34 ideas
9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: It doesn't follow from the fact that a given sentence is being used to implicitly define one of its ingredient terms, that it is not a factual statement. 'This stick is a meter long at t' may define an ingredient terms and express something factual. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: This looks like a rather good point, but it is tied in with a difficulty about definition, which is deciding which sentences are using a term, and which ones are defining it. If I say 'this stick in Paris is a meter long', I'm not defining it. |
6345 | Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich] |
Full Idea: Boghossian argues that minimalism is incoherent because it says truth both is and is not a property; the essence of minimalism is that, unlike traditional theories, truth is not a property, yet properties are needed to explain the theory. | |
From: report of Paul Boghossian (The Status of Content [1990]) by Paul Horwich - Truth (2nd edn) Post.8 | |
A reaction: I doubt whether this is really going to work as a demolition, because it seems to me that no philosophers are even remotely clear about what a property is. If properties are defined causally, it is not quite clear how truth would ever be a property. |
9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: Conventualism is a factualist view: it presupposes that sentences of logic have truth values. It differs from a realist view in its conception of the source of those truth values, not on their existence. I call the denial of truths Non-Factualism. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: It barely seems to count as truth is we say 'p is true because we say so'. It is a truth about an agreement, not a truth about logic. Driving on the left isn't a truth about which side of the road is best. |
9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: Isn't it overwhelmingly obvious that 'Either snow is white or it isn't' was true before anyone stipulated a meaning for it, and that it would have been true even if no one had thought about it, or chosen it to be expressed by one of our sentences? | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §I) | |
A reaction: Boghossian would have to believe in propositions (unexpressed truths) to hold this - which he does. I take the notion of truth to only have relevance when there are minds around. Otherwise the so-called 'truths' are just the facts. |
9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: The central impetus behind the analytic explanation of the a priori is a desire to explain the possibility of a priori knowledge without having to postulate a special evidence-gathering faculty of intuition. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §I) | |
A reaction: I don't see at all why one has to postulate a 'faculty' in order to talk about intuition. I take an intuition to be an apprehension of a probable truth, combined with an inability to articulate how the conclusion was arrived at. |
9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: The analytic theory of the apriority of logic arose indirectly, as a by-product of the attempt to explain in what a grasp of the meaning of the logical constants consists. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: Preumably he is referring to Wittgenstein's anguish over the meaning of the word 'not' in his World War I notebooks. He first defined the constants by truth tables, then asserted that they were purely conventional - so logic is conventional. |
9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: If there is no sentence I must hold true if it is to mean what it does, then there is no basis on which to argue that I am entitled to hold it true without evidence. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: He is exploring Quine's view. Truth by convention depends on agreeing which part of the usage of a term constitutes its defining sentence(s), and that may be rather tricky. Boghossian says this slides into the 'dreaded indeterminacy of meaning'. |
9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: It is consistent with a belief's being a priori in the strong sense that we should have pragmatic reasons for dropping it from our best overall theory. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], n 6) | |
A reaction: Does 'dropping it' from the theory mean just ignoring it, or actually denying it? C.I. Lewis is the ancestor of this view. Could it be our 'best' theory, while conflicting with beliefs that were strongly a priori? Pragmatism can embrace falsehoods. |
9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: If we learn geometrical truths by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: This refers to the development of non-Euclidean geometries, though the main misleading concerns parallels, which involves infinity. Boghossian cites 'distance' as a concept the Euclideans had misunderstood. Why shouldn't intuitions be wrong? |
9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: Conceptual Role Semantics must explain what properties an inference or sentence involving a logical constant must have, if that inference or sentence is to be constitutive of its meaning. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: This is my perennial request that if something is to be defined by its function (or role), we must try to explain what properties it has that make its function possible, and those properties will be the more basic explanation. |
9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: 'Conceptual role semantics' says the logical constants mean what they do by virtue of figuring in certain inferences and/or sentences involving them and not others, ..so some inferences and sentences are constitutive of an expression's meaning. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: If the meaning of the terms derives from the sentences in which they figure, that seems to be meaning-as-use. The view that it depends on the inferences seems very different, and is a more interesting but more risky claim. |
9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: Could there be a fact of the matter about what each expression means, but no fact of the matter about whether they mean the same? | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §II) | |
A reaction: He is discussing Quine's attack on synonymy, and his scepticism about meaning. Boghossian and I believe in propositions, so we have no trouble with two statements having the same meaning. Denial of propositions breeds trouble. |
17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
Full Idea: Boghossian distinguishes metaphysical analyticity (truth purely in virtue of meaning, debunked by Quine, he says) from epistemic analyticity (knowability purely in virtue of understanding - a notion in good standing). | |
From: report of Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996]) by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 2.4 | |
A reaction: [compressed] This fits with Jenkins's claim that we have a priori knowledge just through understanding and relating our concepts. She, however, rejects that idea that a priori is analytic. |
9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: The epistemological notion of analyticity: a statement is 'true by virtue of meaning' provided that grasp of its meaning alone suffices for justified belief in its truth; the metaphysical reading is that it owes its truth to its meaning, not to facts. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §I) | |
A reaction: Kripke thinks it is neither, but is a purely semantic notion. How could grasp of meaning alone be a good justification if it wasn't meaning which was the sole cause of the statement's truth? I'm not convinced by his distinction. |
23125 | Most good social changes are incremental, rather than revolutionary [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: More permanent positive social change is made incrementally rather than by revolutionary transformation. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 1) | |
A reaction: This is the standard liberal response to revolution. Revolutionaries obviously consider such a claim to be very naïve, and a failure to grasp how deep the changes need to go. |
23126 | Conservatives often want peace, prosperity and tolerance, but not social fairness [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: Many conservatives want their world to be peaceful, properous, and pluralist, just as liberals do, but they don't particularly care that it be fair. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 1) | |
A reaction: Every conservative will have a sense of what is fair (such as appropriate punishments, and keeping of contracts), but they are more inclined to think that fairness must be fought for by individuals, not imposed by governments. |
23132 | Conservatives believe obedience and rank are essential to social order [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: The idea that the appearance of submission and obedience and rank are essential to order is at the heart of the conservative ideal. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 2) | |
A reaction: [He has just quoted Edmund Burke writing of Marie Antoinette] I once heard Richard Hare say that he thought social order would be best modelled on the army. A colleague once told me that obedience is a prime duty of a school teacher. |
23128 | The opposite of liberalism is dogmatism [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: The opposite of liberalism is not conservatism but dogmatism. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 1) | |
A reaction: Nice. It pinpoints the liberal opposition to both extremes of normal politics. It might make anarchists their allies, though! |
23142 | People are fallible, so liberalism tries to distribute power [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: Liberalism makes the idea of fallibility into a political practice by trying not to have too much power concentrated in one place or part of the system. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 3) | |
A reaction: There is a potential inefficiency and failure to focus on key goals implicit in this aim. It may be a good idea for a peacetime democracy, but a terrible idea for a wartime army. To stop corruption, don't let anyone do anything? |
23143 | Liberals have tried very hard to build a conscience into their institutions [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: What liberalism can say on its own behalf is that no system of power in human history has tried harder to insert a corrective conscience into its institutions. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 3) | |
A reaction: What we are learning in recent years is that wonderful liberal institutions can be quietly eroded by the forces of darkness, once those forces have sufficient control of the media to hide what they are doing. The 'rule of law' is wobbling. |
23141 | Left-wingers are inconsistent in their essentialist descriptions of social groups [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: A criticism of the left is that it is essentialist at some moments, and wildly anti-essentialist at others. We can call this opportunistic essentialism. Gender is fluid - except for transgender kids. Race is a construction - except for white races. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 3) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Interesting. Gopnik's solution seems to be to abandon all social essentialism as wicked. In this context he is probably right, but I am firmly committed to the idea that many entities in the world have essential natures. 'Bourgeois'. |
23124 | Liberal community is not blood ties or tradition, but shared choices, and sympathy for the losers [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: The liberal idea of community is not one, as it is for many conservatives, of blood ties or traditional authority. It rest on the idea of shared choices …including even a sense of sympathy for those caught on the losing side of the argument. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 1) | |
A reaction: The key point is that most liberals (other than extreme libertarians) have a strong sense of community, contrary to the standard criticisms offered by communitarians. |
23127 | Liberal community includes flight from the family, into energetic reforming groups [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: Where conservatives believe in the renewal of traditional community, liberals believe as well in the flight from family and tradition into new kinds of communal order. …It is an idea of assembling confidence and energies for reform. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 1) | |
A reaction: He cites Greenwich Village as an example. This suggests that his vision is a little narrow. His communities are for radicals who flee to join like minds in big cities. Politics must care about community for those left behind. Pubs, sport and pets. |
23138 | Modern left-wingers criticise liberalism's control of culture [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: Most left-wing critiques of liberalism now turn more often on its cultural power and its cultural illusions. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 3) | |
A reaction: As opposed to older Marxists critiques of the exploitation of workers. This is certainly fertile ground for interesting studies of our culture. It is very hard to grasp the influence had by the endless stories we expose ourselves to. |
23129 | Right-wingers attack liberal faith in reason, left-wingers attack its faith in reform [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: The right-wing critique of liberalism is largely an attack on its overreliance on reason; the left-wing one, mostly an attack on its false faith in reform. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 2) | |
A reaction: I doubt whether sensible liberals do rely too much on reason, though they do rely of scientific evidence (after peer review!). No one can doubt that lots of reforms have occurred, so it must be frustration with the very slow process. |
23133 | Cosmopolitan liberals lack national loyalty, and welcome excessive immigration [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: Critics say liberal cosmopolitanism is indifference to national loyalty, making them easily contemplate going elsewhere and, worse still, welcoming in the world through unsifted immigration. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 2) | |
A reaction: There is certainly some truth in this. Not all liberals are so cosmopolitan, though. It is interesting to observe whether people who retire stay in their old community or move to somewhere quite new. |
23139 | Liberalism's attempt to be neutral and colour-blind erases cultural identities [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: The 'colour-blind' universe of 'neutral' liberalism is actually an attempt to erase cultural identity and history. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 3) | |
A reaction: This is the modern critique of liberalism [centred on the Intersectionality of Bell Hooks or Kimberlé Crenshaw], which analyses alienated minorities, and their emphasis on their difference in response. It can lead to 'identity politics'. |
23135 | Classic Marxists see liberalism as the ideology of the bourgeoisie [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: The classic Marxist account shows liberalism as merely the ideology of the bourgeoisie. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 3) | |
A reaction: The word 'merely' does an awful lot of work in philosohy! I suspect that 'bourgeoisie' is self-defining here - as the believers in liberalism - given that lots of Marxists emerge from the middle classes. |
23140 | Environmental disasters result not from capitalism, but from a general drive for growth [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: It is the drive for growth, not capitalism in particular, that makes environmental disasters happen. Those caused by the command economics of Eastern Europe were far greater than even the worst known in Western Europe. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 3) | |
A reaction: So the next question is whether you can have capitalism without a drive for growth. I would have thought not, given the role recycled profit plays in driving capitalism. Command economies are more easily swept away. |
23130 | Popular imperialism gives the poor the belief that their acts have world historical meaning [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: Popular imperialism is the cosmopolitanism of the poor, the lever by which the small and impotent come to believe that their acts have world historical meaning. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 2) | |
A reaction: It is not only the poor who like imperialism. The focus of this popular attitude is the armed forces, and especially the army, where personal bravery is most obvious. The army gets strong support, no matter how dubious are its activities. |
23131 | Patriots love their place, but nationalists have a paranoid ethnic hostility [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: The patriot loves his place and its cheeses; …the nationalist has not particular affection for the place, but employs his obsessive sense of encirclement and grievance on behalf of acts of ethnic vengeance. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 2) | |
A reaction: 'Vengeance' seems a bit strong. John Le Carré said nationalists are distinguished by the need to have enemies. Russia is particularly obsessed with 'encirclement'. |
23136 | Liberal free speech is actually paid speech [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: What liberals call free speech or a free press is invariably paid speech. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 3) | |
A reaction: He give this as the left-wing view of liberalism. The much-hated social media are a substantial breech in this tendency. Sales of newspapers are declining everywhere, so the battle is for television channels. |
23134 | A 'free' society implies a free market, which always produces predatory capitalism and inequalities [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: 'Free societies', as a matter of practical fact, always mean free-market societies - and free markets will never sponsor more than predatory capitalism. Inequalities always emerge. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 3) | |
A reaction: This is part of his account of left-wing objections to liberalism. The crux of the liberal view is a conviction that the worst of capitalism can be restrained. This began to look doubtful once huge multinational companies emerged. What to do? |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us. | |
From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus | |
A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts? |