24 ideas
| 19712 | Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid] |
| Full Idea: There is a distinction between 'animal knowledge' (which requires only apt belief), and 'reflective knowledge' (requiring both apt and justified belief). | |
| From: Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 5) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Sosa 1991] My inclination (Idea 19711) was to think of knowledge as a continuum (possibly with a contextual component), and this distinction doesn't change my view, though it makes the point. |
| 19703 | Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid] |
| Full Idea: It is widely believed that epistemic justification is distinct from other species of justification such as moral or pragmatic justification in that it is intended to serve the so-called 'truth-goal'. | |
| From: Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 1) | |
| A reaction: Kvanvig explicitly argues against this view. He broadens the aims, but it strikes me that other aims are all intertwined with truth in some way, so I find this idea quite plausible. |
| 19705 | 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid] |
| Full Idea: Since mentalism remains neutral on whether mental states need be accessible to an agent ...it does not seem to do justice to the intuitions that drive paradigm internalist positions. | |
| From: Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 2 A) | |
| A reaction: The rival view is 'access internalism', which implies that you can act on and take responsibility for your knowledge, because you are aware of its grounding. If animals know things, that might fit the mentalist picture better. |
| 19706 | Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid] |
| Full Idea: A strong form of 'access internalism' is when an agent is required to be actually aware of the conditions that constitute justification; a weaker version loosens the accessibility condition, requiring only the ability to access the justification. | |
| From: Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 2 B) | |
| A reaction: The super strong version implies that you probably only know one thing at a time, so it must be nonsense. The weaker version has grey areas. I remember roughly the justification, but not the details. The justification is in my diary. Etc. |
| 19707 | Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid] |
| Full Idea: Access internalism may also have a truth-conducive conception of justification, where one should not only know what one's reasons are, but also why one's beliefs are probable on one's reasons. | |
| From: Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 2 B) | |
| A reaction: [he cites Bonjour 1985] Sounds reasonable. It would seem odd if you had clear access to the reason, but didn't understand it, because you had just learned it by rote. |
| 19709 | Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid] |
| Full Idea: The internalist approach in epistemology seems to suggest an over-inellectualized and deliberative picture of our belief-forming activities. | |
| From: Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 2.2 B) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as confused. The question is not how do I arrive at my beliefs but what justifies my believing them, and what justifies the beliefs in themselves? My head is full of daft beliefs produced by TV advertising. |
| 19704 | Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid] |
| Full Idea: According to the 'mentalist' version of internalism, an externalist is someone who maintains that two people can be in the same present mental states while one has a justified belief and the other does not. | |
| From: Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 2 A) | |
| A reaction: It seems an unlikely coincidence, that we have identical mental states, but your is (say) reliably created but mine isn't. Nevertheless this does seem to be an implication of externalism, though not a definition of it. |
| 19710 | With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid] |
| Full Idea: The causal theory of justification was soon replaced by Nozick's construal of knowledge as counterfactually sensitive to its truth value (that is, it tracks truth). A counterfactual theory of causation connects this to the causal theory. | |
| From: Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 3) | |
| A reaction: This is presented as an externalist theory, close to the causal theory (and prior to the reliability theory). But how could you be 'sensitive' to a changing truth if the justification was all external? Externally supported beliefs seem ossified. |
| 19711 | Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid] |
| Full Idea: Internalists say that externalism is inadequate because it makes the obtaining of knowledge and justified beliefs too easy | |
| From: Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 4) | |
| A reaction: This looks like a key issue in epistemology. Do children and animals have lots of knowledge, which they soak up unthinkingly, or do only thinking adults really 'know' things? Why not have degrees of knowledge? |
| 6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
| Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us. | |
| From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus | |
| A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts? |
| 21202 | The strong force has a considerably greater range than the weak force [Martin,BR] |
| Full Idea: The strong nuclear force has a range of 10^-15 m, considerably larger than the range of the weak force. | |
| From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01) | |
| A reaction: This is because the bosons transmitting the weak force (W+, W-, W°) are much heavier than the gluons of the strong force. |
| 21211 | If an expected reaction does not occur, that implies a conservation law [Martin,BR] |
| Full Idea: If some reaction is not observed when there is apparently nothing to prevent it occurring, it is an indication that a conservation law is in operation. | |
| From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 07) |
| 21209 | Electron emit and reabsorb photons, which create and reabsorb virtual electrons and positrons [Martin,BR] |
| Full Idea: In QED an electron constantly emits and reabsorbs virtual photons and these photons constantly create and reabsorb pairs of virtual electrons and positrons, and so on. | |
| From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 06) | |
| A reaction: 'And so on'! These virtual particles have energy, and hence mass. |
| 21212 | The Higgs field, unlike others, has a nozero value in a state without particles [Martin,BR] |
| Full Idea: The Higgs field has the property of having a nonzero value in a state without particles, the vacuum state. Other fields are assumed to have a value zero in a vacuum state. | |
| From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 09) | |
| A reaction: This seems to make a big difference to our concept of a field, since it has a measurable reality even when there are no particles. So it isn't just a geometrical frame for locating particles. |
| 21201 | A 'field' is just a region to which points can be assigned in space and time [Martin,BR] |
| Full Idea: The word 'field' is simply a shorthand way of saying that a physical property is assigned to the points of space and time in a region. | |
| From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01) | |
| A reaction: This is disappointing because I had begun to think that fields were foundational for modern ontology. Turns out they are operational abstractions (according to Martin). Note that a field extends over time. |
| 21205 | Many physicists believe particles have further structure, if only we could see it [Martin,BR] |
| Full Idea: Although standard particles are assumed to be structureless, many physicists believe that if distances could be probed down to 10^-35 m structures would be discovered. | |
| From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01) | |
| A reaction: Such probing is said to be probably impossible. And does the division then come to a halt? Aristotle's meditations on this are not irrelevant. |
| 21203 | Uncertainty allows very brief violations of energy conservation - even shorter with higher energies [Martin,BR] |
| Full Idea: The uncertainty principle states that energy conservation can be violated, but only for a limited period of time. As the energy violation increases, the time period within which 'borrowed' energy has to be 'paid back' decreases. | |
| From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01) | |
| A reaction: This is the only reason modern physicists ever seem to mention the uncertainty principle. You can ask why this debt must be paid, but it seems to be hidden where the laws of physics may not even apply. |
| 21207 | The Exclusion Principle says no two fermions occupy the same state, with the same numbers [Martin,BR] |
| Full Idea: The 'exclusion principle' initially stated that no two electrons in a system could simultaneously occupy the same quantum state and thus have the same set of quantum numbers. The principle actually applies to all fermions, but not to bosons. | |
| From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 02) | |
| A reaction: This principle is said to be at the root of atomic structure, making each element unique. What exactly is a 'system'? Why does this principle hold? How do you ensure two women don't wear the same dress at a party? |
| 21204 | The standard model combines theories of strong interaction, and electromagnetic and weak interaction [Martin,BR] |
| Full Idea: As presently formulated, the standard model is two theories. One operates in the sector of strong interaction, and the other in the sector of the electromagnetic and weak interactions. | |
| From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01) | |
| A reaction: The first is Quantum Chomodynamics (QCD). The second is Quantum Electrodynamics (QED). Interesting that the weak interaction is included in the latter, which (I take it) means there is an electro-weak union. Interactions are the heart of the model. |
| 21208 | Eletrons don't literally 'spin', because they are point-like [Martin,BR] |
| Full Idea: The picture of a particle spinning like a top is sometime useful, but it is not consistent with the idea of the electron being point-like. In fact there is no analogy for spin in non-quantum physics. | |
| From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 02) | |
| A reaction: If we take this stuff literally then it blow traditional metaphysics to bits, because an electron has properties without being a substance. In what sense can an electron 'have' properties if it is a point? In interactions they cease to be points. Eh? |
| 21210 | Virtual particles surround any charged particle [Martin,BR] |
| Full Idea: A cloud of virtual particles always surrounds a charged particle. | |
| From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 06) | |
| A reaction: Here's a nice fact for aspiring Buddhists to meditate on. |
| 21206 | The properties of a particle are determined by its quantum numbers and its mass [Martin,BR] |
| Full Idea: In quantum theory, the full set of quantum numbers defines the state of the particle and, along with its mass, determines its properties. | |
| From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 02) |
| 21213 | String theory only has one free parameter (tension) - unlike the standard model with 19 [Martin,BR] |
| Full Idea: Unlike the standard model, with its 19 free parameters (including the masses of quarks, coupling constants and mixing angles), string theories have a single free paramater: the string tension. | |
| From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 10) | |
| A reaction: This must be one feature in favour of string theory, despite its problems. |
| 21200 | An 'element' is what cannot be decomposed by chemistry [Martin,BR] |
| Full Idea: In the modern sense 'element' means a substance that cannot be decomposed by the methods of chemistry. | |
| From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01) |