32 ideas
20955 | Art can make reason more all-inclusive, by articulating what seemed inexpressible [Bowie] |
Full Idea: The early German Romantics argued that art pointed to a more all-inclusive conception of reason, which can offer ways of articulating what is not conceptually accessible. | |
From: Andrew Bowie (Introduction to German Philosophy [2003], 5 'Reason') | |
A reaction: [This is Novalis, F.Schlegel, Schleiermacher, and Hölderlin] I'm in favour of expanding reason, to include assessment of situations and coherence, rather than just stepwise reasoning. Not sure that art 'articulates' something new. |
3750 | "It is true that x" means no more than x [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: It is evident that "It is true that Caesar was murdered" means no more than that Caesar was murdered. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (Facts and Propositions [1927]) | |
A reaction: At the very least, saying it is true adds emphasis. One sentence is about Caesar, the other about a proposal concerning Caesar, so they can't quite be the same. Note Frege's priority in making this suggestion. |
13430 | Infinity: there is an infinity of distinguishable individuals [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Infinity means that there are an infinity of distinguishable individuals, which is an empirical proposition. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §5) | |
A reaction: The Axiom sounds absurd, as a part of a logical system, but Ramsey ends up defending it. Logical tautologies, which seem to be obviously true, are rendered absurd if they don't refer to any objects, and some of them refer to infinities of objects. |
13428 | Reducibility: to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Reducibility asserted that to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [note: two functions are equivalent when the same arguments render them both true or both false]. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §2) | |
A reaction: Ramsey in the business of showing that this axiom from Russell and Whitehead is not needed. He says that the axiom seems to be needed for induction and for Dedekind cuts. Since the cuts rest on it, and it is weak, Ramsey says it must go. |
13427 | Either 'a = b' vacuously names the same thing, or absurdly names different things [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: In 'a = b' either 'a' and 'b' are names of the same thing, in which case the proposition says nothing, or of different things, in which case it is absurd. In neither case is it an assertion of a fact; it only asserts when a or b are descriptions. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §1) | |
A reaction: This is essentially Frege's problem with Hesperus and Phosphorus. How can identities be informative? So 2+2=4 is extensionally vacuous, but informative because they are different descriptions. |
13334 | Contradictions are either purely logical or mathematical, or they involved thought and language [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: Group A consists of contradictions which would occur in a logical or mathematical system, involving terms such as class or number. Group B contradictions are not purely logical, and contain some reference to thought, language or symbolism. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], p.171), quoted by Graham Priest - The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference 1 | |
A reaction: This has become the orthodox division of all paradoxes, but the division is challenged by Priest (Idea 13373). He suggests that we now realise (post-Tarski?) that language is more involved in logic and mathematics than we thought. |
6409 | The 'simple theory of types' distinguishes levels among properties [Ramsey, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: The idea that there should be something like a distinction of levels among properties is captured in Ramsey's 'simple theory of types'. | |
From: report of Frank P. Ramsey (works [1928]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell | |
A reaction: I merely report this, though it is not immediately obvious how anyone would decide which 'level' a type belonged on. |
13426 | Formalists neglect content, but the logicists have focused on generalizations, and neglected form [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: The formalists neglected the content altogether and made mathematics meaningless, but the logicians neglected the form and made mathematics consist of any true generalisations; only by taking account of both sides can we obtain an adequate theory. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §1) | |
A reaction: He says mathematics is 'tautological generalizations'. It is a criticism of modern structuralism that it overemphasises form, and fails to pay attention to the meaning of the concepts which stand at the 'nodes' of the structure. |
13425 | Formalism is hopeless, because it focuses on propositions and ignores concepts [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: The hopelessly inadequate formalist theory is, to some extent, the result of considering only the propositions of mathematics and neglecting the analysis of its concepts. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §1) | |
A reaction: You'll have to read Ramsey to see how this thought pans out, but it at least gives a pointer to how to go about addressing the question. |
8495 | The distinction between particulars and universals is a mistake made because of language [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: The whole theory of particulars and universals is due to mistaking for a fundamental characteristic of reality what is merely a characteristic of language. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.13) | |
A reaction: [Fraser MacBride has pursued this idea] It is rather difficult to deny the existence of particulars, in the sense of actual objects, so this appears to make Ramsey a straightforward nominalist, of some sort or other. |
8493 | We could make universals collections of particulars, or particulars collections of their qualities [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: The two obvious methods of abolishing the distinction between particulars and universals are by holding either that universals are collections of particulars, or that particulars are collections of their qualities. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.8) | |
A reaction: Ramsey proposes an error theory, arising out of language. Quine seems to offer another attempt, making objects and predication unanalysable and basic. Abstract reference seems to make the strongest claim to separate out the universals. |
8494 | Obviously 'Socrates is wise' and 'Socrates has wisdom' express the same fact [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: It seems to me as clear as anything can be in philosophy that the two sentences 'Socrates is wise' and 'wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates' assert the same fact and express the same proposition. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.12) | |
A reaction: Could be challenged. One says Socrates is just the way he is, the other says he is attached to an abstract entity greater than himself. The squabble over universals has become a squabble over logical form. Finding logical form needs metaphysics! |
10993 | Ramsey's Test: believe the consequent if you believe the antecedent [Ramsey, by Read] |
Full Idea: Ramsey's Test for conditionals is that a conditional should be believed if a belief in its antecedent would commit one to believing its consequent. | |
From: report of Frank P. Ramsey (Law and Causality [1928]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.3 | |
A reaction: A rather pragmatic approach to conditionals |
13766 | 'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey] |
Full Idea: Ramsey suggested that 'if', 'given that' and 'on the supposition that' come to the same thing, and that the degrees of belief in the antecedent should then conform to probability theory. | |
From: report of Frank P. Ramsey (Truth and Probability [1926]) by Frank P. Ramsey - Law and Causality B | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
14279 | Asking 'If p, will q?' when p is uncertain, then first add p hypothetically to your knowledge [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: If two people are arguing 'If p, will q?' and are both in doubt as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge, and arguing on that basis about q; ...they are fixing their degrees of belief in q given p. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (Law and Causality [1928], B 155 n) | |
A reaction: This has become famous as the 'Ramsey Test'. Bennett emphasises that he is not saying that you should actually believe p - you are just trying it for size. The presupposition approach to conditionals seems attractive. Edgington likes 'degrees'. |
3212 | Beliefs are maps by which we steer [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: Beliefs are maps by which we steer. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (works [1928]), quoted by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind p.259 n5 |
22328 | I just confront the evidence, and let it act on me [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: I can but put the evidence before me, and let it act on my mind. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], p.202), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 70 'Deg' | |
A reaction: Potter calls this observation 'downbeat', but I am an enthusiastic fan. It is roughly my view of both concept formation and of knowledge. You soak up the world, and respond appropriately. The trick is in the selection of evidence to confront. |
22049 | Transcendental idealism aims to explain objectivity through subjectivity [Bowie] |
Full Idea: The aim of transcendental idealism is to give a basis for objectivity in terms of subjectivity. | |
From: Andrew Bowie (German Philosophy: a very short introduction [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: Hume used subjectivity to undermine the findings of objectivity. There was then no return to naive objectivity. Kant's aim then was to thwart global scepticism. Post-Kantians feared that he had failed. |
20950 | German Idealism says our thinking and nature have the same rational structure [Bowie] |
Full Idea: German Idealism aims to demonstrate that our thinking relates to a nature which is intelligibly structured in the same way as our thinking is structured. | |
From: Andrew Bowie (Introduction to German Philosophy [2003], 3 'Limits') | |
A reaction: Now that's an idealism I might buy into. Frege thought his logic was mapping rational reality. My angle is that we are a product of this 'reality', so we should expect our thinking to be similarly structured. Reason is derived from nature. |
22055 | The Idealists saw the same unexplained spontaneity in Kant's judgements and choices [Bowie] |
Full Idea: The Idealist saw in Kant that knowledge, which depends on the spontaneity of judgement, and self-determined spontaneous action, can be seen as sharing the same source, which is not accessible to scientific investigation. | |
From: Andrew Bowie (German Philosophy: a very short introduction [2010]) | |
A reaction: This is the 'spontaneity' of judgements and choices which was seen as the main idea in Kant. It inspired romantic individualism. The judgements are the rule-based application of concepts. |
22054 | German Idealism tried to stop oppositions of appearances/things and receptivity/spontaneity [Bowie] |
Full Idea: A central aim of German Idealism is to overcome Kant's oppositions between appearances and thing in themselves, and between receptivity and spontaneity. | |
From: Andrew Bowie (German Philosophy: a very short introduction [2010], 2) | |
A reaction: I have the impression that there were two strategies: break down the opposition within the self (Fichte), or break down the opposition in the world (Spinozism). |
22056 | Crucial to Idealism is the idea of continuity between receptivity and spontaneous judgement [Bowie] |
Full Idea: A crucial idea for German Idealism (from Hamann) is that apparently passive receptivity and active spontaneity are in fact different degrees of the same 'activity, and the gap between subject and world can be closed. | |
From: Andrew Bowie (German Philosophy: a very short introduction [2010], 3) | |
A reaction: The 'passive' bit seems to be Hume's 'impressions', which are Kant's 'intuitions', which need 'spontaneous' interpretation to become experiences. Critics of Kant said this implied a dualism. |
22325 | A belief is knowledge if it is true, certain and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: I have always said that a belief was knowledge if it was 1) true, ii) certain, iii) obtained by a reliable process. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], p.258), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 66 'Rel' | |
A reaction: Not sure why it has to be 'certain' as well as 'true'. It seems that 'true' is objective, and 'certain' subjective. I think I know lots of things of which I am not fully certain. Reliabilism long preceded Alvin Goldman. |
19724 | Belief is knowledge if it is true, certain, and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: I have always said that a belief was knowledge if it was (i) true, (ii) certain, (iii) obtained by a reliable process. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (Knowledge [1929]), quoted by Juan Comesaña - Reliabilism 2 | |
A reaction: Remarkable to be addressing the Gettier problem at that date, but Russell had flirted with the problem. Ramsey says the production of the belief must be reliable, rather than the justification for the belief. Note that he wants certainty. |
6894 | Mental terms can be replaced in a sentence by a variable and an existential quantifier [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: Ramsey Sentences are his technique for eliminating theoretical terms in science (and can be applied to mental terms, or to social rights); a term in a sentence is replaced by a variable and an existential quantifier. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (Law and Causality [1928]), quoted by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.469 | |
A reaction: The technique is used by functionalists and results in a sort of eliminativism. The intrinsic nature of mental states is eliminated, because everything worth saying can be expressed in terms of functional/causal role. Sounds wrong to me. |
19143 | Ramsey gave axioms for an uncertain agent to decide their preferences [Ramsey, by Davidson] |
Full Idea: Ramsey gave an axiomatic treatment of preference in the face of uncertainty, when applied to a particular agent. | |
From: report of Frank P. Ramsey (Truth and Probability [1926]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 2 | |
A reaction: This is evidently the beginnings of Bayesian decision theory. |
20942 | Nazis think race predetermines the self [Bowie] |
Full Idea: The Nazi idea is that the self is predetermined primarily by its race. | |
From: Andrew Bowie (Introduction to German Philosophy [2003], Intro) | |
A reaction: I suspect that I occasionally encounter this view, in very patriotic people. But then you meet people who feeling that their self is mainly determined by support of a football team. Note, though, 'pre-'determined. Hegel makes this idea possible? |
18818 | Sentence meaning is given by the actions to which it would lead [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: The meaning of a sentence is to be defined by reference to the actions to which asserting it would lead. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (Facts and Propositions [1927], p.51), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought | |
A reaction: I find this idea quite bizarre. Most sentences have no connection to any action or behavior at all. Do we have to ingeniously contrive some possible action? That is the worst sort of behaviourism. See context - Ramsey wasn't stupid! |
20946 | Rhetoric is built into language, so it cannot be stripped from philosophy [Bowie] |
Full Idea: The attempt to rid philosophy of rhetoric falls prey precisely to that fact that what is involved in rhetoric is inherent in what is built into all natural languages by their genesis in the real historical world. | |
From: Andrew Bowie (Introduction to German Philosophy [2003], 2 'Hamann') | |
A reaction: Rhetoric can range from charming to bullying, and it is the latter which is the problem. The underlying issue is dogma versus dialectic. Some analytic philosophers have a good shot at being non-rhetorical. |
9418 | All knowledge needs systematizing, and the axioms would be the laws of nature [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: Even if we knew everything, we should still want to systematize our knowledge as a deductive system, and the general axioms in that system would be the fundamental laws of nature. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (Law and Causality [1928], §A) | |
A reaction: This is the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis view. Cf. Idea 9420. |
9420 | Causal laws result from the simplest axioms of a complete deductive system [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: Causal laws are consequences of those propositions which we should take as axioms if we knew everything and organized it as simply as possible in a deductive system. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (Law and Causality [1928], §B) | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 9418. |
1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |
Full Idea: The Egyptians were the first to claim that the soul of a human being is immortal, and that each time the body dies the soul enters another creature just as it is being born. | |
From: Herodotus (The Histories [c.435 BCE], 2.123.2) |