Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Herodotus, J.L. Mackie and David Roochnik

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
You have to be a Platonist to debate about reality, so every philosopher is a Platonist [Roochnik]
     Full Idea: Everyone who enters into a debate about reality automatically becomes a Platonist. Since such debates are the essence of philosophy, every philosopher is a Platonist.
     From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.199)
     A reaction: This is correct
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy aims to satisfy the chief human desire - the articulation of beauty itself [Roochnik]
     Full Idea: Philosophy, the attempt to articulate the vision of beauty itself, is the attempt to satisfy the highest human desire.
     From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.120)
     A reaction: A million miles away from modern philosophy, but still an ideal to be taken seriously.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
In the seventeenth century the only acceptable form of logos was technical knowledge [Roochnik]
     Full Idea: In the seventeenth century only a certain type of logos was deemed legitimate, namely that identified with technical knowledge (or 'techné').
     From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], Intro. 15)
Logos is not unconditionally good, but good if there is another person willing to engage with it [Roochnik]
     Full Idea: Logos is not unconditionally good, but good contingent on there being some other person (out there) who is willing to talk with logos, to approach it even as an opponent.
     From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.175)
The hallmark of a person with logos is that they give reasons why one opinion is superior to another [Roochnik]
     Full Idea: What is supposed to identify the person of logos from the one without is the commitment to giving reasons explaining why one opinion is superior to another.
     From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], Intro. 17)
Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle [Roochnik]
     Full Idea: Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle.
     From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.109)
'Logos' ranges from thought/reasoning, to words, to rational structures outside thought [Roochnik]
     Full Idea: Logos can mean i) a thought or reasoning, ii) the word which expresses a thought, iii) a rational structure outside human thought. These meanings give 'logos' an extraordinary range.
     From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], Intro. 12)
Logos cannot refute the relativist, and so must admit that it too is a matter of desire (for truth and agreement) [Roochnik]
     Full Idea: Logos cannot refute the radical, consistent and self-conscious relativist. Therefore it must admit that, like the relativist, it itself is essentially a matter of desire. It wants to say what is right and wrong, true and false, and for others to agree.
     From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.108)
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
We prefer reason or poetry according to whether basics are intelligible or not [Roochnik]
     Full Idea: Is the arché (basis) intelligible, or is it chaos? Upon this question hinges all, for answering it determines whether poetry or logos is the form of human speech that best does justice to the world.
     From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.139)
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Modern science, by aiming for clarity about the external world, has abandoned rationality in the human world [Roochnik]
     Full Idea: The modern scientific world view, with all its hope for clarity and precision, has a flipside, …which is its abandonment of rationality in the world of human significance.
     From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.74)
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Unfortunately for reason, argument can't be used to establish the value of argument [Roochnik]
     Full Idea: Unfortunately for the logos there is no argument that can, without begging the question, establish the goodness of argumentation.
     From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.106)
Attempts to suspend all presuppositions are hopeless, because a common ground must be agreed for the process [Roochnik]
     Full Idea: To debate about suspending all our presuppositions requires a common ground which, upon being established, immediately renders the debate superfluous.
     From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.144)
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality can be viewed neutrally, or as an object of desire [Roochnik]
     Full Idea: There are two extremes: the Aristotelian views reality simply as reality, and the sophist or poet views reality only as an object of desire.
     From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.199)
     A reaction: Not sure about the second one. Does this express an actual desire, or just a hope? Could there be a mind for which its reality was only an aspiration?
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Relativism is a disease which destroys the possibility of rational debate [Roochnik]
     Full Idea: Relativism is disease, is pollution, for it negates the efficacy of logos. It destroys the possibility of a complete rational debate of fundamental questions.
     From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.41)
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Reasoning aims not at the understanding of objects, but at the desire to give beautiful speeches [Roochnik]
     Full Idea: Logos originates not in a cognitive capacity for the apprehension of objects, but in the desire to give birth to beautiful speeches.
     From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.124)
     A reaction: It is hard for us to grasp this, but it might be quite life-enhancing if we could return to that old way of thought.
If relativism is the correct account of human values, then rhetoric is more important than reasoning [Roochnik]
     Full Idea: If relativism offers an accurate description of human values, then rhetoric replaces logos as the most fundamental human activity.
     From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.47)
     A reaction: Or putting it another way, logos (reason) becomes meaningless. I suppose, though, that a relativist can conduct conditional reasoning (but must belief in some rules of reason).
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
The 'error theory' of morals says there is no moral knowledge, because there are no moral facts [Mackie, by Engel]
     Full Idea: Mackie's 'error theory' of ethics says that if a fact is something that corresponds to a true proposition, there are actually no moral facts, hence no knowledge of what moral statements are about.
     From: report of J.L. Mackie (Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong [1977]) by Pascal Engel - Truth §4.2
     A reaction: Personally I am inclined to think that there are moral facts (about what nature shows us constitutes a good human being), based on virtue theory. Mackie is a good warning, though, against making excessive claims. You end up like a bad scientist.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie]
     Full Idea: It is sometimes suggested that our ability to recognise a single occurrence as an instance of mental causation is a feature which distinguishes mental causation from physical or 'Humean' causation.
     From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §9)
     A reaction: Hume says regularities are needed for mental causation too. Concentrate hard on causing a lightning flash - 'did I do that?' Gradually recovering from paralysis; you wouldn't just move your leg once, and know it was all right!
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie]
     Full Idea: In spite of Mackie's announced aim of analysing singular causal statements, it is doubtful that the entities that he is concerned with can be consistently interpreted as spatio-temporally bounded individual events.
     From: comment on J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965]) by Jaegwon Kim - Causes and Events: Mackie on causation §3
     A reaction: This is because Mackie mainly talks about 'conditions'. Nearly every theory I encounter in modern philosophy gets accused of either circular definitions, or inadequate individuation conditions for key components. A tough world for theory-makers.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie]
     Full Idea: Relations of necessity and sufficiency seem best suited for properties and for property-like entities such as generic states and events; their application to individual events and states is best explained as derivative from properties and generic events.
     From: comment on J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965]) by Jaegwon Kim - Causes and Events: Mackie on causation §4
     A reaction: This seems to suggest that necessity must either derive from laws, or from powers. It is certainly hard to see how you could do Mackie's assessment of necessary and sufficient components, without comparing similar events.
A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane]
     Full Idea: The details of Mackie's analysis are complex, but the general idea is that the cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect.
     From: report of J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965]) by Tim Crane - Causation 1.3.3
     A reaction: Helpful. Why does something have to be 'the' cause? Immediacy is a vital part of it. A house could be a 'fire waiting to happen'. Oxygen is an INUS condition for a fire.
Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie]
     Full Idea: A necessary causal condition is closely related to a counterfactual conditional: if no-cause then no-effect, and a sufficient causal condition is closely related to a factual conditional (Goodman's phrase): since cause-here then effect.
     From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §4)
     A reaction: The 'factual conditional' just seems to be an assertion that causation occurred (dressed up with the logical-sounding 'since'). An important distinction for Lewis. Sufficiency doesn't seem to need possible-worlds talk.
The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie]
     Full Idea: My account shows how a singular causal statement can be interpreted, and how the corresponding sequence can be shown to be causal, even if the corresponding complete laws are not known.
     From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §9)
     A reaction: Since the 'complete' laws are virtually never known, it would be a bit much to require that to assert causation. His theory is the 'INUS' account of causal conditions - see Idea 8333.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
     Full Idea: If a short-circuit causes a fire, the so-called cause is, and is known to be, an Insufficient but Necessary part of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the result. Let us call this an INUS condition.
     From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §1)
     A reaction: I'm not clear why it is necessary, given that the fire could have started without the short-circuit. The final situation must certainly be sufficient. If only one situation can cause an effect, then the whole situation is necessary.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley]
     Full Idea: For general causal statements Mackie favours a nomological account, but for singular causal statements he argued for an analysis in terms of subjunctive conditionals.
     From: report of J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965]) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience 5.2
     A reaction: These seem to be consistent, by explaining each by placing it within a broader account of reality. Personally I think Ducasse gives the best account of how you get from the particular to the general (via similarity and utility).
The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie]
     Full Idea: We may say not merely that this virus causes yellow fever, but also that it is 'the' cause of yellow fever; but we could only say that sweet-eating causes dental decay, not that it is the cause of dental decay (except in an individual case).
     From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §3)
     A reaction: A bit confusing, but there seems to be something important here, concerning the relation between singular causation and law-governed causation. 'The' cause may not be sufficient (I'm immune to yellow fever). So 'the' cause is the only necessary one?
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus]
     Full Idea: The Egyptians were the first to claim that the soul of a human being is immortal, and that each time the body dies the soul enters another creature just as it is being born.
     From: Herodotus (The Histories [c.435 BCE], 2.123.2)
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
Is evil an illusion, or a necessary contrast, or uncontrollable, or necessary for human free will? [Mackie, by PG]
     Full Idea: Perhaps evil is an illusion, or it is necessary for good to exist, or in humans it is required because we have free will, or God lacks the full power to control it, but none of these looks convincing.
     From: report of J.L. Mackie (Evil and Omnipotence [1955], §B) by PG - Db (ideas)
The propositions that God is good and omnipotent, and that evil exists, are logically contradictory [Mackie, by PG]
     Full Idea: There is a contradiction between the propositions that God is wholly good, God is omnipotent, and evil exists, and one of them has got to give way (assuming good eliminates evil, and omnipotence has no limit).
     From: report of J.L. Mackie (Evil and Omnipotence [1955], Pref.) by PG - Db (ideas)