14 ideas
23326 | In the third century Stoicism died out, replaced by Platonism, with Aristotelian ethics [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: By the second century CE Aristotelianism and Platonism had begun to eclipse Stoicism, and by the end of the third century Stoicism had no followers. All philosophers now opted for some form of Platonism, but including Aristotle's ethical principles. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 04) | |
A reaction: The idea that Aristotelian ethics dominated that period is new to me. Stoic influence remained strong in Augustine, and hence in Christianity. |
23335 | In late antiquity nearly all philosophers were monotheists [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: I am inclined to think that almost all philosophers in late antiquity were monotheists. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 08) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure when late antiquity begins, in this remark. Maybe as early as 100 CE. Epictetus talks of Zeus as if he is supreme. |
16137 | Earlier views of Aristotle were dominated by 'Categories' [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: For centuries 'Categories' and 'De Interpretatione' (+ Porphyry's 'Isagoge') formed the core of the philosophical corpus still being seriously studied. It is hardly surprising that our received view of Aristotle was coloured substantially by 'Categories'. | |
From: Michael Frede (Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' [1983], I) | |
A reaction: He adds that doubts remain about the authenticity of the second part, and the whole thing bears marks of having been edited. |
23249 | The early philosophers thought that reason has its own needs and desires [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It is part of the notion of reason according to these philosophers [Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Stoics] that reason has its own needs and desires. | |
From: Michael Frede (Intro to 'Rationality in Greek Thought' [1996], p.5) | |
A reaction: This sounds as if reason is treated as a separate person within a person. Anyone solving a logical puzzle feels that reason has its own compulsion. 'Boulesis' is the desire characteristic of reason. |
16157 | Insurance on the original ship would hardly be paid out if the plank version was wrecked! [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: No insurance company, presented with a policy written for 'Theoris' [the original ship] would pay for damages suffered if the ship contructed from the old planks had been shipwrecked. | |
From: Michael Frede (Individuals in Aristotle [1978]) | |
A reaction: A very nicely dramatic way of presenting what is taken to be the usual reading of the basic case - that the original identity tracks the continuity of the original structure, not the matter. |
23334 | For Christians man has free will by creation in God's image (as in Genesis) [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The Christian view, following Genesis, is that man is created in the image of God, and this is understood as crucially involving the idea that man has a free will in the image of God's will. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 08) | |
A reaction: The idea of free will evidently originated with Epictetus, but was taken up by Christians because it fitted doctrinal needs. Even Epictetus saw free will as originating in Zeus. |
23333 | The idea of free will achieved universal acceptance because of Christianity [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: There is no doubt that the notion of a free will found almost universal acceptance owing to the influence of Christianity. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 07) | |
A reaction: This is presumably because a free will not only elevates us above the animals, qualifying us for immortality, but also gives us absolute and ultimate responsibility for our lives, which thus justifies either salvation or damnation. |
23337 | The Stoics needed free will, to allow human choices in a divinely providential cosmos [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The Stoics said that everything happens according to a divine providential plan, so they had to explain how this was compatible with human choices. They tried to do this with their doctrine of freedom and a free will. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 10) | |
A reaction: Epictetus made our ability to choose central to moral life, so he particularly needed (and thus created, it seems) this doctrine. |
23336 | There is no will for Plato or Aristotle, because actions come directly from perception of what is good [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Plato and Aristotle do not have a notion of a will, since for them a willing, a desire of reason, is a direct result of one's cognitive state: once one sees something to be good, one will it. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 09) | |
A reaction: The point is that their decisions are 'direct', whereas the will introduces the concept of a final arbiter which weighs up the desires, reasons and drives. The historical steps were first the meta-choosing, then the will as entity, then the will as free. |
4053 | If it is desirable that a given patient die, then moral objections to killing them do not apply [Rachels] |
Full Idea: The cause of death (injection or disease) is important from the legal point of view, but not morally. If euthanasia is desirable in a given case then the patient's death is not an evil, so the usual objections to killing do not apply. | |
From: James Rachels (No Moral Difference [1975], p.102) | |
A reaction: Seems reasonable, but a very consequentialist view. Is it good that small children should clean public toilets? |
4052 | It has become normal to consider passive euthanasia while condemning active euthanasia [Rachels] |
Full Idea: It seems to have become accepted that passive euthanasia (by withholding treatment and allowing a patient to die) may be acceptable, whereas active euthanasia (direct action to kill the patient) is never acceptable. | |
From: James Rachels (No Moral Difference [1975], p.97) | |
A reaction: He goes on to attack the distinction. It is hard to distinguish the two cases, as well as being hard to judge them. |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us. | |
From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus | |
A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts? |
20713 | God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B] |
Full Idea: Rachels argues 1) If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship, 2) No being could be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one's role as an autonomous moral agent, so 3) There cannot be a being who is God. | |
From: report of James Rachels (God and Human Attributes [1971], 7 p.334) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'd morality' | |
A reaction: Presumably Lionel Messi can be a fitting object of worship without being God. Since the problem is with being worshipful, rather than with being God, should I infer that Messi doesn't exist? |
23313 | The Gnostic demiurge (creator) is deluded, and doesn't care about us [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The Gnostics thought the demiurge or creator pursues its own interests without regard for what this does to us, a being lacking in wisdom and goodness, as seen by its deluding itself into thinking that it is God, and demanding worship. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], Intro) | |
A reaction: Frede mentions Irenaeus as a source of this view. The idea that the Great Being doesn't care about us seems a fairly accurate observation. |