Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, James Joule and Thomas W. Polger

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9 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
The taste of chocolate is a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness [Polger]
     Full Idea: The taste of chocolate is presumably a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness.
     From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], Ch.1.4)
     A reaction: An interesting distinction when it comes to what they are like, and whether two very different brains can realise them. Sweetness might be the same for most creatures, but the tast of chocolate subtly different.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
The mind and the self are one, and the mind-self is a biological phenomenon [Polger]
     Full Idea: We should return to the old idea that the mind and the self are one and combine it with the new idea that the mind-self is a biological phenomenon.
     From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], §8.3)
     A reaction: This doesn't make allowance for the fact that some parts of my mind seem like irritating visitors, and other parts seem like the home-owner. Personally I take the self to be the brain's central controller, or the centre (forum) of brain integration.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
Teleological functions explain why a trait exists; causal-role functions say what it does [Polger]
     Full Idea: Teleological functions help explain why a trait has come to exist; causal-role functions tell what a trait does or is apt to do.
     From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], §5.4)
     A reaction: The teleological view has the merit of nesting nicely with the theory of evolution, and with Aristotelian virtue ethics (which I like). Causal-role functionalism focuses better on what is actually happening inside the head.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Identity theory says consciousness is an abstraction: a state, event, process or property [Polger]
     Full Idea: Identity theories locate consciousness at a certain order of abstraction, typically among neurophysiological states, events, processes, or properties.
     From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], Ch.7.6)
     A reaction: I increasingly think that processes are the answer. My new analogy for the mind is a waterfall: its physical ontology is simple, it only exists because there is a sustained process, and it is far too complex to predict individual droplet outcomes.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
     Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us.
     From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus
     A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
A mummified heart has the teleological function of circulating blood [Polger]
     Full Idea: A preserved heart in a jar of formaldehyde has the teleological function of circulating blood.
     From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], §5.4)
     A reaction: A nice illustration.
Teleological notions of function say what a thing is supposed to do [Polger]
     Full Idea: Teleological notions of function specify not just what a thing happens to do, but what it is supposed to do.
     From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], Ch.5.3)
     A reaction: This is the basis of a distinct theory of the mind. It seems to be akin to the 'dispositions' of behaviourism, so that the mind becomes once more a theoretical and abstract entity, rather than a thing of occurrent events and processes.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / b. Heat
Heat is a state of vibration, not a substance [Joule]
     Full Idea: We consider heat not as a substance but as a state of vibration.
     From: James Joule (works [1870]), quoted by Peter Watson - Convergence 01 'Nature's'
     A reaction: The puzzle is that giving accurate accounts of vibrations, heat and movement require a quantitative substance, energy. But all we have here is movement, and the denial of a substance. Energy is 'nature's currency system'.
Joule showed that energy converts to heat, and heat to energy [Joule, by Papineau]
     Full Idea: James Joule established the equivalence of heat and mechanical energy, in the sense of showing that a specific amount of heat will always be produced by the expenditure of a given amount of energy, and vice versa.
     From: report of James Joule (works [1870]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness App 4.2
     A reaction: This was a major step towards the law of conservation of energy.