26 ideas
19125 | If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: If truth can be explicitly defined, it can be eliminated. | |
From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.3) | |
A reaction: That we could just say p corresponds to the facts, or p coheres with our accepted beliefs, or p is the aim of our enquiries, and never mention the word 'true'. Definition is a strategy for reduction or elimination. |
19128 | If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: If axioms are formulated for a language (such as set theory) that lacks names for all objects, then they require the use of a satisfaction relation rather than a unary truth predicate. | |
From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 3.3) | |
A reaction: I take it this is an important idea for understanding why Tarski developed his account of truth based on satisfaction. |
19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: Semantic approaches to truth usually necessitate the use of a metalanguage that is more powerful than the object-language for which it provides a semantics. It is usually taken to include set theory. | |
From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1) | |
A reaction: This is a motivation for developing an axiomatic account of truth, that moves it into the object language. |
19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: Although the theory is materially adequate, Tarski thought that the T-sentences are deductively too weak. …Also it seems that the T-sentences are not conservative, because they prove in PA that 0=0 and ¬0=0 are different, so at least two objects exist. | |
From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 3.2) | |
A reaction: They are weak because they can't prove completeness. This idea give two reasons for looking for a better theory of truth. |
19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: If a natural theory of truth is added to Peano Arithmetic, it is not necessary to add explicity global reflection principles to assert soundness, as the truth theory proves them. Truth theories thus prove soundess, and allows its expression. | |
From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.2) | |
A reaction: This seems like a big attraction of axiomatic theories of truth for students of metamathematics. |
19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: If truth does not have any explanatory force, as some deflationists claim, the axioms of truth should not allow us to prove any new theorems that do not involve the truth predicate. That is, a deflationary axiomatisation of truth should be 'conservative'. | |
From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.3) | |
A reaction: So does truth have 'explanatory force'? These guys are interested in explaining theorems of arithmetic, but I'm more interested in real life. People do daft things because they have daft beliefs. Logic should be neutral, but truth has values? |
19129 | The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: It is a virtue of the Friedman-Sheard axiomatisation that it is thoroughly classical in its logic. Its drawback is that it is ω-inconsistent. That is, it proves &exists;x¬φ(x), but proves also φ(0), φ(1), φ(2), … | |
From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 4.3) | |
A reaction: It seems the theory is complete (and presumably sound), yet not fully consistent. FS also proves the finite levels of Tarski's hierarchy, but not the transfinite levels. |
19130 | KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes a non-classical notion of truth. It allow truth-value gluts, making some sentences (such as the Liar) both true and not-true. Some authors add an axiom ruling out such gluts. | |
From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 4.4) | |
A reaction: [summary, which I hope is correct! Stanford is not wholly clear] |
19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: One might say that 'x is a poor philosopher' is true of Tom instead of saying that Tom has the property of being a poor philosopher. We quantify over formulas instead of over definable properties, and thus reduce properties to truth. | |
From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This stuff is difficult (because the axioms are complex and hard to compare), but I am excited (yes!) about this idea. Their point is that you need a truth predicate within the object language for this, which disquotational truth forbids. |
19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: The reduction of second-order theories (of properties or sets) to axiomatic theories of truth is a form of reductive nominalism, replacing existence assumptions (e.g. comprehension axioms) by innocuous assumptions about the truth predicate. | |
From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I'm currently thinking that axiomatic theories of truth are the most exciting development in contemporary philosophy. See Halbach and Horsten. |
22858 | There is collective action, where a trend is manifest, but is not attributable to individuals [Lukes] |
Full Idea: There is a phenomenon of collective action, where the policy or action of a collectivity is manifest, but not attributable to particular individuals' decisions or behaviour. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.4) | |
A reaction: This observation of Lukes is seen as important in the understanding of social power, but it is also significant for the understanding of the theory of action. Small racial slights by individuals can indicate institutional racism. |
22850 | Hidden powers are the most effective [Lukes] |
Full Idea: Power is at its most effective when it is least observable. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: Kind of common sense, though his account has been very influential. We must be cautious about asserting the existence of powers which are massive but totally undetectable. |
22854 | Power is a capacity, which may never need to be exercised [Lukes] |
Full Idea: Power is a capacity not the exercise of that capacity (it may never be, and never need to be, exercised); and you can be powerful by satisfying and advancing others' interests. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: A school teacher could, in extremis, bring in the army to control a wildly anarchic class of kids. You control kids by making them want to do what you want them to do. |
22852 | The pluralist view says that power is restrained by group rivalry [Lukes] |
Full Idea: In the 1950s 'pluralism' was a common idea about power - that the concentration of power in America is not excessive because one group always balances the power of others. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: [He cites Alan Wolfe's 2000 intro to C. Wright Mills] There must be something to this idea. In the UK we encourage the existence of an official opposition to the government for that reason. |
22855 | One-dimensionsal power is behaviour in observable conflicts of interests [Lukes] |
Full Idea: The one-dimensional view of power involves a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, revealed by political participation. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.2) | |
A reaction: It seems unbalanced to give this the pejorative label 'one-dimensional', as if it wasn't really power at all. Watching police beating demonstrators looks like real power to me. His point that power runs deeper is, of course, a good one. |
22856 | Political organisation brings some conflicts to the fore, and suppresses others [Lukes] |
Full Idea: All forms of political organisation have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others, because organisation is the mobilisation of bias. Some issues are organised into politics while others are organised out | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites Schattschneider 1960] This is what Lukes calls the two-dimensional theory of power. The point is that students of power should observe what does not happen, as well as what does. |
22857 | The two-dimensional view of power recognises the importance of controlling the agenda [Lukes] |
Full Idea: The two-dimensional view of power is a major advance over the one-dimensional view. It incorporates the question of the control of the agenda in politics. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.4) | |
A reaction: So One-D is controlling what happens in conflicts, and Two-D is controlling the nature of the conflicts. If we keep digging we may come to the power which no one knows exists. |
22859 | Power can be exercised to determine a person's desires [Lukes] |
Full Idea: A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but also by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.4) | |
A reaction: The classic modern instances of this are advertising and control of the media. This was apparently a new idea from Lukes, but it seems fairly obvious now. This is his third dimension of power. |
22863 | Power is the capacity of a social class to realise its interests [Lukes] |
Full Idea: Poulantzas (1968) defined his concept of power as the capacity of a social class to realise its specific objective interests. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.8) | |
A reaction: Lukes offers this as an account of power in terms of structures, rather than of the actions of individuals. Lukes says that power must include the ability of the agent to act differently. Power must involve responsibility. Power is not fate. |
22860 | The evidence for the exertion of power need not involve a grievance of the powerless [Lukes] |
Full Idea: It is inadequate to insist that nondecision-making power only exists where there are grievances which are denied entry into the political process in the form of issues. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.4) | |
A reaction: A simple example would be where they tricked you into thinking you couldn't vote in an election, or where the women didn't realise the men were paid more. Part of his third dimension of power. |
22861 | Power is affecting a person in a way contrary to their interests [Lukes] |
Full Idea: I have defined the concept of power by saying that A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.6) | |
A reaction: I assume he is not referring to when I accidentally spill your beer. His point is, I think, that neither A nor B may be fully, or even partly, aware of what is going on. Presumably A can also exert power over B which is in B's interests. Dentists. |
21133 | Supreme power is getting people to have thoughts and desires chosen by you [Lukes] |
Full Idea: Is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have - that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], p.27), quoted by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 06 | |
A reaction: This seems to be beyond dispute. When the operation is successful, those under your power not only do not need to be intimidated, but they don't even need to be guided. But if two people are in perfect harmony, which one has the power? |
22851 | In the 1950s they said ideology is finished, and expertise takes over [Lukes] |
Full Idea: In the 1950s there was talk of the 'end of ideology' - that grand passions over ideas were exhausted, and in future problems would be solved by technical expertise. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: An understandable thought, once fascism and communism seemed to have burned themselves out. Political commentators always try to grip the crowds with simplistic labels, but fewer people will now read up an ideology. Tacit ideology. |
22862 | Liberals take people as they are, and take their preferences to be their interests [Lukes] |
Full Idea: Liberals take people as they are, and relates their interests to what they actually want or prefer. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.6) | |
A reaction: He contrasts this with 'reformists' and 'radicals'. I don't see why liberals should be so uncritical of people's desires. Liberals aren't going to implement harmful policies, simply because people want them. He treats liberals as one-dimensional. |
22853 | Anyone who thinks capitalism can improve their lives is endorsing capitalism [Lukes] |
Full Idea: Wage earners consent to capitalist organisation of society when they act as if they could improve their material conditions within the confines of capitalism. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: [He is citing Przeworski 1985] Not plausible as it stands. Does a prisoner who tries to improve their life within a hideous prison thereby endorse the prison system? In Auschwitz? Slaves can go along with the system for years, then suddenly rebel. |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us. | |
From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus | |
A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts? |