30 ideas
7973 | There is no longer anything on which there is nothing to say [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: There is no longer anything on which there is nothing to say. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p. 17) | |
A reaction: Compare Ideas 2937 and 6870. I'm not sure whether Baudrillard is referring to the limits of philosophy, or merely to social taboos. I like Ansell Pearson's view: we should attempt to discuss what appears to be undiscussable. |
6841 | Some continental philosophers are relativists - Baudrillard, for example [Baudrillard, by Critchley] |
Full Idea: There are philosophers in the continental tradition who are relativists - Baudrillard, for example. | |
From: report of Jean Baudrillard (works [1976]) by Simon Critchley - Interview with Baggini and Stangroom p.192 | |
A reaction: This remark is in the context of Critchley denying that most continental philosophers are relativists. |
7975 | The task of philosophy is to unmask the illusion of objective reality [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: The task of philosophy is to unmask the illusion of objective reality - a trap that is, in a sense, laid for us by nature. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p. 40) | |
A reaction: There is a vast gap between this and the Lockean view (Idea 7653) that philosophers are there to help reveal reality, probably via science. I retain the Enlightenment faith that there is a reality to be found. Baudrillard must be taken seriously, though. |
23277 | Modern pragmatism sees objectivity as possible, despite its gradual evolution [Misak] |
Full Idea: One of the pillars of the new pragmatism is the thought that the standards of objectivity come into being and evolve over time, but that being historically situated in this way does not detract from their objectivity. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Introduction to 'New Pragmatists' [2007], p.2) | |
A reaction: This looks to me like pragmatism finally coming to its senses. I would say that being any sort of 'social construct' (beloved of cultural relativists) in no way detracts from its capacity for objectivity and truth. |
7986 | Drunken boat pilots are less likely to collide than clearly focused ones [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: Two boats on Lake Constance in dense fog are in less danger of colliding if their pilots are drunk than if they are attempting to master the situation. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.196) | |
A reaction: Charming, but I think empirical research would prove it false. At least rational pilots know to keep to the right (?) when a shape looms through the fog. I prefer rational pilots, but then I am one of those sad people who admires the Enlightenment. |
7982 | Instead of thesis and antithesis leading to synthesis, they now cancel out, and the conflict is levelled [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: Gone is the dialectic, the play of thesis and antithesis resolving itself in synthesis. The opposing terms now cancel each other out in a levelling of all conflict. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.129) | |
A reaction: This is from someone who approved of 9/11 (p.137 of this text), and seemed to welcome conflict. His idea, which has plausibility, is that the modern media have become a great warm bath that calmly absorbs every abrasive thrown into it. |
19100 | Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak] |
Full Idea: The role of truth is to make disagreements matter, or to make sense of wanting to resolve disagreements. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 2) | |
A reaction: [She cites Huw Price 2003] This suggests that the most important use of 'truth' is forensic. It is hard to make any sense of a law court without a robust sense of truth. Trial by jury, rather than some great personage, shows this value. |
19094 | For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak] |
Full Idea: For pragmatists there is an unseverable connection between making an assertion and claiming that it is true. ...Were we to get to a belief that is forever assertible...then we would have a true belief. There is nothing higher or better we could ask of it. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 1) | |
A reaction: She is particularly drawing on Peirce. She says his 'ideal end of enquiry' idea is a small aspect of his view of truth, which is mainly given here. I had taken the pragmatic view of truth to be silly, but I may rethink. |
19099 | 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak] |
Full Idea: 'P is true' is used to emphasise p, and avoid logic problems. The pragmatists says there are plenty of other uses: the aim of assertion or deliberation, the improvement of our views, distinguishing objectivity, explaining meaning, negation, consequence... | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 2) | |
A reaction: Pragmatism seems to break 'true' down into its many uses, rather than having a specific theory of truth. This might be where ordinary language philosophy (how is the word 'true' used) meets pragmatism (how is the concept [true] used). |
19103 | 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak] |
Full Idea: The pragmatist says 'That's so' or 'that's true' are not just 'pro-sentential', but carry with them the thought that evidence does currently speak in favour of the statement asserted, and the prediction that it will continue to speak in favour. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 3) | |
A reaction: This is a very nice point made by a pragmatist against the flimsy view of truth held by various deflationary views. You ought to believe what is true, and stand by what you hold to be true. |
19105 | Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak] |
Full Idea: If truth is what satisfies our aims in first-order assertion and inquiry (as the pragmatist says), then there is no search for an elusive property, or a metaphysical property, or a property which we cannot grasp. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 3) | |
A reaction: This pragmatic approach is much more persuasive than the usual caricature of pragmatic truth (Idea 19097), but I'm beginning to wonder how you distinguish an 'inquiry' (or 'assertion') from other modes of thought. Do I smell a circularity? |
19108 | Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak] |
Full Idea: The pragmatist will say that truth is proper assertion, but different discourses have different standards for proper assertion. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 4) | |
A reaction: This remark shows that there is a pragmatic attitude towards truth behind most attempts to analyse the concept of assertion. When and why is assertion legitimate, and what motivates it? |
19101 | Disquotation is bivalent [Misak] |
Full Idea: The disquotational schema entails bivalence. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 2 n10) | |
A reaction: A simple but interesting observation. Critics of Tarski observe that he depends on a bivalent logic. |
19106 | Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak] |
Full Idea: The point of the disquotational schema is that to say that a sentence is true is to assert it, and to assert a sentence is to say that it is true. We must then ask what it is to assert or endorse a proposition. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 4) | |
A reaction: [She is referring to the views of Crispin Wright] Most people would say that we assert something because we think it is true, and truth is obviously prior. Clearly if it has been asserted, that was because someone thought it was true. |
19096 | Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak] |
Full Idea: Disquotationalism is more like a telephone directory than a theory. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 2 n7) | |
A reaction: [She cites Wilfred Sellars 1962:33] The idea is that there is a schema - 'p' is true iff p - and that all the acceptable sentences of a language can be expressed in this way, making a vast but finite list. It seems to replace 'theories'. |
19098 | Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak] |
Full Idea: We must not move seamlessly from the thought that the correspondence theory must be deflated to the thought that any theory of truth must be deflated. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 2) | |
A reaction: This rather good essay offers the idea that Peircean pragmatic approaches to truth can meet the deflationary desires of the opponents of correspondence, without jettisoning all the crucial naturalistic connections with reality. Interesting. |
19104 | Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak] |
Full Idea: Deflationist theories are not theories of truth, or theories of what truth is. ...They are theories which try to explain the role that 'true' plays in natural languages. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 3) | |
A reaction: [She cites Dorothy Grover 2001,2002] If so, then the modern axiomatic theory of truth sounds appealing, because it tries to give a fuller and more precise account than a mere list is disquotations could possibly give. |
7974 | Without God we faced reality: what do we face without reality? [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: The eclipse of God left us up against reality. Where will the eclipse of reality leave us? | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004]) | |
A reaction: Baudrillard's distinctive view is that modern culture is thwarting all our attempts to grasp reality, which itself becomes a fiction. The answer is that you are left in the position of the ancient sceptics. Sextus Empiricus (see) is the saviour. |
19109 | The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak] |
Full Idea: If indefeasibility turns out to be something we can't sensibly aim at in a kind of inquiry, then the judgements that arise from that kind of 'inquiry' are not truth-apt. It is here that the realism/anti-realism debate resides. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 4) | |
A reaction: A very interesting way of presenting the issue, one that makes the debate sound (to me) considerably more interesting than hitherto. I may start using the word 'indefeasible' rather a lot, in my chats with the anti-realist philosophical multitude. |
7987 | Nothing is true, but everything is exact [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: Someone said: everything is true, nothing is exact. I would say the opposite: nothing is true, everything is exact. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.210) | |
A reaction: In analytical terminology, this appears to say that vagueness is ontological, not epistemological, agreeing with Williamson and others. To say that 'nothing is true', though, just strikes me as silly. What does Baudrillard mean by 'true'? |
7978 | There is no need to involve the idea of free will to make choices about one's life [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: There is no need to involve the idea of free will to make choices about one's life. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p. 57) | |
A reaction: Someone who believed that free will was metaphysically possible, but that they themselves lacked it, might feel paralysed, defeated or fatalistic about their decision-making. But that would be like falsely believing you were fatally ill. |
7980 | In modern times, being useless is the essential aesthetic ingredient for an object [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: Since the nineteenth century it has been art's claim that it is useless...so it is enough to elevate any object to uselessness to turn it into a work of art...and obsolete useless objects automatically acquire an aesthetic aura. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.111) | |
A reaction: Art is 'purposive without purpose' (Kant). An nice summary of the situation, and this seems to explain the role of Duchamp's famous urinal, up on the wall and rendered useless. The obvious rebellion, though, is Arts and Crafts. |
7983 | Good versus evil has been banefully reduced to happiness versus misfortune [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: The ideal opposition between good and evil has been reduced to the idealogical oppositions between happiness and misfortune. The reduction of good to happiness is as baneful as that of evil to misfortune. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.139) | |
A reaction: A nice example is the use in the media of the word 'tragic' for every misfortune. See the debate over the translation of the Greek 'eudaimonia'. 'Happiness' seems the wrong translation, if it leads to comments like Baudrillard's. |
7981 | Whole populations are terrorist threats to authorities, who unite against them [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: One way or another, populations themselves are a terrorist threat to the authorities...and by extension, we can hypothesize a coalition of all governments against all populations. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.120) | |
A reaction: This may count as left-wing paranoia, but it is a striking thought, which plants an uneasy notion in the mind whenever we see two world leaders disappear behind closed doors for a chat. |
7976 | People like democracy because it means they can avoid power [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: If the people puts itself into the hands of the political class, it does so more to be rid of power than out of any desire for representation. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p. 54) | |
A reaction: Very nice. If we are all in the grips of some biological 'will to power', that needn't be power over huge numbers of other people, merely power over our immediate lives. It can be expressed by building a wall. |
7977 | Only in the last 200 years have people demanded the democratic privilege of being individuals [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: Individuality is a recent phenomenon. It is only over the last two centuries that the populations of the civilized countries have demanded the democratic privilege of being individuals. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p. 55) | |
A reaction: I think Aristotle's ethics and politics imply individuality, given that the only purpose of civic society seems to be to enable individuals to flourish and lead virtuous lives. Society is justified, for example, because it makes friendship possible. |
7979 | The arrival of the news media brought history to an end [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: The course of history came to an end with the entry on the scene of the news media. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p. 83) | |
A reaction: The sort of remark for which Baudrillard became famous. It strikes me as nonsense. The view the British people got of the Battle of Trafalgar was even more distorted than their picture of the Battle of El Alamein. We know what he means, though. |
7984 | Suicide is ascribed to depression, with the originality of the act of will ignored [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: Suicide is always ascribed to depressive motivations with no account taken of an originality of, an original will to commit, the act itself. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.153) | |
A reaction: Apparently research suggests that most suicides are clinically depressed, but even within the depression there is a startling act of will that goes beyond merely feeling bad. |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us. | |
From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus | |
A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts? |
7985 | Pascal says secular life is acceptable, but more fun with the hypothesis of God [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: What Pascal says, more or less, is that you can more or less content yourself with a secular existence and its advantages, but it's much more fun with the hypothesis of God. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.155) | |
A reaction: Pascal will be a bit startled when he reads this, but it is a lovely way to present his idea. It suddenly sounds much more attractive. Life would be much more fun if we lived according to all sorts of startling beliefs. Relating your life to God is one. |