9 ideas
8886 | Being a true justified belief is not a sufficient condition for knowledge [Gettier] |
Full Idea: The claim that someone knows a proposition if it is true, it is believed, and the person is justified in their belief is false, in that the conditions do not state a sufficient condition for the claim. | |
From: Edmund L. Gettier (Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? [1963], p.145) | |
A reaction: This is the beginning of the famous Gettier Problem, which has motivated most epistemology for the last forty years. Gettier implies that justification is necessary, even if it is not sufficient. He gives two counterexamples. |
23513 | Single neurons can carry out complex functions [Seth] |
Full Idea: It is increasingly apparent that even single neurons are capable of carrying out highly complex functions all by themselves. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], I.1 n) | |
A reaction: Bang goes the simple connectionist account of consciousness. |
23514 | The cerbellum has a huge number of neurons, but little involvement in consciousness [Seth] |
Full Idea: The cerebellum [at the back] has about four times as many neurons as the rest of the brain put together, but seems barely involved in consciousness. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], I.2) | |
A reaction: I wonder if it also has four times as many connections? |
23516 | Maybe a system is conscious if the whole generates more information than its parts [Seth] |
Full Idea: The main claim of Tononi's 'integrated information theory' is that a system is conscious to the extent that its whole generates more information than its parts. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], I.3) | |
A reaction: Seth seems to present this as an 'interesting' proposal. I find it unlikely that consciousness could be explain in terms of information, or that a machine constructed on this principle would thus become conscious. (Databases pass this test). |
23519 | The self is embodied, perspectival, volitional, narrative and social [Seth, by PG] |
Full Idea: The elements of a self are 1) embodied - related directly to the body, 2) perspectival - having a viewpoint, 3) volitional - being an agent, 4) narrative - aware of past and future, and 5) social - as others perceive me. | |
From: report of Anil Seth (Being You [2021], III.8) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: [summarised] Seth says there are distinctive emotions associated with each of these aspects of the self. This list is very helpful, as a discouragement for anyone who wants to pick one of these as the sole true nature of the self. |
23518 | Modern AI is mostly machine-based pattern recognition [Seth] |
Full Idea: Much of today's AI is best described as sophisticated machine-based pattern recognition. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], IV.13) | |
A reaction: Personally I wouldn't want to underestimate the extent to which human intelligence is also pattern recognition (across time as well as in space). |
23517 | Volition is felt as doing what you want, with possible alternatives, and a source from within [Seth] |
Full Idea: The experience of volition is defined by 1) the feeling that I am doing what I want to do, 2) that I could have done otherwise, and 3) that voluntary actions seem to come from within. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], III.11) | |
A reaction: Note that these can all be cited without reference to their feeling 'free'. |
23515 | Human exceptionalism plagues biology, and most other human thinking [Seth] |
Full Idea: Human exceptionalism has repeatedly plagued biology, and has darkened the history of human thought everywhere. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], I.2) | |
A reaction: I increasingly agree with this, as much in philosophy as in biology. We really need to get used to our place in evolution. |
1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |
Full Idea: The Egyptians were the first to claim that the soul of a human being is immortal, and that each time the body dies the soul enters another creature just as it is being born. | |
From: Herodotus (The Histories [c.435 BCE], 2.123.2) |