Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, John Dewey and Bert Leuridan

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


31 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is the study and criticsm of cultural beliefs, to achieve new possibilities [Dewey]
     Full Idea: Philosophy is criticism of the influential beliefs that underlie culture, tracking them to their generating conditions and results, and considering their mutual compatibility. This terminates in a new perspective, which leads to new possibilities.
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 6:19), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey Intro
     A reaction: [compressed] This would make quite a good manifesto for French thinkers of the 1960s. Foucault could hardly disagree. An excellent idea.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Liberalism should improve the system, and not just ameliorate it [Dewey]
     Full Idea: Liberalism must become radical in the sense that, instead of using social power to ameliorate the evil consequences of the existing system, it shall use social power to change the system.
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 11:287), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Dewey'
     A reaction: Conservative liberals ask what people want, and try to give it to them. Radical liberals ask what people actually need, and try to make it possible. The latter is bound to be a bit paternalistic, but will probably create a better world.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge is either the product of competent enquiry, or it is meaningless [Dewey]
     Full Idea: Knowledge, as an abstract term, is a name for the product of competent enquiries. Apart from this relation, its meaning is so empty that any content or filling may be arbitrarily poured into it.
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 12:16), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 2 'Knowledge'
     A reaction: What is the criterion of 'competent'? Danger of tautology, if competent enquiry is what produces knowledge.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
The value and truth of knowledge are measured by success in activity [Dewey]
     Full Idea: What measures knowledge's value, its correctness and truth, is the degree of its availability for conducting to a successful issue the activities of living beings.
     From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 4:180), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 2 'Critique'
     A reaction: Note that this is the measure of truth, not the nature of truth (which James seemed to believe). Dewey gives us a clear and perfect statement of the pragmatic view of knowledge. I don't agree with it.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
We want certainty in order to achieve secure results for action [Dewey]
     Full Idea: The ultimate ground of the quest for cognitive certainty is the need for security in the results for action.
     From: John Dewey (The Quest for Certainty [1929], p.39), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 10.5
     A reaction: Just what a pragmatist should say. This may be true within an evolutionary account of human nature, but seems unlikely when doing a sudoku. The 'ground' of the quest may not be the same as its 'source'.
The quest for certainty aims for peace, and avoidance of the stress of action [Dewey]
     Full Idea: The quest for certainty is a quest for a peace which is assured, an object which is unqualified by risk and the shadow of fear which action costs.
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 4:7), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 2 'Intro'
     A reaction: This is a characteristic pragmatist account. I think Dewey and Peirce offer us the correct attitude to certainty. It is just not available to us, and can only be a delusion. That doesn't mean we don't know anything, however!
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
No belief can be so settled that it is not subject to further inquiry [Dewey]
     Full Idea: The attainment of settled beliefs is a progressive matter; there is no belief so settled as not to be exposed to further inquiry.
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 12:16), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 2 'Knowledge'
     A reaction: A nice pragmatist mantra, but no scientists gets a research grant to prove facts which have been securely established for a very long time. It is neurotic to keep returning to check that you have locked your front door. Dewey introduced 'warranted'.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: A generalisation is explanatory if and only if it is invariant.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §4)
     A reaction: [He cites Jim Woodward 2003] I dislike the idea that generalisations and regularities explain anything at all, but this rule sounds like a bare minimum for being taken seriously in the space of explanations.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: The main alternative to the dispositional theory of biological functions (which confer a survival-enhancing propensity) is the etiological theory (effects are functions if they play a role in the causal history of that very component).
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3)
     A reaction: [Bigelow/Pargetter 1987 for the first, Mitchell 2003 for the second] The second one sounds a bit circular, but on the whole a I prefer causal explanations to dispositional explanations.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on the existence of regularities.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3)
     A reaction: This seems to be the Humean rearguard action in favour of the regularity account of laws. Wrong, but a nice paper. This point shows why only powers (despite their vagueness!) are the only candidate for the bottom level of explanation.
Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: To model a mechanism one must incorporate pragmatic laws. ...As valuable as the concept of mechanism and mechanistic explanation are, they cannot replace regularities nor undermine their relevance for scientific explanation.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1)
     A reaction: [See Idea 12786 for 'pragmatic laws'] I just don't see how the observation of a regularity is any sort of explanation. I just take a regularity to be something interesting which needs to be explained.
We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: Summary: mechanisms depend on regularities, there may be regularities without mechanisms, models of mechanisms must incorporate pragmatic laws, and pragmatic laws do not depend epistemologically on mechanistic models.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1)
     A reaction: See Idea 14382 for 'pragmatic' laws. I'm quite keen on mechanisms, so this is an arrow close to the heart, but at this point I say that my ultimate allegiance is to powers, not to mechanisms.
Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: Nothing can count as a mechanism unless it produces some macro-level regular behaviour. To produce macro-level regular behaviour, it has to rely on micro-level regularities.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §5)
     A reaction: This is the core of Leuridan's argument that regularities are more basic than mechanisms. It doesn't follow, though, that the more basic a thing is the more explanatory work it can do. I say mechanisms explain more than low-level regularities do.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: I see nothing metaphysically wrong in an infinite ontological regress of mechanisms and regularities.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §5)
     A reaction: This is a pretty unusual view, and I can't accept it. My revulsion at this regress is precisely the reason why I believe in powers, as the bottom level of explanation.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
Mind is never isolated, but only exists in its interactions [Dewey]
     Full Idea: Mind is primarily a verb. ...Mind never denotes anything self-contained, isolated from the world of persons and things, but is always used with respect to situations, events, objects, persons and groups.
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 10:267), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 1 'emerge'
     A reaction: I strongly agree with the idea that mind is a process, not a thing. Certain types of solitary introspection don't seem to quite fit his account, but in general he is right.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
Habits constitute the self [Dewey]
     Full Idea: All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the self.
     From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 14:22), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 1 'Acts'
     A reaction: Not an idea I have encountered elsewhere. He emphasises that habits are not repeated actions, but are dispositions. I'm not clear whether these habits must be conscious.
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Dewey argued long before Wittgenstein that there could not seriously be a private language [Dewey, by Orenstein]
     Full Idea: Dewey argued in the twenties that there could not be, in any serious sense, a private language. Wittgenstein also, years later, came to appreciate this point.
     From: report of John Dewey (works [1926]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.6
     A reaction: A nice historical footnote to perhaps the most famous argument in twentieth century philosophy. Can anyone send me the Dewey reference?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
The good people are those who improve; the bad are those who deteriorate [Dewey]
     Full Idea: The bad man is the man who no matter how good he has been is beginning to deteriorate, to grow less good. The good man is the man who no matter how morally unworthy he has been is moving to become better.
     From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 12:181), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 3 'Reconstruct'
     A reaction: Although a slightly improving rat doesn't sound as good as a slightly deteriorating saint, I have some sympathy with this thought. The desire to improve seems to be right at the heart of what makes good character.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Democracy is the development of human nature when it shares in the running of communal activities [Dewey]
     Full Idea: Democracy is but a name for the fact that human nature is developed only when its elements take part in directing things which are common, things for the sake of which men and women form groups.
     From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 12:199), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Democracy'
     A reaction: It is hard to prove that human nature develops when it particpates in groups. If people are excluded from power, their loyalty tends to switch to sub-groups, such as friends in a pub, or a football team. Powerless nationalists baffle me.
Democracy is not just a form of government; it is a mode of shared living [Dewey]
     Full Idea: A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience
     From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 9:93), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Democracy'
     A reaction: This precisely pinpoints the heart of the culture wars in 2021. A huge swathe of western populations believe in Dewey's idea, but a core of wealthy right-wingers and their servants only see democracy as the mechanism for obtaining power.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberals aim to allow individuals to realise their capacities [Dewey]
     Full Idea: Liberalism is committed to …the liberation of individuals so that realisation of their capacities may be the law of their life.
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 11:41), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Dewey'
     A reaction: Capacity expression as the main aim of politics is precisely the idea developed more fully in modern times by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. It strikes me as an excellent proposal. Does it need liberalism, or socialism?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Individuality is only developed within groups [Dewey]
     Full Idea: Only in social groups does a person have a chance to develop individuality.
     From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 15:176), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Individuals'
     A reaction: This is a criticism of both Rawls and Nozick. Rawls's initial choosers don't consult, or have much social background. Nozick's property owners ignore everything except contracts.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
The things in civilisation we prize are the products of other members of our community [Dewey]
     Full Idea: The things in civilisation we most prize are not of ourselves. They exist by grace of the doings and sufferings of the continuous human community in which we are a link
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 9:57), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 7 'Reconstruct'
     A reaction: Dewey defends liberalism, but he has strong communitarian tendencies. What is the significance of an enduring community losing touch with its own achievements?
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
     Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us.
     From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus
     A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: The dispositional theory of biological functions is not unquestioned. The main alternative is the etiological theory: a component's effect is a function of that component if it has played an essential role in the causal history of its existence.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3)
     A reaction: [He cites S.D. Mitchell 2003] Presumably this account is meant to fit into a theory of evolution in biology. The obvious problem is where something comes into existence for one reason, and then acquires a new function (such as piano-playing).
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: A generalization is a 'pragmatic law' if it allows of prediction, explanation and manipulation, even if it fails to satisfy the traditional criteria. To this end, it should describe a stable regularity, but not necessarily a universal and necessary one.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1)
     A reaction: I am tempted to say of this that all laws are pragmatic, given that it is rather hard to know whether reality is stable. The universal laws consist of saying that IF reality stays stable in certain ways, certain outcomes will ensue necessarily.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: Strict regularities are rarely if ever discovered in the life sciences.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §2)
     A reaction: This is elementary once it is pointed out, but too much philosophy have science has aimed at the model provided by the equations of fundamental physics. Science is a broad church, to employ an entertaining metaphor.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: By 'law of nature' or 'natural law' I mean a generalization describing a regularity, not some metaphysical entity that produces or is responsible for that regularity.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1 n1)
     A reaction: I take the second version to be a relic of a religious world view, and having no place in a naturalistic metaphysic. The regularity view is then the only player in the field, and the question is, can we do more? Can't we explain regularities?
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
'God' is an imaginative unity of ideal values [Dewey]
     Full Idea: 'God' represents a unification of ideal values that is essentially imaginative in origin.
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 9:29), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 7 'Construct'
     A reaction: This seems to have happened when a flawed God like Zeus is elevated to be the only God, and is given supreme power and wisdom.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
We should try attaching the intensity of religious devotion to intelligent social action [Dewey]
     Full Idea: One of the few experiments in the attachment of emotion to ends that mankind has not tried is that of devotion (so intense as to be religious) to intelligence as a force in social action.
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 9:53), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 7 'Intro'
     A reaction: An interesting thought that religious emotions such as devotion are so distinctive that they can be treated as valuable, even in the absence of belief. He seems to be advocating Technocracy.
Religions are so shockingly diverse that they have no common element [Dewey]
     Full Idea: There is only a multitude of religions …and the differences between them are so great and so shocking that any common element that can be extracted is meaningless.
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 9:7), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 7 'Construct'
     A reaction: Religion is for Dewey what a game was for Wittgenstein, as an anti-essentialist example. I would have thought that they all involved some commitment to a realm of transcendent existence.