Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Robin Le Poidevin and Jeff McMahan

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


72 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The tenseless stance is quite clear: all times are equally real, so there are truth-makers for the future-tense statements, which consequently have determinate truth-values.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], Intro)
     A reaction: The tenseless view is linked to the B-series view, and to eternalism. This seems to mean that Aristotle took a tensed A-series view of time.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: It is a powerful argument for something's non-existence that it would make absolutely no difference.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 02 'Everything')
     A reaction: Powerful, but not conclusive. Neutrinos don't seem to do much, so it isn't far from there to get a particle which does nothing.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
We want illuminating theories, rather than coherent theories [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Don't ask, which theory is more coherent? Ask, which theory is more illuminating?
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense [1998], 5)
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Not all explanations are causal. We can explain some things by showing what follows logically from what, or what is required by the definition of a term, or in terms of purpose.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 05 'Limits')
     A reaction: Would these fully qualify as 'explanations'? You don't explain the sea by saying that 'wet' is part of its definition.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: In describing a time as 'now' one is not merely describing the world from one's own point of view, but describing the world as it is.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 08 'Mystery')
     A reaction: If we accept this view (which implies absolute time, and the A-series view), then 'now' is not an indexical, in the way that 'I' and 'here' are indexicals.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Legal excuses are duress, ignorance, and diminished responsibility [McMahan]
     Full Idea: The common legal practice is to distinguish three broad categories of excuse: duress, epistemic limitation, and diminished responsibility.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.2.1)
     A reaction: McMahan cites these with reference to soldiers in wartime, but they have general application. The third one seems particularly open to very wide interpretation. Presumably I can't be excused by just being irresponsible.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: For the A-theorists called 'presentists' the past is as unreal as the future, and reality leaves us behind once we die, which is disturbing; but B-theorists, who see time as unreal, say we are just as real after our deaths as we were beforehand.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174)
     A reaction: See Idea 6865 for A and B theories. I wonder if this problem is only superficially 'disturbing'. Becoming unreal may sound more drastic than becoming dead, but they both sound pretty terminal to me.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The view that evil is an illusion is self-refuting: that is, if there is no evil, the illusion that there is evil is certainly evil.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 2)
     A reaction: [The idea comes from McTaggart, and Le Poidevin is quoting Dummett on it]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: I take existentialism to be the focus on the freedom and self-making of the human being, and his or her insertion into the world.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.222)
     A reaction: I take 'self-making' to be the key here. If neuroscientists somehow 'proved' that there was no free will, I don't see that making any difference to existentialism. 'Insertion' seems odd, unless it refers to growing up.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Liberty Rights are permissions, and Claim Rights are freedom from intervention [McMahan]
     Full Idea: There are two types of right. A Liberty right is merely a permission, meaning it is not wrong to do it. But a Claim right is a right against intervention, meaning no one has a liberty right to prevent it.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.3)
     A reaction: There must also be a third type of right, which requires other people to perform actions on your behalf. If you pay for a book in a shop, you must then be given the book.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
A person or state may be attacked if they are responsible for an unjustified threat [McMahan]
     Full Idea: It is a necessary condition of liability to defensive attack that one be morally responsible for posing an objectively unjustified threat.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 4.1.1)
     A reaction: This implies that one may not actually be doing the threatening (but merely ordering it, or enabling it). McMahan aims to have the same criteria for wartime as for peacetime. He denies Anscombe's claim that merely posing the threat is enough.
You (e.g. a police officer) are not liable to attack just because you pose a threat [McMahan]
     Full Idea: It is false that by posing a threat to another, one necessarily makes oneself liable to defensive action. A police officer who shoots an active murderer does not thereby by make herself liable to defensive action.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.2)
     A reaction: This is one of his arguments against the moral equality of combatants. It is not morally OK to shoot all the local soldiers when you unjustly invade a territory. Sounds right to me.
Wars can be unjust, despite a just cause, if they are unnecessary or excessive or of mixed cause [McMahan]
     Full Idea: Wars can be unjust despite having a just cause, because they are not actually needed, or they will cause excessive harm, or they also pursue some unjust causes.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.1)
     A reaction: [compressed] The point is that older writers often think that a 'just cause' is sufficient. He is obviously right.
Just war theory says all and only persons posing a threat are liable to attack [McMahan]
     Full Idea: In mainstream just war theory (Anscombe, Nagel, Walzer) the criterion of liability to attack is simply posing a threat. Since all combatants pose a threat to each other, they are morally liable to attack; because noncombatants do not, they are not liable.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.2)
     A reaction: McMahan says that the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets rests mostly on this basis. The problem is that a huge range of unarmed people can also pose various degrees of threat.
The worst unjustified wars have no aim at all [McMahan]
     Full Idea: The most serious reason why a war might be unjustified is that it lacks any justifying aim at all.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.1)
     A reaction: It seems that Louis XIV invaded the Netherlands in around 1674 purely to enhance his own glory. That strikes me as worse. I supposed Ghenghis Khan invaded places simply because he enjoyed fighting.
A defensive war is unjust, if it is responding to a just war [McMahan]
     Full Idea: It is possible for a defensive war to be unjust, when the defensive war to which it is a response is a just war.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.3.3)
     A reaction: An example might be a state resisting an intervention from outside, when the state is in the process of exterminating some unwanted minority. Or perhaps the invaders are crossing the state's territory to achieve some admirable end.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
Proportionality in fighting can't be judged independently of the justice of each side [McMahan]
     Full Idea: There is simply no satisfactory understanding of proportionality in war that can be applied independently of whether the acts that are evaluated support a just or an unjust cause.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.3)
     A reaction: He rejects traditional just war theory, which sees both sides as morally equal in combat, and hence equally subject to the principles of proportional response. But the just can then be harsher, when their just principles should make them milder.
Can an army start an unjust war, and then fight justly to defend their own civilians? [McMahan]
     Full Idea: There is a paradox if the unjust are justified in fighting the just in order to protect their own civilians who have been endangered by the starting of an unjust war.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.1)
     A reaction: [my summary of MacMahan pp.48-49] It suggests that in a war there may be local concepts of justice which are at odds with the general situation - which is the ad bellum/in bello distinction. But this is the justice of fighting, not how it is conducted.
Soldiers cannot freely fight in unjust wars, just because they behave well when fighting [McMahan]
     Full Idea: We must stop reassuring soldiers that they act permissibly when they fight in an unjust war, provided that they conduct themselve honorably on the battlefield by fighting in accordance with the rules of engagement.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.8)
     A reaction: This culminates McMahan's arguments against the moral equality of combatants, and against the sharp division of justice of war from justice in war. How rare it is for philosophy to culminate in a policy recommendation!
The law of war differs from criminal law; attacking just combatants is immoral, but legal [McMahan]
     Full Idea: Unlike domestic criminal law, the law of war is designed not to protect moral rights but to prevent harm. …This means when unjust combatants attack just combatants they violate their moral rights, yet they act within their legal rights.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.1.1)
     A reaction: He says we must bring the law of war much closer to the morality of war. If there is any hope of slowly eliminating war, it may lie in reforms such as these.
If the unjust combatants are morally excused they are innocent, so how can they be killed? [McMahan]
     Full Idea: If most unjust combatants are morally innocent because they are excused, and if it is wrong to intentionally kill morally innocent people, then a contingent form of pacificism may be inescapable.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.3.1)
     A reaction: A very nice argument against the moral equality of combatants. If I think we are the good guys, and the opposing troops are no morally different from us, how can I possibly kill them?
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
You don't become a legitimate target, just because you violently resist an unjust attack [McMahan]
     Full Idea: It is hard to see how just combatants could become legitimate targets simply by offering violent resistance to unjust attacks by unjust coombatants.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.3)
     A reaction: It is, however, hard to criticise a soldier who is dragged into fighting for an unjust cause, and then kills just defenders in the course of the fight. Once the bullets fly, normal morality seems to be suspended. Just survive.
If all combatants are seen as morally equal, that facilitates starting unjust wars [McMahan]
     Full Idea: It would be naïve to doubt that the widespread acceptance of the moral equality of combatants has facilitated the ability of governments to fight unjust wars.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.1)
     A reaction: The point is that their armies are both compliant and seeing their actions as guiltless, which makes them perfect tools for evil. McMahan's ideal is an army which asks sharp questions about the justification of the war, before they fight it.
Volunteer soldiers accept the risk of attack, but they don't agree to it, or to their deaths [McMahan]
     Full Idea: When soldiers go to war, they undoubtedly assume a certain risk. They voluntarily expose themselves to a significant risk of being attacked. But this is entirely different from consenting to being attacked.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.2.1)
     A reaction: This is his response to Walzer's thought that soldiers resemble people who volunteer for a boxing match. The sailors at Pearl Harbour obviously didn't consent to the attack, or accept the Japanese right to kill them.
If being part of a big collective relieves soldiers of moral responsibility, why not the leaders too? [McMahan]
     Full Idea: If acting as an agent of a political collective justifies the combatants fighting an unjust war, that should also release the leaders from responsibility for their role in the fighting of that war. No one ever explains why this is not so.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.5)
     A reaction: At the very least there seems to be a problem of the cut off point between innocent soldiers and culpable leaders. Which rank in the army or executive triggers the blame?
If soldiers can't refuse to fight in unjust wars, can they choose to fight in just wars? [McMahan]
     Full Idea: There is a certain symmetry here. The permissibility of disobeying a command to fight in an unjust war suggests the permissibility of disobeying a command not to fight in a just war.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.7)
     A reaction: The argument considered here is that since we could never allow soldiers to choose to fight in their own wars, we similarly cannot let them opt out of the official wars. Implying obedience is absolute. Soldiers don't get to 'choose' anything!
Equality is both sides have permission, or both sides are justified, or one justified the other permitted [McMahan]
     Full Idea: Moral equality means either 1) because just combatants are permitted to fight in a just way, so are the unjust , or 2) because the just are justified, so are the unjust, or 3) because the just are justified, the unjust are therefore permitted.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.1.2)
     A reaction: [summary] McMahan calls 1) the weak version, and 2) the strong. He suggests that although 3) is unusual, it is what most people believe - that if the good are justified, the bad are permitted to fight back. He rejects them all.
Fighting unjustly under duress does not justify it, or permit it, but it may excuse it [McMahan]
     Full Idea: It is said that combatants are compelled to fight; they have no choice. But duress is not a justification; nor does it ground a permission - not even a subjective permission. It is, instead, an excusing condition.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.1.2)
     A reaction: The 'subjective' permission is believing you are just, even if you aren't. A nice, accurate and true distinction made by McMahan, I think. It is roughly our postwar attitude to the Nazi army.
Soldiers cannot know enough facts to evaluate the justice of their war [McMahan]
     Full Idea: When soldiers are commanded to fight, they cannot reasonably be expected to have the factual knowledge necessary to evaluate the war as just or unjust.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.3)
     A reaction: This is part of the 'epistemic' justification for a soldier to fight in an unjust war. Sometimes soldiers do have enoough knowledge, especially if they join up late on in a war, when they have studied and observed its progress.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
Innocence implies not being morally responsible, rather than merely being guiltless [McMahan]
     Full Idea: My alternative conception is that one is 'innocent' if one is neither morally responsible for nor guilty of a wrong. Classical theory focused on guilt, but I think we should focus on moral responsibility (which is something less).
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.4)
     A reaction: This seems to make the supporters of evil equally liable to attack with its perpetrators. But you can observe perpetration a lot more easily than you can observe support.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
Unconditional surrender can't be demanded, since evil losers still have legitimate conditions [McMahan]
     Full Idea: Achieving unconditional surrender can never be a justification for the continuation of war, since there are always conditions that a vanquished adversary, no matter how evil, can be justified in demanding.
     From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.3.1)
     A reaction: McMahan is particularly discussing Hiroshima, but this also applies to the European war in 1945. Presumably a civilised victor will grant the conditions which the losers would have demanded, and that probably happened in 1945. It's about power.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
     Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us.
     From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus
     A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts?
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The usual logical properties of the causal relation are asymmetry (one-way), transitivity and irreflexivity (no self-causing).
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 05 'Great')
     A reaction: If two balls rebound off each other, that is only asymmetric if we split the action into two parts, which may be a fiction. Does a bomb cause its own destruction?
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: If the midpoint on a line between the chair and the window is five feet from the end of the bookcase. This can be true, but if no object occupies that midpoint, then unoccupied points exist
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 03 'Lessons')
     A reaction: We can also locate perfect circles (running through fairy rings, or the rings of Saturn), so they must also exist. But then we can also locate the Loch Ness monster. Hm.
If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: If there are such things as points in space, independently of any other object, then these points are by definition stationary (since to be stationary is to stay in the same place, and a point is a place).
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 03 'Search')
     A reaction: So what happens if the whole universe moves ten metres to the left? Is the universe defined by the objects in it (which vary), or by the space that contains them? Why can't a location move, even if that is by definition undetectable?
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Absolutists say space plays a number of roles. It is what we refer to when we talk of positions. It makes other things possible (by moving into unoccupied positions). And it explains geometrical truths.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 03 'Redundancy')
     A reaction: I am persuaded by these, and am happy to treat space (and time) as a primitive of metaphysics.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: For the relationist, if Archytas goes to the edge of space and extends his arm, he is creating a new spatial relation between objects, and thus extending space, which is, after all, just the collection of thos relations.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 05 'beyond')
     A reaction: The obvious point is what are you moving your arm into? And how can some movements be in space, while others create new space? It's a bad theory.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The most characteristic features of time, which distinguish it from space, are the fact that time passes, and the fact that the present is in some sense unique
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 08 'Mystery')
     A reaction: The B-series view tries to avoid passing time and present moments. I suspect that modern proponents of the B-series mainly want to unifying their view of time with Einstein's, to give us a scientific space-time.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Since, by definition, nothing happens in a temporal vacuum, there is no possible means of determining its length.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 02 'without change')
     A reaction: This is offered a part of a dubious proof that a temporal vacuum is impossible. I like Shoemaker's three worlds thought experiment, which tests this idea to the limit.
Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Three arguments that a temporal vacuum is impossible: we can't experience it, we can't measure it, and it would have no reason to ever terminate.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 03 'Lessons')
     A reaction: [summarised] The first two reasons are unimpressive. The interiors of black holes are off limits for us. The arrival of time into a timeless situation may actually have occurred, but be beyond our understanding.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: If the future is unreal, future individuals are ontologically problematic. Any apparent obligations towards them cannot, it seems, have an object.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 5)
     A reaction: I certainly 'feel' obligations to the future, but I am not sure whether I 'have' them. How far into the future do the extend? Should I care if homo sapiens is replaced by a different dominant species?
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: It would appear that any denial of the existence of continuants entails a denial of change.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 1)
     A reaction: [He cites Lowe for this view] Presumably we don't just accept change at face value, in that case. Indeed, views about temporal parts or time-worms give a different account of change (though perhaps a less convincing one).
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process' [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Processes can speed up or slow down, but surely the passage of time is not something that can speed up or slow down?
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 08 'Mystery')
     A reaction: If something is a process we can ask 'process of what?', but the only answer seems to be that it's a process of processing. So it is that which makes processes possible (and so, as I keep saying) it is best viewed as a primitive.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: A worry haunts the denial of tense: if tense is just mind-dependent, then minds at least themselves must be tensed.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 2)
Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: If we cannot coherently adopt a tensed perspective on events within fiction, then fictional discourse seems to provide an example of a tenseless language of before and after which is quite independent of the language of tense.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 7)
It is the view of the future that really decides between tensed and tenseless views of time [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: It is crucially one's view of the status of the future that makes one a tensed or a tenseless theorist.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense [1998], 5)
     A reaction: If you believe in the reality of the future, you are an eternalist and like the B-series. If you deny the existence of the future, you must opt for Presentism or the Growing Block (depending on the status of the past).
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
In the B-series, time-positions are unchanging; in the A-series they change (from future to present to past) [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The crucial distinction is that in the B-series positions in time are unchanging. Positions in the A-series, in contrast, do change: what is now present was once future and will be past.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense [1998], 1 (a))
     A reaction: So does A-series time consist of a property which things gain and then lose, or a location which things enter and then leave? Neither analogy seems to throw much light.
Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Events and objects that have ceased to exist change their A-series position (by becoming increasingly past), but persisting objects, in contrast, change their present B-series position.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 1 n2)
     A reaction: The second half seems to imply a 'moving spotlight' of the present. This distinction is important, as it creates problems for all theories. The asymmetry seems weird.
A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The A-theory regards our intuitive distinction of time into past, present and future as objective, and takes seriously the idea that time flows; the B-theory says this just reflects our perspective, like the spatial distinction between here and there.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174)
     A reaction: The distinction comes from McTaggart. Physics seems to be built on an objective view of time, and yet Einstein makes time relative. What possible evidence could decide between the two theories?
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: It has been argued that the tensed view of time is actually committed to the unreality, not just of the future, but of the past also.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], Intro)
     A reaction: There seem to be strong and weak version here, since if you are committed to tenses, you are presumably committed to the possibility of truths about the past and future. The strong version (denying past and future) seems to make tenses pointless.
Tensed theorists typically try to reduce the tenseless to the tensed [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Tensed theorists typically seek to reduce facts about tenseless relations to tensed facts.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense [1998], 4 (b))
     A reaction: This presumably involves denial of tenseless truths like '2+2=4', which might become '2+2 is always 4'. I can't see an objection to that. Tooley 1997 is cited as an exception to this idea.
We share a common now, but not a common here [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: We appear to share a common now, but not a common here.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 2)
     A reaction: Personally I take this to be quite a strong argument against the simplistic view that there is just something called 'spacetime', with no distinction of dimensions.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The new tenseless theory has given up Russell's attempt to reduce tensed statements (in terms of 'simultaneous with'), and instead give tenseless truth-conditions (in terms of indexicals).
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 3)
     A reaction: [compressed]
To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The causal connection between the past and the present seems to require that the past is as real as the present.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 08 'First')
     A reaction: Cause and effect need to conjoin in space, but their subsequent separation doesn't seem to be a problem. The idea that causes and their effects must be eternally compresent is an absurdity.
The B-series doesn't seem to allow change [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: How can anything change in a B-universe?
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 08 'Second')
     A reaction: It seems that change needs time to move on. A timeless series of varying states doesn't seem to be the same thing as change. B-seriesers must be tempted to deny change, and yet nothing seems more obvious to us than change.
If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it? [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: What in the B-universe determines my temporal perspective? I can move around in space at will, but I have no choice over where I am in time. What time I am is something that changes, and again I have no control over that
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 08 'Second')
     A reaction: The B-series always has to be asserted from the point of view of eternity (e.g. by Einstein). Yet an omniscient mind would still see each of us trapped in our transient moments, so that is part of eternal reality.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: A series can be ordered without being directed (such as the series of integers), …but the passage of time indicates a preferred direction, moving from earlier to later events, and never the other way around.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 12 'Hidden')
     A reaction: I wonder what 'preferred' means here? It is not just memory versus anticipation. The saddest words in the English language are 'Too late!'. It is absurd to say that being too late is an illusion.
If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected? [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: An objection to the Causal analysis of time's arrow is that it is surely possible for non-simultaneous events to be causally unconnected.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 12 'Seeds')
     A reaction: I suppose the events could be linked causally by intermediaries. If reality is a vast causal nexus, everything leads to everything else, in some remote way. It's still a good objections, though.
If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: If the Psychological account of time's arrow is correct …then there is nothing to prevent different minds from imposing different orders on the world.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 12 'The mind's')
     A reaction: All we need is for two people to disagree about the order of some past events. The idea that we are psychologically creating time's arrow when everyone feels they are its victims strikes me as a particularly silly theory.
There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The three most significant arrows of time are the Thermodynamic (the direction from order to disorder), the Psychological (from perceptions of events to memories), and the Causal (from cause to effect).
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 12 'Three')
     A reaction: It would be nice if one of these explained the other two. Le Poidevin rejects the Psychological arrow, and seems to favour the Causal. Since I favour taking time as a primitive, I'm inclined to think that the arrow is included in the deal.
Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: One consequence of the Thermodynamic analysis of time's arrow is that a universe in which things are as disordered as they could be would exhibit no direction of time at all, because there would be no more significant changes in entropy.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 12 'Three')
     A reaction: And presumably time would gradually fizzle out, rather than ending abruptly. If entropy then went into reverse, there would be no time interval between the end and the new beginning. Entropy can vary locally, so it has to be universal.
If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The Second Law of Thermodynamics says it is overwhelmingly probable that entropy will increase. This leaves the door open for occasional isolated instances of decrease. But the thermodynamic arrow makes the increase a necessity.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 12 'Three')
     A reaction: Le Poidevin sees this as a clincher against the thermodynamic explanation of the arrow. I'm now sure how the Second Law can even be stated without explicit or implicit reference to time.
Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: If there is no temporal gap between cause and effect, then the causal analysis of time's arrow is doomed.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 12 'simultaneous')
     A reaction: A number of recent commentators have rejected the sharp distinction between cause and effect, seeing it as a unified process (which takes time to occur).
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / i. Time and motion
Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Being in motion at a particular time can be an intrinsic property of an object, as a disposition to be elsewhere than the place it is.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 09 'in present')
     A reaction: This needs an ontology which includes unrealised dispositions. People trapped in boring meetings have a disposition to be elsewhere, but they are stuck. I think 'power' is a better word here than 'disposition'. The disposition isn't just for 'elsewhere'.
The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: According to the dynamic account of motion, an object's being in motion is a primitive event, not further analysable in terms of objects, properties and times.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 09 'Zeno')
     A reaction: [The rival view is 'static'] Physics suggests that motion may be indefinable, but acceleration can be given a reductive account. If time and space are taken as primitive (which seems sensible to me), then making motion also primitive is a bit greedy.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: If any number of pasts are compatible with the present state of affairs, and it is only the present state of affairs which can make true or false statements about the past, then no statement about the past is either true or false.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 08 'First')
     A reaction: He suggests an explosion which could have had innumerable different causes. The explosion could have had different origins, but not sure that the whole of present reality could. Presentists certainly have problems with truthmakers for the past.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The present is the boundary between past and future, therefore if there was a first moment of time, it could not have been present - because there can be no past at the beginning of time.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 05 'Limits')
     A reaction: How about at the start of a race the athletes cannot be running. How about 'all moments of time have preceding moments - apart from the first moment'?
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Intervals of time can be viewed as primitive, and not decomposable into a series of instants.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 09 'in present')
     A reaction: Given that instants are nothing, and intervals are something, the latter are clearly the better candidates to be the parts of time. Is there a smallest interval?
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Assuming time to be infinitely divisible, the present can have no duration at all, for if it did, we could divide it into parts, and some parts would be earlier than others.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 09 'in present')
     A reaction: I quite like Aristotle's view that things only have parts when you actually divide them. In modern physics fields don't seem to be infinitely divisible. It's a puzzle, though, innit?
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The multiverse is not just a collection of distinct spaces, it is also a collection of distinct time-series.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 11 'Objections')
     A reaction: This boggles the imagination even more than distinct spatial universes.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Is God within, or outside time? How can God causally interact with the universe? How are 'all times present to God'? If the future is not real, can God not know the future? How would he then be omniscient? Does God know the truth of tensed assertions?
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 6)
     A reaction: This lot constitutes one of the main reasons why I cannot believe in God. In brief, the concept is incoherent. The metaphysical convolutions needed to reconcile these problems smack of the absurd aspects of medieval theology.
How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient? [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Could a timeless being now know what the time was? If so, does this show that there must be something wrong with the idea of God as both timeless and omniscient?
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 09 'Questions')
     A reaction: This is a potential contradiction between the perfections of a supreme God which I had not noticed before. Leibniz tried to refute such objections, but not very successfully, I think.