32 ideas
9921 | 'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true' [Burgess/Rosen] |
Full Idea: In the disquotational view of truth, what saves truth from being wholly redundant and so wholly useless, is mainly that it provides an ability to state generalisations like 'Everything Fermat believed was true'. | |
From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], I.A.2.c) | |
A reaction: Sounds like the thin end of the wedge. Presumably we can infer that the first thing Fermat believed on his last Christmas Day was true. |
9924 | Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility [Burgess/Rosen] |
Full Idea: If you want a logic of metaphysical possibility, the existing literature was originally developed to supply a logic of metalogical possibility, and still reflects its origins. | |
From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], II.B.3.b) | |
A reaction: This is a warning shot (which I don't fully understand) to people like me, who were beginning to think they could fill their ontology with possibilia, which could then be incorporated into the wider account of logical thinking. Ah well... |
9933 | The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set [Burgess/Rosen] |
Full Idea: The paradoxes only seem to arise in connection with Frege's logical notion of extension or class, not Cantor's mathematical notion of set. Cantor never assumed that every condition determines a set. | |
From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], III.C.1.b) | |
A reaction: This makes the whole issue a parochial episode in the history of philosophy, not a central question. Cantor favoured some sort of abstractionism (see Kit Fine on the subject). |
9928 | Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates [Burgess/Rosen] |
Full Idea: Mereology has ontological implications. The acceptance of some initial entities involves the acceptance of many further entities, arbitrary wholes having the entities as parts. It must accept conglomerates. Geometric points imply geometric regions. | |
From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], II.C.1.b) | |
A reaction: Presumably without the wholes being entailed by the parts, there is no subject called 'mereology'. But if the conglomeration is unrestricted, there is not much left to be said. 'Restricted' composition (by nature?) sounds a nice line. |
9926 | A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets [Burgess/Rosen] |
Full Idea: While in general a relation is taken to be a set of ordered pairs <u, v> = {{u}, {u, v}}, and hence a set of sets of sets, in special cases a relation can be represented by a set of sets. | |
From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], II.C.1.a) | |
A reaction: [See book for their examples, which are <, symmetric, and arbitrary] The fact that a relation (or anything else) can be represented in a certain way should never ever be taken to mean that you now know what the thing IS. |
9932 | The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory [Burgess/Rosen] |
Full Idea: Recent commentators have de-emphasised the set paradoxes because they play no prominent part in motivating the most articulate and active opponents of set theory, such as Kronecker (constructivism) or Brouwer (intuitionism), or Weyl (predicativism). | |
From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], III.C.1.b) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a sad illustration of the way most analytical philosophers have to limp along behind the logicians and mathematicians, arguing furiously about problems that have largely been abandoned. |
9923 | We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers [Burgess/Rosen] |
Full Idea: The modal strategy for numbers is to replace assumptions about the actual existence of numbers by assumptions about the possible existence of numbers | |
From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], II.B.3.a) | |
A reaction: This seems to be quite a good way of dealing with very large numbers and infinities. It is not clear whether 5 is so regularly actualised that we must consider it as permanent, or whether it is just a prominent permanent possibility. |
9925 | Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together [Burgess/Rosen] |
Full Idea: Usually structuralism and nominalism are considered rivals. But structuralism can also be the first step in a strategy of nominalist reconstrual or paraphrase. | |
From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], II.C.0) | |
A reaction: Hellman and later Chihara seem to be the main proponents of nominalist structuralism. My sympathies lie with this strategy. Are there objects at the nodes of the structure, or is the structure itself platonic? Mill offers a route. |
9934 | Number words became nouns around the time of Plato [Burgess/Rosen] |
Full Idea: The transition from using number words purely as adjectives to using them extensively as nouns has been traced to 'around the time of Plato'. | |
From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], III.C.2.a) | |
A reaction: [The cite Kneale and Kneale VI,§2 for this] It is just too tempting to think that in fact Plato (and early Platonists) were totally responsible for this shift, since the whole reification of numbers seems to be inherently platonist. |
21812 | Being is the product of pure intellect [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: Intellectual-Principle [Nous] by its intellective act establishes Being. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.04) | |
A reaction: This is a surprising view - that there is something which is prior to Being - but I take it to be Plotinus giving primacy to Plato's Form of the Good (a pure ideal), ahead of the One of Parmenides (which is Being). |
21817 | The One does not exist, but is the source of all existence [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: The First is no member of existence, but can be the source of all. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.07) | |
A reaction: The First is the One, and this explicitly denies that it has Being. This answers the self-predication problem of Forms. Plato thought the Form of the Beautiful was beautiful, but it can't be (because of the regress). The source of existence can't exist. |
21824 | The One is a principle which transcends Being [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: There exists a principle which transcends Being; this the One. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.10) | |
A reaction: The idea that the One transcends Being is the distinctive Plotinus doctrine. He defends the view that this was also the view of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato. |
21813 | Number determines individual being [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: Number is the determinant of individual being. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.05) | |
A reaction: You might have thought that number was the consequence of the individualities (or units) within being, but not so. You can't get more platonic than saying that the idealised numbers are the source of the particular units. |
9918 | Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree [Burgess/Rosen] |
Full Idea: The distinction of abstract and concrete is one of kind and not degree. | |
From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], I.A.1.a) | |
A reaction: I think I must agree with this. If there is a borderline, it would be in particulars that seem to have an abstract aspect to them. A horse involves the abstraction of being a horse, and it involves be one horse. |
9929 | Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden' [Burgess/Rosen] |
Full Idea: Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden'. | |
From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], III.A.1.d) | |
A reaction: Not just science. In ordinary conversation we continually refer to particulars using so-called 'universal' predicates and object-terms, which are presumably abstractions. 'I've just seen an elephant'. |
9927 | Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction [Burgess/Rosen] |
Full Idea: In mathematics, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, there has been an ascent to higher and higher levels of abstraction. | |
From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], II.C.1.b) | |
A reaction: I am interested in clarifying what this means, which might involve the common sense and psychological view of the matter, as well as some sort of formal definition in terms of equivalence (or whatever). |
9930 | Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas [Burgess/Rosen] |
Full Idea: There is a scale of abstractness that leads downwards from sets through attributes to formulas as abstract types and on to formulas as abstract tokens. | |
From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], III.B.2.c) | |
A reaction: Presumably the 'abstract tokens' at the bottom must have some interpretation, to support the system. Presumably one can keep going upwards, through sets of sets of sets. |
5506 | If soul was like body, its parts would be separate, without communication [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: If the soul had the nature of the body, it would have isolated members each unaware of the condition of the other;..there would be a particular soul as a distinct entity to each local experience, so a multiplicity of souls would administer an individual. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 4.2.2), quoted by R Martin / J Barresi - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' p.15 | |
A reaction: Of course, the modern 'modularity of mind' theory does suggest that we are run by a team, but a central co-ordinator is required, with a full communication network across the modules. |
21827 | The movement of Soul is continuous, but we are only aware of the parts of it that are sensed [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: The Soul maintains its unfailing movement; for not all that passes in the soul is, by that fact, perceptible; we know just as much as impinges on the faculty of the sense. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.12) | |
A reaction: This is a straightforward argument in favour of an unconscious aspect to the mind - and a rather good argument too. No one thinks that our minds ever stop working, even in sleep. |
21828 | A person is the whole of their soul [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: Man is not merely a part (the higher part) of the Soul but the total. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.12) | |
A reaction: The soul is psuche, which includes the vegetative soul. The higher part is normally taken to be reason. This seems pretty close to John Locke's view of the matter. |
21809 | Our soul has the same ideal nature as the oldest god, and is honourable above the body [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: Our own soul is of that same ideal nature [as the oldest god of them all], so that to consider it, purified, freed from all accruement, is to recognise in ourselves which we have found soul to be, honourable above the body. For what is body but earth? | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.02) | |
A reaction: The strongest versions of substance dualism are religious in character, because the separateness of the mind elevates us above the grubby physical character of the world. I'm with Nietzsche on this one - this view is actually harmful to us. |
21825 | The soul is outside of all of space, and has no connection to the bodily order [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: We may not seek any point in space in which to seat the soul; it must be set outside of all space; its distinct quality, its separateness, its immateriality, demand that it be a thing alone, untouched by all of the bodily order. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.10) | |
A reaction: You can't get more dualist than that. He doesn't seem bothered about the interaction problem. He likens such influence to the radiation of the sun, rather than to physical movement. |
9919 | The old debate classified representations as abstract, not entities [Burgess/Rosen] |
Full Idea: The original debate was over abstract ideas; thus it was mental (or linguistic) representations that were classified as abstract or otherwise, and not the entities represented. | |
From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], I.A.1.b) | |
A reaction: This seems to beg the question of whether there are any such entities. It is equally plausible to talk of the entities that are 'constructed', rather than 'represented'. |
21826 | The Soul reasons about the Right, so there must be some permanent Right about which it reasons [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: Since there is a Soul which reasons upon the right and good - for reasoning is an enquiry into the rightness and goodness of this rather than that - there must exist some pemanent Right, the source and foundation of this reasoning in our soul. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.11) | |
A reaction: This is pretty close the Kant's concept of 'the moral order within me', and Plotinus even sees it as rational. Presumably this right is 'permanent' because the revelatlons of reason about it are necessary truths. |
6922 | Ecstasy is for the neo-Platonist the highest psychological state of man [Plotinus, by Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: Ecstasy or rapture is for the neo-Platonist the highest psychological state of man. | |
From: report of Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245]) by Ludwig Feuerbach - Principles of Philosophy of the Future §29 | |
A reaction: See Bernini's statue of St Theresa. Personally I find this very unappealing because of its utter irrationality, but what is the 'highest' human psychological state? Doing mental arithmetic? Doing what is morally right? Dignity under pressure? |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us. | |
From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus | |
A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts? |
21816 | Soul is the logos of Nous, just as Nous is the logos of the One [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: The soul is an utterance [logos] and act of the Intellectual-Principle [Nous], as that is an utterance and act of the One. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.06) | |
A reaction: Being only comes into the picture at the secondary Nous stage. Nous is the closest to the modern concept of God. |
21815 | Because the One is immobile, it must create by radiation, light the sun producing light [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: Given this immobility of the Supreme ...what happened then? It must be a circumradiation, which may be compared to the brilliant light encircling the sun and ceaselessly generating from that unchanging substance, | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.06) | |
A reaction: This is the answer given to the problem raised in Idea 21814. The sun produces energy, without apparent movement. Not an answer that will satisfy a physicist, but an interesting answer. |
21814 | How can multiple existence arise from the unified One? [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: The problem endlessly debated is how, from such a unity as we have declared the One to be, does anything at all come into substantial existence, any multiplicity, dyad or number? | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.06) | |
A reaction: This was precisely Aristotle's objection to the One of Parmenides, and especially the problem of the source of movement (which Plotinus also notices). |
9922 | If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity [Burgess/Rosen] |
Full Idea: According to many philosophical commentators, a force-field must be considered to be a physical entity, and as the distinction between space and the force-field may be considered to be merely verbal, space itself may be considered to be a physical entity. | |
From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], II.A.1) | |
A reaction: The ontology becomes a bit odd if we cheerfully accept that space is physical, but then we can't give the same account of time. I'm not sure how time could be physical. What's it made of? |
21808 | Soul is author of all of life, and of the stars, and it gives them law and movement [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: Soul is the author of all living things, ...it has breathed life into them all, whatever is nourished by earth and sea, the divine stars in the sky; ...it is the principle distinct from all of these to which it gives law and movement and life. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.02) | |
A reaction: This seems to derive from Anaxagoras, who is mentioned by Plotinus. The soul he refers to his not the same as our concept of God. Note the word 'law', which I am guessing is nomos. Not, I think, modern laws of nature, but closer to guidelines. |
21811 | Even the soul is secondary to the Intellectual-Principle [Nous], of which soul is an utterance [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: Soul, for all the worth we have shown to belong to it, is yet a secondary, an image of the Intellectual-Principle [Nous]; reason uttered is an image of reason stored within the soul, and similarly soul is an utterance of the Intellectual-Principle. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.03) | |
A reaction: It then turns out that Nous is secondary to the One, so there is a hierarchy of Being (which only enters at the Nous stage). |