78 ideas
| 16604 | Philosophy consists of choosing between Plato, Aristotle and Democritus [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: The history of philosophy consists in a series of choices between three primordial rivals: Plato, Aristotle and Democritus. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 05.1) | |
| A reaction: Pasnau's point is that the importance of Democritus is not usually appreciated. As far as I can see, Democritus may have been the greatest of all philosophers, but most of his works are lost. His fragments are the best fragments. |
| 16606 | Original philosophers invariably seek inspiration from past thinkers [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Philosophers almost never strike out on wholly new ground, without the historical inspiration of some figure or other. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 05.1) |
| 16586 | The commentaries of Averroes were the leading guide to Aristotle [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: The commentaries of Averroes on virtually the whole Aristotelian corpus became by far the most important scholastic guide to the interpretation of Aristotle. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 03.1) |
| 16568 | Modernity begins in the late 12th century, with Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: I tend to think of modernity as coming in the late twelfth century, with Averroes's magisterial commentaries on Aristotle. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: A rather quirky use of 'modernity', but this seems to be a huge landmark. Note that it comes from the Islamic Arab world, not from Europe. |
| 16653 | Once accidents were seen as real, 'Categories' became the major text for ontology [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Originally you count substances for ontology. Once there is the doctrine of real accidents (in the 14th cent) the list of ten categories begins to look like an inventory of the kinds of things there are, and 'Categories' looks like the fundamental text. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 12.1) | |
| A reaction: Prior to this development, 'Categories' was treated as a mere beginner's text, once the major corpus of Aristotle had been rediscovered in the 13th century. The result of this development is sortal essentialism, which I don't like. |
| 16704 | In 1347, the Church effectively stopped philosophy for the next 300 years [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: The year 1347 is a great milestone in the history of philosophy, because then the route to modern philosophy was blocked by Church authorities, and effectively put on hold for almost 300 years. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 19.3) | |
| A reaction: It is interesting that it was 100 years after the Reformation before philosophy got going again, and then only thanks to one man. Islam stopped philosophy earlier. |
| 16605 | After c.1450 all of Plato was available. Before that, only the first half of 'Timaeus' was known [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: From the mid-fifteenth century forward, for the first time, the whole Platonic corpus was available in Ficino's Latin translation. Before then, only the first half of the 'Timaeus' had widely circulated in Latin. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 05.1) |
| 16607 | Renaissance Platonism is peripheral [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: The fabled phenomenon of Renaissance Platonism is peripheral. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 05.3) | |
| A reaction: The point is that only a few Italians pursued the Platonic line. Pasnau suggests Cartesian dualism as a possible influence from Plato. |
| 16715 | Plato only made an impact locally in 15th century Italy [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: In certain limited circles in Italy, Plato made an impact in the fifteenth century, but his influence never came close to challenging Aristotle's. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 20.2) |
| 16610 | Philosophy could easily have died in 17th century, if it weren't for Descartes [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: As scholasticism collapsed in the 17th century, it might easily have happened is that philosophy simply died. That this did not happen is due in large part to René Descartes. …It is remarkable that this brilliant man insisted on still doing philosophy. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 05.5) | |
| A reaction: The alternative view is, of course, that you just can't stop people from thinking philosophically (except by totalitarian education). Are there philosophers in North Korea, or among the Taliban? |
| 16781 | The 17th century is a metaphysical train wreck [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: The seventeenth century is a metaphysical train wreck. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 26.6) | |
| A reaction: This is, roughly, because the corpuscularian philosophy lacked the resources to answer all the problems dealt with by substantial forms. |
| 16677 | Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: The Anti-Razor says 'whenever an affirmative proposition is truly stated, if one thing does not suffice to account for its truth, then one must posit things, and if two do not suffice then three, and so on to infinity'. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 14.3) | |
| A reaction: This is quoted from an anonymous logic text of 1325. Apparently Ockham himself articulated the idea more than once. |
| 16598 | Priority was a major topic of dispute for scholastics [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: For a scholastic author, hardly anything was so likely to precipitate a lengthy disputatio as talk of priority, in its various kinds. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 04.3) |
| 16727 | In mixtures, the four elements ceased to exist, replaced by a mixed body with a form [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: The standard view was that in a mixture there is only the mixed body and its substantial form (gold). There are no further substantial forms of the elements, because the elements do not actually exist within the body. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 22.3) | |
| A reaction: This seems to me to be the key idea that was overthrown in the seventeenth century, so that corpuscular matter kept aspects of its ingredients, which science could then investigate. With the substantial form, investigation seemed impossible. |
| 16732 | 17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: The seventeenth century is often said to have bequeathed us three ways of thinking about sensible qualities: either in reductive microphysical terms, or as internal phenomenal states, or else as powers or dispositions. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 23.1) | |
| A reaction: Pasnau goes on to claim that no one in the 17th century believed the third one. I take it to be a very new, and totally wonderful and correct, view. |
| 16733 | 17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: In the seventeenth century, my claim is that authors during the period recognise only categorical properties, and never dispositional properties. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 23.1) |
| 16662 | The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Among scholastics the primary agreement is that what primarily exist are substances. The primary disagreement concerns the nature of their changeable properties. Are they real accidents, or mere modes of substance? | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 13.1) |
| 16767 | There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: One could empirically reject a centralised power within a substance - and still think a genuine substance requires a form of some more abstract kind, not for a physical explanation, but for a full metaphysical understanding of how things are. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 25.2) | |
| A reaction: This divorce of the 'metaphysical' from the physical is a running theme in Pasnau, and he cites support from Leibniz. I'm not sure I understand 'metaphysical' understanding, if it is actually contrary to physics. I take it to be 'psychological'. |
| 16788 | Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Someone who wants to enrich a strict corpuscularian account with other metaphysical entities has alternatives other than Aristotelian hylomorphism. One can, for instance, introduce dispositions. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 28.2) | |
| A reaction: This slightly throws me, because I have been flirting with a dispositional account of hylomorphism. The implication is that the form is abstract and structural, where the disposition is real and physical. But dispositions can do the job of forms. |
| 16738 | Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Scholastics reject anything like bare dispositions, on Aristotelian principles. Powers are forms, and forms actualise their subject, and are causally efficacious. Therefore no powers can be bare dispositions. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 23.5) | |
| A reaction: The point seems to be that a mere disposition is not actual, as a form is required to be. I would have thought that a power does not have to be operational to be actual. A live electric wire is a real phenomenon. It isn't waiting to be live. |
| 16649 | Scholastics say there is a genuine thing if it is 'separable' [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Among the scholastics (after Duns Scotus) it would be come to be taken for granted that the crucial test for being a genuine thing - a 'res' - is separability. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 11.2) | |
| A reaction: The idea of separability is implicit in Aristotle. In borderline cases, it seems that they are tempted to claim that things like accidental properties are separable, simply because they want them to be genuine things. A criterion for separability? |
| 16785 | If you reject essences, questions of individuation become extremely difficult [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Given the accepted linkage between a thing's essence and its identity, the rejection of essences makes a complete mess out of questions of individuation. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 27.6) | |
| A reaction: I note that he talks of a thing having 'identity', contra the view of identity as a two-place relation. I agree with this, but there is a chicken-egg problem. Do I perceive an identity and surmise an essence, or surmise an essence and deduce identity? |
| 16680 | Scholastics thought Quantity could be the principle of individuation [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Quantity was a leading scholastic contender for the principle of individuation. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 14.4) |
| 16628 | Corpuscularianism promised a decent account of substance [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: One of the great attractions of corpuscularianism is that it promises to put our acquaintance with substances on a solid foundation. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 07.3) | |
| A reaction: This is why the seventeenth century did not abandon 'substance', even though they banished 'substantial form'. |
| 16617 | Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism say only substances exist [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism tend to think that only substances exist. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 06.2) | |
| A reaction: Pasnau treats this as an extreme 17th C reaction which was hopelessly inadequate as metaphysics. We have been struggling with the nature of 'properties' ever since, while losing our grip on the concept of a unified 'substance'. |
| 16741 | Scholastics wanted to treat Aristotelianism as physics, rather than as metaphysics [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: There is a broad scholastic tendency to understand Aristotelianism not in abstract, metaphysical terms, but as a concrete, physical theory of the world. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 23.5) | |
| A reaction: This seems to give a good explanation of why Aristotelianism plummeted to oblivion in the 17th C. Pasnau obviously wants to revive it, by drawing a sharp line between metaphysics and science. I doubt the line. |
| 16777 | If crowds are things at all, they seem to be Substances, since they bear properties [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Crowds seem to be the bearers of properties, and if they are things at all, then there is no place for them other than in the category of Substance. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 26.1) | |
| A reaction: It is tempting to say, based on Aristotle, that a substance is whatever 1) bears properties, and 2) endures in spite of change, but a crowd is a nice problem case, because it looks too disunited to be a 'substance'. |
| 16615 | Scholastics use 'substantia' for thick concrete entities, and for thin metaphysical ones [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Scholastic texts are rife with different senses of 'substantia', using the term to refer, among other things, both to thick concrete entities and to thin metaphysical ones. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 06.1) | |
| A reaction: Pasnau introduces 'thin' and 'thick' substance for this reason. I may adopt this. Without distinctions between thin and thick concepts of things we can get very muddled. I like the word to label something which is an 'entity'. |
| 16775 | For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: According to strict corpuscularianism the only real constituents of a substance are its integral parts. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 26.1) | |
| A reaction: An understandable reaction to the emptiness of Aristotelian substantial forms in science. It seems to leave out the structural principles that distinguish one arrangement of parts from another. See Koslicki on this. |
| 16769 | If clay survives destruction of the statue, the statue wasn't a substance, but a mere accident [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: The unitarian view of substance says it cannot be divided. If the clay can survive the destruction of the statue, then that shows that the statue was not a substance at all, and that its shape (or whatever made it a statue) was merely a passing accident. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 25.3) | |
| A reaction: This seems to give the orthodox Aristotelian/Thomist reading, assuming that a substance only has one form, which unifies it. Since clay must have shape, and statues must have matter, I have never understood how there were two objects here. |
| 16602 | Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: What marks the rise of the corpuscularian movement is not just the rejection of form, but the rejection of matter as dependent on form. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 04.5) | |
| A reaction: The point was that matter required form to have any kind of actual existence, but now matter can stand on its own. |
| 16612 | Hylomorphism may not be a rival to science, but an abstract account of unity and endurance [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Hylomorphism admits of an alternative formulation, as an explanatory schema at a different level of analysis, not competing with corpuscular-mechanistic theory, but accounting for abstract features of the world - notably unity and endurance of substances. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 06.1) | |
| A reaction: Pasnau is clearly sympathetic. As a view of why normal objects have unity and persist over time it is almost the only decent theory around. Hawley, for example, struggles to explain how 'stages' of a thing are linked. Classical mereology is silly. |
| 16613 | Hylomorphism declined because scholastics made it into a testable physical theory [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Scholastics lost their grip on hylomorphism as a metaphysical theory, conceiving of it as a concrete, physical hypothesis about causal forces. Once form and matter were made subject to empirical research, their days were inevitably numbered. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 06.1) | |
| A reaction: Pasnau seems to make a sharp distinction between science, and a separate realm he labels 'metaphysical'. You can't keep causation out of Aristotelian hylomorphism. The defence is that it is at a higher level of generality than science. |
| 16747 | Scholastics made forms substantial, in a way unintended by Aristotle [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: The conception of form as somehow substantial took on new life among scholastic Aristotelians, and was developed in ways that Aristotle himself never suggested. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.1) | |
| A reaction: This is music to we modern neo-Aristotelians, because scholasticism was rightly dumped in the 17th C, but we can go back and start again from what The Philosopher actually said. |
| 16759 | Scholastics began to see substantial form more as Aristotle's 'efficient' cause [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: The whole scholastic conception of substantial form came to have more and more in common with an Aristotelian efficient cause. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.2) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle, of course, identified the form with the 'formal cause [aitia]', which is the shape of the statue, rather than the efficient cause, which is the sculptor. |
| 16748 | Aquinas says a substance has one form; Scotists say it has many forms [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Aquinas subscribes to the unitarian doctrine that a single substance has just a single substantial form, but authors like Scotus subscribe to a plurality of substantial forms. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.1) | |
| A reaction: The Scotists seem to think that qualities themselve can have forms. I take it that Aristotle would have agreed with Aquinas. |
| 16671 | Scholastic Quantity either gives a body parts, or spreads them out in a unified way [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: On one version of Quantity realism it is what makes a body have parts; on another version, it is what makes the body's parts be spread out in a continuous and unified way. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 14.1) |
| 16579 | There may be different types of substrate, or temporary substrates [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: The substratum thesis says …perhaps there is a different subject for different kinds of changes, and perhaps what endures through one kind of change will be corrupted by another. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 02.5) |
| 16596 | A substratum can't be 'bare', because it has a job to do [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: A completely bare substratum seems not just incoherent but also unable to carry out the function for which it is intended - to be a substratum. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 03.3) |
| 16584 | If a substrate gives causal support for change, quite a lot of the ingredients must endure [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: When the substratum thesis is grounded on the idea that the ingredients must endure through the change, if they are to play a causal role, then it is natural to suppose that quite a lot of the ingredients must endure. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 02.5) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle sharply distinguishes alteration from substantial change, but as the substrate gets thinner, the boundary between those two would blur. |
| 16580 | A substrate may be 'prime matter', which endures through every change [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: The 'conservation thesis' about substrates says that there is a single, most basic substrate that endures through every material change, something we call 'prime matter'. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 02.5) |
| 16749 | Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: For an Aristotelian not all necessary properties are essential; the essential properties are those that define a thing as what it is. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.1) | |
| A reaction: I take it as basic that whatever is essential is in some way important, whereas necessities can be trivial. |
| 16694 | Typical successive things are time and motion [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: The standard scholastic examples of 'entia successiva' are time and motion. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 18.1) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle's examples of a day and the Games seem clearer, as time and motion do not count so clearly as 'things'. |
| 16583 | Weak ex nihilo says it all comes from something; strong version says the old must partly endure [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: The weak ex nihilo principle says that everything comes from something, and the strong ex nihilo principle says that in everything new, something of the old must endure | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 02.5) |
| 17979 | Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: Goldstone's research has shown how learning concepts can change perceptual units. For example, perceptual discrimination is heightened along category boundaries. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: [Goldstone 1994, 2000] This is just the sort of research which throws a spanner into the simplistic a priori thinking of many philosophers. |
| 18690 | Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: Most theories of induction claim that it should depend primarily on the similarity of the categories involved, but then the type of property should not matter, yet research shows that it does. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be good empirical support for Gilbert Harman's view that induction is really inference to the best explanation. The thought (which strikes me as obviously correct) is that we bring nested domains of knowledge to bear in induction. |
| 16783 | Essences must explain, so we can infer them causally from the accidents [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Without the explanatory role of essence, the underlying epistemic picture would be jeopardised, because there would no longer be any causal route by which we might get from accidents to essence. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 27.5) | |
| A reaction: There is a slight whiff of circularity here. It could be that we are psychologically desperate for essences, and so we invent bogus causal routes from the accidents to get at them. Can we know there are essences awaiting us, on independent grounds? |
| 17980 | The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The three main theories of concepts under consideration are the exemplar, the prototype and the knowledge approaches. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) |
| 17973 | The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: It has been extremely difficult to find definitions for most natural categories, and even harder to find definitions that are plausible psychological representations that people of all ages would be likely to use. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) |
| 17969 | The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The early psychological approaches to concepts took a definitional approach. ...but this view does not have any way of distinguishing typical and atypical category members (...as when a trout is a typical fish and an eel an atypical one). | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: [pp. 12 and 22] Eleanor Rosch in the 1970s is said to have largely killed off the classical view. |
| 17970 | Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The classical view of concepts has been tied to traditional logic. 'Fido is a dog and a pet' is true if it has the necessary and sufficient conditions for both, ...but there is empirical evidence that people do not follow that rule. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: Examples given are classifying chess as a sport and/or game, and classifying a tree house (which is agreed to be both a building and not a building!). |
| 17971 | Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The classical view of concepts explains hierarchical order, where categories form nested sets. But research shows that categories are often not transitive. Research shows that a seat is furniture, and a car seat is a seat, but it is not furniture. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Murphy adds that the nesting of definitions is classically used to match the nesting of hierarchies. This is a nice example of the neatness of the analytic philosopher breaking down when it meets the mess of the world. |
| 17972 | The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: A problem with the revised classical view is that the concept core does not seem to be an important part of the concept, despite its name and theoretical intention as representing the 'real' concept. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: Apparently most researchers feel they can explain their results without reference to any core. Not so fast, I would say (being an essentialist). Maybe people acknowledge an implicit core without knowing what it is. See Susan Gelman. |
| 17975 | There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: Is there really an 'ideal bird' that could represent all birds? ...Furthermore a single prototype would give no information about the variability of a category. ...Compare the incredible variety of dogs to the much smaller diversity of cats. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 3) | |
| A reaction: The point about variability is particularly noteworthy. You only grasp the concept of 'furniture' when you understand its range, as well as its typical examples. What structure is needed in a concept to achieve this? |
| 17976 | Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: In the prototype view the entire category is represented by a unified representation rather than separate representations for each member, or for different classes of members. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 3) | |
| A reaction: This is the improved prototype view, as opposed to the implausible idea that there is one ideal exemplar. The new theory still have the problem of how to represent diversity within the category, while somehow remaining 'unified'. |
| 18691 | The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: Nothing in the prototype model says the shape of an animal is more important than its location in identifying its kind. The theory does not provide a way the features can be constructed, rather than just observed. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: This makes some kind of mental modelling central to thought, and not just a bonus once you have empirically acquired the concepts. We bring our full range of experience to bear on even the most instantaneous observations. |
| 17983 | The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The prototype view has no trouble with either hierarchical structure or explaining categories. ...Meaning and conceptual combination provide strong evidence for prototypes. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: Prototypes are not vague, making clearer classification possible. A 'mountain lion' is clear, because its components are clear. |
| 17985 | Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: Our theory of concepts must be primarily prototype-based. That is, it must be a description of an entire concept, with its typical features (presumably weighted by their importance). | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: This is to be distinguished from the discredited 'classical' view of concepts, that the concept consists of its definition. I take Aristotle's account of definition to be closer to a prototype description than to a dictionary definition. |
| 17986 | Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: My proposal is that people attempt to form prototypes as part of a larger knowledge structure when they learn concepts. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: This combines theory theory (knowledge) with the prototype view, and sounds rather persuasive. The formation of prototypes fits with the explanatory account of essentialism I am defending. He later calls prototype formation 'abstraction' (494). |
| 17974 | The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototype or exemplar theories that are strongly unclassical. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) |
| 17977 | The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: In the exemplar view of concepts, the idea that people have a representation that somehow encompasses an entire concept is rejected. ...Instead a person's concept of dogs is the set of dogs that the person remembers. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 3) | |
| A reaction: [The theory was introduced by Medin and Schaffer 1978] I think I have finally met a plausible theory of concepts. When I think 'dog' I conjure up a fuzz of dogs that exhibit the range I have encountered (e.g. tiny to very big). Individuals come first! |
| 17982 | Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The exemplar view has trouble with hierarchical classification and with induction in adults. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: To me these both strongly support essentialism - that you form the concept 'dog' from seeing some dogs, but you then extrapolate to large categories and general truths about dogs, on the assumption of the natures of the dogs you have seen. |
| 17981 | Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The findings showing that children use knowledge and may be essentialist about category membership do not comport well with the exemplar view. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: Tricky, because Gelman persuaded me of the essentialism, but the exemplar view of concepts looks the most promising. Clearly they must be forced to coexist.... |
| 17984 | Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The exemplar accounts of conceptual combination are demonstrably wrong, because the meaning of a phrase has to be composed from the meaning of its parts (plus broader knowledge), and it cannot be composed as a function of exemplars. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: This sounds quite persuasive, and I begin to see that my favoured essentialism fits the prototype view of concepts best, though this mustn't be interpreted too crudely. We change our prototypes with experience. 'Bird' is a tricky case. |
| 17987 | The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: We don't have one concept of birds formed by learning from exemplars, and another concept of birds that is used in induction. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: In other words exemplar concepts break down when we generalise using the concept. The exemplars must be unified, to be usable in thought and language. |
| 17978 | We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The knowledge approach argues that concepts are part of our general knowledge about the world. We do not learn concepts in isolation, ...but as part of our overall understanding of the world. Animal concepts are integrated with biology, behaviour etc. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 3) | |
| A reaction: This is one of the leading theories of concepts among psychologists. It seems to be an aspect of the true theory, but it needs underpinning with some account of isolated individual concepts. This is also known as the 'theory theory'. |
| 18687 | Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: A concept's content influences how easy it is to learn. If the concept is grossly incompatible with what people know prior to the experiment, it will be difficult to acquire. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: This is a preliminary fact which leads towards the 'knowledge' theory of concepts (aka 'theory theory'). The point being that the knowledge involved is integral to the concept. Fits my preferred mental files approach. |
| 18688 | Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: Some kinds of knowledge are probably directly incorporated into the category representation and used in normal, fast decisions about objects. Other kinds of knowledge, however, may come into play only when it has been solicited. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: This is a summary of empirical research, but seems to fit our normal experience. If you see a hawk, you have some instant understanding, but if you ask what the hawk is doing here, you draw more widely. |
| 18689 | People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: People tend to positively categorise items that are consistent with their knowledge and to exclude items that are inconsistent, sometimes even overruling purely empirical sources of information. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: The main rival to 'theory theory' is the purely empirical account of how concepts are acquired. This idea reports empirical research in favour of the theory theory (or 'knowledge') approach. |
| 6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
| Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us. | |
| From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus | |
| A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts? |
| 16609 | Atomists say causation is mechanical collisions, and all true qualities are microscopic [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: The atomist view is that causation is limited to collisions among corpuscles (which is 'mechanism'), and the only bodily qualities are those found at the microcorpuscular level; sensible qualities are in fact sensations. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 05.4) | |
| A reaction: [Part of a full summary of atomism by Pasnau] |
| 16603 | In the 17th C matter became body, and was then studied by science [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: In the seventeenth century, matter becomes body, and body becomes the object of natural science. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 04.5) |
| 16592 | Atomism is the commonest version of corpuscularianism, but isn't required by it [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Atomism is the most common version of corpuscular prime matter, but it is not the only option. Indeed, atomism neither entails nor is entailed by the combination of corpuscularianism and the substratum thesis. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 03.2) | |
| A reaction: The point is that the corpuscles may be endlessly divisible (which Lewis called 'gunk'). |
| 16750 | If there are just arrangements of corpuscles, where are the boundaries between substances? [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: If all there are corpuscles of various shapes and sizes, variously arranged, it is not easy to see how we might draw the boundary lines, at any given moment, between one substance and another. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.2) | |
| A reaction: We still have precisely that problem, and it leads to the nihilism about ordinary objects found in Unger, Van Inwagen and Merricks. I have so far found modern defences of ordinary objects unpersuasive. |
| 16722 | Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: There is a scholastic theory of causation. Of Aristotle's Four Causes, the main one is the 'formal' cause, and that consists of changes in the primary, elemental qualities, which are hot, cold, wet and dry. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 21.2) | |
| A reaction: [my summary] It is probably right to call this 'scholastic' rather than 'Aristotelian', as I take Aristotelian essence to run deeper than this, and involve principles as well as qualities. |
| 16760 | Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Substantial forms might well be viewed as an early step in the development of scientific essentialism. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.4) | |
| A reaction: This is the scholastic view of substantial forms, which is much more physical and causal, rather than Aristotle's more abstract view. The rejection of substantial forms led to the 'Humean' view of laws of nature. |
| 16581 | Scholastic authors agree that matter was created by God, out of nothing [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Authors from 1274 to 1671 unanimously endorse the Christian doctrine that matter was created by God, before which time there was no material world at all. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 02.5) |
| 16642 | Transubstantion says accidents of bread and wine don't inhere in the substance [Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Transubstantiation maintains that the accidents of the bread and wine endure after consecration without inhering in the substance. | |
| From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 10.3) | |
| A reaction: It's a big puzzle to outsiders why softness and nice taste should have theological significance. If it is the body and blood of Christ, presumably a miracle has occurred, so normal theories don't apply. It is the key difficulty for scholastic metaphysics. |