13 ideas
| 22701 | Jokes can sometimes be funny because they are offensive [Jacobson,D] |
| Full Idea: Sometimes it is exactly what is offensive about a joke that makes it funny. | |
| From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], 'emotional') | |
| A reaction: Jacobson offers this in support of his immoralist view, that immoral literature can be aesthetically successful. It is uncomfortable to find yourself laughing at a joke of which you disapprove. |
| 5504 | Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi] |
| Full Idea: Some recent philosophers have argued that we should replace the three-dimensional view of persons with a four-dimensional view according to which only time-slices, or 'stages', of persons exist at short intervals of time. | |
| From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3) | |
| A reaction: At first glance this seems to neatly eliminate lots of traditional worries. But why would I want to retain my identity, if someone threatened to brainwash me. I also want to disown my inadequate earlier selves. Interesting, though. Lewis. |
| 5503 | Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi] |
| Full Idea: A modern question is whether personal identity is primarily what matters in survival; that is, people might cease and be continued by others whose continuation the original people would value as much. | |
| From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3) | |
| A reaction: When put like this, the proposal seems hard to grasp. It only makes sense if you don't really believe in a thing called 'personal identity'. I don't see how you can believe in it without also believing that for you it has central importance. |
| 5502 | Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi] |
| Full Idea: In modern times the Lockean intrinsic relations view of personal identity has been superseded by an extrinsic relations view (also called the 'closest-continuer' or 'externalist' view). | |
| From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.1) | |
| A reaction: Sounds sweeping. My suspicion is that there is a raging fashion for externalist views of everything (justification, content etc.), but this will pass. I take Parfit to be the source of the modern views. |
| 22703 | We don't often respond to events in art as if they were real events [Jacobson,D] |
| Full Idea: We routinely do not respond to art as if we were as if we were real-life spectators of its events. | |
| From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], 'rejection') | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as one of the basic facts about aesthetics, and especially of narrative art. People sometimes encounter terrible events on the street, only to find someone is making a film. |
| 22702 | Audiences can be too moral [Jacobson,D] |
| Full Idea: An audience can be overly moralistic. | |
| From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], 'emotional') | |
| A reaction: People can be too moral in real life as well. Goody Two Shoes. |
| 22696 | 'Autonomism' says the morality is irrelevant to the aesthetics [Jacobson,D] |
| Full Idea: 'Autonomism' is the theory that the intrinsic moral merits and defects of an artwork are irrelevant to its aesthetic value. | |
| From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This contrasts with 'moralism', which says the ethics is part of the aesthetics. Autonomism seems to be the modern academic label for art for art's sake. In nineteenth century novels the ethics are central; in modernist novels they seem to be irrelevant. |
| 22697 | Moral defects of art can be among its aesthetic virtues [Jacobson,D] |
| Full Idea: To put my claim most provocatively: the moral defects in a work of art can be among its aesthetic virtues. This claim has been called 'immoralism'. | |
| From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], Intro) | |
| A reaction: To describe sympathetic descriptions of vile moral behaviour as 'defects' may be a misunderstanding. If a work sets out to promote wickedness, then its wickedness isn't a defect in the work. It could be a masterpiece of corruption. |
| 22700 | Immoral art encourages immoral emotions [Jacobson,D] |
| Full Idea: Humean moralism includes the view that immoral art prescribes unethical emotional responses. | |
| From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], 'emotional') | |
| A reaction: [He cites Hume's 'On the Standard of Taste'] 'Prescribes' is tricky. Is a vivid description of wicked events, given without comment, a prescription? What if the commentary condemns, but the description entices? Trust the work itself, said Lawrence. |
| 22699 | Moderate moralism says moral qualities can sometimes also be aesthetic qualities [Jacobson,D] |
| Full Idea: Noël Carroll's moderate moralism maintains that some moral defects in artworks are aesthetic defects, and some moral virtues are aesthetic merits. | |
| From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], 'How moderate') | |
| A reaction: I'm beginning to think that moralist critics are confusing morality and wisdom. We don't admire novels for hammering on about goodness. We admire their insight into characters and actions, of which the most interesting aspects happen to be moral. |
| 22698 | We can judge art ethically, or rate its ethical influence, or assess its quality via its ethics [Jacobson,D] |
| Full Idea: Ethical criticism includes 1) ethical judgements of art works, 2) assessment of an art work's role in moral education, or 3) bringing moral praise or censure to bear on the aesthetic evaluation. | |
| From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], 'What is') | |
| A reaction: [a compressed summary of Jacobson. He cites Levinson 1998 and Carroll 2000 as examples of ethical criticism] |
| 1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |
| Full Idea: The Egyptians were the first to claim that the soul of a human being is immortal, and that each time the body dies the soul enters another creature just as it is being born. | |
| From: Herodotus (The Histories [c.435 BCE], 2.123.2) |
| 5505 | For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi] |
| Full Idea: In Aristotle's view, with the possible exception of 'nous' the psyche and all its parts come into being at the same time as its associated body; it is inseparable from the body, and perishes along with it. | |
| From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.8) | |
| A reaction: It is suggested that he thought there was only one 'nous', which all humans share (p.9). If he wants to claim that one part is immortal, he doesn't have much evidence. If psyche is the form of the body, it is bound to perish. |