8 ideas
| 8249 | Class membership is not transitive, unlike being part of a part of the whole [Lesniewski, by George/Van Evra] |
| Full Idea: Lesniewski distinguished the part-whole relationship from class membership. Membership is not transitive: if s is an element of t, and t of u, then s is not an element of u, whereas a part of a part is a part of the whole. | |
| From: report of Stanislaw Lesniewski (works [1916]) by George / Van Evra - The Rise of Modern Logic 7 | |
| A reaction: If I am a member of a sports club, and my club is a member of the league, I am not thereby a member of the league (so clubs are classes, not wholes). This distinction is clearly fairly crucial in ontology. |
| 20877 | Errors in moral practice might be inconsistent or inappropriate principles, or inappropriate application [LaFollette] |
| Full Idea: I might make parallel 'mistakes' in ethical deliberation. For instance I might 1) use inconsistent ethical principles, 2) have inappropriate moral standards, and 3) apply moral standards inappropriately. | |
| From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.005) | |
| A reaction: I would want to get the word 'values' in there somewhere. Dogmatic application of moral rules might indicate a failure of values. |
| 20878 | We can discuss the criteria of a judgment, or the weight given to them, or their application [LaFollette] |
| Full Idea: In discussing a movie you can challenge my criteria, the weight I give to those criteria, or my application of the criteria (the claim that the movie satisfies the criteria). | |
| From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.008) | |
| A reaction: I can't think of anything missing here, so it is a helpful start. |
| 20881 | The act/omission distinction is important for duties, but less so for consequences [LaFollette] |
| Full Idea: Consequentialists, unlike deontologists, are unlikely to think that the act/omission distinction is fundamentally important. | |
| From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.021) | |
| A reaction: Not sure where virtue theory fits in here. Virtues tend to be applied more locally, where duty tends to be global. All moral theories must acknowledge that failure to act may be either a good or a bad thing, depending on circumstances |
| 20886 | Are we only obligated by agreement, or should we always help the weak? [LaFollette] |
| Full Idea: A fundamental question in morality is whether we are obligated to help only those we specifically agreed to help, or are we obligated to help others in need, because they are vulnerable? | |
| From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.061) | |
| A reaction: [He is considering J.J. Thomson's defence of abortion] The first option sounds extraordinary. If I don't make any agreements at all, then I cease to be a moral being? Not help strangers when they fall over? |
| 20879 | Too many options may open us to unwanted pressures, like being paid very little [LaFollette] |
| Full Idea: Having options is not an unadulterated good. Options may make us vulnerable to unwanted pressure from others. For example, having the option to work for less than the minimum wage increases the chances of employers offering less. | |
| From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.019) | |
| A reaction: [J.D. Velleman is cited for this] A nice point, beginning to articulate my growing feeling that although freedom is generally a virtue, it is the most overrated virtue. |
| 20880 | Should people be forced to make choices? [LaFollette] |
| Full Idea: Should we give people choices they might not want to have? | |
| From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.020) | |
| A reaction: In personal life we encounter people who force us to make an unwanted choice (choose the wine, when you know nothing about wine). Politically, there is the sneaky move of giving unwanted choices, to disguise absence of desired choices. |
| 6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
| Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us. | |
| From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus | |
| A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts? |