79 ideas
23350 | A wise philosophers uses reason to cautiously judge each aspect of living [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The sinews of a philosopher are desire that never fails in its achievement; aversion that never meets with what it would avoid; appropriate impulse; carefully considered purpose; and assent that is never precipitate. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.08.29) | |
A reaction: This is a very individual view of wisdom and the philosopher, whereas wisdom is often thought to have a social role. Is it not important for a philosopher to at least offer advice? |
23355 | The task of philosophy is to establish standards, as occurs with weights and measures [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Things are judged and weighed, when we have the standards ready. This is the task of philosophy: to examine and establish the standards. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.11.24) | |
A reaction: It is interesting that this gives philosophers a very specific social role, and also that it seems to identify epistemology as First Philosophy. Other disciplines, of course, establish their own standards without reference to philosophy. |
21394 | Philosophy is knowing each logos, how they fit together, and what follows from them [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: [Philosophical speculation] consists in knowing the elements of 'logos', what each of them is like, how they fit together, and what follows from them. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 4.08.14), quoted by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.1 | |
A reaction: [Said to echo Zeno] If you substitute understanding for 'logos' (plausibly), I think this is exactly the view of philosophy I would subscribe to. We want to understand each aspect of life, and we want those understandings to cohere with one another. |
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
20876 | Philosophy investigates the causes of disagreements, and seeks a standard for settling them [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The start of philosophy is perception of the mutual conflict among people, and a search for its cause, plus the rejection and distrust of mere opinion, an investigation to see if opinion is right, and the discovery of some canon, like scales for weighing. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.11.13) | |
A reaction: So the number one aim of philosophy is epistemological, to find the criterion for true opinion. But it starts in real life, and would cease to trade if people would just agree. I think we should set the bar higher than that. |
23344 | Reason itself must be compounded from some of our impressions [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: What is reason itself? Something compounded from impressions of a certain kind. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.20.05) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the only escape from the dead end attempts to rationally justify reason. Making reason a primitive absolute is crazy metaphysics. |
23343 | Because reason performs all analysis, we should analyse reason - but how? [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Since it is reason that analyses and completes all other things, reason itself should not be left unanalysed. But by what shall it be analysed? ..That is why philosophers put logic first, just as when measuring grain we first examine the measure. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.17.01) | |
A reaction: The problem of the definitive metre rule in Paris. I say we have to test reason against the physical world, and the measure of reason is truth. Something has to be primitive, but reason is too vague for that role. Idea 23344 agrees with me! |
18996 | A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo] |
Full Idea: A statement S is 'partly true' insofar as it has wholly true parts: wholly true implications whose subject matter is included in that of S. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 01.6) | |
A reaction: He suggests that if we have rival theories, we agree that it is one or the other. And 'we may have pork for dinner, or human flesh' is partly true. |
19006 | An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo] |
Full Idea: An 'enthymeme' is a deductive argument with an unstated assumption that must be true for the premises to lead to the conclusion. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 11.1) |
8859 | The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo] |
Full Idea: Lewis's different systems of modal logic differed about such formulae as □P implies □□P; ◊□P implies □P; and ◊S implies □◊S | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §06) | |
A reaction: Yablo's point is that the various version don't seem to make much difference to our practices in logic, mathematics and science. The problem, says Yablo, is deciding exactly what you mean by 'necessarily' and 'possibly'. |
18999 | y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo] |
Full Idea: The principle of Supplementation says that y is properly part of x, only if a z exists that 'makes up the difference' between them. [note: that is, z is disjoint from y and sums with y to form x] | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 03.2) |
19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
Full Idea: 'Pegasus does not exist' has a paradoxical, self-undermining flavour. On the one hand, the empty name makes it untrue. But now, why is the name empty? Because Pegasus does not exist. 'Pegasus does not exist' is untrue because Pegasus does not exist. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 05.7 n20) | |
A reaction: Beautiful! This is Yablo's reward for continuing to ask 'why?' after everyone else has stopped in bewilderment at the tricky phenomenon. |
9138 | An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference [Yablo, by Sorensen] |
Full Idea: Banning self-reference is too narrow to avoid the liar paradox. With 1) all the subsequent sentences are false, 2) all the subsequent sentences are false, 3) all the subsequent... the paradox still arises. Self-reference is a special case of this. | |
From: report of Stephen Yablo (Paradox without Self-Reference [1993]) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction 11.1 | |
A reaction: [Idea 9137 pointed out that the ban was too narrow. Sorensen p.168 explains why this one is paradoxical] This is a nice example of progress in philosophy, since the Greeks would have been thrilled with this idea (unless they knew it, but it was lost). |
8865 | If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo] |
Full Idea: If someone says 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', he or she wants to focus on Democrats, not numbers. If the number is 50 million, is 50 million really on the rise? | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §14) | |
A reaction: This is a very nice warning from Yablo, against easy platonism, or any sort of platonism at all. We routinely say that numbers are 'increasing', but the real meaning needs entangling. Here it refers to people joining a party. |
19002 | A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo] |
Full Idea: If I am a nominalist non-Platonist, I think it is false that 'there are primes over 10', but I want to be able to say it like everyone else. I argue that this because the statement has a part that I do believe, a part that remains interestingly true. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 05.8) | |
A reaction: This is obviously a key motivation for Yablo's book, as it reinforces his fictional view of abstract objects, but aims to capture the phenomena, by investigating what such sentences are 'about'. Admirable. |
8863 | We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo] |
Full Idea: It is only by making as if to countenance numbers that one can give expression in English to a fact having nothing to do with numbers, a fact about stars and planets and how they are numerically proportioned. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §13) | |
A reaction: To avoid the phrase 'numerically proportioned', he might have alluded to the 'pattern' of the stars and planets. I'm not sure which -ism this is, but it seems to me a good approach. The application is likely to precede the theory. |
10580 | Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo] |
Full Idea: Mathematics seems necessary because the real contents of mathematical statements are logical truths, which are necessary, and it seems a priori because logical truths really are a priori. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 10) | |
A reaction: Yablo says his logicism has a Kantian strain, because numbers and sets 'inscribed on our spectacles', but he takes a different view (in the present Idea) from Kant about where the necessity resides. Personally I am tempted by an a posteriori necessity. |
8862 | Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo] |
Full Idea: The means by which platonic objects are simulated is existential metaphor. Numbers are conjured up as metaphorical measures of cardinality. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §12) | |
A reaction: 'Fictional' might be a better word than 'metaphorical', since the latter usually implies some sort of comparison. |
10579 | Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo] |
Full Idea: Saying 'the number of Fs is 5', instead of using five quantifiers, puts the numeral in quantifiable position, which brings expressive advantages. 'There are more sheep in the field than cows' is an infinite disjunction, expressible in finite compass. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 08) | |
A reaction: See Hofweber with similar thoughts. This idea I take to be a key one in explaining many metaphysical confusions. The human mind just has a strong tendency to objectify properties, relations, qualities, categories etc. - for expression and for reasoning. |
10578 | We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo] |
Full Idea: Our knowledge of concreta is a posteriori, but our knowledge of numbers, at least, has often been considered a priori. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 02) |
10577 | Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo] |
Full Idea: Objects like me have a few essential properties, and numerous accidental ones. Abstract objects are a different story. The intrinsic properties of the empty set are mostly essential. The relations of numbers are also mostly essential. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 01) |
19489 | For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value [Yablo] |
Full Idea: A 'myth' or fiction for me is a true internal statement (a statement endorsed by the rules) whose external truth value is as may be, the point being that that truth value is from an internal standpoint quite irrelevant. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? [1998], IX) | |
A reaction: This contrasts with Carnap, for whom talk of 'ghosts' is false in an internal thing-framework. Yablo seems here to say a statement can be true while having no truth value. Presumably he is relaxing the internal rules. |
19490 | Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures [Yablo] |
Full Idea: Make-believe games can make it easier to reason about facts, to systematize them, to visualize them, to spot connections with other facts, and to evaluate potential lines of research. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? [1998], XI) | |
A reaction: This is the key pragmatic defence of the fictionalist view of abstract objects. Fictions are devices to help us think better. I think a lot of ontology turns out that way. |
19491 | 'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds' [Yablo] |
Full Idea: It is an open question whether the clouds that we call 'angry' are literally F, for any F other than 'such that it would be natural and proper to regard them as angry if one were going to attribute emotions to clouds'. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? [1998], XII) | |
A reaction: His point is that it is TRUE, in those circumstances, that the clouds are angry. Thus fictions are a valid and useful part of ordinary sensible course, giving real information. I like it. |
8864 | We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo] |
Full Idea: It is not that the contents of sentences are inexpressible without quantifying over events, worlds, etc. (they aren't). But the logical relations become much more tractable if we represent them quantificationally. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §13) | |
A reaction: Yablo is explaining why we find ourselves committed to abstract objects. It is essentially, as I am beginning to suspect, a conspiracy of logicians. What on earth is 'the empty set' when it is at home? What's it made of? |
19494 | Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo] |
Full Idea: The fictionalist offers the option that your simulated beliefs and assertions may be tracking a realm of genuine facts, or a realm of what you take to be facts. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Go Figure: a Path through Fictionalism [2001], 13) | |
A reaction: This means that fictionalism does not have to be an error theory. That is, we aren't mistakenly believing something that we actually made up. Instead we are sensibly believing something we know to be not literally true. Love it. |
8858 | Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo] |
Full Idea: There's a tradition in philosophy of finding 'unexpected objects' in truth-conditions, such as countermodels, possible worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets and properties. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §02) | |
A reaction: This is a very nice perspective on the whole matter of abstract objects. If we find ourselves reluctantly committed to the existence of something which is ontologically peculiar, we should go back to the philosophical drawing-board. |
14381 | A statue is essentially the statue, but its lump is not essentially a statue, so statue isn't lump [Yablo, by Rocca] |
Full Idea: Yablo proposes the argument that Statue A is essentially a statue, and Lump 1 is not essentially a statue, so Statue A is not identical with Lump 1. | |
From: report of Stephen Yablo (Identity, Essence and Indiscernibility [1987]) by Michael della Rocca - Essentialists and Essentialism I | |
A reaction: Della Rocca and Yablo unashamedly elide necessary properties with essential properties, so this argument doesn't bother me too much. It concerns the statue and the clay having different modal properties. |
18998 | Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo] |
Full Idea: Most relations obtain only between certain kinds of thing. To learn that x is a part of y, however, tells you nothing about x and y taken individually. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 03.2) | |
A reaction: Too sweeping. To be a part of crowd you have to be a person. To be part of the sea you have to be wet. It might depend on whether composition is unrestricted. |
19493 | Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo] |
Full Idea: The governing fiction of possible worlds theory says that whenever something is possible, there is a world where it happens. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Go Figure: a Path through Fictionalism [2001], 05) | |
A reaction: This sounds like the only sensible attitude to possible worlds I can think of. |
23359 | We can't believe apparent falsehoods, or deny apparent truths [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to assent to an apparent falsehood, or to deny an apparent truth. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 3.07.15) | |
A reaction: The way some philosophers write you would think that most beliefs just result from private whims or social fashion. That happens, of course, but most beliefs result from direct contact with reality. |
23356 | Self-evidence is most obvious when people who deny a proposition still have to use it [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: It is about the strongest proof one could offer of a proposition being evident, that even he who contradicts it finds himself having to make use of it. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.20.01) | |
A reaction: Philosophers sometimes make fools of themselves by trying, by the use of elaborate sophistry, to demolish propositions which are self-evidently true. Don't be one of these philosophers! |
19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo] |
Full Idea: We know from Gettier that if you are right to regard Q as true, but you are sufficiently confused about HOW it is true - about how things stand with respect to its subject matter - then you don't know that Q. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 07.4) | |
A reaction: I'm inclined to approach Gettier by focusing on the propositions being expressed, where his cases tend to focus on the literal wording of the sentences. What did the utterer mean by the sentences - not what did they appear to say. |
19007 | A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo] |
Full Idea: A physical theory need not be true to be good, Field has argued, and I agree. All we ask of it truth-wise is that its physical implications should be true, or, in my version, that it should be true about the physical. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 12.5) | |
A reaction: Yablo is, of course, writing a book here about the concept of 'about'. This seems persuasive. The internal terminology of the theory isn't committed to anything - it is only at its physical periphery (Quine) that the ontology matters. |
18993 | If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo] |
Full Idea: 'All crows are black' cannot say quite the same as 'All non-black things are non-crows', for the two are confirmed by different evidence. Subject matter looks to be the distinguishing feature. One is about crows, the other not. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], Intro) | |
A reaction: You might reply that they are confirmed by the same evidence (but only in its unobtainable totality). The point, I think, is that the sentences invite you to start your search in different places. |
19003 | Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo] |
Full Idea: The standard response to the raven paradox is to say that a nonblack nonraven does confirm that all ravens are black. But it confirms it just the teeniest little bit - not as much as a black raven does. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 06.5) | |
A reaction: It depends on the proportion between the relevant items. How do you confirm 'all the large animals in this zoo are mammals'? Check for size every animal which is obviously not a mammal? |
23329 | We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Progress is when any of you turns to his own faculty of choice, working at it and perfecting it, so as to bring it fully into harmony with nature; elevated, free, unrestrained, unhindered, faithful, self-respecting. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.04.18) | |
A reaction: [See also Disc.3.5.7] Rationality is the stoic concept of being in 'harmony with nature'. It appears (from reading Frede) that this may be the FIRST EVER reference to free will. Note the very rhetorical way in which it is presented. |
23330 | Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: He is free for whom all things happen in accordance with his choice, and whom no one can constrain. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.12.09) | |
A reaction: The idea of 'free' will seems to have resulted from a wide extension of the idea of constraint, with global determinism lurking in the background. |
23342 | Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: He is free for whom all things happen in accordance with his choice, and whom no one can constrain. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.12.09) | |
A reaction: Presumable this means that constraint is absolutely impossible, even by Zeus, and not just contingent possibility, when no one sees me raid the fridge. |
23332 | Zeus gave me a nature which is free (like himself) from all compulsion [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Zeus placed my good nature in my own power, and gave it to me as he has it himself, free from all hindrance, compulsion and restraint. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 3.03.10) | |
A reaction: Although Frede traces the origin of free will to the centrality of choice in moral life (and hence to the elevation of its importance), this remark shows that there is a religious aspect to it. Zeus is supreme, and obviously has free will. |
23331 | Not even Zeus can control what I choose [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus himself can get the better of my choice. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.01.23) | |
A reaction: This is the beginnings of the idea of free will. It is based on the accurate observation that the intrinsic privacy of a mind means that no external force can be assured of controlling its actions. Epictetus failed to think of internal forces. |
23338 | You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: What are you saying, man? Fetter me? You will fetter my leg; but not even Zeus himself can get the better of my choice. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.01.23) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the beginning of the idea of 'absolute' freedom, which is conjured up to preserve perfect inegrity and complete responsibility. Obviously you can be prevented from doing what you choose, so this is not compatibilism. |
20875 | If we could foresee the future, we should collaborate with disease and death [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The philosophers are right to say that if the honorable and good person knew what was going to happen, he would even collaborate with disease, death and lameness. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.05) | |
A reaction: The 'philosophers' must be the earlier stoics, founders of his school. |
23347 | If I know I am fated to be ill, I should want to be ill [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: If I really knew that it was ordained for me to be ill at this moment, I would aspire to be so. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.06.10) | |
A reaction: The rub, of course, is that it is presumably impossible to know what is fated. Book 2.7 is on divination. I don't see any good in a mortally ill person desiring, for that reason alone, to die. Rage against the dying of the light, I say. |
10805 | A sentence should be recarved to reveal its content or implication relations [Yablo] |
Full Idea: A sentence invites recarving iff it will then do better justice to the internal structure of its content and/or its implication relations. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Carving Content at the Joints [2002], §11) | |
A reaction: This invites human intervention in a logical process (by choosing which recarvings to do, instead of allowing all equivalences to generate them). He seems to think we should abstract in order to reveal logical form. |
18992 | Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo] |
Full Idea: A sentence's meaning is to do with its truth-value in various possible scenarios, AND the factors responsible for that truth-value. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], Intro) | |
A reaction: The thesis of his book, which I welcome. I'm increasingly struck by the way in which much modern philosophy settles for a theory being complete, when actually further explanation is possible. Exhibit A is functional explanations. Why that function? |
18994 | The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo] |
Full Idea: Assertive content - what a sentence is heard as saying - can be at quite a distance from compositional content. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is the obvious reason why semantics cannot be entirely compositional, since there is nearly always a contextual component which then has to be added. In the case of irony, the compositional content is entirely reversed. |
18997 | Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo] |
Full Idea: If the subject-matter of S is how it is true, we get three unfortunate results: S has truth-value in worlds where its subject-matter draws a blank; learning what S is about tells you its truth-value; negating S changes what it's about. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 02.8) | |
A reaction: Together these make fairly devastating objections to the truth-conditions (in possible worlds) theory of meaning. The first-objection concerns when S is false |
19005 | Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo] |
Full Idea: The idea that negation is, or can be, a cancellation device raises an interesting question. What does one do to wipe the slate clean after an improper assertion? Not-A is too strong; it reverses our stand on A rather than nullifying it. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 09.8) | |
A reaction: [He is discussing a remark of Strawson 1952] It seems that 'not' has two meanings or uses: a weak use of 'nullifying' an assertion, and a strong use of 'reversing' an assertion. One could do both: 'that's not right; in fact, it's just the opposite'. |
8861 | Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo] |
Full Idea: There is hardly a word in the language - be it an adverb, preposition, conjunction, or what have you - that is devoid of metaphorical potential. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §12) | |
A reaction: Yablo goes on to claim that metaphor is at the heart of all of our abstract thinking. 'Dead metaphors' (like the "mouth" of a river) sink totally into literal language. I think Yablo is on the right lines. |
23325 | Epictetus developed a notion of will as the source of our responsibility [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The notion of will in Epictetus is clearly developed to pinpoint the source of our responsibility for our actions and to identify precisely what it is that makes them our own doings. | |
From: report of Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56]) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 3 | |
A reaction: So the key move is that responsibility needs a 'source', rather than being a generalisation about how our actions arise. The next step is demand an 'ultimate' source, and this leads to the idea that this new will is 'free'. This will can be good or bad. |
20873 | Tragedies are versified sufferings of people impressed by externals [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Tragedies are nothing but the sufferings of people who are impressed by externals, performed in the right sort of meter. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.04.26) | |
A reaction: The externals are things like honour, position and wealth. Wonderfully dismissive! |
23364 | Homer wrote to show that the most blessed men can be ruined by poor judgement [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Did not Homer write to show us that the noblest, the strongest, the richest, the handsomest of men may nevertheless be the most unfortunate and wretched, if they do not hold the judgements that they ought to hold? | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 4.10.36) | |
A reaction: This seems to be right. He clearly wrote about the greatest and most memorable events of recent times, but not just to record triumphs, because almost every hero (in the Iliad, at least) ends in disaster. |
23366 | We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The will of nature may be learned from those things in which we do not differ from one another. | |
From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 26) | |
A reaction: There you go! This is the rule for anthropologists on field trips. And it guides us towards a core of essential human nature. But it neglects the way that nature is expressed in different cultures, which is also important. |
23340 | We consist of animal bodies and god-like reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: We have these two elements mingled within us, a body in common with the animals, and reason and intelligence in common with the gods. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.03.03) | |
A reaction: This is what I call Human Exceptionalism, but note that it doesn't invoke a Christian soul or spiritual aspect. This separation of reason goes back at least to Plato. High time we stopped thinking this way. Animals behave very sensibly. |
23358 | Every species produces exceptional beings, and we must just accept their nature [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: In every species nature produces some exceptional being, in oxen, in dogs, in bees, in horses. We do not say to them 'Who are you?' It will tell you 'I am like the purple in the robe. Do not expect me to be like the rest, or find fault with my nature'. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 3.01.23) | |
A reaction: This idea began with Aristotle's 'great soul', and presumably culminates in Nietzsche, who fills in more detail. In the modern world such people are mostly nothing but trouble. |
23339 | I will die as becomes a person returning what he does not own [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: When the time comes, then I will die - as becomes a person who gives back what is not his own. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.01.32) | |
A reaction: There is a tension between his demand that he have full control of his choices, and this humility that says his actual life is not his own. The things which can't be controlled, though, are 'indifferents' so life and death are indifferent. |
23345 | Don't be frightened of pain or death; only be frightened of fearing them [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: It is not pain or death that is to be feared, but the fear of pain or death. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.01.13) | |
A reaction: These two cases are quite different, I would say. I'm much more frightened of pain than I am of the fear of pain, and the opposite view seems absurd. About death, though, I think this is right. Mostly I'm with Spinoza: think about life, not death. |
23357 | Knowledge of what is good leads to love; only the wise, who distinguish good from evil, can love [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Whoever has knowledge of good things would know how to love them; and how could he who cannot distinguish good things from evil still have to power to love? It follows that the wise man alone has the power to love. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.22.03) | |
A reaction: A rather heartwarming remark, but hard to assess for its truth. Evil people are unable to love? Not even love a cat, or their favourite car? We would never call someone wise if they lacked love. |
23363 | The evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Where is the paradox if we say that what is evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature? | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 4.01.125) | |
A reaction: A very Greek view. For humans, it must rely on the belief that human nature is essentially good. If I am sometimes grumpy and annoying, why is that not part of my nature? |
23328 | The essences of good and evil are in dispositions to choose [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The essence of the good is a certain disposition of our choice, and essence of evil likewise. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.29.01) | |
A reaction: This is the origin of Kant's famous view, that the only true good is a good will. This is the alternative to good character or good states of affairs as the good. It points towards the modern more legalistic view of morality, as concerning actions. |
23362 | All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The cause of all human ills is that people are incapable of applying their general preconceptions to particular cases. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 4.01.42) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure whether 'preconceptions' is meant pejoratively (as unthinking, and opposed to true principles). This sounds like modern particularism (e.g. Jonathan Dancy) to the letter. |
23353 | We have a natural sense of honour [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: What faculty do you mean? - Have we not a natural sense of honour? - We have. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.22) | |
A reaction: This seems unlikely, given the lower status that honour now has with us, compared to two hundred years ago. But there may be a natural sense of status, and of humiliation and shame. |
23354 | If someone harms themselves in harming me, then I harm myself by returning the harm [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Since he has harmed himself by wronging me, shall not I harm myself by harming him? | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.26) | |
A reaction: I am very keen on this idea. See Hamlet's remarks to Polonius about 'honour and dignity'. The best strategy for achieving moral excellence is to focus on our own characters, rather than how to act, and to respond to others. |
23324 | In the Discourses choice [prohairesis] defines our character and behaviour [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: In Epictetus's 'Discourses' the notion of choice [prohairesis] plays perhaps the central role. It is our prohairesis which defines us a person, as the sort of person we are; it is our prohairesis which determines how we behave. | |
From: report of Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56]) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 3 | |
A reaction: Frede is charting the gradual move in Greek philosophy from action by desire, reason and habit to action by the will (which then turns out to be 'free'). Character started as dispositions and ended as choices. |
4022 | Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: The injunction of Epictetus is well known, that in commiserating with another for his misfortune, we ought to talk consolingly, but not be moved by pity. | |
From: report of Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], §16) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §15.1 | |
A reaction: This goes strongly against the grain of the Christian tradition, but strikes me as an appealing attitude (even if I am the sufferer). |
23365 | If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: When you see someone weeping is sorrow …do not shrink from sympathising with him, and even groaning with him, but be careful not to groan inwardly too. | |
From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 16) | |
A reaction: The point is that the person's suffering is an 'indifferent' because nothing can be done about it, and we should only really care about what we are able to choose. He is not opposed to the man's suffering, or his need for support. |
23361 | Health is only a good when it is used well [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Is health a good and sickness an evil? No. Health is good when used well, and bad when used ill. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 3.20.04) | |
A reaction: Although I like the idea that health is a natural value, which bridges the gap from facts to values (as a successful function), there is no denying that the health of very evil people is not something the rest of us hope for. |
23346 | A person is as naturally a part of a city as a foot is part of the body [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Just as the foot in detachment is no longer a foot, so you in detachment are not longer a man. For what is a man? A part of a city, first. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.05.26) | |
A reaction: It is, of course, not true that a detached foot ceases to be a foot (and an isolated human is still a human). This an extreme version of the Aristotelian idea that we are essentially social. It is, though, the sort of view favoured by totalitarianism. |
23351 | We are citizens of the universe, and principal parts of it [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: You are a citizen of the universe, and a part of it; and no subservient, but a principal part of it. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.03) | |
A reaction: He got this view from Diogenes of Sinope, one of his heroes. What community you are a part of seems to be a choice as much as a fact. Am I British or a European? |
20874 | A citizen is committed to ignore private advantage, and seek communal good [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The commitment of the citizen is to have no private advantage, not to deliberate about anything as though one were a separate part. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.04) | |
A reaction: This is the modern problem of whether democratic voters are choosing for themselves or for the community. I think we should make an active effort at every election to persuade voters to aim for the communal good. Cf Rawls. |
23352 | A citizen should only consider what is good for the whole society [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The calling of a citizen is to consider nothing in terms of personal advantage, never to deliberate on anything as though detached from the whole, but be like our hand or foot. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.04) | |
A reaction: Fat chance of that in an aggressively capitalist society. I've always voted for what I thought was the common good, and was shocked to gradually realise that many people only vote for what promotes their own interests. Heigh ho. |
22604 | Punishing a criminal for moral ignorance is the same as punishing someone for being blind [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: You should ask 'Ought not this man to be put to death, who is deceived in things of the greatest importance, and is blinded in distinguishing good from evil?' …You then see how inhuman it is, and the same as 'Ought not this blind man to be put to death?' | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.18.6-7) | |
A reaction: This is the doctrine of Socrates, that evil is ignorance (and weakness of will [akrasia] is impossible). Epictetus wants us to reason with the man, but what should be do if reasoning fails and he persists in his crimes? |
23368 | Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The governor Agrippinus would try to persuade those whom he sentenced that it was proper for them to be sentenced, …just as the physician persuades a patient to accept their treatment. | |
From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 22) | |
A reaction: This resembles the Contractualism of T.H. Scanlon (that actions are good if you can justify them to those involved). It may be possible to persuade people by the use of sophistry and lies. Nevertheless, a fairly civilise proposal. |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us. | |
From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus | |
A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts? |
23349 | Asses are born to carry human burdens, not as ends in themselves [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: An ass is surely not born as an end in itself? No, but because we had need of a back that is able to carry burdens. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.08.07) | |
A reaction: This is the absurd human exceptionalism which plagues our thinking. It would be somewhat true of animals which are specifically bred for human work, such as large cart horses. |
23341 | God created humans as spectators and interpreters of God's works [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: God has introduced man into the world as a spectator of himself and of his works: and not only as a spectator of them, but an interpreter of them as well. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.06.19) | |
A reaction: This idea (which strikes me as bizarre) was picked up directly by the Christians. I can't imagine every Johnson wanting to creating their own Boswell. If you think we are divinely created, you have to propose some motive for it, I suppose. |
23348 | Both god and the good bring benefits, so their true nature seems to be the same [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: God brings benefits; but the good also brings benefit. It would seem, then, that where the true nature of god is, there too is the true nature of good. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.08.01) | |
A reaction: An enthymeme, missing the premise that there can only be one source of benefit (which sounds unlikely). Does god bring anything other than benefits? And does the good? I think this is an idea from later platonism. |
23360 | Each of the four elements in you is entirely scattered after death [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Whatever was in you of fire, departs into fire; what was of earth, into earth; what of air, into air; what of water, into water. There is no Hades, nor Acheron. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 3.13.15) | |
A reaction: This sort of remark may explain why so few of the great Stoic texts (such as those of Chrysippus) survived the Christian era. |