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7401
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Heat and colour don't exist, so cannot mislead about the external world [Galileo, by Tuck]
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Full Idea:
Galileo argued that there is no such thing as heat (and hence also as colour) in the external world, so there is no reason to conclude from colour-blindness that we cannot know the truth about the world.
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From:
report of Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.1
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A reaction:
This key idea, taken up by Gassendi, Descartes and Locke, seems to me to be one of the most important (and, in retrospect, rather obvious) facts ever worked out by the human mind. Why does anyone still doubt it?
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5454
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Tastes, odours and colours only reside in consciousness, and would disappear with creatures [Galileo]
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Full Idea:
I think tastes, odours, colours, and so on are mere names as far as the objects are concerned, and only reside in consciousness. Hence if the living creature were removed, all these qualities would be wiped away and annihilated.
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From:
Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]), quoted by Brian Ellis - The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism Ch.3
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A reaction:
A nice bold assertion of the primary/secondary distinction from the first great scientist. I agree, and to disagree (and hence side with Berkeley and Hume) is to head for metaphsical and epistemological confusion.
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7322
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Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A]
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Full Idea:
We should distinguish 'constitutive scepticism' (about the existence of certain sorts of facts) from the traditional 'epistemological scepticism' (which concedes that the sort of fact in question exists, but questions our right to claim knowledge of it).
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From:
Alexander Miller (Philosophy of Language [1998], 4.7)
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A reaction:
I would be inclined to call the first type 'ontological scepticism'. Miller is discussing Quine's scepticism about meaning. Atheists fall into the first group, and agnostics into the second. An important, and nicely simple, distinction.
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16560
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Galileo introduced geometrico-mechanical explanation, based on Archimedes [Galileo, by Machamer/Darden/Craver]
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Full Idea:
The modern idea of explaining with mechanisms became current in the 17th century when Galileo articulated a geometrico-mechanical form of explanation based on Archimedes' simple machines. This became the 'mechanical philosophy'.
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From:
report of Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]) by Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C - Thinking About Mechanisms 5.2
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A reaction:
So is Archimedes the source? I would say that mechanical explanation is just commonsense, and is predominant in all human thinking, even in tiny infants.
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7325
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Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A]
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Full Idea:
Dispositional facts are facts about what we will do, not about what we ought to do, and as such cannot capture the normativity of meaning.
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From:
Alexander Miller (Philosophy of Language [1998], 6.2)
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A reaction:
Miller is discussing language, but this raises a nice question for all behaviourist accounts of mental events. Perhaps there is a disposition to behave in a guilty way if you do something you think you shouldn't do. (Er, isn't 'guilt' a mental event?)
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7324
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Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
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Full Idea:
Grice wants to explain linguistic meaning in terms of the content of propositional attitudes, Dummett has championed the view that propositional attitudes must be explained by linguistic meaning, while Davidson says they must be explained together.
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From:
Alexander Miller (Philosophy of Language [1998], 6.1)
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A reaction:
A useful map. My intuition says propositional attitudes come first, for evolutionary reasons. We are animals first, and speakers second. Thought precedes language. A highly social animal flourishes if it can communicate.
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7328
|
The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A]
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Full Idea:
Properly construed, the principle of charity is a holistic constraint applying, not to individual beliefs, but rather to systems of belief: we must interpret a speaker so that most of the beliefs in his system are, by our lights, true.
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From:
Alexander Miller (Philosophy of Language [1998], 8.7)
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A reaction:
This is a lot more plausible than applying the principle to individual sentences, particularly if you are in the company of habitual ironists or constitutional liars.
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19673
|
Galileo mathematised movement, and revealed its invariable component - acceleration [Galileo, by Meillassoux]
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Full Idea:
Galileo conceives of movement in mathematical terms. ...In doing so, he uncovered, beyond the variations of position and speed, the mathematical invariant of movement - that is to say, acceleration.
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From:
report of Galileo Galilei (Two Chief World Systems [1632]) by Quentin Meillassoux - After Finitude; the necessity of contingency 5
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A reaction:
That is a very nice advert for the mathematical physics which replaced the Aristotelian substantial forms. ...And yet, is acceleration some deep fact about nature, or a concept which is only needed if you insist on being mathematical?
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