49 ideas
15477 | Ontology is highly abstract physics, containing placeholders and exclusions [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Ontology sets out an even more abstract model of how the world is than theoretical physics, a model that has placeholders for scientific results and excluders for tempting confusions. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
A reaction: Most modern metaphysicians accept this account. The interesting (mildly!) question is whether physicists will accept it. If the metaphysics is really rooted in physics, a metaphysical physicist is better placed than a metaphysician knowing some physics. |
6253 | Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Reason is our power of finding out true propositions. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §I) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a very good definition. I don't see how you can define reason without mentioning truth, and you can't believe in reason if you don't believe in truth. The concept of reason entails the concept of a good reason. |
15471 | Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker') [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Truth is a relation between two things - a representation (the truth 'bearer') and the world or some part of it (the 'truthmaker'). | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 03.1) | |
A reaction: That truth is about representations seems to me to be exactly right. That it is about truthmakers is more controversial. There are well known problems with negative truths, general truths, future truths etc. I'm happy with 'facts'. |
15484 | A property is a combination of a disposition and a quality [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: I take properties to have a dual nature; in virtue of possessing a property, an object possesses both a particular dispositionality and a particular qualitative character. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
A reaction: That leaves you with the question of the relationship between the disposition and the quality. I say you must choose, and I choose the disposition. Qualities (which are partly subjective, obviously) arise from fundamental dispositions. |
15478 | Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: If objects belong to classes in virtue of resemblances they bear to one another, they resemble one another in virtue of their properties. Objects resemble in some way or respect, and you could think of these ways or respects as 'properties'. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
A reaction: If you pare the universe down to one object with five distinct properties, they resemble nothing, and fail this definition. Resemblance seems like the epistemology, not the ontology. |
15483 | Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: The redness or sphericity of this tomato cannot migrate to another tomato. This is a consequence of the idea that properties are particular ways things are. The identity of a property is bound up with the identity of its possessor. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
A reaction: This is part of his declaration that he believes in tropes. At the very least, properties can be thought of separately, and have second-order properties that don't seem tied to the particulars. |
15480 | Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things) [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: The bundle theory for tropes treats properties inappositely as parts of objects. Objects can have parts, but an object's properties are not its parts, they are particular ways the object is. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
A reaction: The 'way an object is' seems a very vague concept. Most things that get labelled as tropes are actually highly complex. Without mention of causal powers I think these discussions drift in a muddle. |
15489 | A property that cannot interact is worse than inert - it isn't there at all [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: A property that is intrinsically incapable of affecting or being affected by anything else, actual or possible, is not merely a case of inertness - it amounts to a no-thing. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 06.6) | |
A reaction: In the end Martin rejects Shoemaker's purely causal account of properties, but he clearly understands Shoemaker's point well. |
15487 | If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Given a realist view of dispositions as fully actual, even without manifestations or partners, a purely dispositional account of properties has a degree of plausibility, which is enhanced because properties lack purely qualitative characterisations. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 06.4) | |
A reaction: In the end Martin opts for a mixed account, as in Idea 15484, but he gives reasons here for the view which I favour. If he concedes that dispositions may exist without manifestation, they must surely lack qualities. Are they not properties, then? |
15479 | Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Each property endows a ball with a distinctive qualitative character and a distinctive range of powers or dispositionalities. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
A reaction: I think this is the wrong way round. Do properties support powers, or powers support properties? I favour the latter. Properties are much vaguer than powers. Powers generate the required causation and activity. |
15488 | Qualities and dispositions are aspects of properties - what it exhibits, and what it does [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: For any intrinsic and irreducible property, what is qualitative and what is dispositional are one and the same property considered as what that property exhibits of its nature and what that property is directive and selective for in its manifestation. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 06.6) | |
A reaction: This is supposed to support qualities and dispositions as equal partners, but I don't see how 'what a property exhibits' can have any role in fundamental ontology. What it exhibits may be very misleading about its nature. |
15469 | Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Three forms of dispositionality are illustrated by explosives (which are destroyed by manifestation), being soluble (where the dispositions is lost but recoverable), and being stable (where the disposition is unchanged). | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 02.7) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Presumably the explosives could be recovered after the explosion, since the original elements are still there, but it would take a while. The retina remains stable by continually changing. There are no simple distinctions! |
15467 | Powers depend on circumstances, so can't be given a conditional analysis [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Nobody believes, or ought to believe, that manifestations of powers follow upon the single event mentioned in the antecedent of the conditional independently of the circumstances. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 02.4) | |
A reaction: Another way of putting it would be that the behaviour of powers is more ceteris paribus than law. |
15466 | 'The wire is live' can't be analysed as a conditional, because a wire can change its powers [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: According to the conditional analysis of 'the wire is live', if the wire is touched then it gives off electricity. What ultimately defeats this analysis is the acknowledged possibility of objects gaining or losing powers. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 02.3) | |
A reaction: He offers his 'electro-fink' as a counterexample, where touching the wire changes its disposition. The conditional analysis is simple and clearcut, but dispositions in reality are complex and unstable. |
15465 | Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: It is self-defeating to try to explain dispositionality in terms of structural states because structural states are themselves dispositional. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 01.2) | |
A reaction: No doubt structures have dispositions, but are they entirely dispositional? Might there be 'emergent' dispositions which can only be explained by the structure itself, rather than by the dispositions that make up the structure? |
15476 | Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: I take it as obvious that any structural property involves dispositionality and, therefore, cannot be used to 'explain' dispositionality. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.3) | |
A reaction: I think this is the right way round. The so-called 'categorical' properties seem to be close in nature to the 'structural' properties. |
15481 | I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: I favour the old idea of substratum: the haver of properties not itself had as a property. Space-time might itself be the bearer of properties, not itself borne as a property. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
A reaction: A very nice idea. The choice is between saying either that fundamentals like space-time and physical fields are the propertyless bearers of properties, or that they purely consist of properties (so properties are fundamental, not substrata). |
15474 | Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: There is no causal work for the whole that is not done by the parts, provided the complex role of the parts is fully appreciated. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.1) | |
A reaction: It seems like a truth that because some parts are doing particular causal work (e.g. glue), the whole can acquire causal powers that the mereological sum of parts lacks. |
15486 | Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Abstract entities (as nonspatiotemporal) seem to be the only candidates for specific and full identity specifications. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 05.2 n1) | |
A reaction: Martin says that only the 'mad logician' seeks such specifications elsewhere. Some people like persons to have perfect identity. God is a popular candidate too. Can objects have perfect 'macroscopic' identity? |
15475 | The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: We must avoid a use of 'identity' that implies that any entity over time must be said to lack continuing identity simply because it has changed properties or has lost, added, or had substituted some parts. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.3) | |
A reaction: This may the key area where the logical-mathematical type of philosophy comes into contact with the natural-metaphysical type. Imagine Martin's concept of 'identity' in mathematics. π changes to 3.1387... during the calculation! |
15472 | It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: To claim that the truthmaker for a counterfactual, for example, is a set of possible worlds, but to deny that these worlds really exist, seems pointless. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 03.3) | |
A reaction: Lewis therefore argues that they do exist. Martin argues that possible worlds are not truthmakers. He rests his account of modality on dispositions. I prefer Martin. |
15492 | Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 10.2) | |
A reaction: I don't think you can rule out the 'real' explanation, as the one dominant causal predecessor, such as the earthquake producing a tsunami. |
15495 | Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: The long-derided way of analogy works! Otherwise why, when someone else is relishing a food we have not tried, is it reasonable for us to try it ourselves? | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 12.2) | |
A reaction: Why wouldn't we rush to eat something an animal was relishing? Nice idea. |
15493 | Memory requires abstraction, as reminders of what cannot be fully remembered [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Selectivity and abstraction are required for the development of memory, because reminders and promptings are rarely replicas of what is being remembered. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 10.3) | |
A reaction: I take the key idea of mental life to be that of a 'label'. This need not be verbal, so 'conceptual label'. It could be an image, as on a road sign. Labelling is the most indispensable aspect of thought. We label objects, parts, properties and groups. |
6248 | Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: We boast of our mighty reason above other animals, but its processes are too slow, too full of doubt, to serve us in every exigency, either for our preservation, without external senses, or to influence our actions for good without the moral sense. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §VII.III) | |
A reaction: This idea was taken up by Hume, and it must have influence Hume's general scepticism about the importance of reason. What this idea misses is the enormous influence of prior reasoning on our quick decisions. |
6238 | We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: By a superior sense, which I call a moral one, we approve the actions of others. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], Intro) | |
A reaction: This tries to present moral insight as being on a par with the famous five senses. This doesn't seem quite right to me; separate parts of me can operate individual senses, but the whole of me is required for moral judgements, based on evidence. |
6239 | We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Let us consider if a traitor, who would sell his own country to us, may not often be as advantageous to us, as an hero who defends us: and yet we can love the treason, and hate the traitor. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §I.VI) | |
A reaction: A nice example, which certainly refutes any claim that morality is entirely and directly self-interested. High-minded idealism, though, is not the only alternative explanation. We admire loyalty, but not loyalty to, say, Hitler. |
6240 | The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: The moral sense is not an innate idea or knowledge, but a determination of our minds to receive the simple ideas of approbation or condemnation, from actions observed, antecedent to any opinions of advantage or loss to redound to ourselves. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §I.VIII) | |
A reaction: This may claim a pure moral intuition, but it is also close to Kantian universalising of the rules for behaviour. It is also a variation on Descartes' 'natural light' of reason. Of course, if we say the ideas are 'received', where are they received from? |
6242 | We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Neither benevolence nor any other affection or desire can be directly raised by volition; if they could, then we could be bribed into any affection whatsoever toward any object. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §II.IV) | |
A reaction: Of course, notoriously, the vast mass of people have often been bribed to love a politician, by low taxes, or bread and circuses. Still, you cannot choose to love or admire someone, you just do. Not much free will there. |
6247 | Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Every mortal is made uneasy by any grievous misery he sees another involved in, unless the person be imagined morally evil. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §V.VIII) | |
A reaction: This is the natural compassion on which Hume built his moral theory. This remark emphasises that a concern for justice is just as important as a compassion for pain. Kant was more interested in what we deserve than in what we get. |
6256 | Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Can there not be a right and wrong state of our moral sense, as there is in our other senses? | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §IV) | |
A reaction: Hutcheson replies by saying something like they are both fully reliable in normal conditions. It remains, though, a very good question for the intuitionist to face, as the moral sense is supposed to be direct and reliable, but how do you check? |
6244 | Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Human nature seems scarce capable of malicious disinterested hatred, or an ultimate desire of the misery of others, when we imagine them not pernicious to us, or opposite to our interests; ..that is only the effect of self-love, not disinterested malice. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §II.VII) | |
A reaction: I suppose it is true that even the worst criminals brooding in prison don't wish the entire population of some foreign country to die in pain. Only a very freakish person would wish the human race were extinct. A very nice observation. |
6243 | As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: How comes it that we do not lose, at the approach of death, all concern for our families, friends, or country? | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §II.V) | |
A reaction: A nice question. No doubt some people do cease to care, but on the whole it raises the 'last round' problem in social contract theory, which is why fulfil your part of a bargain if it is too late to receive the repayment afterwards? |
6246 | My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: No good effect, which I did not actually foresee and intend, makes my action morally good. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §III.XII) | |
A reaction: This is one of the parents of utilitarianism repudiating pure consequentialism. Bentham sharply divided the action (which is consequentialist) from the person (who has useful intentions, but is not particulary important); this division is misleading. |
6252 | Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: In the following discourse, happiness denotes pleasant sensation of any kind, or continued state of such sensations. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is a very long way from Greek eudaimonia. Hutcheson seems to imply that I would be happy if I got high on drugs after my family had just burnt to death. Socrates points out that scratching an itch is a very pleasant sensation (Idea 132). |
6241 | Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Mere courage, or contempt of danger, if we conceive it to have no regard to the defence of the innocent, or repairing of wrongs or self-interest, would only entitle its possessor to bedlam. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §II.I) | |
A reaction: If many criminals would love to rob a bank, but only a few have the nerve to attempt it, we can hardly deny that the latter exhibit a sort of courage. The Greeks say that good sense must be involved, but few of them were so moral about courage. |
6257 | You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: What rule of actions can be formed, without relation to some end proposed? Or what end can be proposed, without presupposing instincts, desires, affections, or a moral sense, it will not be easy to explain. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §IV) | |
A reaction: We have no reason to think that 'instincts, desires and affections' will give us the remotest guidance on how to behave morally well (though we would expect them to aid our survival). How could a moral sense give a reason, without spotting a rule? |
6245 | That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number; and that worst, which, in like manner, occasions misery. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §III.VIII) | |
A reaction: The first use of a phrase taken up by Bentham. This is not just an anticipation of utilitarianism, it is utilitarianism, with all its commitment to consequentialism (but see Idea 6246), and to the maximising of happiness. It is a brilliant idea. |
6251 | The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Perfect rights are necessary to the public good, and it makes those miserable whose rights are thus violated; …imperfect rights tend to the improvement and increase of good in a society, but are not necessary to prevent universal misery. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §VII.VI) | |
A reaction: This is a very utilitarian streak in Hutcheson, converting natural law into its tangible outcome in actual happiness or misery. The distinction here is interesting (taken up by Mill), but there is a very blurred borderline. |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us. | |
From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus | |
A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts? |
15485 | Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: The two-event cause-and-effect view is easily avoided and replaced by the view of mutual manifestations of reciprocal disposition partners, suggesting a natural contemporaneity. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 05.1) | |
A reaction: This view, which I find much more congenial than the traditional one, is explored in the ideas of Mumford and Anjum. |
15491 | Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Disposition and manifestation are the basic categories by means of which cause and effect are to be explained. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 07.8) | |
A reaction: 'Manifestation' sounds a bit subjective. The manifestation evident to us may not indicate what is really going on below the surface. I like his basic picture. |
15468 | Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: 'Causal' counterfactuals have a place, of course, but only as clumsy and inexact linguistic gestures to dispositions, and they should be kept in that place. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 02.6) | |
A reaction: Counterfactuals only seem to give a regularity account of causation, by correlating an effect with a minimal context which will give rise to it. Surely dispositions run deeper than that? |
15470 | Causal laws are summaries of powers [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Causal laws are summaries of what entities are capable and incapable of. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 02.8) | |
A reaction: That's a pretty good formulation. Personally I favour a Humean analysis, perhaps along Lewis's lines, but on a basis of real powers. This remark of Martin's has got me rethinking. |
15482 | We can't think of space-time as empty and propertyless, and it seems to be a substratum [Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: It makes no sense in ontology or modern physics to think of space-time as empty and propertyless. Space-time nicely fulfils the condition of a substratum. | |
From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
A reaction: At the very least, space-time seems to be 'curved', so it had better be something. Time has properties like being transitive. Space-time (or fields) might be a pure bundle of properties (the only pure bundle?), rather than a substratum. |
6254 | We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: The reasons assigned for actions are such as 'It is the end proposed by the Deity'. But why do we approve concurring with the divine ends? The reason is given 'He is our benefactor', but then, for what reason do we approve concurrence with a benefactor? | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §I) | |
A reaction: Characteristic of what MacIntyre calls the 'Enlightenment Project', which is the application of Cartesian scepticism to proving the foundations of morals. Proof beyond proof is continually demanded. If you could meet God, you would obey without question. |
6255 | Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Why may not the Deity have something of a superior kind, analogous to our moral sense, essential to him? | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §I) | |
A reaction: This is Plato's notion of the gods, as beings who are profoundly wise, and understand all the great moral truths, but are not the actual originators of those truths. The idea that God creates morality actually serves to undermine morality. |
6250 | We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: We call the Deity morally good, when we apprehend that his whole providence tends to the universal happiness of his creatures. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §VII.V) | |
A reaction: From the point of view of eternity, we might accept that God aims at some even greater good than the happiness of a bunch of miserable little creatures whose bad behaviour merits little reward. The greater good needs to be impressive, though. |
6249 | If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: To call the laws of the supreme Deity good or holy or just, if these be constituted by laws, or the will of a superior, must be an insignificant tautology, amounting to no more than 'God wills what he wills' or 'His will is conformable to his will'. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §VII.V) | |
A reaction: This argues not only against God as the source of morality, but also against any rules, such as those of the Categorical Imperative. Why should I follow the Categorical Imperative? What has value must dictate the rules. Is obedience the highest value? |