Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) and J.M.E. McTaggart

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Words of wisdom are precise and clear [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Words of wisdom are precise and clear.
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2)
     A reaction: I can only approve of this. The issue of clarity is much discussed amongs philosophers, especially in the analytic v continental debate. Note, therefore, the additional requirement to be 'precise'. Should we be less clear in order to be precise?
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Don't even start, let's just stay put [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Don't even start, let's just stay put.
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2)
     A reaction: What a remarkable proposal! He seems frightened to make an omelette, because he will have to break an egg, or he might burn himself. I can't relate to this idea, but it's existence must be noted, like other scepticisms.
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Disagreement means you do not understand at all [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: The sage encompasses everything, while ordinary people just argue about things. Disagreement means you do not understand at all.
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This is why democracy and western analytical philosophy come as a package. We can't assume that our government is always right, and we can't assume that a 'sage' has managed to encompass everything. Criticism is essential!
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
If you beat me in argument, does that mean you are right? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: If you get the better of me in a disagreement, rather than me getting the better of you, does this mean that you are automatically right and I am automatically wrong?
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2)
     A reaction: Very nice. I don't, though, think that this invalidates the process of argument. What matters about such an exchange is the resulting reflection by the two parties. Only a fool thinks that he is right because he won, or wrong because he lost.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
How could change consist of a conjunction of changeless facts? [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: McTaggart objects, to Russell 1903, that change cannot consist of a conjunction of changeless facts.
     From: report of J.M.E. McTaggart (The Nature of Existence vol.2 [1927]) by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 1 (b)
     A reaction: I agree with McTaggart. Logicians like to model processes with domains of timeless entities, but it just won't do.
Change is not just having two different qualities at different points in some series [McTaggart]
     Full Idea: The fact that it is hot at one point in a series and cold at other points cannot give change, if neither of these facts change. If two points on a line have different properties, this doesn't give change.
     From: J.M.E. McTaggart (The Nature of Existence vol.2 [1927], 33.315-6), quoted by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 6.2
     A reaction: [The second half compresses an example about the Meridian] This objection is aimed at Russell's view, that change is just different properties at different times. I (unlike Sider) am wholly with McTaggart on this one. Change is 'dynamic'.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance has to exist, with no intrinsic qualities or relations [McTaggart]
     Full Idea: Something must exist, then, and have qualities, without being itself either a quality or a relation. And this is Substance.
     From: J.M.E. McTaggart (The Nature of Existence vol.1 [1921], §67), quoted by R.D. Ingthorsson - A Powerful Particulars View of Causation 7.2
     A reaction: Ingthorsson quotes this as 'the most extreme analytic view', which is a long way from the Aristotelian view. This is the implausible bare substrate.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Do not try to do things, or to master knowledge; just be empty [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Do not try to do things. Do not try to master knowledge. ...Just be empty.
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.7)
     A reaction: Stands as a nice challenge to the assumption that knowledge is a good thing. Aristotle's views make a nice contrast (Ideas 548 and 549). Personally I totally agree with Aristotle, and with the western tradition.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
You know you were dreaming when you wake, but there might then be a greater awakening from that [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Often after waking do you know that your dream was a dream. Still, there may be an even greater awakening after which you will know that this, too, was just a greater dream.
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], 02), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 9.2
     A reaction: This is the key to the full horror of dream scepticism (as dramatised in the film 'The Matrix'). We can never know whether there is yet another awakening about to occur.
Did Chuang Tzu dream he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dream he was Chuang Tzu? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Once I, Chuang Tzu, dreamt that I was a butterfly, flitting around and enjoying myself. Suddenly I woke and was Chuang Tzu again. But had I been Chuang Tzu dreaming I was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming I was now Chuang Tzu?
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2)
     A reaction: Plato (Idea 2047) also spotted this problem, later made famous by Descartes (Idea 2250). Given the size of a butterfly's brain, this suggests that Chuang Tzu was a dualist. What can't I take the idea seriously, when reason says I should?
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The perfect man has no self [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: As the saying goes, 'The perfect man has no self'
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This seems to be quoted with approval. This is interesting because it implies that lesser beings do have a self, and that having a self is a moral issue, and one which can be controlled. One could, I suppose, concentrate on externals.
To see with true clarity, your self must be irrelevant [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: When a man discerns his own self as irrelevant, he sees with true clarity.
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.6)
     A reaction: Seeing 'with clarity' is only one of the ways of seeing, and one mustn't unquestioningly assume that it is the best. Wisdom should contemplate vision with and without the self, and then rise higher and compare the two views. Compare Parfit (Idea 5518).
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
If words can't be defined, they may just be the chirruping of chicks [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Our words are not just hot air. Words work because they are something, but the problem is that, if we cannot define a word's meaning, it doesn't really say anything. Can we make a case for it being anything different from the chirruping of chicks?
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This obviously points us towards Quine's challenge to analyticity, and hence the value of definitions (Ideas 1622 and 1624). Even for Chuang Tzu, it seems naïve to think that you cannot use a word well if you cannot define it.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Words are for meaning, and once you have that you can forget the words [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Words are for meaning: when you've gotten the meaning, you can forget the words.
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], 26), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 9.VI
     A reaction: 'What exactly did this person say?' 'Don't know, but I've given you the accurate gist'. This is such an obvious phenomenon that I amazed by modern philosophers who deny propositions, or deny meaning entirely.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Great courage is not violent [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Great courage is not violent.
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2)
     A reaction: A very nice remark. This, I think, is what the Greeks were struggling to say about courage, but they never quite pinned it down as Chuang Tzu does.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
     Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us.
     From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus
     A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts?
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
For McTaggart time is seen either as fixed, or as relative to events [McTaggart, by Ayer]
     Full Idea: McTaggart says we can speak of events in time in two ways, as past, present or future, or as being before or after or simultaneous with one another. The first cannot be reduced to the second, as the second makes no provision for the passage of time.
     From: report of J.M.E. McTaggart (The Nature of Existence vol.2 [1927], II.329-) by A.J. Ayer - The Central Questions of Philosophy 1.D
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
A-series time positions are contradictory, and yet all events occupy all of them! [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: McTaggart's proof of time's unreality: A-series positions (past, present and future) are mutually incompatible, so no event can exhibit more than one of them; but since A-series events change position, all events have all A-series posititions. Absurd!
     From: report of J.M.E. McTaggart (The Nature of Existence vol.2 [1927]) by Robin Le Poidevin - Travels in Four Dimensions 08 'McTaggart's'
     A reaction: I'm not convinced that this is any more contradictory than someone being married at one time and unmarried at another. No one is suggesting that an A-series event can be both past and future simultaneously.
Time involves change, only the A-series explains change, but it involves contradictions, so time is unreal [McTaggart, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: McTaggart argued that time involves change, only the A-series can explain change, the A-series involves contradictions (past, present and future), and hence time is unreal.
     From: report of J.M.E. McTaggart (The Nature of Existence vol.2 [1927]) by E.J. Lowe - A Survey of Metaphysics p.313
     A reaction: I doubt whether it is a logical contradiction to say Waterloo has been past, present and future, though it is odd.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
There could be no time if nothing changed [McTaggart]
     Full Idea: It is universally admitted.... that there could be no time if nothing changed.
     From: J.M.E. McTaggart (The Nature of Existence vol.2 [1927], II p.11), quoted by Sydney Shoemaker - Time Without Change p.49
     A reaction: This is set up alongside Aristotle (Idea 8590) to be attacked by Shoemaker. I think Shoemaker is right, and that the rejection of McTaggart's view is a key result in modern metaphysics.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
The B-series can be inferred from the A-series, but not the other way round [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: McTaggart says the A-series is more fundamental than the B-series. An objective being could not deduce the present moment of the A-series from the B-series, but the B-series can be deduced from the A-series.
     From: report of J.M.E. McTaggart (The Nature of Existence vol.2 [1927]) by Robin Le Poidevin - Travels in Four Dimensions 08 'McTaggart's'
     A reaction: [summarised] This has no ontological importance for McTaggart, since he thinks time is unreal either way. But giving the A-series priority because it reveals the present moment seems to nullify the B-series as incomplete.
A-series uses past, present and future; B-series uses 'before' and 'after' [McTaggart, by Girle]
     Full Idea: The A-series puts events into past, present and future. The B-series puts events into a series based on relationships of 'before' and 'after'. McTaggart said the A-series was contradictory, and the B-series failed to cope with essential features of time.
     From: report of J.M.E. McTaggart (The Nature of Existence vol.2 [1927]) by Rod Girle - Modal Logics and Philosophy 8.10
     A reaction: The A-series is indexical.
A-series expressions place things in time, and their truth varies; B-series is relative, and always true [McTaggart, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: A-series expressions include words like 'today' and 'five weeks ago', and can be true at one time and false at another; B-series expressions are like 'simultaneously', and are always true, if true at all.
     From: report of J.M.E. McTaggart (The Nature of Existence vol.2 [1927]) by E.J. Lowe - A Survey of Metaphysics p.308
     A reaction: A-series gives time separate existence, where B-series time is purely relational. Intuition favours the A-series, but how fast do events travel against this fixed background?
The B-series must depend on the A-series, because change must be explained [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: McTaggart's argument is 1) B-series relations are temporal relations, 2) There cannot be temporal relations unless there is change, 3) There cannot be change unless there is real A-series ordering, so there can't be a B-series unless there is an A-series.
     From: report of J.M.E. McTaggart (The Nature of Existence vol.2 [1927], vol.ii) by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 1 a
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
As all life is one, what need is there for words? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: As all life is one, what need is there for words?
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2)
     A reaction: In a sense this is nonsense, but it has an appeal. I presume that God would not need words, any more than he would need arithmetic. Life is obviously a complex one, with parts which can be discussed.
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 2. Taoism
Go with the flow, and be one with the void of Heaven [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Don't struggle, go with the flow, and you will find yourself at one with the vastness of the void of Heaven.
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.6)
     A reaction: Ugh. I've got all eternity to do that. The underlying assumption of Taoism seems to be that it is better not to have been born, and if you are thus unfortunate, you should try to pretend that it never happened. Much too negative for my taste.
Fish forget about each other in the pond and forget each other in the Tao [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Fish forget about each other in the pond and forget each other in the Tao.
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.6)
     A reaction: Strikingly different from Christianity. No wonder Europeans used to describe orientals as 'enigmatic'; the faces of Taoists presumably express indifference. Not for me, I'm afraid. I identify with my fellow humans, because of our shared predicaments.