17 ideas
17950 | The logos enables us to track one particular among a network of objects [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: The logos (the definition) is a summary statement of the path within a network of objects that one will have to follow in order to locate a particular member of that network. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Episteme and Logos in later Plato [1984], p.234) | |
A reaction: I like this because it confirms that Plato (as well as Aristotle) was interested in the particulars rather than in the kinds (which I take to be general truths about particulars). |
17951 | A logos may be short, but it contains reference to the whole domain of the object [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: A thing's logos, apparently short as it may be, is implicitly a very rich statement since it ultimately involves familiarity with the whole domain to which that particular object belongs. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Episteme and Logos in later Plato [1984], p.234) | |
A reaction: He may be wrong that the logos is short, since Aristotle (Idea 12292) says a definition can contain many assertions. |
22180 | Multiple realisability is said to make reduction impossible [Okasha] |
Full Idea: Philosophers have often invoked multiple realisability to explain why psychology cannot be reduced to physics or chemistry, but in principle the explanation works for any higher-level science. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 3) | |
A reaction: He gives the example of a 'cell' in biology, which can be implemented in all sorts of ways. Presumably that can be reduced to many sorts of physics, but not just to one sort. The high level contains patterns that vanish at the low level. |
17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: The theory of Forms is not a theory of universals but a first attempt to explain how predication, the application of a single term to many objects - now considered one of the most elementary operations of language - is possible. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxvii) |
17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: Only Tallness and nothing else really is tall; everything else merely participates in the Forms and, being excluded from the realm of Being, belongs to the inferior world of Becoming. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxviii) | |
A reaction: This is just as weird as the normal view (and puzzle of participation), but at least it makes more sense of 'metachein' (partaking). |
17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: The Greek 'episteme' is usually translated as 'knowledge' but, I argue, closer to our notion of understanding. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xvi) | |
A reaction: He agrees with Julia Annas on this. I take it to be crucial. See the first sentence of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. It is explanation which leads to understanding. |
22172 | Not all sciences are experimental; astronomy relies on careful observation [Okasha] |
Full Idea: Not all sciences are experimental - astronomers obviously cannot do experiments on the heavens, but have to content themselves with careful observation instead. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 1) | |
A reaction: Biology too. Psychology tries hard to be experimental, but I doubt whether the main theories emerge from experiments. |
22177 | Randomised Control Trials have a treatment and a control group, chosen at random [Okasha] |
Full Idea: In the Randomised Controlled Trial for a new drug, patients are divided at random into a treatment group who receive the drug, and a control group who do not. Randomisation is important to eliminate confounding factors. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Devised in the 1930s, and a major breakthrough in methodology for that kind of trial. Psychologists use the method all the time. Some theorists say it is the only reliable method. |
22174 | The discoverers of Neptune didn't change their theory because of an anomaly [Okasha] |
Full Idea: Adams and Leverrier began with Newton's theory of gravity, which made an incorrect prediction about the orbit of Uranus. They explained away the conflicting observations by postulating a new planet, Neptune. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 1) | |
A reaction: The falsificationists can say that the anomalous observation did not falsify the theory, because they didn't know quite what they were observing. It was not in fact an anomaly for Newtonian theory at all. |
22175 | Science mostly aims at confirming theories, rather than falsifying them [Okasha] |
Full Idea: The goal of science is not solely to refute theories, but also to determine which theories are true (or probably true). When a scientist collects data …they are trying to show that their own theory is true. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: This is the aim of 'accommodation' to a wide set of data, rather than prediction or refutation. |
22182 | Theories with unobservables are underdetermined by the evidence [Okasha] |
Full Idea: According to anti-realists, scientific theories which posit unobservable entities are underdetermined by the empirical data - there will always be a number of competing theories which can account for the data equally well. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 4) | |
A reaction: The fancy version is Putnam's model theoretic argument, explored by Tim Button. The reply, apparently, is that there are other criteria for theory choice, apart from the data. And we don't have to actually observe everything in a theory. |
22185 | Two things can't be incompatible if they are incommensurable [Okasha] |
Full Idea: If two things are incommensurable they cannot be incompatible. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 5) | |
A reaction: Kuhn had claimed that two rival theories are incompatible, which forces the paradigm shift. He can't stop the slide off into total relativism. The point is there cannot be a conflict if there cannot even be a comparison. |
22176 | Induction is inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind [Okasha] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers use 'inductive' to just mean not deductive, …but we reserve it for inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: The instances must at least be comparable. Must you know the kind before you start? Surely you can examine a sequence of things, trying to decide whether or not they are of one kind? Is checking the uniformity of a kind induction? |
22178 | If the rules only concern changes of belief, and not the starting point, absurd views can look ratiional [Okasha] |
Full Idea: If the only objective constraints concern how we should change our credences, but what our initial credences should be is entirely subjective, then individuals with very bizarre opinions about the world will count as perfectly rational. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: The important rationality has to be the assessement of a diverse batch of evidence, for which there can never be any rules or mathematics. |
22173 | Galileo refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier objects fall faster [Okasha] |
Full Idea: Galileo's most enduring contribution lay in mechanics, where he refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier bodies fall faster than lighter. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: This must the first idea in the theory of mechanics, allowing mathematical treatment and accurate comparisons. |
17366 | Virtually all modern views of speciation rest on relational rather than intrinsic features [Okasha] |
Full Idea: On all modern species concepts (except the phenetic), the property in virtue of which a particular organism belongs to one species rather than another is a relational rather than an intrinsic property of the organism. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Darwinian Metaphysics: Species and Essentialism [2002], p.201), quoted by Michael Devitt - Resurrecting Biological Essentialism 4 | |
A reaction: I am in sympathy with Devitt's attack on this view, for the same reason that I take relational explanations of almost anything (such as the mind) to be inadequate. We need to know the intrinsic features that enable the relations. |
1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |
Full Idea: The Egyptians were the first to claim that the soul of a human being is immortal, and that each time the body dies the soul enters another creature just as it is being born. | |
From: Herodotus (The Histories [c.435 BCE], 2.123.2) |