68 ideas
18996 | A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo] |
Full Idea: A statement S is 'partly true' insofar as it has wholly true parts: wholly true implications whose subject matter is included in that of S. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 01.6) | |
A reaction: He suggests that if we have rival theories, we agree that it is one or the other. And 'we may have pork for dinner, or human flesh' is partly true. |
19006 | An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo] |
Full Idea: An 'enthymeme' is a deductive argument with an unstated assumption that must be true for the premises to lead to the conclusion. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 11.1) |
8859 | The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo] |
Full Idea: Lewis's different systems of modal logic differed about such formulae as □P implies □□P; ◊□P implies □P; and ◊S implies □◊S | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §06) | |
A reaction: Yablo's point is that the various version don't seem to make much difference to our practices in logic, mathematics and science. The problem, says Yablo, is deciding exactly what you mean by 'necessarily' and 'possibly'. |
15413 | With four tense operators, all complex tenses reduce to fourteen basic cases [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Fand P as 'will' and 'was', G as 'always going to be', H as 'always has been', all tenses reduce to 14 cases: the past series, each implying the next, FH,H,PH,HP,P,GP, and the future series PG,G,FG,GF,F,HF, plus GH=HG implying all, FP=PF which all imply. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 2.8) | |
A reaction: I have tried to translate the fourteen into English, but am not quite confident enough to publish them here. I leave it as an exercise for the reader. |
15415 | The temporal Barcan formulas fix what exists, which seems absurd [Burgess] |
Full Idea: In temporal logic, if the converse Barcan formula holds then nothing goes out of existence, and the direct Barcan formula holds if nothing ever comes into existence. These results highlight the intuitive absurdity of the Barcan formulas. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 2.9) | |
A reaction: This is my reaction to the modal cases as well - the absurdity of thinking that no actually nonexistent thing might possibly have existed, or that the actual existents might not have existed. Williamson seems to be the biggest friend of the formulas. |
15430 | Is classical logic a part of intuitionist logic, or vice versa? [Burgess] |
Full Idea: From one point of view intuitionistic logic is a part of classical logic, missing one axiom, from another classical logic is a part of intuitionistic logic, missing two connectives, intuitionistic v and → | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 6.4) |
15431 | It is still unsettled whether standard intuitionist logic is complete [Burgess] |
Full Idea: The question of the completeness of the full intuitionistic logic for its intended interpretation is not yet fully resolved. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 6.9) |
15429 | Relevance logic's → is perhaps expressible by 'if A, then B, for that reason' [Burgess] |
Full Idea: The relevantist logician's → is perhaps expressible by 'if A, then B, for that reason'. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.8) |
18999 | y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo] |
Full Idea: The principle of Supplementation says that y is properly part of x, only if a z exists that 'makes up the difference' between them. [note: that is, z is disjoint from y and sums with y to form x] | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 03.2) |
15404 | Technical people see logic as any formal system that can be studied, not a study of argument validity [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Among the more technically oriented a 'logic' no longer means a theory about which forms of argument are valid, but rather means any formalism, regardless of its applications, that resembles original logic enough to be studied by similar methods. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], Pref) | |
A reaction: There doesn't seem to be any great intellectual obligation to be 'technical'. As far as pure logic is concerned, I am very drawn to the computer approach, since I take that to be the original dream of Aristotle and Leibniz - impersonal precision. |
15405 | Classical logic neglects the non-mathematical, such as temporality or modality [Burgess] |
Full Idea: There are topics of great philosophical interest that classical logic neglects because they are not important to mathematics. …These include distinctions of past, present and future, or of necessary, actual and possible. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.1) |
15427 | The Cut Rule expresses the classical idea that entailment is transitive [Burgess] |
Full Idea: The Cut rule (from A|-B and B|-C, infer A|-C) directly expresses the classical doctrine that entailment is transitive. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.3) |
15421 | Classical logic neglects counterfactuals, temporality and modality, because maths doesn't use them [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Classical logic neglects counterfactual conditionals for the same reason it neglects temporal and modal distinctions, namely, that they play no serious role in mathematics. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 4.1) | |
A reaction: Science obviously needs counterfactuals, and metaphysics needs modality. Maybe so-called 'classical' logic will be renamed 'basic mathematical logic'. Philosophy will become a lot clearer when that happens. |
15403 | Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, and is now centred in computer science [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, a technical subject. …Its centre of gravity today lies in theoretical computer science. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], Pref) | |
A reaction: He firmly distinguishes it from 'philosophy of logic', but doesn't spell it out. I take it that philosophical logic concerns metaprinciples which compare logical systems, and suggest new lines of research. Philosophy of logic seems more like metaphysics. |
15407 | Formalising arguments favours lots of connectives; proving things favours having very few [Burgess] |
Full Idea: When formalising arguments it is convenient to have as many connectives as possible available.; but when proving results about formulas it is convenient to have as few as possible. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: Illuminating. The fact that you can whittle classical logic down to two (or even fewer!) connectives warms the heart of technicians, but makes connection to real life much more difficult. Hence a bunch of extras get added. |
15424 | Asserting a disjunction from one disjunct seems odd, but can be sensible, and needed in maths [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Gricean implicature theory might suggest that a disjunction is never assertable when a disjunct is (though actually the disjunction might be 'pertinent') - but the procedure is indispensable in mathematical practice. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.2) | |
A reaction: He gives an example of a proof in maths which needs it, and an unusual conversational occasion where it makes sense. |
15409 | All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free [Burgess] |
Full Idea: All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.7) |
19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
Full Idea: 'Pegasus does not exist' has a paradoxical, self-undermining flavour. On the one hand, the empty name makes it untrue. But now, why is the name empty? Because Pegasus does not exist. 'Pegasus does not exist' is untrue because Pegasus does not exist. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 05.7 n20) | |
A reaction: Beautiful! This is Yablo's reward for continuing to ask 'why?' after everyone else has stopped in bewilderment at the tricky phenomenon. |
15414 | The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess] |
Full Idea: By contrast to rigidly designating proper names, …the denotation of definite descriptions is (in general) not rigid but flexible. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 2.9) | |
A reaction: This modern way of putting it greatly clarifies why Russell was interested in the type of reference involved in definite descriptions. Obviously some descriptions (such as 'the only person who could ever have…') might be rigid. |
15406 | 'Induction' and 'recursion' on complexity prove by connecting a formula to its atomic components [Burgess] |
Full Idea: There are atomic formulas, and formulas built from the connectives, and that is all. We show that all formulas have some property, first for the atomics, then the others. This proof is 'induction on complexity'; we also use 'recursion on complexity'. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: That is: 'induction on complexity' builds a proof from atomics, via connectives; 'recursion on complexity' breaks down to the atomics, also via the connectives. You prove something by showing it is rooted in simple truths. |
15425 | The sequent calculus makes it possible to have proof without transitivity of entailment [Burgess] |
Full Idea: It might be wondered how one could have any kind of proof procedure at all if transitivity of entailment is disallowed, but the sequent calculus can get around the difficulty. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.3) | |
A reaction: He gives examples where transitivity of entailment (so that you can build endless chains of deductions) might fail. This is the point of the 'cut free' version of sequent calculus, since the cut rule allows transitivity. |
15426 | We can build one expanding sequence, instead of a chain of deductions [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Instead of demonstrations which are either axioms, or follow from axioms by rules, we can have one ever-growing sequence of formulas of the form 'Axioms |- ______', where the blank is filled by Axioms, then Lemmas, then Theorems, then Corollaries. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.3) |
15408 | 'Tautologies' are valid formulas of classical sentential logic - or substitution instances in other logics [Burgess] |
Full Idea: The valid formulas of classical sentential logic are called 'tautologically valid', or simply 'tautologies'; with other logics 'tautologies' are formulas that are substitution instances of valid formulas of classical sentential logic. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.5) |
15418 | Validity (for truth) and demonstrability (for proof) have correlates in satisfiability and consistency [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Validity (truth by virtue of logical form alone) and demonstrability (provability by virtue of logical form alone) have correlative notions of logical possibility, 'satisfiability' and 'consistency', which come apart in some logics. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 3.3) |
15412 | Models leave out meaning, and just focus on truth values [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Models generally deliberately leave out meaning, retaining only what is important for the determination of truth values. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 2.2) | |
A reaction: This is the key point to hang on to, if you are to avoid confusing mathematical models with models of things in the real world. |
15411 | We only need to study mathematical models, since all other models are isomorphic to these [Burgess] |
Full Idea: In practice there is no need to consider any but mathematical models, models whose universes consist of mathematical objects, since every model is isomorphic to one of these. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.8) | |
A reaction: The crucial link is the technique of Gödel Numbering, which can translate any verbal formula into numerical form. He adds that, because of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem only subsets of the natural numbers need be considered. |
15416 | We aim to get the technical notion of truth in all models matching intuitive truth in all instances [Burgess] |
Full Idea: The aim in setting up a model theory is that the technical notion of truth in all models should agree with the intuitive notion of truth in all instances. A model is supposed to represent everything about an instance that matters for its truth. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 3.2) |
9138 | An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference [Yablo, by Sorensen] |
Full Idea: Banning self-reference is too narrow to avoid the liar paradox. With 1) all the subsequent sentences are false, 2) all the subsequent sentences are false, 3) all the subsequent... the paradox still arises. Self-reference is a special case of this. | |
From: report of Stephen Yablo (Paradox without Self-Reference [1993]) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction 11.1 | |
A reaction: [Idea 9137 pointed out that the ban was too narrow. Sorensen p.168 explains why this one is paradoxical] This is a nice example of progress in philosophy, since the Greeks would have been thrilled with this idea (unless they knew it, but it was lost). |
15428 | The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut' [Burgess] |
Full Idea: It is a common view that the liar sentence ('This very sentence is not true') is an instance of a truth-value gap (neither true nor false), but some dialethists cite it as an example of a truth-value glut (both true and false). | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.7) | |
A reaction: The defence of the glut view must be that it is true, then it is false, then it is true... Could it manage both at once? |
8865 | If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo] |
Full Idea: If someone says 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', he or she wants to focus on Democrats, not numbers. If the number is 50 million, is 50 million really on the rise? | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §14) | |
A reaction: This is a very nice warning from Yablo, against easy platonism, or any sort of platonism at all. We routinely say that numbers are 'increasing', but the real meaning needs entangling. Here it refers to people joining a party. |
10185 | Set theory is the standard background for modern mathematics [Burgess] |
Full Idea: In present-day mathematics, it is set theory that serves as the background theory in which other branches of mathematics are developed. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Review of Chihara 'Struct. Accnt of Maths' [2005], §1) | |
A reaction: [He cites Bourbaki as an authority for this] See Benacerraf for a famous difficulty here, when you actually try to derive an ontology from the mathematicians' working practices. |
10184 | Structuralists take the name 'R' of the reals to be a variable ranging over structures, not a structure [Burgess] |
Full Idea: On the structuralist interpretation, theorems of analysis concerning the real numbers R are about all complete ordered fields. So R, which appears to be the name of a specific structure, is taken to be a variable ranging over structures. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Review of Chihara 'Struct. Accnt of Maths' [2005], §1) | |
A reaction: Since I am beginning to think that nearly all linguistic expressions should be understood as variables, I find this very appealing, even if Burgess hates it. Terms slide and drift, and are vague, between variable and determinate reference. |
10189 | There is no one relation for the real number 2, as relations differ in different models [Burgess] |
Full Idea: One might meet the 'Van Inwagen Problem' by saying that the intrinsic properties of the object playing the role of 2 will differ from one model to another, so that no statement about the intrinsic properties of 'the' real numbers will make sense. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Review of Chihara 'Struct. Accnt of Maths' [2005], §5) | |
A reaction: There seems to be a potential confusion among opponents of structuralism between relations at the level of actual mathematical operations, and generalisations about relations, which are captured in the word 'patterns'. Call them 'meta-relations'? |
10186 | If set theory is used to define 'structure', we can't define set theory structurally [Burgess] |
Full Idea: It is to set theory that one turns for the very definition of 'structure', ...and this creates a problem of circularity if we try to impose a structuralist interpretation on set theory. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Review of Chihara 'Struct. Accnt of Maths' [2005], §1) | |
A reaction: This seems like a nice difficulty, especially if, like Shapiro, you wade in and try to give a formal account of structures and patterns. Resnik is more circumspect and vague. |
10187 | Abstract algebra concerns relations between models, not common features of all the models [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Abstract algebra, such as group theory, is not concerned with the features common to all models of the axioms, but rather with the relationships among different models of those axioms (especially homomorphic relation functions). | |
From: John P. Burgess (Review of Chihara 'Struct. Accnt of Maths' [2005], §1) | |
A reaction: It doesn't seem to follow that structuralism can't be about the relations (or patterns) found when abstracting away and overviewing all the models. One can study family relations, or one can study kinship in general. |
10188 | How can mathematical relations be either internal, or external, or intrinsic? [Burgess] |
Full Idea: The 'Van Inwagen Problem' for structuralism is of explaining how a mathematical relation (such as set membership, or the ratios of an ellipse) can fit into one of the three scholastics types of relations: are they internal, external, or intrinsic? | |
From: John P. Burgess (Review of Chihara 'Struct. Accnt of Maths' [2005], §5) | |
A reaction: The difficulty is that mathematical objects seem to need intrinsic properties to get any of these three versions off the ground (which was Russell's complaint against structures). |
19002 | A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo] |
Full Idea: If I am a nominalist non-Platonist, I think it is false that 'there are primes over 10', but I want to be able to say it like everyone else. I argue that this because the statement has a part that I do believe, a part that remains interestingly true. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 05.8) | |
A reaction: This is obviously a key motivation for Yablo's book, as it reinforces his fictional view of abstract objects, but aims to capture the phenomena, by investigating what such sentences are 'about'. Admirable. |
8863 | We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo] |
Full Idea: It is only by making as if to countenance numbers that one can give expression in English to a fact having nothing to do with numbers, a fact about stars and planets and how they are numerically proportioned. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §13) | |
A reaction: To avoid the phrase 'numerically proportioned', he might have alluded to the 'pattern' of the stars and planets. I'm not sure which -ism this is, but it seems to me a good approach. The application is likely to precede the theory. |
10580 | Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo] |
Full Idea: Mathematics seems necessary because the real contents of mathematical statements are logical truths, which are necessary, and it seems a priori because logical truths really are a priori. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 10) | |
A reaction: Yablo says his logicism has a Kantian strain, because numbers and sets 'inscribed on our spectacles', but he takes a different view (in the present Idea) from Kant about where the necessity resides. Personally I am tempted by an a posteriori necessity. |
8862 | Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo] |
Full Idea: The means by which platonic objects are simulated is existential metaphor. Numbers are conjured up as metaphorical measures of cardinality. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §12) | |
A reaction: 'Fictional' might be a better word than 'metaphorical', since the latter usually implies some sort of comparison. |
10579 | Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo] |
Full Idea: Saying 'the number of Fs is 5', instead of using five quantifiers, puts the numeral in quantifiable position, which brings expressive advantages. 'There are more sheep in the field than cows' is an infinite disjunction, expressible in finite compass. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 08) | |
A reaction: See Hofweber with similar thoughts. This idea I take to be a key one in explaining many metaphysical confusions. The human mind just has a strong tendency to objectify properties, relations, qualities, categories etc. - for expression and for reasoning. |
10578 | We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo] |
Full Idea: Our knowledge of concreta is a posteriori, but our knowledge of numbers, at least, has often been considered a priori. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 02) |
10577 | Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo] |
Full Idea: Objects like me have a few essential properties, and numerous accidental ones. Abstract objects are a different story. The intrinsic properties of the empty set are mostly essential. The relations of numbers are also mostly essential. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 01) |
19489 | For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value [Yablo] |
Full Idea: A 'myth' or fiction for me is a true internal statement (a statement endorsed by the rules) whose external truth value is as may be, the point being that that truth value is from an internal standpoint quite irrelevant. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? [1998], IX) | |
A reaction: This contrasts with Carnap, for whom talk of 'ghosts' is false in an internal thing-framework. Yablo seems here to say a statement can be true while having no truth value. Presumably he is relaxing the internal rules. |
19490 | Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures [Yablo] |
Full Idea: Make-believe games can make it easier to reason about facts, to systematize them, to visualize them, to spot connections with other facts, and to evaluate potential lines of research. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? [1998], XI) | |
A reaction: This is the key pragmatic defence of the fictionalist view of abstract objects. Fictions are devices to help us think better. I think a lot of ontology turns out that way. |
19491 | 'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds' [Yablo] |
Full Idea: It is an open question whether the clouds that we call 'angry' are literally F, for any F other than 'such that it would be natural and proper to regard them as angry if one were going to attribute emotions to clouds'. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? [1998], XII) | |
A reaction: His point is that it is TRUE, in those circumstances, that the clouds are angry. Thus fictions are a valid and useful part of ordinary sensible course, giving real information. I like it. |
8864 | We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo] |
Full Idea: It is not that the contents of sentences are inexpressible without quantifying over events, worlds, etc. (they aren't). But the logical relations become much more tractable if we represent them quantificationally. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §13) | |
A reaction: Yablo is explaining why we find ourselves committed to abstract objects. It is essentially, as I am beginning to suspect, a conspiracy of logicians. What on earth is 'the empty set' when it is at home? What's it made of? |
19494 | Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo] |
Full Idea: The fictionalist offers the option that your simulated beliefs and assertions may be tracking a realm of genuine facts, or a realm of what you take to be facts. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Go Figure: a Path through Fictionalism [2001], 13) | |
A reaction: This means that fictionalism does not have to be an error theory. That is, we aren't mistakenly believing something that we actually made up. Instead we are sensibly believing something we know to be not literally true. Love it. |
8858 | Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo] |
Full Idea: There's a tradition in philosophy of finding 'unexpected objects' in truth-conditions, such as countermodels, possible worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets and properties. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §02) | |
A reaction: This is a very nice perspective on the whole matter of abstract objects. If we find ourselves reluctantly committed to the existence of something which is ontologically peculiar, we should go back to the philosophical drawing-board. |
14381 | A statue is essentially the statue, but its lump is not essentially a statue, so statue isn't lump [Yablo, by Rocca] |
Full Idea: Yablo proposes the argument that Statue A is essentially a statue, and Lump 1 is not essentially a statue, so Statue A is not identical with Lump 1. | |
From: report of Stephen Yablo (Identity, Essence and Indiscernibility [1987]) by Michael della Rocca - Essentialists and Essentialism I | |
A reaction: Della Rocca and Yablo unashamedly elide necessary properties with essential properties, so this argument doesn't bother me too much. It concerns the statue and the clay having different modal properties. |
18998 | Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo] |
Full Idea: Most relations obtain only between certain kinds of thing. To learn that x is a part of y, however, tells you nothing about x and y taken individually. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 03.2) | |
A reaction: Too sweeping. To be a part of crowd you have to be a person. To be part of the sea you have to be wet. It might depend on whether composition is unrestricted. |
15420 | De re modality seems to apply to objects a concept intended for sentences [Burgess] |
Full Idea: There is a problem over 'de re' modality (as contrasted with 'de dicto'), as in ∃x□x. What is meant by '"it is analytic that Px" is satisfied by a', given that analyticity is a notion that in the first instance applies to complete sentences? | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 3.9) | |
A reaction: This is Burgess's summary of one of Quine's original objections. The issue may be a distinction between whether the sentence is analytic, and what makes it analytic. The necessity of bachelors being unmarried makes that sentence analytic. |
15419 | General consensus is S5 for logical modality of validity, and S4 for proof [Burgess] |
Full Idea: To the extent that there is any conventional wisdom about the question, it is that S5 is correct for alethic logical modality, and S4 correct for apodictic logical modality. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 3.8) | |
A reaction: In classical logic these coincide, so presumably one should use the minimum system to do the job, which is S4 (?). |
15417 | Logical necessity has two sides - validity and demonstrability - which coincide in classical logic [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Logical necessity is a genus with two species. For classical logic the truth-related notion of validity and the proof-related notion of demonstrability, coincide - but they are distinct concept. In some logics they come apart, in intension and extension. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 3.3) | |
A reaction: They coincide in classical logic because it is sound and complete. This strikes me as the correct approach to logical necessity, tying it to the actual nature of logic, rather than some handwavy notion of just 'true in all possible worlds'. |
15422 | Three conditionals theories: Materialism (material conditional), Idealism (true=assertable), Nihilism (no truth) [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Three main theories of the truth of indicative conditionals are Materialism (the conditions are the same as for the material conditional), Idealism (identifying assertability with truth-value), and Nihilism (no truth, just assertability). | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 4.3) |
15423 | It is doubtful whether the negation of a conditional has any clear meaning [Burgess] |
Full Idea: It is contentious whether conditionals have negations, and whether 'it is not the case that if A,B' has any clear meaning. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 4.9) | |
A reaction: This seems to be connected to Lewis's proof that a probability conditional cannot be reduced to a single proposition. If a conditional only applies to A-worlds, it is not surprising that its meaning gets lost when it leaves that world. |
19493 | Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo] |
Full Idea: The governing fiction of possible worlds theory says that whenever something is possible, there is a world where it happens. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Go Figure: a Path through Fictionalism [2001], 05) | |
A reaction: This sounds like the only sensible attitude to possible worlds I can think of. |
19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo] |
Full Idea: We know from Gettier that if you are right to regard Q as true, but you are sufficiently confused about HOW it is true - about how things stand with respect to its subject matter - then you don't know that Q. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 07.4) | |
A reaction: I'm inclined to approach Gettier by focusing on the propositions being expressed, where his cases tend to focus on the literal wording of the sentences. What did the utterer mean by the sentences - not what did they appear to say. |
19007 | A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo] |
Full Idea: A physical theory need not be true to be good, Field has argued, and I agree. All we ask of it truth-wise is that its physical implications should be true, or, in my version, that it should be true about the physical. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 12.5) | |
A reaction: Yablo is, of course, writing a book here about the concept of 'about'. This seems persuasive. The internal terminology of the theory isn't committed to anything - it is only at its physical periphery (Quine) that the ontology matters. |
18993 | If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo] |
Full Idea: 'All crows are black' cannot say quite the same as 'All non-black things are non-crows', for the two are confirmed by different evidence. Subject matter looks to be the distinguishing feature. One is about crows, the other not. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], Intro) | |
A reaction: You might reply that they are confirmed by the same evidence (but only in its unobtainable totality). The point, I think, is that the sentences invite you to start your search in different places. |
19003 | Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo] |
Full Idea: The standard response to the raven paradox is to say that a nonblack nonraven does confirm that all ravens are black. But it confirms it just the teeniest little bit - not as much as a black raven does. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 06.5) | |
A reaction: It depends on the proportion between the relevant items. How do you confirm 'all the large animals in this zoo are mammals'? Check for size every animal which is obviously not a mammal? |
10805 | A sentence should be recarved to reveal its content or implication relations [Yablo] |
Full Idea: A sentence invites recarving iff it will then do better justice to the internal structure of its content and/or its implication relations. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Carving Content at the Joints [2002], §11) | |
A reaction: This invites human intervention in a logical process (by choosing which recarvings to do, instead of allowing all equivalences to generate them). He seems to think we should abstract in order to reveal logical form. |
18992 | Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo] |
Full Idea: A sentence's meaning is to do with its truth-value in various possible scenarios, AND the factors responsible for that truth-value. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], Intro) | |
A reaction: The thesis of his book, which I welcome. I'm increasingly struck by the way in which much modern philosophy settles for a theory being complete, when actually further explanation is possible. Exhibit A is functional explanations. Why that function? |
18994 | The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo] |
Full Idea: Assertive content - what a sentence is heard as saying - can be at quite a distance from compositional content. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is the obvious reason why semantics cannot be entirely compositional, since there is nearly always a contextual component which then has to be added. In the case of irony, the compositional content is entirely reversed. |
18997 | Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo] |
Full Idea: If the subject-matter of S is how it is true, we get three unfortunate results: S has truth-value in worlds where its subject-matter draws a blank; learning what S is about tells you its truth-value; negating S changes what it's about. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 02.8) | |
A reaction: Together these make fairly devastating objections to the truth-conditions (in possible worlds) theory of meaning. The first-objection concerns when S is false |
19005 | Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo] |
Full Idea: The idea that negation is, or can be, a cancellation device raises an interesting question. What does one do to wipe the slate clean after an improper assertion? Not-A is too strong; it reverses our stand on A rather than nullifying it. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 09.8) | |
A reaction: [He is discussing a remark of Strawson 1952] It seems that 'not' has two meanings or uses: a weak use of 'nullifying' an assertion, and a strong use of 'reversing' an assertion. One could do both: 'that's not right; in fact, it's just the opposite'. |
8861 | Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo] |
Full Idea: There is hardly a word in the language - be it an adverb, preposition, conjunction, or what have you - that is devoid of metaphorical potential. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §12) | |
A reaction: Yablo goes on to claim that metaphor is at the heart of all of our abstract thinking. 'Dead metaphors' (like the "mouth" of a river) sink totally into literal language. I think Yablo is on the right lines. |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us. | |
From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus | |
A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts? |