35 ideas
22338 | An unexamined life can be virtuous [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: An unexamined life can be virtuous. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: Nice. A firm rejection of the intellectualist view of virtue, to which most Greeks subscribed. Jesus would have liked this one. |
22337 | Philosophy must keep returning to the beginning [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Philosophy has in a sense to keep trying to return to the beginning. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: This is a sign that philosophy is not like other subjects, and indicates that although the puzzles are not solved, they won't go away. Also that, unlike most other subjects, the pre-suppositions are not part of the subject. |
23563 | Philosophy moves continually between elaborate theories and the obvious facts [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: There is a two-way movement in philosophy, a movement towards the building of elaborate theories, and a move back again towards the consideration of simple and obvious facts. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: Nice. Without the theories there is no philosophy, but without continual reference back to the obvious facts the theories are worthless. |
13076 | Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: The scholastics treated it as a step in the right explanatory direction to analyze a relational statement of the form 'aRb' into two subject-predicate statements, attributing different relational predicates to a and to b. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 2.2.1) | |
A reaction: The only alternative seems to be Russell's view of relations as pure universals, having a life of their own, quite apart from their relata. Or you could take them as properties of space, time (and powers?), external to the relata? |
13102 | If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: If we go for the necessity-of-origins view, A and B are different if the origin of A is different from the origin of B. But one is left with the further question 'When is the origin of A distinct from the origin of B?' | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1) | |
A reaction: There may be an answer to this, in a regress of origins that support one another, but in the end the objection is obviously good. You can't begin to refer to an 'origin' if you can't identify anything in the first place. |
13103 | Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: Scholastics distinguished criteria of numerical difference from questions of individuation proper, since numerical difference is a symmetrical notion. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1) | |
A reaction: This apparently old-fashioned point appears to be conclusively correct. Modern thinkers, though, aren't comfortable with proper individuation, because they don't believe in concepts like 'essence' and 'substance' that are needed for the job. |
13104 | Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: There is a contemporary property construal of haecceities, ...and a Scotistic construal as primitive, 'colourless' thisnesses which, unlike singleton-set haecceities, are aimed to do some explanatory work. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.4) | |
A reaction: [He associates the contemporary account with David Kaplan] I suppose I would say that individuation is done by properties, but not by some single property, so I take it that I don't believe in haecceities at all. What individuates a haecceity? |
13100 | Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: We could think of 'substance' on the model of a mass noun, rather than a count noun. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.3) | |
A reaction: They offer this to help Leibniz out of a mess, but I think he would be appalled. The proposal seems close to 'prime matter' in Aristotle, which never quite does the job required of it. The idea is nice, though, and should be taken seriously. |
13068 | We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: In the 'blueprint' approach to substance, we confront at least three questions: What is it for a thing to be an individual substance? What is it for a thing to be the kind of substance that it is? What is it to be that very individual substance? | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.1) | |
A reaction: My working view is that the answer to the first question is that substance is essence, that the second question is overrated and parasitic on the third, and that the third is the key question, and also reduces to essence. |
13069 | The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: There is a widespread assumption, now and in the past, that substances are essentially substances: nothing is actually a substance but possibly a non-substance. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.2) | |
A reaction: It seems to me that they clearly mean, in this context, that substances are 'necessarily' substances, not that they are 'essentially' substances. I would just say that substances are essences, and leave the necessity question open. |
13072 | Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: The modern view of essence is that the essence of a particular thing is given by the set of predicate-functions essential to it, and the essence of any kind is given by the set of predicate-functions essential to every possible member of that kind. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.2.2) | |
A reaction: Thus the modern view has elided the meanings of 'essential' and 'necessary' when talking of properties. They are said to be 'functions' from possible worlds to individuals. The old view (and mine) demands real essences, not necessary properties. |
17080 | Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: The modern essentialist gives the same metaphysical treatment to every grammatical predicate - by associating a function from worlds to extensions for each. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 2.2) | |
A reaction: I take this to mean that essentialism is the view that if some predicate attaches to an object then that predicate is essential if there is an extension of that predicate in all possible worlds. In English, essential predicates are necessary predicates. |
13101 | Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: A necessity-of-origins approach cannot work to distinguish things that come into being genuinely ex nihilo, and cannot work to distinguish things sharing a single origin. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1) | |
A reaction: Since I am deeply suspicious of essentiality or necessity of origin (and they are not, I presume, the same thing) I like these two. Twins have always bothered me with the second case (where order of birth seems irrelevant). |
13081 | Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: It might be suggested that even the extreme modal realist can countenance transworld identity for abstract objects. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 3.2.2 n46) | |
A reaction: This may sound right for uncontroversial or well-defined abstracta such as numbers and circles, but even 'or' is ambiguous, and heaven knows what the transworld identity of 'democracy' is! |
13071 | We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: The philosopher comfortable with an 'order of being' has richer resources to make sense of the 'in virtue of' relation than that provided only by causal relations between states of affairs, positing in addition other sorts of explanatory relationships. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.2) | |
A reaction: This might best be characterised as 'ontological dependence', and could be seen as a non-causal but fundamental explanatory relationship, and not one that has to depend on a theistic world view. |
22591 | We know perfection when we see what is imperfect [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: We know of perfection as we look upon what is imperfect. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals [1992], 13) | |
A reaction: This is in the context of a discussion of the ontological argument for God's existence, but I seize on it as a nice expression of the idealisation capacity of our minds. The alternative is that perfection is innate idea, since we aren't seeing it. |
22709 | We should first decide what are the great works of art, with aesthetic theory following from that [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Our aesthetic must stand to be judged by great works of art which we know to be such independently. …So let us start by saying that Shakespeare is the greatest of all artists, and let our aesthetic be the philosophical justification of this judgement. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.205) | |
A reaction: She offers this view in specific contradiction of Tolstoy, which says we should first have a theory, and then judge accordingly. I take Murdoch to be entirely right, but it means that our aesthetic theory will shift over time. |
22341 | Literature is the most important aspect of culture, because it teaches understanding of living [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: The most essential and fundamental aspect of culture is the study of literature, since this is an education in how to picture and understand human situations. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], i) | |
A reaction: It is significant that literature belongs more clearly to a nation or community than does most music or painting. You learn about Russians from their literature, but not much from their music. |
22715 | Great art proves the absurdity of art for art's sake [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: The work of the great artists shows up 'art-for-art's-sake' as a flimsy frivolous doctrine. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.218) | |
A reaction: She keeps referring to tragedy (as the greatest art), but it is hard to see how we learn love and morality from a great pot or a great abstract painting. Wilde makes the doctrine frivolous, but I think it contains a degree of truth. Music. |
22714 | Because art is love, it improves us morally [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: It is of course a fact that if art is love then art improves us morally, but this is, as it were, accidental. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.218) | |
A reaction: Is an enhancement of one's love necessarily a moral improvement? Love is a fine feeling, but how does it motivate? Has no wickedness ever been perpetrated in the name of love? 'All's fair in love and war'. |
22347 | Appreciating beauty in art or nature opens up the good life, by restricting selfishness [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: The appreciation of beauty in art or nature is not only the easiest available spiritual exercise; it is also a completely adequate entry into (and not just analogy of) the good life, since it checks selfishness in the interest of seeing the real. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], II) | |
A reaction: Not keen on 'spiritual' exercises, but I very much like 'seeing the real' as a promotion of the good life. The hard bit is to know what reality you are seeing in a work of art. [p.84] Her example is the sudden sight of a hovering kestrel. |
22712 | Art and morals are essentially the same, and are both identical with love [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Art and morals are (with certain provisos) one. Their essence is the same. The essence of both of them is love. Love is the perception of individuals. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.215) | |
A reaction: The idea that art, morals and love are all just a single thing seems unhelpful. What about satire? What about duty without love? What about pure abstract painting? What about Stravinsky's highly formal view of his music? |
22339 | Love is a central concept in morals [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Love is a central concept in morals. ....[p.30] The central concept of morality is 'the individual' thought of as knowable by love, thought of in the light of the command 'Be ye therefore perfect'. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a critique of the chillier aspects of utilitarianism and Kantian duty. Love doesn't seem essential to Aristotle's concept of virtue either, and Murdoch's tradition seems to be Christian. I'm undecided about this idea. |
22348 | Ordinary human love is good evidence of transcendent goodness [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Is not ordinary human love ...striking evidence of a transcendental principle of good? | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], II) | |
A reaction: Sorry to be mean, but I would say not. Love is tied up with sexual desire, and with family and tribal loyalty, and can be observed in quite humble animals. (Love, I should quickly add, is a very good thing indeed. Really). |
22713 | Love is realising something other than oneself is real [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Love is the extremely difficult realisation that something other than oneself is real. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.215) | |
A reaction: I suspect that this is a necessary condition for love, but not the thing itself. The realisation she describes may not be love. You would attain her realisation if you shared a prison cell with a terrifying psychopath. |
22343 | If I attend properly I will have no choices [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: If I attend properly I will have no choices, and this is the ultimate condition to be aimed at. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: I take it this is an expression of what we now call Particularism. It is not just that every moral situation is subtly morally different, but that the particulars of the situation will lead directly to moral choices (in a 'healthy' agent). |
22349 | Art trains us in the love of virtue [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: The enjoyment of art is a training in the love of virtue. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], III) | |
A reaction: Very Aristotelian to talk of 'training'. Unfortunately it is children who have the greatest need for training, but most art is aimed at mature adults. Can you be too old to be trained by art, even if you enjoy it? |
22340 | It is hard to learn goodness from others, because their virtues are part of their personal history [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: It is the historical, individual, nature of the virtues as actually exemplified which makes it difficult to learn goodness from another person. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: A penetrating remark, which strikes me as true. When confronted with a virtuous person you might want to acquire their virtue, just as you might want them to teach you algebra, but their virtues are too bound up with their individuality. |
22350 | Only trivial virtues can be possessed on their own [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: It would be impossible to have only one virtue, unless it were a very trivial one such as thrift. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], III) | |
A reaction: A nicely nuanced commitment to the unity of virtue. You might exhibit courage alone in a brute animal way, but the sort of courage we all admire is part of more extended virtues. |
22346 | Moral reflection and experience gradually reveals unity in the moral world [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Reflection rightly tends to unify the moral world, and increasing moral sophistication reveals increasing unity. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], II) | |
A reaction: As an example she suggests asking what is the best type of courage. Connections to other virtues will emerge. That is a persuasive example. We all have strong views on what type of courage is the most admirable. |
20765 | Man is a brave naked will, separate from a background of values and realities [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Existentialists no longer see man against a background of values, of realities, which transcend him. We picture man as a brave naked will. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (Against Dryness: a polemical sketch [1983], p.46), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 7 'Subjectivism' | |
A reaction: It is one thing to deny the values, and another to deny the realities. This piece is a 'polemic', and reads more like an exhortation than a truth. Many of us are, at best, cowardly naked wills. |
22342 | Kantian existentialists care greatly for reasons for action, whereas Surrealists care nothing [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: What may be called the Kantian wing and the Surrealist wing of existentialism may be distinguished by the degree of their interest in reasons for action, which diminishes to nothing at the Surrealist end. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: Presumably for all existentialists moral decisions are the most important aspect of life, since they define what you are, but the Surrealist wing seem to be nihilists about that, so they barely count as existentialists. For them life is sleepwalking. |
22351 | Only a philosopher might think choices create values [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: The ordinary person does not, unless corrupted by philosophy, believe that he creates values by his choices. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], III) | |
A reaction: This looks like a swipe at Nietzsche, more than anyone. Sartre and co talk less about values, other than authenticity. Philosophy can definitely be corrupting. |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us. | |
From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus | |
A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts? |
22345 | Moral philosophy needs a central concept with all the traditional attributes of God [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: God was (or is) a single perfect transcendent non-representable and necessarily real object of attention. ....Moral philosophy should attempt to retain a central concept which has all these characteristics. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], II) | |
A reaction: This is a combination of middle Platonism (which sees the Form of the Good as the mind of God) and G.E. Moore's indefinable ideal of goodness. Murdoch connects this suggestion with the centrality of love in moral philosophy. I disagree. |