Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Ray Monk and Jan Lukasiewicz

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason

6851	We overvalue whether arguments are valid, and undervalue whether they are interesting [Monk]
	Full Idea: We encourage students to be concerned with whether an argument is valid or not, and we don't encourage them much to consider the question of whether the argument is interesting or not.
	From: Ray Monk (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.16)
	A reaction: What do you make of arguments which are very interesting, but (unfortunately) totally invalid? That said, this is a nice comment. A philosopher cannot contemplate too long or too deeply on the question of what is really 'interesting'.

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic

8942	Lukasiewicz's L3 logic has three truth-values, T, F and I (for 'indeterminate') [Lukasiewicz, by Fisher]
	Full Idea: In response to Aristotle's sea-battle problem, Lukasiewicz proposed a three-valued logic that has come to be known as L3. In addition to the values true and false (T and F), there is a third truth-value, I, meaning 'indeterminate' or 'possible'.
	From: report of Jan Lukasiewicz (Elements of Mathematical Logic [1928], 7.I) by Jennifer Fisher - On the Philosophy of Logic
	A reaction: [He originated the idea in 1917] In what sense is the third value a 'truth' value? Is 'I don't care' a truth-value? Or 'none of the above'? His idea means that formalization doesn't collapse when things get obscure. You park a few propositions under I.

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement

7535	If all beliefs are propositional, then belief and judgement are the same thing [Monk]
	Full Idea: Whether the words 'belief' and 'judgement' mean the same thing is a moot point. Traditionally, a judgement is the assent of mind to a proposition. If one thinks that all beliefs are propositional, then beliefs and judgements are the same thing.
	From: Ray Monk (Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude [1996], Ch.19 n6)
	A reaction: If I think I have put a bit too much toothpaste on my brush, that strikes me as a non-propositional judgement, even though it could be spelled out as a proposition. But it also strikes me as a belief.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics

6850	Wittgenstein pared his life down in his search for decency [Monk]
	Full Idea: One of the most conspicuous things about Wittgenstein is that, on the ethics side, he pared his life down to the minimum, so as to make as central as possible his search for decency, the drive to be a decent person.
	From: Ray Monk (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.14)
	A reaction: It rather looks as if decency was quite an effort for him, as he had a rather waspish temperament, and people found it hard to get close to him. On the whole, though, he sounds like good company, as do nearly all the great philosophers.

25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights

6005	Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
	Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us.
	From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus
	A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts?