10198
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If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW]
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Full Idea:
If nothing existed except two electrons, which are indiscernible, it remains possible that differences will emerge later. Even if this universe has eternal symmetry, such differences are still logically, metaphysically, physically and causally possible.
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From:
Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306)
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A reaction:
The question then is whether the two electrons have hidden properties that make differences possible. Zimmerman assumes that 'laws' of an indeterministic kind will do the job. I doubt that. Can differences be discerned after the event?
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10199
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Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW]
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Full Idea:
Possible differences which may later become discernible could be treated as differences in a counterpart, which is similar to, but not identical with, the original object.
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From:
Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.307)
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A reaction:
[compressed] This is a reply to Idea 10198, which implies that two things could never be indiscernible over time, because of their different possibilities. One must then decide issues about rigid designation and counterparts.
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12314
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Audience-relative explanation, or metaphysical explanation based on information? [Stanford]
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Full Idea:
Rather than an 'interest-relative' notion of explanation (Putnam), it can be informational content which makes an explanation, which is an 'audience-invariant' contraint, which is not pragmatic, but mainly epistemological and also partly metaphysical.
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From:
Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.172)
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A reaction:
[compressed summary of Ruben 1990] Examples given are that Rome burning explains Nero fiddling, even if no one ever says so, and learning that George III had porphyria explains his madness.
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14608
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A-theorists, unlike B-theorists, believe some sort of objective distinction between past, present and future [Zimmerman,DW]
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Full Idea:
To be an A-theorist is to believe in some sort of objective distinction between what is present and past and future. ..To be a B-theorist is to deny the objectivity of our talk about past, present and future.
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From:
Dean W. Zimmerman (The Privileged Present: A-Theory [2008], 2)
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A reaction:
The A/B distinction originates with McTaggart. All my intuitions side with the A-theory, certainly to the extent that the present seems to be objectively privileged in some way (despite special relativity).
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