12750
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The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant]
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Full Idea:
The whole question is to know if the force to act in bodies is in matter something distinct and independent of everything else that one conceives there. Without that, this force cannot be its essence, and will remain the result of some primitive quality.
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From:
Jacques Lenfant (Letters to Leibniz [1693], 1693.11.07), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 8
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A reaction:
This challenge to Leibniz highlights the drama of trying to simultaneously arrive at explanations of things, and to decide the nature of essence. Leibniz replied that force is primitive, because it is the 'principle' of behaviour and dispositions.
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14596
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Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr]
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Full Idea:
Just as there are no numbers or properties, there are no relations (like 'being heavier than' or 'betweenness'), or sets. I will provisionally use 'nominalism' for the conjunction of these four claims.
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From:
Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 1)
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A reaction:
If you are going to be a nominalist, do it properly! My starting point in metaphysics is strong sympathy with this view. Right now [Tues 22nd Nov 2011, 10:57 am GMT] I think it is correct.
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14598
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Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr]
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Full Idea:
If there are abstract objects, there are necessary truths about these things that cannot be reduced to truths of logic. So only the nominalist, who denies that there are any such things, can adequately respect the idea that there are no brute necessities.
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From:
Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 4)
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A reaction:
This is where two plates of my personal philosophy grind horribly against one another. I love nominalism, and I love natural necessities. They meet like a ring-species in evolution. I'll just call it a 'paradox', and move on (swiftly).
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