10751
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Second-order logic needs the sets, and its consequence has epistemological problems [Rossberg]
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Full Idea:
Second-order logic raises doubts because of its ontological commitment to the set-theoretic hierarchy, and the allegedly problematic epistemic status of the second-order consequence relation.
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From:
Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §1)
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A reaction:
The 'epistemic' problem is whether you can know the truths, given that the logic is incomplete, and so they cannot all be proved. Rossberg defends second-order logic against the second problem. A third problem is that it may be mathematics.
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10753
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Logical consequence is intuitively semantic, and captured by model theory [Rossberg]
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Full Idea:
Logical consequence is intuitively taken to be a semantic notion, ...and it is therefore the formal semantics, i.e. the model theory, that captures logical consequence.
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From:
Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §2)
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A reaction:
If you come at the issue from normal speech, this seems right, but if you start thinking about the necessity of logical consequence, that formal rules and proof-theory seem to be the foundation.
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10752
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Γ |- S says S can be deduced from Γ; Γ |= S says a good model for Γ makes S true [Rossberg]
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Full Idea:
Deductive consequence, written Γ|-S, is loosely read as 'the sentence S can be deduced from the sentences Γ', and semantic consequence Γ|=S says 'all models that make Γ true make S true as well'.
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From:
Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §2)
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A reaction:
We might read |= as 'true in the same model as'. What is the relation, though, between the LHS and the RHS? They seem to be mutually related to some model, but not directly to one another.
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10756
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A model is a domain, and an interpretation assigning objects, predicates, relations etc. [Rossberg]
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Full Idea:
A standard model is a set of objects called the 'domain', and an interpretation function, assigning objects in the domain to names, subsets to predicate letters, subsets of the Cartesian product of the domain with itself to binary relation symbols etc.
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From:
Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §3)
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A reaction:
The model actually specifies which objects have which predicates, and which objects are in which relations. Tarski's account of truth in terms of 'satisfaction' seems to be just a description of those pre-decided facts.
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10758
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If models of a mathematical theory are all isomorphic, it is 'categorical', with essentially one model [Rossberg]
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Full Idea:
A mathematical theory is 'categorical' if, and only if, all of its models are isomorphic. Such a theory then essentially has just one model, the standard one.
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From:
Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §3)
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A reaction:
So the term 'categorical' is gradually replacing the much-used phrase 'up to isomorphism'.
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2171
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The 'will' doesn't exist; there is just conclusion, then action [Homer, by Williams,B]
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Full Idea:
Homer left out another mental action lying between coming to a conclusion and acting on it; and he did well, since there is no such action, and the idea is the invention of bad philosophy.
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From:
report of Homer (The Iliad [c.850 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Shame and Necessity II - p.37
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A reaction:
This is a characteristically empiricist view, which is found in Hobbes. The 'will' seems to have a useful role in folk psychology. We can at least say that coming to a conclusion that I should act, and then actually acting, are not the same thing.
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21819
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Plato says the Good produces the Intellectual-Principle, which in turn produces the Soul [Homer, by Plotinus]
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Full Idea:
In Plato the order of generation is from the Good, the Intellectual-Principle; from the Intellectual-Principle, the Soul.
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From:
report of Homer (The Iliad [c.850 BCE], 509b) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08
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A reaction:
The doctrine of Plotinus merely echoes Plato, in that case, except that the One replaces the Form of the Good. Does this mean that what is first in Plotinus is less morally significant, and more concerned with reason and being?
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