 'Meaning') | |
| A reaction: A God who is outside of time but performs actions is a bit of a puzzle. It seems that Augustine started the idea of a timeless God. |
| 20701 | Can God be good, if he has not maximised goodness? [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: We may wonder whether God can be good since he has not produced more moral goodness than he has. We may wonder whether God is guilty by neglect. | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 3 'Freedom') | |
| A reaction: The orthodox response is that we cannot possibly know what the maximum of moral goodness would look like, so we can't make this judgement. Atheists say that God fails by human standards, which are not particularly high. |
| 20702 | The goodness of God may be a higher form than the goodness of moral agents [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: If we can know that God exists and if God's goodness is not moral goodness, then moral goodness is not the highest form of goodness we know. There is the goodness of God to be reckoned with. | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 3 'Goodness') | |
| A reaction: This idea is to counter the charge that God fails to meet human standards for an ideal moral agent. But it sounds hand-wavy, since we presumably cannot comprehend the sort of goodness that is postulated here. |
| 20703 | How could God have obligations? What law could possibly impose them? [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: We have good reason for resisting the suggestion that God has any duties or obligations. …What can oblige God in relation to his creatures? Could there be a law saying God has such obligations? Where does such a law come from? | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 3 'Goodness') | |
| A reaction: Plato can answer this question. Greek gods are not so supreme that nothing could put them under an obligation, but 'God' has to be supreme in every respect. |
| 20694 | 'Natural theology' aims to prove God to anyone (not just believers) by reason or argument [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: 'Natural theology' is the attempt to show that belief in God's existence can be defended with reference to reason or argument which ought to be acceptable to anyone, not simply to those who believe in God's existence. | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 1 'Other') | |
| A reaction: I assume by 'reason or argument' he primarily means evidence (plus the ontological argument). He cites Karl Barth as objecting to the assumption of natural theology (preferring revelation). Presumably Kierkegaard offers a rival view too. |
| 20706 | A distinct cause of the universe can't be material (which would be part of the universe) [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: If the universe was caused to come into being, it presumably could not have been caused to do so by anything material. For a material object would be part of the universe, and we are now asking for a cause distinct from the universe. | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 5 'God') | |
| A reaction: We're out of our depth here. We only have two modes of existence to offer, material and spiritual, and 'spiritual' means little more than non-material. |
| 20707 | The universe exhibits design either in its sense of purpose, or in its regularity [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: The design argument offers two lines: the first states that the universe displays design in the sense of purpose; the second that it displays design in the sense of regularity. | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 6 'Versions') | |
| A reaction: I would have thought that you would infer the purpose from the regularity. How could you see purpose in a totally chaotic universe? |
| 20708 | If God is an orderly being, he cannot be the explanation of order [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: If God is an instance of something orderly, how can he serve to account for the order of orderly things? | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 6 'b Has') | |
| A reaction: You can at least explain the tidiness of a house by the tidiness of its owner, but obviously that won't explain the phenomenon of tidiness. |
| 20710 | Maybe an abnormal state of mind is needed to experience God? [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: Might it not be possible that experience of God requires an unusual state or psychological abnormality, just as an aerial view of Paris requires that one be in the unusual state of being abnormally elevated? | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 7 'Are the') | |
| A reaction: That would make sense if it were analogous to great mathematical or musical ability, but it sounds more like ouija boards in darkened rooms. Talent has a wonderful output, but people in mystical states don't return with proofs. |
| 20711 | A believer can experience the world as infused with God [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: Maybe someone who believes in God can be regarded as experiencing everything as something behind which God lies. Believers see the world as a world in which God is present. | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 7 'Experiencing') | |
| A reaction: [Attributed to John Hick] This would count as supporting evidence for God, perhaps, if seeing reality as infused with God produces a consistent and plausible picture. But seeing reality as infused with other things might pass the same test. |
| 20709 | The experiences of God are inconsistent, not universal, and untestable [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: A proclaimed experience of God must be rejected because a) there is no agreed test that it is such an experience, b) some people experience God's absence, and c) there is no uniformity of testimony about the experience. | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 7 'Objections') | |
| A reaction: [compressed] I'm not sure that absence of an experience is experience of an absence. Compare it with experiencing the greatness of Beethoven's Ninth. |
| 20697 | One does not need a full understanding of God in order to speak of God [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: In order to speak meaningfully about God, it is not necessary that one should understand exactly the import of one's statements about him. | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 2 'Sayng') | |
| A reaction: Perfectly reasonable. To insist that all discussion of a thing requires exact understanding of the thing is ridiculous. Equally, though, to discuss God while denying all understanding of God is just as ridiculous. |
| 20699 | Paradise would not contain some virtues, such as courage [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: There are virtues (such as courage) that would not be present in a paradise. | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 3 'Evil') | |
| A reaction: Part of a suggestion that morality would be entirely inapplicable in paradise, and so we need dangers etc in the world. |