28 ideas
9247 | Life will be lived better if it has no meaning [Camus] |
Full Idea: Life will be lived all the better if it has no meaning. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs free') | |
A reaction: One image of the good life is that of a successful wild animal, for which existence is not a problem, merely a constant activity and pursuit. Maybe life begins to acquire meaning once we realise that meaning should not be sought directly. |
6707 | Suicide - whether life is worth living - is the one serious philosophical problem [Camus] |
Full Idea: There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide. Judgine whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], p.11) | |
A reaction: What a wonderful thesis for a book. In Idea 2682 there is the possibility of life being worth living, but not worth a huge amount of effort. It is better to call Camus' question the first question, rather than the only question. |
9245 | To an absurd mind reason is useless, and there is nothing beyond reason [Camus] |
Full Idea: To an absurd mind reason is useless, and there is nothing beyond reason. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Phil Suic') | |
A reaction: But there is, surely, intuition and instinct? Read Keats's Letters. There is good living through upbringing and habit. Read Aristotle. If you like Camus' thought, you will love Chuang Tzu. Personally I am a child of the Enlightenment. |
9244 | Logic is easy, but what about logic to the point of death? [Camus] |
Full Idea: It is always easy to be logical. It is almost impossible to be logical to the bitter end. The only problem that interests me is: is there a logic to the point of death? | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs and Suic') | |
A reaction: This is a lovely hand grenade to lob into an analytical logic class! It is very hard to get logicians to actually ascribe a clear value to their activity. They tend to present it as a marginal private game, and yet it has high status. |
16554 | Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: Activities can be identified spatiotemporally, and individuated by rate, duration, and types of entity and property that engage in them. They also have modes of operation, directionality, polarity, energy requirements and a range. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 3) | |
A reaction: This is their attempt at making 'activity' one of the two central concepts of ontology, along with 'entity'. A helpful analysis. It just seems to be one way of slicing the cake. |
16556 | Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: It is not the penicillin that causes the pneumonia to disappear, but what the penicillin does. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 3.1) | |
A reaction: This is a very neat example for illustrating how we slip into 'entity' talk, when the reality we are addressing actually concerns processes. Without the 'what it does', penicillin can't participate in causation at all. |
16562 | We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: The intelligibility of a phenomenon consists in the mechanisms being portrayed in terms of a field's bottom out entities and activities. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 7) | |
A reaction: In other words, we understand complex things by reducing them to things we do understand. It would, though, be illuminating to see a nest of interconnected activities, even if we understood none of them. |
16563 | The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: It is not regularities that explain but the activities that sustain the regularities. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 7) | |
A reaction: Good, but we had better not characterise the 'activities' in terms of regularities. |
16555 | Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: It is common to speak of functions as properties 'had by' entities, …but they should rather be understood in terms of the activities by virtue of which entities contribute to the workings of a mechanism. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 3) | |
A reaction: I'm certainly quite passionately in favour of cutting down on describing the world almost entirely in terms of entities which have properties. An 'activity', though, is a bit of an elusive concept. |
16528 | Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: One should not think of mechanisms as exclusively mechanical (push-pull) systems. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 1) | |
A reaction: The difficulty seems to be that you could broaden the concept of 'mechanism' indefinitely, so that it covered history, mathematics, populations, cultural change, and even mathematics. Where to stop? |
16529 | Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular change from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 1) | |
A reaction: This is their initial formal definition of a mechanism. Note that a mere 'activity' can be included. Presumably the mechanism might have an outcome that was not the intended outcome. Does a random element disqualify it? Are hands mechanisms? |
16530 | A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: To give a description of a mechanism for a phenomenon is to explain that phenomenon, i.e. to explain how it was produced. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 1) | |
A reaction: To 'show how' something happens needs a bit of precisification. It is probably analytic that 'showing how' means 'revealing the mechanism', though 'mechanism' then becomes the tricky concept. |
16553 | Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: We emphasise the activities in mechanisms. This is explicitly dualist. Substantivalists speak of entities with dispositions to act. Process ontologists reify activities and try to reduce entities to processes. We try to capture both intuitions. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 3) | |
A reaction: [A quotation of selected fragments] The problem here seems to be the raising of an 'activity' to a central role in ontology, when it doesn't seem to be primitive, and will typically be analysed in a variety of ways. |
16559 | Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: Nested hierachical descriptions of mechanisms typically bottom out in lowest level mechanisms. …Bottoming out is relative …the explanation comes to an end, and description of lower-level mechanisms would be irrelevant. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 5.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to me exactly the right story about mechanism, and it is a story I am associating with essentialism. The relevance is ties to understanding. The lower level is either fully understood, or totally baffling. |
16564 | There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: There are four bottom-out kinds of activities: geometrico-mechanical, electro-chemical, electro-magnetic and energetic. These are abstract means of production that can be fruitfully applied in particular cases to explain phenomena. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 7) | |
A reaction: I like that. It gives a nice core for a metaphysics for physicalists. I suspect that 'mechanical' can be reduced to something else, and that 'energetic' will disappear in the final story. |
16561 | We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: Abstractions may be constructed by taking an exemplary case or instance and removing detail. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 5.3) | |
A reaction: I love 'removing detail'. That's it. Simple. I think this process is the basis of our whole capacity to formulate abstract concepts. Forget Frege - he's just describing the results of the process. How do we decide what is 'detail'? Essentialism! |
9249 | Whether we are free is uninteresting; we can only experience our freedom [Camus] |
Full Idea: Knowing whether or not a man is free doesn't interest me. I can only experience my own freedom. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs free') | |
A reaction: Camus has the right idea. Personally I think you could drop the word 'freedom', and just say that I am confronted by the need to make decisions. |
9253 | The human heart has a tiresome tendency to label as fate only what crushes it [Camus] |
Full Idea: The human heart has a tiresome tendency to label as fate only what crushes it. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Appendix') | |
A reaction: Nice. It might just as much be fate that you live a happy bourgeois life, as that you inadvertently murder your own father at a crossroads. But you can't avoid the powerful awareness of fate when a road accident occurs. |
9250 | Discussing ethics is pointless; moral people behave badly, and integrity doesn't need rules [Camus] |
Full Idea: There can be no question of holding forth on ethics. I have seen people behave badly with great morality and I note every day that integrity has no need of rules. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs Man') | |
A reaction: I don't agree. If someone 'behaves badly with great morality' there is something wrong with their morality, and I want to know what it is. The last part is more plausible, and could be a motto for Particularism. Rules dangerously over-simplify life. |
9252 | The more one loves the stronger the absurd grows [Camus] |
Full Idea: The more one loves the stronger the absurd grows. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Don Juan') | |
A reaction: A penetrating remark, to be placed as a contrary to the remarks of Harry Frankfurt on love. But if the absurd increases the intensity of life, as Camus thinks, then they both make love the great life-affirmation, but in different ways. |
9251 | One can be virtuous through a whim [Camus] |
Full Idea: One can be virtuous through a whim. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs Man') | |
A reaction: A nice remark. Obviously neither Aristotle nor Kant would be too impressed by someone who did this, and Aristotle would certainly say that it is not really virtue, but merely right behaviour. I agree with Aristotle. |
9243 | If we believe existence is absurd, this should dictate our conduct [Camus] |
Full Idea: What a man believes to be true must determine his action. Belief in the absurdity of existence must then dictate his conduct. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs and Suic') | |
A reaction: It is intriguing to speculate what the appropriate conduct is. Presumably it is wild existential gestures, like sticking a knife through your hand. Suicide will be an obvious temptation. But bourgeois life might be equally appropriate. |
6708 | Happiness and the absurd go together, each leading to the other [Camus] |
Full Idea: Happiness and the absurd are two sons of the same earth; they are inseparable; it would be a mistake to say that happiness necessarily springs from the absurd discovery; it happens as well that the feeling of the absurd springs from happiness. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], p.110) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that I understand this, but I understand the experience of absurdity, and I can see that somehow one feels a bit more alive when one acknowledges the absurdity of it all. Meta-meta-thought is the highest form of human life, I say. |
9242 | Essential problems either risk death, or intensify the passion of life [Camus] |
Full Idea: The essential problems are those that run the risk of leading to death, or those that intensify the passion of living. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs and Suic') | |
A reaction: This seems to be distinctively existentialist, in a way that a cool concern for great truths are not ranked as so important. Ranking dangerous problems as crucial seems somehow trivial for a philosopher. Intensity of life is more impressive. |
9246 | Danger and integrity are not in the leap of faith, but in remaining poised just before the leap [Camus] |
Full Idea: The leap of faith does not represent an extreme danger as Kierkegaard would like it to do. The danger, on the contrary, lies in the subtle instant that precedes the leap. Being able to remain on the dizzying crest - that is integrity. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Phil Suic') | |
A reaction: I have always found that a thrilling thought. It perfectly distinguishes atheist existentialism from religious existentialism. It is Camus' best image for how the Absurd can be a life affirming idea, rather than a sort of nihilism. Life gains intensity. |
9248 | It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will [Camus] |
Full Idea: It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will. Suicide is a repudiation. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs free') | |
A reaction: Camus' whole book addresses the question of suicide. He suggests that life can be redeemed and become livable if you squarely face up to the absurdity of it, and the gap between what we hope for and what we get. |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us. | |
From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus | |
A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts? |
16558 | Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: The traditional notion of a law of nature has few, if any, applications in neurobiology or molecular biology. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 3.2) | |
A reaction: This is a simple and self-evident fact, and bad news for anyone who want to build their entire ontology around laws of nature. I take such a notion to be fairly empty, except as a convenient heuristic device. |