Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Herodotus, Dean W. Zimmerman and Michael Stanford

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9 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals

10197	An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place [Zimmerman,DW]
	Full Idea: An immanent universal will routinely be 'at some distance from itself', in the sense that it is wholly present in more than one place.
	From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306)
	A reaction: This is the Aristotelian view, which sounds distinctly implausible in this formulation. Though I suppose redness is wholly present in a tomato, in the way that fourness is wholly present in the Horsemen of the Apocalypse. How many rednesses are there?

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects

10198	If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW]
	Full Idea: If nothing existed except two electrons, which are indiscernible, it remains possible that differences will emerge later. Even if this universe has eternal symmetry, such differences are still logically, metaphysically, physically and causally possible.
	From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306)
	A reaction: The question then is whether the two electrons have hidden properties that make differences possible. Zimmerman assumes that 'laws' of an indeterministic kind will do the job. I doubt that. Can differences be discerned after the event?

10199	Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW]
	Full Idea: Possible differences which may later become discernible could be treated as differences in a counterpart, which is similar to, but not identical with, the original object.
	From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.307)
	A reaction: [compressed] This is a reply to Idea 10198, which implies that two things could never be indiscernible over time, because of their different possibilities. One must then decide issues about rigid designation and counterparts.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation

12314	Audience-relative explanation, or metaphysical explanation based on information? [Stanford]
	Full Idea: Rather than an 'interest-relative' notion of explanation (Putnam), it can be informational content which makes an explanation, which is an 'audience-invariant' contraint, which is not pragmatic, but mainly epistemological and also partly metaphysical.
	From: Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.172)
	A reaction: [compressed summary of Ruben 1990] Examples given are that Rome burning explains Nero fiddling, even if no one ever says so, and learning that George III had porphyria explains his madness.

12313	Explanation is for curiosity, control, understanding, to make meaningful, or to give authority [Stanford]
	Full Idea: There are a number of reasons why we explain: out of sheer curiosity, to increase our control of a situation, to help understanding by simplifying or making familiar, to confer meaning or significance, and to give scientific authority to some statement.
	From: Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.172)

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction

12315	We can explain by showing constitution, as well as showing causes [Stanford]
	Full Idea: The powerful engine of my car can be explained by an examination of each of its parts, but it is not caused by them. They do not cause the engine; they constitute it.
	From: Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.174)
	A reaction: [example from Ruben 1990:221] This could be challenged, since there is clearly a causal connection between the constitution and the whole. We distinguish engine parts which contribute to the power from those which do not.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block

14610	Neither 'moving spotlight' nor 'growing block' views explain why we care what is present or past [Zimmerman,DW]
	Full Idea: Neither the 'moving spotlight' nor the 'growing block' view of A-theory time can explain why we care so much about whether things (such as a headache) are present or past.
	From: Dean W. Zimmerman (The Privileged Present: A-Theory [2008], 3)
	A reaction: He goes on the defend Presentism as the best version of the A-series view. You can't deny that the past is more of a 'truthmaker' than the future, so it seems to have a firmer ontological status. Deeply weird.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series

14608	A-theorists, unlike B-theorists, believe some sort of objective distinction between past, present and future [Zimmerman,DW]
	Full Idea: To be an A-theorist is to believe in some sort of objective distinction between what is present and past and future. ..To be a B-theorist is to deny the objectivity of our talk about past, present and future.
	From: Dean W. Zimmerman (The Privileged Present: A-Theory [2008], 2)
	A reaction: The A/B distinction originates with McTaggart. All my intuitions side with the A-theory, certainly to the extent that the present seems to be objectively privileged in some way (despite special relativity).

29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality

1513	The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus]
	Full Idea: The Egyptians were the first to claim that the soul of a human being is immortal, and that each time the body dies the soul enters another creature just as it is being born.
	From: Herodotus (The Histories [c.435 BCE], 2.123.2)