Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Herodotus, Joseph Butler and Empedocles

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30 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Nothing could come out of nothing, and existence could never completely cease [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: From what in no wise exists, it is impossible for anything to come into being; for Being to perish completely is incapable of fulfilment and unthinkable.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B012), quoted by Anon (Lyc) - On Melissus 975b1-4
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Empedocles says things are at rest, unless love unites them, or hatred splits them [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Empedocles claims that things are alternately changing and at rest - that they are changing whenever love is creating a unity out of plurality, or hatred is creating plurality out of unity, and they are at rest in the times in between.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 250b26
     A reaction: I suppose one must say that this an example of Ruskin's 'pathetic fallacy' - reading human emotions into the cosmos. Being constructive little creatures, we think goodness leads to construction. I'm afraid Empedocles is just wrong.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only mixing and separating [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Empedocles says there is no coming-to-be of anything, but only a mingling and a divorce of what has been mingled.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314b08
     A reaction: Aristotle comments that this prevents Empedocleans from distinguishing between superficial alteration and fundamental change of identity. Presumably, though, that wouldn't bother them.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Substance is not created or destroyed in mortals, but there is only mixing and exchange [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: There is no creation of substance in any one of mortal existence, nor any end in execrable death, but only mixing and exchange of what has been mixed.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B008), quoted by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1111f
     A reaction: also Aristotle 314b08
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Everything is what it is, and not another thing [Butler]
     Full Idea: Everything is what it is, and not another thing.
     From: Joseph Butler (works [1732]), quoted by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 2.4
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler]
     Full Idea: When a man swears to the same tree having stood for fifty years in the same place, he means ...not that the tree has been all that time the same in the strict philosophical sense of the word. ...In a loose and popular sense they are said to be the same.
     From: Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1)
     A reaction: A helpful distinction which we should hang on. Of course, by the standards of modern physics, nothing is strictly the same from one Planck time to the next. All is flux. So we either drop the word 'same' (for objects) or relax a bit.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
One vision is produced by both eyes [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: One vision is produced by both eyes
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B088), quoted by Strabo - works 8.364.3
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler]
     Full Idea: Though the successive consciousnesses which we have of our own existence are not the same, yet they are consciousnesses of one and the same thing or object; of the same person, self, or living agent.
     From: Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1)
     A reaction: Butler's arguments seems to be that he appears to be the same person, so he is the same person. He is explicitly disagreeing with Locke.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler]
     Full Idea: Though consciousness of what is past does ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons is to say a person has not existed a single moment but what he can remember.
     From: Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1)
     A reaction: An over-cautious scepticism has crept in about the reliability of bodily identity. Now we can have photographs and CCTV to prove that we experienced events we have forgotten. Butler is right.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler]
     Full Idea: One would think it really self-evident that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity, any more than knowledge can presuppose truth, which it presupposes.
     From: Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1)
     A reaction: It rather begs the question to dogmatically assert that mere consciousness presupposes a self, especially after Hume's criticisms. That consciousness implies a subject to experience needs arguing for. Is it the best explanation?
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 5. Concerns of the Self
If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler]
     Full Idea: If personality is a transient thing ...then it follows that it is a fallacy to charge ourselves with any thing we did, or to imagine our present selves interested in any thing which befell us yesterday, or what will befall us tomorrow.
     From: Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1)
     A reaction: We seem to care about the past and future of our children, without actually being our children. Can't my future self be my descendant, a close one, instead of me?
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Wisdom and thought are shared by all things [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: Wisdom and power of thought, know thou, are shared in by all things.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) II.286
     A reaction: Sextus quotes this, saying that it is 'still more paradoxical', and that it explicitly includes plants. This may mean that Empedocles was not including inanimate matter.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
For Empedocles thinking is almost identical to perception [Empedocles, by Theophrastus]
     Full Idea: Empedocles assumes that thinking is either identical to or very similar to sense-perception.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], A86) by Theophrastus - On the Senses 9
     A reaction: Not to be sniffed at. We can, of course, control our thinking (though we can't control the controller) and we contemplate abstractions, but that might be seen as a sort of perception. Vision is not as visual as we think.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Butler exalts conscience, but it may be horribly misleading [Anscombe on Butler]
     Full Idea: Butler exalts conscience, but appears ignorant that a man's conscience may tell him to do the vilest things.
     From: comment on Joseph Butler (Fifteen Sermons [1726]) by G.E.M. Anscombe - Modern Moral Philosophy p.176
     A reaction: That would appear to be the end of conscience. To make conscience work, it must have a huge authority to back it, and also a fairly infallible means of knowing what it truly says, and that an impostor hasn't replaced it (e.g. via a bad upbringing).
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Empedocles said good and evil were the basic principles [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Empedocles was the first to give evil and good as principles.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 985a
     A reaction: Once you start to think that good and evil will only matter if they have causal powers, it is an easy step to the idea of a benevolent god, and a satanic anti-god. Otherwise the 'principles' could be ignored.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
'Nature' is just a word invented by people [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: Nature is but a word of human framing.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B008), quoted by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1015a
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
The principle of 'Friendship' in Empedocles is the One, and is bodiless [Empedocles, by Plotinus]
     Full Idea: In Empedocles we have a dividing principle, 'Strife', set against 'Friendship' - which is the One and is to him bodiless, while the elements represent matter.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.09
     A reaction: The first time I've seen the principle of Love in Empedocles identified with the One of Parmenides. Plotinus is a trustworthy reporter, I think, because he was well read, and had access to lost texts.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Empedocles said that there are four material elements, and two further creative elements [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Empedocles holds that the corporeal elements are four, but that all the elements, including those which create motion, are six in number.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314a16
Empedocles says bone is water, fire and earth in ratio 2:4:2 [Empedocles, by Inwood]
     Full Idea: Empedocles used numerical ratios to explain different kinds of matter; for example, bone is two parts water, four parts fire, two parts earth; and blood is an equal blend of all four elements.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Brad Inwood - Empedocles
     A reaction: Why isn't the ration 1:2:1? This presumably shows the influence of Pythagoras (who had also been based in Italy, like Empedocles), as well as that of the earlier naturalistic philosophers. It was a very good theory, though wrong.
Fire, Water, Air and Earth are elements, being simple as well as homoeomerous [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Empedocles says that Fire, Water, Air and Earth are four elements, and are thus 'simple' rather than flesh, bone and bodies which, like these, are 'homoeomeries'.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314a26
     A reaction: The translation is not quite clear. I take it that flesh and bone may look simple, because they are homoeomerous, but they are not really - but what is his evidence for that? Compare Idea 13208.
All change is unity through love or division through hate [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: These elements never cease their continuous exchange, sometimes uniting under the influence of Love, so that all become One, at other times again moving apart through the hostile force of Hate.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B017), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 158.1-
The elements combine in coming-to-be, but how do the elements themselves come-to-be? [Aristotle on Empedocles]
     Full Idea: Empedocles says it is evident that all the other bodies down to the 'elements' have their coming-to-be and their passing-away: but it is not clear how the 'elements' themselves, severally in their aggregated masses, come-to-be and pass-away.
     From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 325b20
     A reaction: Presumably the elements are like axioms - and are just given. How do electrons and quarks come-to-be?
Love and Strife only explain movement if their effects are distinctive [Aristotle on Empedocles]
     Full Idea: It is not an adequate explanation to say that 'Love and Strife set things moving', unless the very nature of Love is a movement of this kind and the very nature of Strife a movement of that kind.
     From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 333b23
     A reaction: I take this to be of interest for showing Aristotle's quest for explanations, and his unwillingness to be fobbed off with anything superficial. I take a task of philosophy to be to push explanations further than others wish to go.
If the one Being ever diminishes it would no longer exist, and what could ever increase it? [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: Besides these elements, nothing else comes into being, nor does anything cease. For if they had been perishing continuously, they would Be no more; and what could increase the Whole? And whence could it have come?
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B017), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 158.1-
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Maybe bodies are designed by accident, and the creatures that don't work are destroyed [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Is it just an accident that teeth and other parts of the body seem to have some purpose, and creatures survive because they happen to be put together in a useful way? Everything else has been destroyed, as Empedocles says of his 'cow with human head'.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], 61) by Aristotle - Physics 198b29
     A reaction: Good grief! Has no one ever noticed that Empedocles proposed the theory of evolution? It isn't quite natural selection, because we aren't told what does the 'destroying', but it is a little flash of genius that was quietly forgotten.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is pure mind permeating the universe [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: God is mind, holy and ineffable, and only mind, which darts through the whole cosmos with its swift thought.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B134), quoted by Ammonius - On 'De Interpretatione' 4.5.249.6
God is a pure, solitary, and eternal sphere [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: God is equal in all directions to himself and altogether eternal, a rounded Sphere enjoying a circular solitude.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B028), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.15.2
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
In Empedocles' theory God is ignorant because, unlike humans, he doesn't know one of the elements (strife) [Aristotle on Empedocles]
     Full Idea: It is a consequence of Empedocles' view that God is the most unintelligent thing, for he alone is ignorant of one of the elements, namely strife, whereas mortal creatures are familiar with them all.
     From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - De Anima 410b08
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
It is wretched not to want to think clearly about the gods [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: Wretched is he who cares not for clear thinking about the gods.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B132), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 5.140.5.1
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus]
     Full Idea: The Egyptians were the first to claim that the soul of a human being is immortal, and that each time the body dies the soul enters another creature just as it is being born.
     From: Herodotus (The Histories [c.435 BCE], 2.123.2)