30 ideas
8092 | Logic was merely a branch of rhetoric until the scientific 17th century [Devlin] |
Full Idea: Until the rise of what we call the scientific method in the seventeenth century, logic was regarded largely as one aspect of rhetoric - a study of how one person't argument could convince another. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This may well give the main reason why the Greeks invented logic in the first place. Aristotle wrote a book on rhetoric, and that was where the money was. Leibniz is clearly a key figure in the change of attitude. |
8081 | 'No councillors are bankers' and 'All bankers are athletes' implies 'Some athletes are not councillors' [Devlin] |
Full Idea: Most people find it hard to find any conclusion that fits the following premises: 'No councillors are bankers', and 'All bankers are athletes'. There is a valid conclusion ('Some athletes are not councillors') but it takes quite an effort to find it. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration of the fact that syllogistic logic is by no means automatic and straightforward. There is a mechanical procedure, but a lot of intuition and common sense is also needed. |
8085 | Modern propositional inference replaces Aristotle's 19 syllogisms with modus ponens [Devlin] |
Full Idea: Where Aristotle had 19 different inference rules (his valid syllogisms), modern propositional logic carries out deductions using just one rule of inference: modus ponens. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: At first glance it sounds as if Aristotle's guidelines might be more useful than the modern one, since he tells you something definite and what implies what, where modus ponens just seems to define the word 'implies'. |
8086 | Predicate logic retains the axioms of propositional logic [Devlin] |
Full Idea: Since predicate logic merely extends propositional logic, all the axioms of propositional logic are axioms of predicate logic. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: See Idea 7798 for the axioms. |
8091 | Situation theory is logic that takes account of context [Devlin] |
Full Idea: In many respects, situation theory is an extension of classical logic that takes account of context. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: John Barwise is cited as the parent of this movement. Many examples show that logical form is very hard to pin down, because word-meaning depends on context (e.g. 'several crumbs' differs from 'several mountains'). |
8089 | Montague's intensional logic incorporated the notion of meaning [Devlin] |
Full Idea: Montague's intensional logic was the first really successful attempt to develop a mathematical framework that incorporates the notion of meaning. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: Previous logics, led by Tarski, had flourished by sharply dividing meaning from syntax, and concentrating on the latter. |
8087 | Golden ages: 1900-1960 for pure logic, and 1950-1985 for applied logic [Devlin] |
Full Idea: The period from 1900 to about 1960 could be described as the golden age of 'pure' logic, and 1950 to 1985 the golden age of 'applied' logic (e.g. applied to everyday reasoning, and to theories of language). | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: Why do we always find that we have just missed the Golden Age? However this supports the uneasy feeling that the golden age for all advances in human knowledge is just coming to an end. Biology, including the brain, is the last frontier. |
8082 | Where a conditional is purely formal, an implication implies a link between premise and conclusion [Devlin] |
Full Idea: Implication involves some form of link or causality between the antecedent and the consequent of an if-then; normally it says that the conclusion is a consequence of the premise (where conditionals are just defined by 'true' and 'false'). | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This distinction is a key one when discussing 'If-then' sentences. Some are merely formal conditionals, but others make real claims about where you can get to from where you are. |
8072 | Sentences of apparent identical form can have different contextual meanings [Devlin] |
Full Idea: "Safety goggles must be worn in the building" is clear enough, but "dogs must always be carried on the escalator" doesn't require us to head off in search of a dog. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration of how the requirements of logical form will often take us beyond the strict and literal meaning of a sentence, into context, tone, allusion and subjective aspects. |
8075 | Space and time are atomic in the arrow, and divisible in the tortoise [Devlin] |
Full Idea: The arrow paradox starts with the assumption that space and time are atomic; the tortoise starts with the opposite assumption that space and time are infinitely divisible. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: Aquinas similarly covers all options (the cosmos has a beginning, or no beginning). The nature of movement in a space which involves quantum leaps remains metaphysically puzzling. Where is a particle at half of the Planck time? |
21812 | Being is the product of pure intellect [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: Intellectual-Principle [Nous] by its intellective act establishes Being. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.04) | |
A reaction: This is a surprising view - that there is something which is prior to Being - but I take it to be Plotinus giving primacy to Plato's Form of the Good (a pure ideal), ahead of the One of Parmenides (which is Being). |
21817 | The One does not exist, but is the source of all existence [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: The First is no member of existence, but can be the source of all. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.07) | |
A reaction: The First is the One, and this explicitly denies that it has Being. This answers the self-predication problem of Forms. Plato thought the Form of the Beautiful was beautiful, but it can't be (because of the regress). The source of existence can't exist. |
21824 | The One is a principle which transcends Being [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: There exists a principle which transcends Being; this the One. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.10) | |
A reaction: The idea that the One transcends Being is the distinctive Plotinus doctrine. He defends the view that this was also the view of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato. |
21813 | Number determines individual being [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: Number is the determinant of individual being. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.05) | |
A reaction: You might have thought that number was the consequence of the individualities (or units) within being, but not so. You can't get more platonic than saying that the idealised numbers are the source of the particular units. |
8088 | People still say the Hopi have no time concepts, despite Whorf's later denial [Devlin] |
Full Idea: The Hopi time myth does not appear to have been stopped for a moment by the fact that Whorf himself subsequently wrote that the Hopi language does indeed have words for past, present, and future | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: Arguments for relativism based on the Hopi seem now to be thoroughly discredited. Sensible people never believed them in the first place. |
5506 | If soul was like body, its parts would be separate, without communication [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: If the soul had the nature of the body, it would have isolated members each unaware of the condition of the other;..there would be a particular soul as a distinct entity to each local experience, so a multiplicity of souls would administer an individual. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 4.2.2), quoted by R Martin / J Barresi - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' p.15 | |
A reaction: Of course, the modern 'modularity of mind' theory does suggest that we are run by a team, but a central co-ordinator is required, with a full communication network across the modules. |
21827 | The movement of Soul is continuous, but we are only aware of the parts of it that are sensed [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: The Soul maintains its unfailing movement; for not all that passes in the soul is, by that fact, perceptible; we know just as much as impinges on the faculty of the sense. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.12) | |
A reaction: This is a straightforward argument in favour of an unconscious aspect to the mind - and a rather good argument too. No one thinks that our minds ever stop working, even in sleep. |
21828 | A person is the whole of their soul [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: Man is not merely a part (the higher part) of the Soul but the total. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.12) | |
A reaction: The soul is psuche, which includes the vegetative soul. The higher part is normally taken to be reason. This seems pretty close to John Locke's view of the matter. |
21809 | Our soul has the same ideal nature as the oldest god, and is honourable above the body [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: Our own soul is of that same ideal nature [as the oldest god of them all], so that to consider it, purified, freed from all accruement, is to recognise in ourselves which we have found soul to be, honourable above the body. For what is body but earth? | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.02) | |
A reaction: The strongest versions of substance dualism are religious in character, because the separateness of the mind elevates us above the grubby physical character of the world. I'm with Nietzsche on this one - this view is actually harmful to us. |
21825 | The soul is outside of all of space, and has no connection to the bodily order [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: We may not seek any point in space in which to seat the soul; it must be set outside of all space; its distinct quality, its separateness, its immateriality, demand that it be a thing alone, untouched by all of the bodily order. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.10) | |
A reaction: You can't get more dualist than that. He doesn't seem bothered about the interaction problem. He likens such influence to the radiation of the sun, rather than to physical movement. |
8073 | How do we parse 'time flies like an arrow' and 'fruit flies like an apple'? [Devlin] |
Full Idea: How do people identify subject and verb in the sentences "time flies like an arrow" and "fruit flies like an apple"? | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration of the fact that even if we have an innate syntax mechanism, it won't work without some semantics, and some experience of the environmental context of utterances. |
8076 | The distinction between sentences and abstract propositions is crucial in logic [Devlin] |
Full Idea: The distinction between sentences and the abstract propositions that they express is one of the key ideas of logic. A logical argument consists of propositions, assembled together in a systematic fashion. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: He may claim that arguments consist of abstract propositions, but they always get expressed in sentences. However, the whole idea of logical form implies the existence of propositions - there is something which a messy sentence 'really' says. |
21826 | The Soul reasons about the Right, so there must be some permanent Right about which it reasons [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: Since there is a Soul which reasons upon the right and good - for reasoning is an enquiry into the rightness and goodness of this rather than that - there must exist some pemanent Right, the source and foundation of this reasoning in our soul. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.11) | |
A reaction: This is pretty close the Kant's concept of 'the moral order within me', and Plotinus even sees it as rational. Presumably this right is 'permanent' because the revelatlons of reason about it are necessary truths. |
6922 | Ecstasy is for the neo-Platonist the highest psychological state of man [Plotinus, by Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: Ecstasy or rapture is for the neo-Platonist the highest psychological state of man. | |
From: report of Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245]) by Ludwig Feuerbach - Principles of Philosophy of the Future §29 | |
A reaction: See Bernini's statue of St Theresa. Personally I find this very unappealing because of its utter irrationality, but what is the 'highest' human psychological state? Doing mental arithmetic? Doing what is morally right? Dignity under pressure? |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us. | |
From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus | |
A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts? |
21815 | Because the One is immobile, it must create by radiation, light the sun producing light [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: Given this immobility of the Supreme ...what happened then? It must be a circumradiation, which may be compared to the brilliant light encircling the sun and ceaselessly generating from that unchanging substance, | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.06) | |
A reaction: This is the answer given to the problem raised in Idea 21814. The sun produces energy, without apparent movement. Not an answer that will satisfy a physicist, but an interesting answer. |
21816 | Soul is the logos of Nous, just as Nous is the logos of the One [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: The soul is an utterance [logos] and act of the Intellectual-Principle [Nous], as that is an utterance and act of the One. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.06) | |
A reaction: Being only comes into the picture at the secondary Nous stage. Nous is the closest to the modern concept of God. |
21814 | How can multiple existence arise from the unified One? [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: The problem endlessly debated is how, from such a unity as we have declared the One to be, does anything at all come into substantial existence, any multiplicity, dyad or number? | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.06) | |
A reaction: This was precisely Aristotle's objection to the One of Parmenides, and especially the problem of the source of movement (which Plotinus also notices). |
21808 | Soul is author of all of life, and of the stars, and it gives them law and movement [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: Soul is the author of all living things, ...it has breathed life into them all, whatever is nourished by earth and sea, the divine stars in the sky; ...it is the principle distinct from all of these to which it gives law and movement and life. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.02) | |
A reaction: This seems to derive from Anaxagoras, who is mentioned by Plotinus. The soul he refers to his not the same as our concept of God. Note the word 'law', which I am guessing is nomos. Not, I think, modern laws of nature, but closer to guidelines. |
21811 | Even the soul is secondary to the Intellectual-Principle [Nous], of which soul is an utterance [Plotinus] |
Full Idea: Soul, for all the worth we have shown to belong to it, is yet a secondary, an image of the Intellectual-Principle [Nous]; reason uttered is an image of reason stored within the soul, and similarly soul is an utterance of the Intellectual-Principle. | |
From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.03) | |
A reaction: It then turns out that Nous is secondary to the One, so there is a hierarchy of Being (which only enters at the Nous stage). |